2269 lines
56 KiB
C
2269 lines
56 KiB
C
/*
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* ntp_proto.c - NTP version 3 protocol machinery
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include "ntpd.h"
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#include "ntp_stdlib.h"
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#include "ntp_unixtime.h"
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/*
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* System variables are declared here. See Section 3.2 of the
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* specification.
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*/
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u_char sys_leap; /* system leap indicator */
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u_char sys_stratum; /* stratum of system */
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s_char sys_precision; /* local clock precision */
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s_fp sys_rootdelay; /* distance to current sync source */
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u_fp sys_rootdispersion; /* dispersion of system clock */
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u_long sys_refid; /* reference source for local clock */
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l_fp sys_offset; /* combined offset from clock_select */
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u_fp sys_maxd; /* dispersion of selected peer */
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l_fp sys_reftime; /* time we were last updated */
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l_fp sys_refskew; /* accumulated skew since last update */
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struct peer *sys_peer; /* our current peer */
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u_char sys_poll; /* log2 of system poll interval */
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extern long sys_clock; /* second part of current time */
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long sys_lastselect; /* sys_clock at last synch update */
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/*
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* Nonspecified system state variables.
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*/
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int sys_bclient; /* we set our time to broadcasts */
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s_fp sys_bdelay; /* broadcast client default delay */
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int sys_authenticate; /* authenticate time used for syncing */
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u_char consensus_leap; /* mitigated leap bits */
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u_long sys_authdelay; /* encryption time (l_fp fraction) */
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u_char leap_consensus; /* consensus of survivor leap bits */
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/*
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* Statistics counters
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*/
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u_long sys_stattime; /* time when we started recording */
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u_long sys_badstratum; /* packets with invalid stratum */
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u_long sys_oldversionpkt; /* old version packets received */
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u_long sys_newversionpkt; /* new version packets received */
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u_long sys_unknownversion; /* don't know version packets */
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u_long sys_badlength; /* packets with bad length */
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u_long sys_processed; /* packets processed */
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u_long sys_badauth; /* packets dropped because of auth */
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u_long sys_limitrejected; /* pkts rejected due toclient count per net */
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/*
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* Imported from ntp_timer.c
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*/
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extern u_long current_time;
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extern struct event timerqueue[];
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/*
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* Imported from ntp_io.c
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*/
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extern struct interface *any_interface;
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/*
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* Imported from ntp_loopfilter.c
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*/
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extern int pll_enable;
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extern int pps_update;
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/*
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* Imported from ntp_util.c
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*/
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extern int stats_control;
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/*
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* The peer hash table. Imported from ntp_peer.c
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*/
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extern struct peer *peer_hash[];
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extern int peer_hash_count[];
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/*
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* debug flag
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*/
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extern int debug;
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static void clear_all P((void));
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/*
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* transmit - Transmit Procedure. See Section 3.4.1 of the
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* specification.
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*/
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void
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transmit(peer)
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register struct peer *peer;
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{
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struct pkt xpkt; /* packet to send */
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u_long peer_timer;
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u_fp precision;
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int bool;
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/*
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* We need to be very careful about honking uncivilized time. If
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* not operating in broadcast mode, honk in all except broadcast
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* client mode. If operating in broadcast mode and synchronized
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* to a real source, honk except when the peer is the local-
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* clock driver and the prefer flag is not set. In other words,
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* in broadcast mode we never honk unless known to be
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* synchronized to real time.
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*/
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bool = 0;
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if (peer->hmode != MODE_BROADCAST) {
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if (peer->hmode != MODE_BCLIENT)
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bool = 1;
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} else if (sys_peer != 0 && sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC) {
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if (!(sys_peer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK &&
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!(sys_peer->flags & FLAG_PREFER)))
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bool = 1;
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}
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if (bool) {
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u_long xkeyid;
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int find_rtt = (peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
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peer->hmode != MODE_BROADCAST;
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/*
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* Figure out which keyid to include in the packet
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*/
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if ((peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE)
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&& (peer->flags & (FLAG_CONFIG|FLAG_AUTHENTIC))
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&& authhavekey(peer->keyid)) {
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xkeyid = peer->keyid;
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} else {
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xkeyid = 0;
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}
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/*
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* Make up a packet to send.
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*/
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xpkt.li_vn_mode = PKT_LI_VN_MODE(sys_leap,
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peer->version, peer->hmode);
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xpkt.stratum = STRATUM_TO_PKT(sys_stratum);
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xpkt.ppoll = peer->hpoll;
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xpkt.precision = sys_precision;
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xpkt.rootdelay = HTONS_FP(sys_rootdelay);
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precision = FP_SECOND >> -(int)sys_precision;
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if (precision == 0)
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precision = 1;
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xpkt.rootdispersion = HTONS_FP(sys_rootdispersion +
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precision + LFPTOFP(&sys_refskew));
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xpkt.refid = sys_refid;
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HTONL_FP(&sys_reftime, &xpkt.reftime);
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HTONL_FP(&peer->org, &xpkt.org);
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HTONL_FP(&peer->rec, &xpkt.rec);
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/*
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* Decide whether to authenticate or not. If so, call
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* encrypt() to fill in the rest of the frame. If not,
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* just add in the xmt timestamp and send it quick.
