freebsd-dev/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_crypto.c
John-Mark Gurney 08fca7a56b Add some new modes to OpenCrypto. These modes are AES-ICM (can be used
for counter mode), and AES-GCM.  Both of these modes have been added to
the aesni module.

Included is a set of tests to validate that the software and aesni
module calculate the correct values.  These use the NIST KAT test
vectors.  To run the test, you will need to install a soon to be
committed port, nist-kat that will install the vectors.  Using a port
is necessary as the test vectors are around 25MB.

All the man pages were updated.  I have added a new man page, crypto.7,
which includes a description of how to use each mode.  All the new modes
and some other AES modes are present.  It would be good for someone
else to go through and document the other modes.

A new ioctl was added to support AEAD modes which AES-GCM is one of them.
Without this ioctl, it is not possible to test AEAD modes from userland.

Add a timing safe bcmp for use to compare MACs.  Previously we were using
bcmp which could leak timing info and result in the ability to forge
messages.

Add a minor optimization to the aesni module so that single segment
mbufs don't get copied and instead are updated in place.  The aesni
module needs to be updated to support blocked IO so segmented mbufs
don't have to be copied.

We require that the IV be specified for all calls for both GCM and ICM.
This is to ensure proper use of these functions.

Obtained from:	p4: //depot/projects/opencrypto
Relnotes:	yes
Sponsored by:	FreeBSD Foundation
Sponsored by:	NetGate
2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00

296 lines
7.2 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2005-2010 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#else
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#define _OpenSSL_
#endif
#include <geom/eli/g_eli.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
MALLOC_DECLARE(M_ELI);
static int
g_eli_crypto_done(struct cryptop *crp)
{
crp->crp_opaque = (void *)crp;
wakeup(crp);
return (0);
}
static int
g_eli_crypto_cipher(u_int algo, int enc, u_char *data, size_t datasize,
const u_char *key, size_t keysize)
{
struct cryptoini cri;
struct cryptop *crp;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
uint64_t sid;
u_char *p;
int error;
KASSERT(algo != CRYPTO_AES_XTS,
("%s: CRYPTO_AES_XTS unexpected here", __func__));
bzero(&cri, sizeof(cri));
cri.cri_alg = algo;
cri.cri_key = __DECONST(void *, key);
cri.cri_klen = keysize;
error = crypto_newsession(&sid, &cri, CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
p = malloc(sizeof(*crp) + sizeof(*crd), M_ELI, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
if (p == NULL) {
crypto_freesession(sid);
return (ENOMEM);
}
crp = (struct cryptop *)p; p += sizeof(*crp);
crd = (struct cryptodesc *)p; p += sizeof(*crd);
crd->crd_skip = 0;
crd->crd_len = datasize;
crd->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_IV_PRESENT;
if (enc)
crd->crd_flags |= CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
crd->crd_alg = algo;
crd->crd_key = __DECONST(void *, key);
crd->crd_klen = keysize;
bzero(crd->crd_iv, sizeof(crd->crd_iv));
crd->crd_next = NULL;
crp->crp_sid = sid;
crp->crp_ilen = datasize;
crp->crp_olen = datasize;
crp->crp_opaque = NULL;
crp->crp_callback = g_eli_crypto_done;
crp->crp_buf = (void *)data;
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_desc = crd;
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if (error == 0) {
while (crp->crp_opaque == NULL)
tsleep(crp, PRIBIO, "geli", hz / 5);
error = crp->crp_etype;
}
free(crp, M_ELI);
crypto_freesession(sid);
return (error);
}
#else /* !_KERNEL */
static int
g_eli_crypto_cipher(u_int algo, int enc, u_char *data, size_t datasize,
const u_char *key, size_t keysize)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *type;
u_char iv[keysize];
int outsize;
assert(algo != CRYPTO_AES_XTS);
switch (algo) {
case CRYPTO_NULL_CBC:
type = EVP_enc_null();
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
switch (keysize) {
case 128:
type = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
break;
case 192:
type = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
break;
case 256:
type = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
case CRYPTO_BLF_CBC:
type = EVP_bf_cbc();
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
case CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_CBC:
switch (keysize) {
case 128:
type = EVP_camellia_128_cbc();
break;
case 192:
type = EVP_camellia_192_cbc();
break;
case 256:
type = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
#endif
case CRYPTO_3DES_CBC:
type = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ctx, keysize / 8);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0);
bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, enc);
if (EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, data, &outsize, data, datasize) == 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return (EINVAL);
}
assert(outsize == (int)datasize);
if (EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, data + outsize, &outsize) == 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return (EINVAL);
}
assert(outsize == 0);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return (0);
}
#endif /* !_KERNEL */
int
g_eli_crypto_encrypt(u_int algo, u_char *data, size_t datasize,
const u_char *key, size_t keysize)
{
/* We prefer AES-CBC for metadata protection. */
if (algo == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
algo = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
return (g_eli_crypto_cipher(algo, 1, data, datasize, key, keysize));
}
int
g_eli_crypto_decrypt(u_int algo, u_char *data, size_t datasize,
const u_char *key, size_t keysize)
{
/* We prefer AES-CBC for metadata protection. */
if (algo == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
algo = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
return (g_eli_crypto_cipher(algo, 0, data, datasize, key, keysize));
}
void
g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(struct hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *hkey,
size_t hkeylen)
{
u_char k_ipad[128], key[128];
SHA512_CTX lctx;
u_int i;
bzero(key, sizeof(key));
if (hkeylen == 0)
; /* do nothing */
else if (hkeylen <= 128)
bcopy(hkey, key, hkeylen);
else {
/* If key is longer than 128 bytes reset it to key = SHA512(key). */
SHA512_Init(&lctx);
SHA512_Update(&lctx, hkey, hkeylen);
SHA512_Final(key, &lctx);
}
/* XOR key with ipad and opad values. */
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); i++) {
k_ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
ctx->k_opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
}
bzero(key, sizeof(key));
/* Perform inner SHA512. */
SHA512_Init(&ctx->shactx);
SHA512_Update(&ctx->shactx, k_ipad, sizeof(k_ipad));
bzero(k_ipad, sizeof(k_ipad));
}
void
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(struct hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data,
size_t datasize)
{
SHA512_Update(&ctx->shactx, data, datasize);
}
void
g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(struct hmac_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *md, size_t mdsize)
{
u_char digest[SHA512_MDLEN];
SHA512_CTX lctx;
SHA512_Final(digest, &ctx->shactx);
/* Perform outer SHA512. */
SHA512_Init(&lctx);
SHA512_Update(&lctx, ctx->k_opad, sizeof(ctx->k_opad));
bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
SHA512_Update(&lctx, digest, sizeof(digest));
SHA512_Final(digest, &lctx);
bzero(&lctx, sizeof(lctx));
/* mdsize == 0 means "Give me the whole hash!" */
if (mdsize == 0)
mdsize = SHA512_MDLEN;
bcopy(digest, md, mdsize);
bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
}
void
g_eli_crypto_hmac(const uint8_t *hkey, size_t hkeysize, const uint8_t *data,
size_t datasize, uint8_t *md, size_t mdsize)
{
struct hmac_ctx ctx;
g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(&ctx, hkey, hkeysize);
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, data, datasize);
g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(&ctx, md, mdsize);
}