47934915cc
kernel access control. Instrument the kernel ACL retrieval and modification system calls to invoke MAC framework entry points to authorize these operations. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
858 lines
21 KiB
C
858 lines
21 KiB
C
/*-
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Robert N. M. Watson
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
*
|
|
* $FreeBSD$
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
|
|
* Support for POSIX.1e access control lists.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "opt_mac.h"
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
|
#include <sys/systm.h>
|
|
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
|
|
#include <sys/kernel.h>
|
|
#include <sys/mac.h>
|
|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
|
|
#include <sys/vnode.h>
|
|
#include <sys/lock.h>
|
|
#include <sys/mutex.h>
|
|
#include <sys/namei.h>
|
|
#include <sys/file.h>
|
|
#include <sys/proc.h>
|
|
#include <sys/sysent.h>
|
|
#include <sys/errno.h>
|
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
|
#include <sys/acl.h>
|
|
|
|
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_ACL, "acl", "access control list");
|
|
|
|
static int vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
|
|
static int vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
|
|
static int vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics.
|
|
* Return 0 on success, else an errno value. Should be merged into
|
|
* vaccess() eventually.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
|
|
struct acl *acl, mode_t acc_mode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused)
|
|
{
|
|
struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask;
|
|
mode_t dac_granted;
|
|
mode_t cap_granted;
|
|
mode_t acl_mask_granted;
|
|
int group_matched, i;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory
|
|
* as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt
|
|
* to use privileges granted via cap_granted. In some cases,
|
|
* which privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match",
|
|
* in which case fall back on first match for the time being.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (privused != NULL)
|
|
*privused = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found
|
|
* a DAC entry that matches but has failed to allow access.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef CAPABILITIES
|
|
if (suser_cred(cred, PRISON_ROOT) == 0)
|
|
cap_granted = VALLPERM;
|
|
else
|
|
cap_granted = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
cap_granted = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (type == VDIR) {
|
|
if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
|
|
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, PRISON_ROOT))
|
|
cap_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
|
|
CAP_DAC_EXECUTE, PRISON_ROOT))
|
|
cap_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
|
|
PRISON_ROOT))
|
|
cap_granted |= VREAD;
|
|
|
|
if (((acc_mode & VWRITE) || (acc_mode & VAPPEND)) &&
|
|
!cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_WRITE, PRISON_ROOT))
|
|
cap_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
|
|
|
|
if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_FOWNER,
|
|
PRISON_ROOT))
|
|
cap_granted |= VADMIN;
|
|
#endif /* CAPABILITIES */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the
|
|
* credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're
|
|
* doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK
|
|
* and ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations.
|
|
*/
|
|
acl_mask = acl_other = NULL;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
|
|
break;
|
|
dac_granted = 0;
|
|
dac_granted |= VADMIN;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
dac_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
dac_granted |= VREAD;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
|
|
if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) ==
|
|
acc_mode) {
|
|
if (privused != NULL)
|
|
*privused = 1;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_MASK:
|
|
acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access
|
|
* ACL. If it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now,
|
|
* this means a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future
|
|
* should probably be a panic.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (acl_other == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX This should never happen
|
|
*/
|
|
printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n");
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields
|
|
* are masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify
|
|
* the ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential
|
|
* user matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK,
|
|
* assume that the mask allows all requests to succeed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (acl_mask != NULL) {
|
|
acl_mask_granted = 0;
|
|
if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
acl_mask_granted |= VREAD;
|
|
if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
|
|
} else
|
|
acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Iterate through user ACL entries. Do checks twice, first
|
|
* without privilege, and then if a match is found but failed,
|
|
* a second time with privilege.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check ACL_USER ACL entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
|
|
break;
|
|
dac_granted = 0;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
dac_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
dac_granted |= VREAD;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
|
|
dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
|
|
if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
|
|
acc_mode)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (privused != NULL)
|
|
*privused = 1;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a
|
|
* "best" match. Iterate across, testing each potential group
|
|
* match. Make sure we keep track of whether we found a match
|
|
* or not, so that we know if we should try again with any
|
|
* available privilege, or if we should move on to ACL_OTHER.