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*/
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if (peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE) {
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int sendlen;
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xpkt.keyid = htonl(xkeyid);
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auth1crypt(xkeyid, (U_LONG *)&xpkt,
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LEN_PKT_NOMAC);
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get_systime(&peer->xmt);
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L_ADDUF(&peer->xmt, sys_authdelay);
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HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
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sendlen = auth2crypt(xkeyid, (U_LONG *)&xpkt,
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LEN_PKT_NOMAC);
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sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, find_rtt ?
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any_interface : peer->dstadr,
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((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ?
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peer->ttl : -7, &xpkt, sendlen +
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LEN_PKT_NOMAC);
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#ifdef DEBUG
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if (debug > 1)
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printf("transmit auth to %s\n",
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ntoa(&(peer->srcadr)));
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#endif
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peer->sent++;
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} else {
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/*
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* Get xmt timestamp, then send it without mac
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* field
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*/
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int find_rtt = (peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
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peer->dstadr != any_interface;
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get_systime(&(peer->xmt));
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HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
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sendpkt(&(peer->srcadr), find_rtt ?
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any_interface : peer->dstadr,
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((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ?
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peer->ttl : -8, &xpkt, LEN_PKT_NOMAC);
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#ifdef DEBUG
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if (debug > 1)
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printf("transmit to %s\n",
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ntoa(&(peer->srcadr)));
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#endif
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peer->sent++;
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}
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}
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if (peer->hmode != MODE_BROADCAST) {
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u_char opeer_reach;
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/*
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* Determine reachability and diddle things if we
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* haven't heard from the host for a while. If we are
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* about to become unreachable and are a
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* broadcast/multicast client, the server has refused to
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* boogie in client/server mode, so we switch to
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* MODE_BCLIENT anyway and wait for subsequent
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* broadcasts.
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*/
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opeer_reach = peer->reach;
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if (opeer_reach & 0x80 && peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2) {
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peer->hmode = MODE_BCLIENT;
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}
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peer->reach <<= 1;
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if (peer->reach == 0) {
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if (opeer_reach != 0)
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report_event(EVNT_UNREACH, peer);
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/*
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* Clear this guy out. No need to redo clock
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* selection since by now this guy won't be a
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* player
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*/
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if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) {
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if (opeer_reach != 0) {
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peer_clear(peer);
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peer->timereachable =
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current_time;
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}
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}
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/*
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* While we have a chance, if our system peer is
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* zero or his stratum is greater than the last
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* known stratum of this guy, make sure hpoll is
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* clamped to the minimum before resetting the
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* timer. If the peer has been unreachable for a
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* while and we have a system peer who is at
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* least his equal, we may want to ramp his
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* polling interval up to avoid the useless
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* traffic.
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*/
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if (sys_peer == 0) {
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peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
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peer->unreach = 0;
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} else if (sys_peer->stratum > peer->stratum) {
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peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
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peer->unreach = 0;
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} else {
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if (peer->unreach < 16) {
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peer->unreach++;
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peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
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} else if (peer->hpoll < peer->maxpoll) {
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peer->hpoll++;
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peer->ppoll = peer->hpoll;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Update reachability and poll variables
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*/
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} else if ((opeer_reach & 3) == 0) {
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l_fp off;
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if (peer->valid > 0)
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peer->valid--;
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if (peer->hpoll > peer->minpoll)
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peer->hpoll--;
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L_CLR(&off);
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clock_filter(peer, &off, (s_fp)0,
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(u_fp)NTP_MAXDISPERSE);
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if (peer->flags & FLAG_SYSPEER)
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clock_select();
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} else {
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if (peer->valid < NTP_SHIFT) {
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peer->valid++;
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} else {
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if (peer->hpoll < peer->maxpoll)
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peer->hpoll++;
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}
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}
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}
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/*
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* Finally, adjust the hpoll variable for special conditions. If
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* we are a broadcast/multicast client, we use the server poll
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* interval if listening for broadcasts and one-eighth this
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* interval if in client/server mode. The following clamp
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* prevents madness. If this is the system poll, sys_poll
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* controls hpoll.
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*/
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if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2) {
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if (peer->hmode == MODE_BCLIENT)
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peer->hpoll = peer->ppoll;
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else
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peer->hpoll = peer->ppoll - 3;
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} else if (peer->flags & FLAG_SYSPEER)
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peer->hpoll = sys_poll;
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if (peer->hpoll < peer->minpoll)
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peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
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/*
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* Arrange for our next timeout. hpoll will be less than maxpoll
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* for sure.
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*/
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if (peer->event_timer.next != 0)
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/*
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* Oops, someone did already.
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*/
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TIMER_DEQUEUE(&peer->event_timer);
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peer_timer = 1 << (int)max((u_char)min(peer->ppoll,
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peer->hpoll), peer->minpoll);
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peer->event_timer.event_time = current_time + peer_timer;
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TIMER_ENQUEUE(timerqueue, &peer->event_timer);
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}
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/*
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* receive - Receive Procedure. See section 3.4.2 in the specification.
