03656ac1b0
the "core" Kerberos functionality. The rest of the userland will get their own changes later.
214 lines
6.6 KiB
C
214 lines
6.6 KiB
C
/*
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Copyright (C) 1989 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed
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to require a specific license from the United States Government.
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It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
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export to obtain such a license before exporting.
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WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
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distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
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without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
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notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
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this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
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the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
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to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
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permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
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this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
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or implied warranty.
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*/
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/*
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* Kerberos administration server-side support functions
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*/
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/*
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kadm_ser_wrap.c
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unwraps wrapped packets and calls the appropriate server subroutine
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*/
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#include "kadm_locl.h"
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RCSID("$Id: kadm_ser_wrap.c,v 1.20 1997/05/02 10:29:14 joda Exp $");
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/* GLOBAL */
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Kadm_Server server_parm;
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/*
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kadm_ser_init
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set up the server_parm structure
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*/
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int
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kadm_ser_init(int inter, char *realm)
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/* interactive or from file */
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{
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struct hostent *hp;
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char hostname[MaxHostNameLen];
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init_kadm_err_tbl();
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init_krb_err_tbl();
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if (k_gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)))
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return KADM_NO_HOSTNAME;
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strcpy(server_parm.sname, PWSERV_NAME);
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strcpy(server_parm.sinst, KRB_MASTER);
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strcpy(server_parm.krbrlm, realm);
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server_parm.admin_fd = -1;
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/* setting up the addrs */
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memset(&server_parm.admin_addr,0, sizeof(server_parm.admin_addr));
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server_parm.admin_addr.sin_port = k_getportbyname (KADM_SNAME,
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"tcp",
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htons(751));
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server_parm.admin_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
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if ((hp = gethostbyname(hostname)) == NULL)
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return KADM_NO_HOSTNAME;
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server_parm.admin_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
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/* setting up the database */
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if (kdb_get_master_key((inter==1), &server_parm.master_key,
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server_parm.master_key_schedule) != 0)
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return KADM_NO_MAST;
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if ((server_parm.master_key_version =
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kdb_verify_master_key(&server_parm.master_key,
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server_parm.master_key_schedule,stderr))<0)
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return KADM_NO_VERI;
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return KADM_SUCCESS;
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}
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static void errpkt(u_char **dat, int *dat_len, int code)
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{
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u_int32_t retcode;
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char *pdat;
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free(*dat); /* free up req */
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*dat_len = KADM_VERSIZE + sizeof(u_int32_t);
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*dat = (u_char *) malloc((unsigned)*dat_len);
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pdat = (char *) *dat;
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retcode = htonl((u_int32_t) code);
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strncpy(pdat, KADM_ULOSE, KADM_VERSIZE);
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memcpy(&pdat[KADM_VERSIZE], &retcode, sizeof(u_int32_t));
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return;
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}
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/*
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kadm_ser_in
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unwrap the data stored in dat, process, and return it.
