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freebsd-dev/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
Pawel Jakub Dawidek 7008be5bd7 Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend 
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.

The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.

The structure definition looks like this:

	struct cap_rights {
		uint64_t	cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
	};

The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.

The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.

The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.

To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.

	#define	CAP_PDKILL	CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)

We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:

	#define	CAP_LOOKUP	CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
	#define	CAP_FCHMOD	CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)

	#define	CAP_FCHMODAT	(CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)

There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:

	cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
	void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
	void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
	bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);

	bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
	void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
	void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
	bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);

Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:

	cap_rights_t rights;

	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);

There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:

	#define	cap_rights_set(rights, ...)				\
		__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
	void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);

Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:

	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);

Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.

This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.

Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00

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/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/domain.h>
#include <sys/sbuf.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
/*
* Calls to manipulate elements of the audit record structure from system
* call code. Macro wrappers will prevent this functions from being entered
* if auditing is disabled, avoiding the function call cost. We check the
* thread audit record pointer anyway, as the audit condition could change,
* and pre-selection may not have allocated an audit record for this event.
*
* XXXAUDIT: Should we assert, in each case, that this field of the record
* hasn't already been filled in?
*/
void
audit_arg_addr(void *addr)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_addr = addr;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ADDR);
}
void
audit_arg_exit(int status, int retval)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitstatus = status;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitretval = retval;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EXIT);
}
void
audit_arg_len(int len)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = len;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LEN);
}
void
audit_arg_atfd1(int atfd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_atfd1 = atfd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ATFD1);
}
void
audit_arg_atfd2(int atfd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_atfd2 = atfd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ATFD2);
}
void
audit_arg_fd(int fd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fd = fd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FD);
}
void
audit_arg_fflags(int fflags)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags = fflags;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FFLAGS);
}
void
audit_arg_gid(gid_t gid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GID);
}
void
audit_arg_uid(uid_t uid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID);
}
void
audit_arg_egid(gid_t egid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = egid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EGID);
}
void
audit_arg_euid(uid_t euid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = euid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EUID);
}
void
audit_arg_rgid(gid_t rgid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = rgid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RGID);
}
void
audit_arg_ruid(uid_t ruid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = ruid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RUID);
}
void
audit_arg_sgid(gid_t sgid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sgid = sgid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SGID);
}
void
audit_arg_suid(uid_t suid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_suid = suid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SUID);
}
void
audit_arg_groupset(gid_t *gidset, u_int gidset_size)
{
u_int i;
struct kaudit_record *ar;
KASSERT(gidset_size <= ngroups_max + 1,
("audit_arg_groupset: gidset_size > (kern.ngroups + 1)"));
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset == NULL)
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset = malloc(
sizeof(gid_t) * gidset_size, M_AUDITGIDSET, M_WAITOK);
for (i = 0; i < gidset_size; i++)
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset[i] = gidset[i];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset_size = gidset_size;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GROUPSET);
}
void
audit_arg_login(char *login)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
strlcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_login, login, MAXLOGNAME);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LOGIN);
}
void
audit_arg_ctlname(int *name, int namelen)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
bcopy(name, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, namelen * sizeof(int));
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = namelen;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CTLNAME | ARG_LEN);
}
void
audit_arg_mask(int mask)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mask = mask;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MASK);
}
void