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*/
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void
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receive(rbufp)
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struct recvbuf *rbufp;
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{
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register struct peer *peer;
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register struct pkt *pkt;
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register u_char hismode;
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int restrict;
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int has_mac;
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int trustable;
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int is_authentic;
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u_long hiskeyid;
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struct peer *peer2;
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#ifdef DEBUG
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if (debug > 1)
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printf("receive from %s\n", ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
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#endif
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/*
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* Let the monitoring software take a look at this first.
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*/
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monitor(rbufp);
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/*
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* Get the restrictions on this guy. If we're to ignore him,
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* go no further.
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*/
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restrict = restrictions(&rbufp->recv_srcadr);
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if (restrict & RES_IGNORE)
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return;
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/*
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* Get a pointer to the packet.
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*/
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pkt = &rbufp->recv_pkt;
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/*
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* Catch packets whose version number we can't deal with
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*/
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if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) >= NTP_VERSION) {
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sys_newversionpkt++;
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} else if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) >= NTP_OLDVERSION) {
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sys_oldversionpkt++;
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} else {
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sys_unknownversion++;
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Catch private mode packets. Dump it if queries not allowed.
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*/
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if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_PRIVATE) {
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if (restrict & RES_NOQUERY)
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return;
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process_private(rbufp, ((restrict&RES_NOMODIFY) == 0));
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Same with control mode packets.
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*/
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if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_CONTROL) {
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if (restrict & RES_NOQUERY)
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return;
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process_control(rbufp, restrict);
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return;
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}
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/*
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* See if we're allowed to serve this guy time. If not, ignore
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* him.
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*/
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if (restrict & RES_DONTSERVE)
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return;
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/*
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* See if we only accept limited number of clients from the net
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* this guy is from. Note: the flag is determined dynamically
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* within restrictions()
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*/
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if (restrict & RES_LIMITED) {
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extern u_long client_limit;
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sys_limitrejected++;
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syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
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"rejected mode %d request from %s - per net client limit (%d) exceeded",
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PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode),
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ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), client_limit);
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Dump anything with a putrid stratum. These will most likely
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* come from someone trying to poll us with ntpdc.
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*/
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if (pkt->stratum > NTP_MAXSTRATUM) {
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sys_badstratum++;
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Find the peer. This will return a null if this guy isn't in
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* the database.
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*/
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peer = findpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, rbufp->fd);
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/*
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* Check the length for validity, drop the packet if it is
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* not as expected. If this is a client mode poll, go no
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* further. Send back his time and drop it.
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*
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* The scheme we use for authentication is this. If we are
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* running in non-authenticated mode, we accept both frames
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* which are authenticated and frames which aren't, but don't
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* authenticate. We do record whether the frame had a mac field
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* or not so we know what to do on output.
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*
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* If we are running in authenticated mode, we only trust frames
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* which have authentication attached, which are validated and
|
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* which are using one of our trusted keys. We respond to all
|
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* other pollers without saving any state. If a host we are
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* passively peering with changes his key from a trusted one to
|
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* an untrusted one, we immediately unpeer with him, reselect
|
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* the clock and treat him as an unmemorable client (this is
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* a small denial-of-service hole I'll have to think about).
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* If a similar event occurs with a configured peer we drop the
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* frame and hope he'll revert to our key again. If we get a
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* frame which can't be authenticated with the given key, we
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* drop it. Either we disagree on the keys or someone is trying
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* some funny stuff.
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*/
|
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|
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/*
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* here we assume that any packet with an authenticator is at
|
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* least LEN_PKT_MAC bytes long, which means at least 96 bits
|
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*/
|
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if (rbufp->recv_length >= LEN_PKT_MAC) {
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has_mac = rbufp->recv_length - LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
|
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hiskeyid = ntohl(pkt->keyid);
|
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#ifdef DEBUG
|
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if (debug > 2)
|
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printf(
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"receive: pkt is %d octets, mac %d octets long, keyid %ld\n",
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rbufp->recv_length, has_mac, hiskeyid);
|
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#endif
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} else if (rbufp->recv_length == LEN_PKT_NOMAC) {
|
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hiskeyid = 0;
|
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has_mac = 0;
|
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} else {
|
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#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 2)
|
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printf("receive: bad length %d %ld\n",
|
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rbufp->recv_length, sizeof(struct pkt));
|
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#endif
|
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sys_badlength++;
|
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return;
|
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}
|
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|
|
|
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/*
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* Figure out his mode and validate it.
|
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*/
|
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hismode = PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode);
|
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#ifdef DEBUG
|
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if (debug > 2)
|
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printf("receive: his mode %d\n", hismode);
|
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#endif
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if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) == NTP_OLDVERSION && hismode ==
|
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0) {
|
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/*
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* Easy. If it is from the NTP port it is
|
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* a sym act, else client.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SRCPORT(&rbufp->recv_srcadr) == NTP_PORT)
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hismode = MODE_ACTIVE;
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else
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hismode = MODE_CLIENT;
|
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} else {
|
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if (hismode != MODE_ACTIVE && hismode != MODE_PASSIVE &&
|
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hismode != MODE_SERVER && hismode != MODE_CLIENT &&
|
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hismode != MODE_BROADCAST) {
|
|
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad mode %d received from %s",
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PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode),
|
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ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr));
|
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return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If he included a mac field, decrypt it to see if it is
|
|
* authentic.
