fcf596178b
Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
571 lines
12 KiB
C
571 lines
12 KiB
C
/* $FreeBSD$ */
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/* $KAME: keysock.c,v 1.25 2001/08/13 20:07:41 itojun Exp $ */
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/*-
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* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "opt_ipsec.h"
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/* This code has derived from sys/net/rtsock.c on FreeBSD2.2.5 */
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/domain.h>
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#include <sys/errno.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/priv.h>
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#include <sys/protosw.h>
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#include <sys/signalvar.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/socketvar.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <net/vnet.h>
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#include <net/raw_cb.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <net/pfkeyv2.h>
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#include <netipsec/key.h>
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#include <netipsec/keysock.h>
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#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
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#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
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#include <machine/stdarg.h>
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struct key_cb {
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int key_count;
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int any_count;
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};
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static VNET_DEFINE(struct key_cb, key_cb);
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#define V_key_cb VNET(key_cb)
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static struct sockaddr key_src = { 2, PF_KEY, };
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static int key_sendup0(struct rawcb *, struct mbuf *, int);
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VNET_PCPUSTAT_DEFINE(struct pfkeystat, pfkeystat);
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VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSINIT(pfkeystat);
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#ifdef VIMAGE
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VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSUNINIT(pfkeystat);
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#endif /* VIMAGE */
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/*
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* key_output()
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*/
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int
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key_output(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, ...)
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{
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struct sadb_msg *msg;
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int len, error = 0;
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if (m == NULL)
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panic("%s: NULL pointer was passed.\n", __func__);
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(out_total);
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PFKEYSTAT_ADD(out_bytes, m->m_pkthdr.len);
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len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
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if (len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(out_tooshort);
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error = EINVAL;
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goto end;
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}
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if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
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if ((m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg))) == NULL) {
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(out_nomem);
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error = ENOBUFS;
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goto end;
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}
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}
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M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m);
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KEYDBG(KEY_DUMP, kdebug_mbuf(m));
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msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(out_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]);
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if (len != PFKEY_UNUNIT64(msg->sadb_msg_len)) {
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(out_invlen);
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error = EINVAL;
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goto end;
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}
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error = key_parse(m, so);
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m = NULL;
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end:
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if (m)
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m_freem(m);
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return error;
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}
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/*
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* send message to the socket.
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*/
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static int
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key_sendup0(struct rawcb *rp, struct mbuf *m, int promisc)
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{
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int error;
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if (promisc) {
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struct sadb_msg *pmsg;
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M_PREPEND(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), M_NOWAIT);
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if (m == NULL) {
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_nomem);
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return (ENOBUFS);
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}
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pmsg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
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bzero(pmsg, sizeof(*pmsg));
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pmsg->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
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pmsg->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_PROMISC;
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pmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(m->m_pkthdr.len);
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/* pid and seq? */
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_msgtype[pmsg->sadb_msg_type]);
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}
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if (!sbappendaddr(&rp->rcb_socket->so_rcv, (struct sockaddr *)&key_src,
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m, NULL)) {
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_nomem);
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m_freem(m);
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error = ENOBUFS;
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} else
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error = 0;
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sorwakeup(rp->rcb_socket);
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return error;
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}
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/* XXX this interface should be obsoleted. */
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int
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key_sendup(struct socket *so, struct sadb_msg *msg, u_int len, int target)
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{
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struct mbuf *m, *n, *mprev;
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int tlen;
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/* sanity check */
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if (so == NULL || msg == NULL)
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panic("%s: NULL pointer was passed.\n", __func__);
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KEYDBG(KEY_DUMP,
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printf("%s: \n", __func__);
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kdebug_sadb(msg));
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/*
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* we increment statistics here, just in case we have ENOBUFS
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* in this function.
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*/
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_total);
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PFKEYSTAT_ADD(in_bytes, len);
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]);
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/*
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* Get mbuf chain whenever possible (not clusters),
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* to save socket buffer. We'll be generating many SADB_ACQUIRE
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* messages to listening key sockets. If we simply allocate clusters,
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* sbappendaddr() will raise ENOBUFS due to too little sbspace().
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* sbspace() computes # of actual data bytes AND mbuf region.
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*
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* TODO: SADB_ACQUIRE filters should be implemented.