audit_arg_mode(mode_t mode)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mode = mode;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MODE);
}
void
audit_arg_dev(int dev)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_dev = dev;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_DEV);
}
void
audit_arg_value(long value)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_value = value;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VALUE);
}
void
audit_arg_owner(uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID | ARG_GID);
}
void
audit_arg_pid(pid_t pid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = pid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_PID);
}
void
audit_arg_process(struct proc *p)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct ucred *cred;
KASSERT(p != NULL, ("audit_arg_process: p == NULL"));
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
cred = p->p_ucred;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = cred->cr_uid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = cred->cr_groups[0];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = cred->cr_ruid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = cred->cr_rgid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = cred->cr_audit.ai_asid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr = cred->cr_audit.ai_termid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = p->p_pid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_EUID | ARG_EGID | ARG_RUID |
ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID_ADDR | ARG_PID | ARG_PROCESS);
}
void
audit_arg_signum(u_int signum)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = signum;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SIGNUM);
}
void
audit_arg_socket(int sodomain, int sotype, int soprotocol)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_domain = sodomain;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_type = sotype;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_protocol = soprotocol;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
}
void
audit_arg_sockaddr(struct thread *td, int dirfd, struct sockaddr *sa)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
KASSERT(td != NULL, ("audit_arg_sockaddr: td == NULL"));
KASSERT(sa != NULL, ("audit_arg_sockaddr: sa == NULL"));
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
bcopy(sa, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr, sa->sa_len);
switch (sa->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET);
break;
case AF_INET6:
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET6);
break;
case AF_UNIX:
if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD)
audit_arg_atfd1(dirfd);
audit_arg_upath1(td, dirfd,
((struct sockaddr_un *)sa)->sun_path);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRUNIX);
break;
/* XXXAUDIT: default:? */
}
}
void
audit_arg_auid(uid_t auid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = auid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID);
}
void
audit_arg_auditinfo(struct auditinfo *au_info)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = au_info->ai_auid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = au_info->ai_asid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_success = au_info->ai_mask.am_success;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_failure = au_info->ai_mask.am_failure;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.port = au_info->ai_termid.port;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.machine = au_info->ai_termid.machine;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_ASID | ARG_AMASK | ARG_TERMID);
}
void
audit_arg_auditinfo_addr(struct auditinfo_addr *au_info)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = au_info->ai_auid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = au_info->ai_asid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_success = au_info->ai_mask.am_success;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_failure = au_info->ai_mask.am_failure;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_type = au_info->ai_termid.at_type;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_port = au_info->ai_termid.at_port;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[0] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[0];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[1] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[1];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[2] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[2];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[3] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[3];
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_ASID | ARG_AMASK | ARG_TERMID_ADDR);
}
void
audit_arg_text(char *text)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
KASSERT(text != NULL, ("audit_arg_text: text == NULL"));
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
/* Invalidate the text string */
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_TEXT);
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text == NULL)
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITTEXT,
M_WAITOK);
strncpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, text, MAXPATHLEN);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_TEXT);
}
void
audit_arg_cmd(int cmd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd = cmd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CMD);
}
void
audit_arg_svipc_cmd(int cmd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_cmd = cmd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_CMD);
}
void
audit_arg_svipc_perm(struct ipc_perm *perm)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
bcopy(perm, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm,
sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm));
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_PERM);
}
void
audit_arg_svipc_id(int id)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_id = id;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ID);
}
void
audit_arg_svipc_addr(void * addr)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_addr = addr;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ADDR);
}
void
audit_arg_posix_ipc_perm(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_uid = uid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_gid = gid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_mode = mode;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_POSIX_IPC_PERM);
}
void
audit_arg_auditon(union auditon_udata *udata)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