|
|
*/
|
|
is_authentic = 0;
|
|
if (has_mac) {
|
|
if (authhavekey(hiskeyid)) {
|
|
if (!authistrusted(hiskeyid)) {
|
|
sys_badauth++;
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 3)
|
|
printf("receive: untrusted keyid\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (authdecrypt(hiskeyid, (U_LONG *)pkt,
|
|
LEN_PKT_NOMAC)) {
|
|
is_authentic = 1;
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 3)
|
|
printf("receive: authdecrypt succeeds\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
sys_badauth++;
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 3)
|
|
printf("receive: authdecrypt fails\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this is someone we don't remember from a previous
|
|
* association, dispatch him now. Either we send something back
|
|
* quick, we ignore him, or we allocate some memory for him and
|
|
* let him continue.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer == 0) {
|
|
int mymode;
|
|
|
|
mymode = MODE_PASSIVE;
|
|
switch(hismode) {
|
|
case MODE_ACTIVE:
|
|
/*
|
|
* See if this guy qualifies as being the least
|
|
* bit memorable. If so we keep him around for
|
|
* later. If not, send his time quick.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (restrict & RES_NOPEER) {
|
|
fast_xmit(rbufp, (int)hismode,
|
|
is_authentic);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_PASSIVE:
|
|
case MODE_SERVER:
|
|
/*
|
|
* These are obvious errors. Ignore.
|
|
*/
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_CLIENT:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send it back quick and go home.
|
|
*/
|
|
fast_xmit(rbufp, (int)hismode, is_authentic);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_BROADCAST:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sort of a repeat of the above...
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((restrict & RES_NOPEER) || !sys_bclient)
|
|
return;
|
|
mymode = MODE_MCLIENT;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Okay, we're going to keep him around. Allocate him
|
|
* some memory.
|
|
*/
|
|
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
|
|
rbufp->dstadr, mymode, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
|
|
NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, hiskeyid);
|
|
|
|
if (peer == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The only way this can happen is if the
|
|
* source address looks like a reference
|
|
* clock. Since this is an illegal address
|
|
* this is one of those "can't happen" things.
|
|
*/
|
|
syslog(LOG_ERR,
|
|
"receive() failed to peer with %s, mode %d",
|
|
ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), mymode);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Mark the time of reception
|
|
*/
|
|
peer->timereceived = current_time;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the peer isn't configured, set his keyid and authenable
|
|
* status based on the packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)) {
|
|
if (has_mac) {
|
|
if (!(peer->reach && peer->keyid != hiskeyid)) {
|
|
peer->keyid = hiskeyid;
|
|
peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENABLE;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
peer->keyid = 0;
|
|
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTHENABLE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this message was authenticated properly, note this
|
|
* in the flags.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_authentic) {
|
|
peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this guy is authenable, and has been authenticated
|
|
* in the past, but just failed the authentic test,
|
|
* report the event.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE
|
|
&& peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENTIC)
|
|
report_event(EVNT_PEERAUTH, peer);
|
|
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determine if this guy is basically trustable.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (restrict & RES_DONTTRUST)
|
|
trustable = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
trustable = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (sys_authenticate && trustable) {
|
|
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) ||
|
|
(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE)) {
|
|
if (has_mac && is_authentic)
|
|
trustable = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
trustable = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Dispose of the packet based on our respective modes. We
|
|
* don't drive this with a table, though we probably could.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (peer->hmode) {
|
|
case MODE_ACTIVE:
|
|
case MODE_CLIENT:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Active mode associations are configured. If the data
|
|
* isn't trustable, ignore it and hope this guy
|
|
* brightens up. Else accept any data we get and process
|
|
* it.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (hismode) {
|
|
case MODE_ACTIVE:
|
|
case MODE_PASSIVE:
|
|
case MODE_SERVER:
|
|
case MODE_BROADCAST:
|
|
process_packet(peer, pkt, &(rbufp->recv_time),
|
|
has_mac, trustable);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_CLIENT:
|
|
if (peer->hmode == MODE_ACTIVE)
|
|
fast_xmit(rbufp, hismode, is_authentic);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_PASSIVE:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Passive mode associations are (in the current
|
|
* implementation) always dynamic. If we get an invalid
|
|
* header, break the connection. I hate doing this since
|
|
* it seems like a waste. Oh, well.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (hismode) {
|
|
case MODE_ACTIVE:
|
|
if (process_packet(peer, pkt,
|
|
&(rbufp->recv_time),
|
|
has_mac, trustable) == 0) {
|
|
unpeer(peer);
|
|
clock_select();
|
|
fast_xmit(rbufp, (int)hismode, is_authentic);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_PASSIVE:
|
|
case MODE_SERVER:
|
|
case MODE_BROADCAST:
|
|
/*
|
|
* These are errors. Just ignore the packet.
|
|
* If he doesn't straighten himself out this
|
|
* association will eventually be disolved.
|
|
*/
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_CLIENT:
|
|
fast_xmit(rbufp, hismode, is_authentic);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
case MODE_BCLIENT:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Broadcast client pseudo-mode. We accept both server
|
|
* and broadcast data. Passive mode data is an error.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (hismode) {
|
|
case MODE_ACTIVE:
|
|
/*
|
|
* This guy wants to give us real time when
|
|
* we've been existing on lousy broadcasts!