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*/
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tlen = len;
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m = mprev = NULL;
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while (tlen > 0) {
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if (tlen == len) {
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MGETHDR(n, M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
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if (n == NULL) {
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_nomem);
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return ENOBUFS;
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}
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n->m_len = MHLEN;
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} else {
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MGET(n, M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
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if (n == NULL) {
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_nomem);
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return ENOBUFS;
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}
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n->m_len = MLEN;
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}
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if (tlen >= MCLBYTES) { /*XXX better threshold? */
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if (!(MCLGET(n, M_NOWAIT))) {
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m_free(n);
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m_freem(m);
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_nomem);
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return ENOBUFS;
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}
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n->m_len = MCLBYTES;
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}
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if (tlen < n->m_len)
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n->m_len = tlen;
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n->m_next = NULL;
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if (m == NULL)
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m = mprev = n;
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else {
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mprev->m_next = n;
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mprev = n;
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}
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tlen -= n->m_len;
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n = NULL;
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}
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m->m_pkthdr.len = len;
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m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL;
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m_copyback(m, 0, len, (caddr_t)msg);
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/* avoid duplicated statistics */
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PFKEYSTAT_ADD(in_total, -1);
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PFKEYSTAT_ADD(in_bytes, -len);
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PFKEYSTAT_ADD(in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type], -1);
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return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target);
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}
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/* so can be NULL if target != KEY_SENDUP_ONE */
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int
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key_sendup_mbuf(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m, int target)
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{
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struct mbuf *n;
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struct keycb *kp;
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int sendup;
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struct rawcb *rp;
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int error = 0;
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if (m == NULL)
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panic("key_sendup_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed.\n");
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if (so == NULL && target == KEY_SENDUP_ONE)
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panic("%s: NULL pointer was passed.\n", __func__);
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_total);
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PFKEYSTAT_ADD(in_bytes, m->m_pkthdr.len);
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if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
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m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
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if (m == NULL) {
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_nomem);
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return ENOBUFS;
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}
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}
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if (m->m_len >= sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
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struct sadb_msg *msg;
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msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]);
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}
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mtx_lock(&rawcb_mtx);
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LIST_FOREACH(rp, &V_rawcb_list, list)
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{
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if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_family != PF_KEY)
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continue;
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if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol
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&& rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol != PF_KEY_V2) {
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continue;
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}
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kp = (struct keycb *)rp;
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/*
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* If you are in promiscuous mode, and when you get broadcasted
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* reply, you'll get two PF_KEY messages.
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* (based on pf_key@inner.net message on 14 Oct 1998)
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*/
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if (((struct keycb *)rp)->kp_promisc) {
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if ((n = m_copym(m, 0, M_COPYALL, M_NOWAIT)) != NULL) {
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(void)key_sendup0(rp, n, 1);
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n = NULL;
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}
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}
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/* the exact target will be processed later */
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if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
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continue;
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sendup = 0;
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switch (target) {
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case KEY_SENDUP_ONE:
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/* the statement has no effect */
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if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
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sendup++;
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break;
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case KEY_SENDUP_ALL:
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sendup++;
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break;
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case KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED:
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if (kp->kp_registered)
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sendup++;
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break;
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}
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_msgtarget[target]);
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if (!sendup)
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continue;
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if ((n = m_copym(m, 0, M_COPYALL, M_NOWAIT)) == NULL) {
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m_freem(m);
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PFKEYSTAT_INC(in_nomem);
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mtx_unlock(&rawcb_mtx);
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return ENOBUFS;
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}
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if ((error = key_sendup0(rp, n, 0)) != 0) {
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m_freem(m);
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mtx_unlock(&rawcb_mtx);
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return error;
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}
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n = NULL;
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}
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if (so) {
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error = key_sendup0(sotorawcb(so), m, 0);
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m = NULL;
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} else {
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error = 0;
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m_freem(m);
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}
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mtx_unlock(&rawcb_mtx);
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return error;
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}
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/*
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* key_abort()
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* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_abort()
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*/
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static void
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key_abort(struct socket *so)
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{
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raw_usrreqs.pru_abort(so);
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}
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/*
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* key_attach()
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* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_attach()
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*/
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static int
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key_attach(struct socket *so, int proto, struct thread *td)
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{
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struct keycb *kp;
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int error;
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KASSERT(so->so_pcb == NULL, ("key_attach: so_pcb != NULL"));
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if (td != NULL) {
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error = priv_check(td, PRIV_NET_RAW);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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/* XXX */
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kp = malloc(sizeof *kp, M_PCB, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
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if (kp == NULL)
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return ENOBUFS;
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so->so_pcb = (caddr_t)kp;
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error = raw_attach(so, proto);
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kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
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if (error) {
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free(kp, M_PCB);
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so->so_pcb = (caddr_t) 0;
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return error;
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}
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kp->kp_promisc = kp->kp_registered = 0;
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if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
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V_key_cb.key_count++;
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V_key_cb.any_count++;
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soisconnected(so);
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so->so_options |= SO_USELOOPBACK;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* key_bind()
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* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_bind()
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*/
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static int
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key_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
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{
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return EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* key_close()
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* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_close().