bcopy((void *)udata, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon,
sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon));
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUDITON);
}
/*
* Audit information about a file, either the file's vnode info, or its
* socket address info.
*/
void
audit_arg_file(struct proc *p, struct file *fp)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct socket *so;
struct inpcb *pcb;
struct vnode *vp;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
switch (fp->f_type) {
case DTYPE_VNODE:
case DTYPE_FIFO:
/*
* XXXAUDIT: Only possibly to record as first vnode?
*/
vp = fp->f_vnode;
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
audit_arg_vnode1(vp);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
break;
case DTYPE_SOCKET:
so = (struct socket *)fp->f_data;
if (INP_CHECK_SOCKAF(so, PF_INET)) {
SOCK_LOCK(so);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_type =
so->so_type;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_domain =
INP_SOCKAF(so);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_protocol =
so->so_proto->pr_protocol;
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
pcb = (struct inpcb *)so->so_pcb;
INP_RLOCK(pcb);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_raddr =
pcb->inp_faddr.s_addr;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_laddr =
pcb->inp_laddr.s_addr;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_rport =
pcb->inp_fport;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_lport =
pcb->inp_lport;
INP_RUNLOCK(pcb);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
}
break;
default:
/* XXXAUDIT: else? */
break;
}
}
/*
* Store a path as given by the user process for auditing into the audit
* record stored on the user thread. This function will allocate the memory
* to store the path info if not already available. This memory will be
* freed when the audit record is freed.
*/
static void
audit_arg_upath(struct thread *td, int dirfd, char *upath, char **pathp)
{
if (*pathp == NULL)
*pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
audit_canon_path(td, dirfd, upath, *pathp);
}
void
audit_arg_upath1(struct thread *td, int dirfd, char *upath)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
audit_arg_upath(td, dirfd, upath, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UPATH1);
}
void
audit_arg_upath2(struct thread *td, int dirfd, char *upath)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
audit_arg_upath(td, dirfd, upath, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UPATH2);
}
/*
* Function to save the path and vnode attr information into the audit
* record.
*
* It is assumed that the caller will hold any vnode locks necessary to
* perform a VOP_GETATTR() on the passed vnode.
*
* XXX: The attr code is very similar to vfs_vnops.c:vn_stat(), but always
* provides access to the generation number as we need that to construct the
* BSM file ID.
*
* XXX: We should accept the process argument from the caller, since it's
* very likely they already have a reference.
*
* XXX: Error handling in this function is poor.
*
* XXXAUDIT: Possibly KASSERT the path pointer is NULL?
*/
static int
audit_arg_vnode(struct vnode *vp, struct vnode_au_info *vnp)
{
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "audit_arg_vnode");
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, curthread->td_ucred);
if (error) {
/* XXX: How to handle this case? */
return (error);
}
vnp->vn_mode = vattr.va_mode;
vnp->vn_uid = vattr.va_uid;
vnp->vn_gid = vattr.va_gid;
vnp->vn_dev = vattr.va_rdev;
vnp->vn_fsid = vattr.va_fsid;
vnp->vn_fileid = vattr.va_fileid;
vnp->vn_gen = vattr.va_gen;
return (0);
}
void
audit_arg_vnode1(struct vnode *vp)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
int error;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ARG_CLEAR_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE1);
error = audit_arg_vnode(vp, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode1);
if (error == 0)
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE1);
}
void
audit_arg_vnode2(struct vnode *vp)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
int error;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ARG_CLEAR_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE2);
error = audit_arg_vnode(vp, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode2);
if (error == 0)
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE2);
}
/*
* Audit the argument strings passed to exec.
*/
void
audit_arg_argv(char *argv, int argc, int length)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
if (audit_argv == 0)
return;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv = malloc(length, M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
bcopy(argv, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv, length);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argc = argc;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ARGV);
}
/*
* Audit the environment strings passed to exec.
*/
void
audit_arg_envv(char *envv, int envc, int length)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
if (audit_arge == 0)
return;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv = malloc(length, M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
bcopy(envv, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv, length);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envc = envc;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ENVV);
}
void
audit_arg_rights(cap_rights_t *rightsp)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rights = *rightsp;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RIGHTS);
}
void
audit_arg_fcntl_rights(uint32_t fcntlrights)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fcntl_rights = fcntlrights;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FCNTL_RIGHTS);
}
/*
* The close() system call uses it's own audit call to capture the path/vnode
* information because those pieces are not easily obtained within the system
* call itself.
*/
void
audit_sysclose(struct thread *td, int fd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct vnode *vp;
struct file *fp;
KASSERT(td != NULL, ("audit_sysclose: td == NULL"));
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
audit_arg_fd(fd);
if (getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, 0, &fp) != 0)
return;
vp = fp->f_vnode;
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
audit_arg_vnode1(vp);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
fdrop(fp, td);
}
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