|
|
* Create a passive mode association and do it
|
|
* that way, but keep the old one in case the
|
|
* packet turns out to be bad.
|
|
*/
|
|
peer2 = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
|
|
rbufp->dstadr, MODE_PASSIVE,
|
|
PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
|
|
NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXPOLL, 0, hiskeyid);
|
|
if (process_packet(peer2, pkt,
|
|
&rbufp->recv_time, has_mac, trustable) == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Strange situation. We've been
|
|
* receiving broadcasts from him which
|
|
* we liked, but we don't like his
|
|
* active mode stuff. Keep his old peer
|
|
* structure and send him some time
|
|
* quickly, we'll figure it out later.
|
|
*/
|
|
unpeer(peer2);
|
|
fast_xmit(rbufp, (int)hismode,
|
|
is_authentic);
|
|
} else
|
|
/*
|
|
* Drop the old association
|
|
*/
|
|
unpeer(peer);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_PASSIVE:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_SERVER:
|
|
case MODE_BROADCAST:
|
|
process_packet(peer, pkt, &rbufp->recv_time,
|
|
has_mac, trustable);
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't test for invalid headers.
|
|
* Let him time out.
|
|
*/
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_MCLIENT:
|
|
/*
|
|
* This mode is temporary and does not appear outside
|
|
* this routine. It lasts only from the time the
|
|
* broadcast/multicast is recognized until the
|
|
* association is instantiated. Note that we start up in
|
|
* client/server mode to initially synchronize the
|
|
* clock.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (hismode) {
|
|
case MODE_BROADCAST:
|
|
peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST1 | FLAG_MCAST2;
|
|
peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT;
|
|
process_packet(peer, pkt, &rbufp->recv_time,
|
|
has_mac, trustable);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_SERVER:
|
|
case MODE_PASSIVE:
|
|
case MODE_ACTIVE:
|
|
case MODE_CLIENT:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* process_packet - Packet Procedure, a la Section 3.4.3 of the
|
|
* specification. Or almost, at least. If we're in here we have a
|
|
* reasonable expectation that we will be having a long term
|
|
* relationship with this host.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
process_packet(peer, pkt, recv_ts, has_mac, trustable)
|
|
register struct peer *peer;
|
|
register struct pkt *pkt;
|
|
l_fp *recv_ts;
|
|
int has_mac;
|
|
int trustable; /* used as "valid header" */
|
|
{
|
|
l_fp t10, t23;
|
|
s_fp di, ei, p_dist, p_disp;
|
|
l_fp ci, p_rec, p_xmt, p_org;
|
|
int randomize;
|
|
u_char ostratum, oreach;
|
|
U_LONG temp;
|
|
u_fp precision;
|
|
|
|
sys_processed++;
|
|
peer->processed++;
|
|
p_dist = NTOHS_FP(pkt->rootdelay);
|
|
p_disp = NTOHS_FP(pkt->rootdispersion);
|
|
NTOHL_FP(&pkt->rec, &p_rec);
|
|
NTOHL_FP(&pkt->xmt, &p_xmt);
|
|
if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) != MODE_BROADCAST)
|
|
NTOHL_FP(&pkt->org, &p_org);
|
|
else
|
|
p_org = peer->rec;
|
|
peer->rec = *recv_ts;
|
|
peer->flash = 0;
|
|
randomize = POLL_RANDOMCHANGE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Test for old or duplicate packets (tests 1 through 3).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (L_ISHIS(&peer->org, &p_xmt)) /* count old packets */
|
|
peer->oldpkt++;
|
|
if (L_ISEQU(&peer->org, &p_xmt)) /* test 1 */
|
|
peer->flash |= TEST1; /* duplicate packet */
|
|
if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) != MODE_BROADCAST) {
|
|
if (!L_ISEQU(&peer->xmt, &p_org)) { /* test 2 */
|
|
randomize = POLL_MAKERANDOM;
|
|
peer->bogusorg++;
|
|
peer->flash |= TEST2; /* bogus packet */
|
|
}
|
|
if (L_ISZERO(&p_rec) || L_ISZERO(&p_org))
|
|
peer->flash |= TEST3; /* unsynchronized */
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (L_ISZERO(&p_org))
|
|
peer->flash |= TEST3; /* unsynchronized */
|
|
}
|
|
peer->org = p_xmt; /* reuse byte-swapped pkt->xmt */
|
|
peer->ppoll = pkt->ppoll;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call poll_update(). This will either start us, if the
|
|
* association is new, or drop the polling interval if the
|
|
* association is existing and ppoll has been reduced.
|
|
*/
|
|
poll_update(peer, peer->hpoll, randomize);
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Test for valid header (tests 5 through 8)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (trustable == 0) /* test 5 */
|
|
peer->flash |= TEST5; /* authentication failed */
|
|
temp = ntohl(pkt->reftime.l_ui);
|
|
if (PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode) == LEAP_NOTINSYNC || /* test 6 */
|
|
p_xmt.l_ui < temp || p_xmt.l_ui >= temp + NTP_MAXAGE)
|
|
peer->flash |= TEST6; /* peer clock unsynchronized */
|
|
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && /* test 7 */
|
|
(PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum) >= NTP_MAXSTRATUM ||
|
|
PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum) > sys_stratum))
|
|
peer->flash |= TEST7; /* peer stratum out of bounds */
|
|
if (p_dist >= NTP_MAXDISPERSE /* test 8 */
|
|
|| p_dist <= (-NTP_MAXDISPERSE)
|
|
|| p_disp >= NTP_MAXDISPERSE)
|
|
peer->flash |= TEST8; /* delay/dispersion too big */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the packet header is invalid (tests 5 through 8), exit
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->flash & (TEST5 | TEST6 | TEST7 | TEST8)) {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 1)
|
|
printf("invalid packet header %s %02x\n",
|
|
ntoa(&peer->srcadr), peer->flash);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Valid header; update our state.