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*/
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static void
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key_close(struct socket *so)
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{
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raw_usrreqs.pru_close(so);
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}
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/*
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* key_connect()
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* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_connect()
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*/
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static int
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key_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
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{
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return EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* key_detach()
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* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_detach()
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*/
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static void
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key_detach(struct socket *so)
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{
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struct keycb *kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
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KASSERT(kp != NULL, ("key_detach: kp == NULL"));
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if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol
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== PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
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V_key_cb.key_count--;
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V_key_cb.any_count--;
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key_freereg(so);
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raw_usrreqs.pru_detach(so);
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}
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/*
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* key_disconnect()
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* derived from net/rtsock.c:key_disconnect()
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*/
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static int
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key_disconnect(struct socket *so)
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{
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return(raw_usrreqs.pru_disconnect(so));
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}
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/*
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* key_peeraddr()
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* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_peeraddr()
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*/
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static int
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key_peeraddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
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{
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return(raw_usrreqs.pru_peeraddr(so, nam));
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}
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/*
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* key_send()
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* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_send()
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*/
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static int
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key_send(struct socket *so, int flags, struct mbuf *m, struct sockaddr *nam,
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struct mbuf *control, struct thread *td)
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{
|
|
return(raw_usrreqs.pru_send(so, flags, m, nam, control, td));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* key_shutdown()
|
|
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_shutdown()
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
key_shutdown(struct socket *so)
|
|
{
|
|
return(raw_usrreqs.pru_shutdown(so));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* key_sockaddr()
|
|
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_sockaddr()
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
key_sockaddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
|
|
{
|
|
return(raw_usrreqs.pru_sockaddr(so, nam));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct pr_usrreqs key_usrreqs = {
|
|
.pru_abort = key_abort,
|
|
.pru_attach = key_attach,
|
|
.pru_bind = key_bind,
|
|
.pru_connect = key_connect,
|
|
.pru_detach = key_detach,
|
|
.pru_disconnect = key_disconnect,
|
|
.pru_peeraddr = key_peeraddr,
|
|
.pru_send = key_send,
|
|
.pru_shutdown = key_shutdown,
|
|
.pru_sockaddr = key_sockaddr,
|
|
.pru_close = key_close,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* sysctl */
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_net, PF_KEY, key, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Key Family");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Definitions of protocols supported in the KEY domain.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
extern struct domain keydomain;
|
|
|
|
struct protosw keysw[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
.pr_type = SOCK_RAW,
|
|
.pr_domain = &keydomain,
|
|
.pr_protocol = PF_KEY_V2,
|
|
.pr_flags = PR_ATOMIC|PR_ADDR,
|
|
.pr_output = key_output,
|
|
.pr_ctlinput = raw_ctlinput,
|
|
.pr_init = raw_init,
|
|
.pr_usrreqs = &key_usrreqs
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
key_init0(void)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bzero((caddr_t)&V_key_cb, sizeof(V_key_cb));
|
|
key_init();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct domain keydomain = {
|
|
.dom_family = PF_KEY,
|
|
.dom_name = "key",
|
|
.dom_init = key_init0,
|
|
#ifdef VIMAGE
|
|
.dom_destroy = key_destroy,
|
|
#endif
|
|
.dom_protosw = keysw,
|
|
.dom_protoswNPROTOSW = &keysw[nitems(keysw)]
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
VNET_DOMAIN_SET(key);
|