|
|
*/
|
|
group_matched = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
|
|
break;
|
|
dac_granted = 0;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
dac_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
dac_granted |= VREAD;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
|
|
dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
|
|
|
|
if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
group_matched = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred))
|
|
break;
|
|
dac_granted = 0;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
dac_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
dac_granted |= VREAD;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
|
|
dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
|
|
|
|
if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
group_matched = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (group_matched == 1) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* There was a match, but it did not grant rights via
|
|
* pure DAC. Try again, this time with privilege.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
|
|
break;
|
|
dac_granted = 0;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
dac_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
dac_granted |= VREAD;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
|
|
dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
|
|
|
|
if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
|
|
acc_mode)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (privused != NULL)
|
|
*privused = 1;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id,
|
|
cred))
|
|
break;
|
|
dac_granted = 0;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
dac_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
dac_granted |= VREAD;
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
|
|
dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
|
|
|
|
if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
|
|
acc_mode)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (privused != NULL)
|
|
*privused = 1;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient.
|
|
* Return failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER.
|
|
*/
|
|
dac_granted = 0;
|
|
if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
dac_granted |= VEXEC;
|
|
if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
dac_granted |= VREAD;
|
|
if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
|
|
|
|
if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) == acc_mode) {
|
|
if (privused != NULL)
|
|
*privused = 1;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
return ((acc_mode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an
|
|
* inode with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry
|
|
* to an acl_perm_t.
|
|
*/
|
|
acl_perm_t
|
|
acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
acl_perm_t perm = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch(tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
if (mode & S_IXUSR)
|
|
perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
if (mode & S_IRUSR)
|
|
perm |= ACL_READ;
|
|
if (mode & S_IWUSR)
|
|
perm |= ACL_WRITE;
|
|
return (perm);
|
|
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
if (mode & S_IXGRP)
|
|
perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
if (mode & S_IRGRP)
|
|
perm |= ACL_READ;
|
|
if (mode & S_IWGRP)
|
|
perm |= ACL_WRITE;
|
|
return (perm);
|
|
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
if (mode & S_IXOTH)
|
|
perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
if (mode & S_IROTH)
|
|
perm |= ACL_READ;
|
|
if (mode & S_IWOTH)
|
|
perm |= ACL_WRITE;
|
|
return (perm);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the
|
|
* appropriate type.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct acl_entry
|
|
acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct acl_entry acl_entry;
|
|
|
|
acl_entry.ae_tag = tag;
|
|
acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode);
|
|
switch(tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
acl_entry.ae_id = uid;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
acl_entry.ae_id = gid;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
|
|
printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (acl_entry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
mode_t
|
|
acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry,
|
|
struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry)
|
|
{
|
|
mode_t mode;
|
|
|
|
mode = 0;
|
|
if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
mode |= S_IXUSR;
|
|
if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
mode |= S_IRUSR;
|
|
if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
mode |= S_IWUSR;
|
|
if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
mode |= S_IXGRP;
|
|
if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
mode |= S_IRGRP;
|
|
if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
mode |= S_IWGRP;
|
|
if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
|
|
mode |= S_IXOTH;
|
|
if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
|
|
mode |= S_IROTH;
|
|
if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
|
|
mode |= S_IWOTH;
|
|
|
|
return (mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an
|
|
* implementing filesystem to determine if it should accept this and
|
|
* rely on the POSIX.1e ACL properties.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl)
|
|
{
|
|
int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group;
|
|
int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum
|
|
* defined for acl_t.
|
|
* Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are
|
|
* present:
|
|
* Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ
|
|
* Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ
|
|
* Exactly one ACL_OTHER
|
|
* If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one
|
|
* ACL_MASK entry must also appear.
|
|
* Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS.
|
|
* Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation.
|
|
* Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field.