|
|
*/
|
|
peer->leap = PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode);
|
|
peer->pmode = PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode);
|
|
if (has_mac)
|
|
peer->pkeyid = ntohl(pkt->keyid);
|
|
else
|
|
peer->pkeyid = 0;
|
|
ostratum = peer->stratum;
|
|
peer->stratum = PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum);
|
|
peer->precision = pkt->precision;
|
|
peer->rootdelay = p_dist;
|
|
peer->rootdispersion = p_disp;
|
|
peer->refid = pkt->refid;
|
|
NTOHL_FP(&pkt->reftime, &peer->reftime);
|
|
oreach = peer->reach;
|
|
if (peer->reach == 0) {
|
|
peer->timereachable = current_time;
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this guy was previously unreachable, set his
|
|
* polling interval to the minimum and reset the
|
|
* unreach counter.
|
|
*/
|
|
peer->unreach = 0;
|
|
peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
|
|
}
|
|
peer->reach |= 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If running in a client/server association, calculate the
|
|
* clock offset c, roundtrip delay d and dispersion e. We use
|
|
* the equations (reordered from those in the spec). Note that,
|
|
* in a broadcast association, org has been set to the time of
|
|
* last reception. Note the computation of dispersion includes
|
|
* the system precision plus that due to the frequency error
|
|
* since the originate time.
|
|
*
|
|
* c = ((t2 - t3) + (t1 - t0)) / 2
|
|
* d = (t2 - t3) - (t1 - t0)
|
|
* e = (org - rec) (seconds only)
|
|
*/
|
|
t10 = p_xmt; /* compute t1 - t0 */
|
|
L_SUB(&t10, &peer->rec);
|
|
t23 = p_rec; /* compute t2 - t3 */
|
|
L_SUB(&t23, &p_org);
|
|
ci = t10;
|
|
precision = FP_SECOND >> -(int)sys_precision;
|
|
if (precision == 0)
|
|
precision = 1;
|
|
ei = precision + peer->rec.l_ui - p_org.l_ui;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If running in a broacast association, the clock offset is (t1
|
|
* - t0) corrected by the one-way delay, but we can't measure
|
|
* that directly; therefore, we start up in client/server mode,
|
|
* calculate the clock offset, using the engineered refinement
|
|
* algorithms, while also receiving broadcasts. When a broadcast
|
|
* is received in client/server mode, we calculate a correction
|
|
* factor to use after switching back to broadcast mode. We know
|
|
* NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16, which accounts for the simplified ei
|
|
* calculation.
|
|
*
|
|
* If FLAG_MCAST2 is set, we are a broadcast/multicast client.
|
|
* If FLAG_MCAST1 is set, we haven't calculated the propagation
|
|
* delay. If hmode is MODE_CLIENT, we haven't set the local
|
|
* clock in client/server mode. Initially, we come up
|
|
* MODE_CLIENT. When the clock is first updated and FLAG_MCAST2
|
|
* is set, we switch from MODE_CLIENT to MODE_BCLIENT.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->pmode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
|
|
if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST1) {
|
|
if (peer->hmode == MODE_BCLIENT)
|
|
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_MCAST1;
|
|
L_SUB(&ci, &peer->offset);
|
|
L_NEG(&ci);
|
|
peer->estbdelay = LFPTOFP(&ci);
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
FPTOLFP(peer->estbdelay, &t10);
|
|
L_ADD(&ci, &t10);
|
|
di = peer->delay;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
L_ADD(&ci, &t23);
|
|
L_RSHIFT(&ci);
|
|
L_SUB(&t23, &t10);
|
|
di = LFPTOFP(&t23);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 3)
|
|
printf("offset: %s, delay %s, error %s\n",
|
|
lfptoa(&ci, 6), fptoa(di, 5), fptoa(ei, 5));
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (di >= NTP_MAXDISPERSE || di <= (-NTP_MAXDISPERSE)
|
|
|| ei >= NTP_MAXDISPERSE) /* test 4 */
|
|
peer->flash |= TEST4; /* delay/dispersion too big */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the packet data is invalid (tests 1 through 4), exit.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->flash) {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug)
|
|
printf("invalid packet data %s %02x\n",
|
|
ntoa(&peer->srcadr), peer->flash);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If there was a reachability change report it even
|
|
* though the packet was bogus.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (oreach == 0)
|
|
report_event(EVNT_REACH, peer);
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This one is valid. Mark it so, give it to clock_filter().
|
|
*/
|
|
clock_filter(peer, &ci, di, (u_fp)ei);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this guy was previously unreachable, report him reachable.