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*/
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int
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kadm_ser_in(u_char **dat, int *dat_len)
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{
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u_char *in_st; /* pointer into the sent packet */
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int in_len,retc; /* where in packet we are, for
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returns */
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u_int32_t r_len; /* length of the actual packet */
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KTEXT_ST authent; /* the authenticator */
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AUTH_DAT ad; /* who is this, klink */
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u_int32_t ncksum; /* checksum of encrypted data */
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des_key_schedule sess_sched; /* our schedule */
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MSG_DAT msg_st;
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u_char *retdat, *tmpdat;
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int retval, retlen;
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if (strncmp(KADM_VERSTR, (char *)*dat, KADM_VERSIZE)) {
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errpkt(dat, dat_len, KADM_BAD_VER);
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return KADM_BAD_VER;
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}
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in_len = KADM_VERSIZE;
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/* get the length */
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if ((retc = stv_long(*dat, &r_len, in_len, *dat_len)) < 0)
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return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR;
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in_len += retc;
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authent.length = *dat_len - r_len - KADM_VERSIZE - sizeof(u_int32_t);
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memcpy(authent.dat, (char *)(*dat) + in_len, authent.length);
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authent.mbz = 0;
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/* service key should be set before here */
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if ((retc = krb_rd_req(&authent, server_parm.sname, server_parm.sinst,
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server_parm.recv_addr.sin_addr.s_addr, &ad, NULL)))
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{
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errpkt(dat, dat_len,retc + krb_err_base);
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return retc + krb_err_base;
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}
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#define clr_cli_secrets() {memset(sess_sched, 0, sizeof(sess_sched)); memset(ad.session, 0,sizeof(ad.session));}
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in_st = *dat + *dat_len - r_len;
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#ifdef NOENCRYPTION
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ncksum = 0;
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#else
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ncksum = des_quad_cksum((des_cblock *)in_st, (des_cblock *)0, (long) r_len, 0, &ad.session);
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#endif
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if (ncksum!=ad.checksum) { /* yow, are we correct yet */
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clr_cli_secrets();
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errpkt(dat, dat_len,KADM_BAD_CHK);
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return KADM_BAD_CHK;
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}
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#ifdef NOENCRYPTION
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memset(sess_sched, 0, sizeof(sess_sched));
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#else
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des_key_sched(&ad.session, sess_sched);
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#endif
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if ((retc = (int) krb_rd_priv(in_st, r_len, sess_sched, &ad.session,
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&server_parm.recv_addr,
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&server_parm.admin_addr, &msg_st))) {
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clr_cli_secrets();
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errpkt(dat, dat_len,retc + krb_err_base);
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return retc + krb_err_base;
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}
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switch (msg_st.app_data[0]) {
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case CHANGE_PW:
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retval = kadm_ser_cpw(msg_st.app_data+1,(int) msg_st.app_length - 1,
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&ad, &retdat, &retlen);
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break;
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case ADD_ENT:
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retval = kadm_ser_add(msg_st.app_data+1,(int) msg_st.app_length - 1,
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&ad, &retdat, &retlen);
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break;
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case GET_ENT:
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retval = kadm_ser_get(msg_st.app_data+1,(int) msg_st.app_length - 1,
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&ad, &retdat, &retlen);
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break;
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case MOD_ENT:
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retval = kadm_ser_mod(msg_st.app_data+1,(int) msg_st.app_length - 1,
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&ad, &retdat, &retlen);
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break;
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case DEL_ENT:
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retval = kadm_ser_delete(msg_st.app_data + 1, msg_st.app_length - 1,
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&ad, &retdat, &retlen);
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break;
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default:
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clr_cli_secrets();
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errpkt(dat, dat_len, KADM_NO_OPCODE);
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return KADM_NO_OPCODE;
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}
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/* Now seal the response back into a priv msg */
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free(*dat);
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tmpdat = (u_char *) malloc((unsigned)(retlen + KADM_VERSIZE +
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sizeof(u_int32_t)));
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strncpy((char *)tmpdat, KADM_VERSTR, KADM_VERSIZE);
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retval = htonl((u_int32_t)retval);
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memcpy((char *)tmpdat + KADM_VERSIZE, &retval, sizeof(u_int32_t));
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if (retlen) {
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memcpy((char *)tmpdat + KADM_VERSIZE + sizeof(u_int32_t), retdat,
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retlen);
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free(retdat);
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}
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/* slop for mk_priv stuff */
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*dat = (u_char *) malloc((unsigned) (retlen + KADM_VERSIZE +
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sizeof(u_int32_t) + 200));
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if ((*dat_len = krb_mk_priv(tmpdat, *dat,
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(u_int32_t) (retlen + KADM_VERSIZE +
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sizeof(u_int32_t)),
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sess_sched,
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&ad.session, &server_parm.admin_addr,
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&server_parm.recv_addr)) < 0) {
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clr_cli_secrets();
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errpkt(dat, dat_len, KADM_NO_ENCRYPT);
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return KADM_NO_ENCRYPT;
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}
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clr_cli_secrets();
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return KADM_SUCCESS;
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}
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