|
|
*/
|
|
num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group =
|
|
num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0;
|
|
if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES || acl->acl_cnt < 0)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check for a valid tag.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
num_acl_user_obj++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
num_acl_group_obj++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
num_acl_user++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
num_acl_group++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
num_acl_other++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_MASK:
|
|
acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
|
|
if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
num_acl_mask++;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check for valid perm entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) !=
|
|
ACL_PERM_BITS)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) ||
|
|
(num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1))
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) &&
|
|
(num_acl_mask != 1))
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* These calls wrap the real vnode operations, and are called by the
|
|
* syscall code once the syscall has converted the path or file
|
|
* descriptor to a vnode (unlocked). The aclp pointer is assumed
|
|
* still to point to userland, so this should not be consumed within
|
|
* the kernel except by syscall code. Other code should directly
|
|
* invoke VOP_{SET,GET}ACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a vnode, set its ACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
|
|
struct acl *aclp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct acl inkernacl;
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = copyin(aclp, &inkernacl, sizeof(struct acl));
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return(error);
|
|
error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
error = mac_check_vnode_setacl(td->td_ucred, vp, type, &inkernacl);
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = VOP_SETACL(vp, type, &inkernacl, td->td_ucred, td);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
out:
|
|
#endif
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
|
return(error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a vnode, get its ACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
|
|
struct acl *aclp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct acl inkernelacl;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
error = mac_check_vnode_getacl(td->td_ucred, vp, type);
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = VOP_GETACL(vp, type, &inkernelacl, td->td_ucred, td);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
out:
|
|
#endif
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
error = copyout(&inkernelacl, aclp, sizeof(struct acl));
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a vnode, delete its ACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
vacl_delete(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type)
|
|
{
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
error = mac_check_vnode_deleteacl(td->td_ucred, vp, type);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = VOP_SETACL(vp, type, 0, td->td_ucred, td);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
out:
|
|
#endif
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a vnode, check whether an ACL is appropriate for it
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
|
|
struct acl *aclp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct acl inkernelacl;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = copyin(aclp, &inkernelacl, sizeof(struct acl));
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return(error);
|
|
error = VOP_ACLCHECK(vp, type, &inkernelacl, td->td_ucred, td);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* syscalls -- convert the path/fd to a vnode, and call vacl_whatever.
|
|
* Don't need to lock, as the vacl_ code will get/release any locks
|
|
* required.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a file path, get an ACL for it
|
|
*
|
|
* MPSAFE
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
__acl_get_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_file_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&Giant);
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
error = vacl_get_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, type),
|
|
SCARG(uap, aclp));
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a file path, set an ACL for it
|
|
*
|
|
* MPSAFE
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
__acl_set_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_file_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&Giant);
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
error = vacl_set_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, type),
|
|
SCARG(uap, aclp));
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a file descriptor, get an ACL for it
|
|
*
|
|
* MPSAFE
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
__acl_get_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_fd_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&Giant);
|
|
error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, filedes), &fp);
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
error = vacl_get_acl(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data,
|
|
SCARG(uap, type), SCARG(uap, aclp));
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a file descriptor, set an ACL for it
|
|
*
|
|
* MPSAFE
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
__acl_set_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_fd_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&Giant);
|
|
error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, filedes), &fp);
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
error = vacl_set_acl(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data,
|
|
SCARG(uap, type), SCARG(uap, aclp));
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a file path, delete an ACL from it.
|
|
*
|
|
* MPSAFE
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
__acl_delete_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_file_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&Giant);
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
error = vacl_delete(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, type));
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a file path, delete an ACL from it.
|
|
*
|
|
* MPSAFE
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
__acl_delete_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_fd_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&Giant);
|
|
error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, filedes), &fp);
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
error = vacl_delete(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data,
|
|
SCARG(uap, type));
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a file path, check an ACL for it
|
|
*
|
|
* MPSAFE
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
__acl_aclcheck_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_aclcheck_file_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&Giant);
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
error = vacl_aclcheck(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, type),
|
|
SCARG(uap, aclp));
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a file descriptor, check an ACL for it
|
|
*
|
|
* MPSAFE
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
__acl_aclcheck_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_aclcheck_fd_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&Giant);
|
|
error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, filedes), &fp);
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
error = vacl_aclcheck(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data,
|
|
SCARG(uap, type), SCARG(uap, aclp));
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|