|
|
* Note we do this here so that the peer values we return are
|
|
* the updated ones.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (oreach == 0)
|
|
report_event(EVNT_REACH, peer);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now update the clock. If we have found a system peer and this
|
|
* is a broadcast/multicast client, switch to listen mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
clock_update(peer);
|
|
if (sys_peer && peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2)
|
|
peer->hmode = MODE_BCLIENT;
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* clock_update - Clock-update procedure, see section 3.4.5.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
clock_update(peer)
|
|
struct peer *peer;
|
|
{
|
|
u_char oleap;
|
|
u_char ostratum;
|
|
s_fp d;
|
|
extern u_char leap_mask;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug)
|
|
printf("clock_update(%s)\n", ntoa(&peer->srcadr));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
record_peer_stats(&peer->srcadr, ctlpeerstatus(peer),
|
|
&peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->dispersion);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call the clock selection algorithm to see if this update
|
|
* causes the peer to change. If this is not the system peer,
|
|
* quit now.
|
|
*/
|
|
clock_select();
|
|
if (peer != sys_peer)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update the system state. This updates the system stratum,
|
|
* leap bits, root delay, root dispersion, reference ID and
|
|
* reference time. We also update select dispersion and max
|
|
* frequency error.
|
|
*/
|
|
oleap = sys_leap;
|
|
ostratum = sys_stratum;
|
|
sys_stratum = peer->stratum + 1;
|
|
if (sys_stratum == 1)
|
|
sys_refid = peer->refid;
|
|
else
|
|
sys_refid = peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr;
|
|
sys_reftime = peer->rec;
|
|
d = peer->delay;
|
|
if (d < 0)
|
|
d = -d;
|
|
sys_rootdelay = peer->rootdelay + d;
|
|
d = peer->soffset;
|
|
if (d < 0)
|
|
d = -d;
|
|
d += peer->dispersion + peer->selectdisp;
|
|
if (!peer->flags & FLAG_REFCLOCK && d < NTP_MINDISPERSE)
|
|
d = NTP_MINDISPERSE;
|
|
sys_rootdispersion = peer->rootdispersion + d;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reset/adjust the system clock. Watch for timewarps here.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (local_clock(&sys_offset, peer)) {
|
|
case -1:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clock is too screwed up. Just exit for now.
|
|
*/
|
|
report_event(EVNT_SYSFAULT, (struct peer *)0);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
/*NOTREACHED*/
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clock was slewed. Continue on normally.
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_leap = leap_consensus & leap_mask;
|
|
L_CLR(&sys_refskew);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clock was stepped. Clear filter registers
|
|
* of all peers.
|
|
*/
|
|
clear_all();
|
|
leap_process(); /* reset the leap interrupt */
|
|
sys_leap = LEAP_NOTINSYNC;
|
|
sys_refskew.l_i = NTP_MAXSKEW; sys_refskew.l_f = 0;
|
|
report_event(EVNT_CLOCKRESET, (struct peer *)0);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
sys_maxd = peer->dispersion + peer->selectdisp;
|
|
if (oleap != sys_leap)
|
|
report_event(EVNT_SYNCCHG, (struct peer *)0);
|
|
if (ostratum != sys_stratum)
|
|
report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG, (struct peer *)0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* poll_update - update peer poll interval. See Section 3.4.8 of the
|
|
* spec.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
poll_update(peer, new_hpoll, randomize)
|
|
struct peer *peer;
|
|
unsigned int new_hpoll;
|
|
int randomize;
|
|
{
|
|
register struct event *evp;
|
|
register u_long new_timer;
|
|
u_char newpoll, oldpoll;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 1)
|
|
printf("poll_update(%s, %d, %d)\n", ntoa(&peer->srcadr),
|
|
new_hpoll, randomize);
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* Catch reference clocks here. The polling interval for a
|
|
* reference clock is fixed and needn't be maintained by us.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->flags & FLAG_REFCLOCK || peer->hmode ==
|
|
MODE_BROADCAST)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This routine * will randomly perturb the new peer.timer if
|
|
* requested, to try to prevent synchronization with the remote
|
|
* peer from occuring. There are three options, based on the
|
|
* value of randomize:
|
|
*
|
|
* POLL_NOTRANDOM - essentially the spec algorithm. If
|
|
* peer.timer is greater than the new polling interval,
|
|
* drop it to the new interval.
|
|
*
|
|
* POLL_RANDOMCHANGE - make changes randomly. If peer.timer
|
|
* must be changed, based on the comparison about, randomly
|
|
* perturb the new value of peer.timer.
|
|
*
|
|
* POLL_MAKERANDOM - make next interval random. Calculate
|
|
* a randomly perturbed poll interval. If this value is
|
|
* less that peer.timer, update peer.timer.
|
|
*/
|
|
oldpoll = peer->hpoll;
|
|
if (peer->hmode == MODE_BCLIENT)
|
|
peer->hpoll = peer->ppoll;
|
|
else if ((peer->flags & FLAG_SYSPEER) && new_hpoll > sys_poll)
|
|
peer->hpoll = max(peer->minpoll, sys_poll);
|
|
else {
|
|
if (new_hpoll > peer->maxpoll)
|
|
peer->hpoll = peer->maxpoll;
|
|
else if (new_hpoll < peer->minpoll)
|
|
peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
|
|
else
|
|
peer->hpoll = new_hpoll;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* hpoll <= maxpoll for sure */
|
|
newpoll = max((u_char)min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll),
|
|
peer->minpoll);
|
|
if (randomize == POLL_MAKERANDOM || (randomize ==
|
|
POLL_RANDOMCHANGE && newpoll != oldpoll))
|
|
new_timer = (1 << (newpoll - 1))
|
|
+ ranp2(newpoll - 1) + current_time;
|
|
else
|
|
new_timer = (1 << newpoll) + current_time;
|
|
evp = &(peer->event_timer);
|
|
if (evp->next == 0 || evp->event_time > new_timer) {
|
|
TIMER_DEQUEUE(evp);
|
|
evp->event_time = new_timer;
|
|
TIMER_ENQUEUE(timerqueue, evp);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* clear_all - clear all peer filter registers. This is done after
|
|
* a step change in the time.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
clear_all()
|
|
{
|
|
register int i;
|
|
register struct peer *peer;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < HASH_SIZE; i++)
|
|
for (peer = peer_hash[i]; peer != 0; peer = peer->next) {
|
|
peer_clear(peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear sys_peer. We'll sync to one later.
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_peer = 0;
|
|
sys_stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* clear - clear peer filter registers. See Section 3.4.7 of the spec.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
peer_clear(peer)
|
|
register struct peer *peer;
|
|
{
|
|
register int i;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug)
|
|
printf("clear(%s)\n", ntoa(&peer->srcadr));
|
|
#endif
|
|
memset(CLEAR_TO_ZERO(peer), 0, LEN_CLEAR_TO_ZERO);
|
|
peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
|
|
peer->dispersion = NTP_MAXDISPERSE;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < NTP_SHIFT; i++)
|
|
peer->filter_error[i] = NTP_MAXDISPERSE;
|
|
poll_update(peer, peer->minpoll, POLL_RANDOMCHANGE);
|
|
clock_select();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear out the selection counters
|
|
*/
|
|
peer->candidate = 0;
|
|
peer->select = 0;
|
|
peer->correct = 0;
|
|
peer->was_sane = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since we have a chance to correct possible funniness in
|
|
* our selection of interfaces on a multihomed host, do so
|
|
* by setting us to no particular interface.
|
|
*/
|
|
peer->dstadr = any_interface;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* clock_filter - add incoming clock sample to filter register and run
|
|
* the filter procedure to find the best sample.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
clock_filter(peer, sample_offset, sample_delay, sample_error)
|
|
register struct peer *peer;
|
|
l_fp *sample_offset;
|
|
s_fp sample_delay;
|
|
u_fp sample_error;
|
|
{
|
|
register int i, j, k, n;
|
|
register u_char *ord;
|
|
s_fp distance[NTP_SHIFT];
|
|
long skew, skewmax;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug)
|
|
printf("clock_filter(%s, %s, %s, %s)\n",
|
|
ntoa(&peer->srcadr), lfptoa(sample_offset, 6),
|
|
fptoa(sample_delay, 5), ufptoa(sample_error, 5));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update sample errors and calculate distances. Also initialize
|
|
* sort index vector. We know NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16
|
|
*/
|
|
skew = sys_clock - peer->update;
|
|
peer->update = sys_clock;
|
|
ord = peer->filter_order;
|
|
j = peer->filter_nextpt;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < NTP_SHIFT; i++) {
|
|
peer->filter_error[j] += (u_fp)skew;
|
|
if (peer->filter_error[j] > NTP_MAXDISPERSE)
|
|
peer->filter_error[j] = NTP_MAXDISPERSE;
|
|
distance[i] = peer->filter_error[j] +
|
|
(peer->filter_delay[j] >> 1);
|
|
ord[i] = j;
|
|
if (--j < 0)
|
|
j += NTP_SHIFT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Insert the new sample at the beginning of the register.
|
|
*/
|
|
peer->filter_delay[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_delay;
|
|
peer->filter_offset[peer->filter_nextpt] = *sample_offset;
|
|
peer->filter_soffset[peer->filter_nextpt] =
|
|
LFPTOFP(sample_offset);
|
|
peer->filter_error[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_error;
|
|
distance[0] = sample_error + (sample_delay >> 1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sort the samples in the register by distance. The winning
|
|
* sample will be in ord[0]. Sort the samples only if the
|
|
* samples are not too old and the delay is meaningful.
|
|
*/
|
|
skewmax = 0;
|
|
for (n = 0; n < NTP_SHIFT && sample_delay; n++) {
|
|
for (j = 0; j < n && skewmax <
|
|
CLOCK_MAXSEC; j++) {
|
|
if (distance[j] > distance[n]) {
|
|
s_fp ftmp;
|
|
|
|
ftmp = distance[n];
|
|
k = ord[n];
|
|
distance[n] = distance[j];
|
|
ord[n] = ord[j];
|
|
distance[j] = ftmp;
|
|
ord[j] = k;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skewmax += (1 << peer->hpoll);
|
|
}
|
|
peer->filter_nextpt++;
|
|
if (peer->filter_nextpt >= NTP_SHIFT)
|
|
peer->filter_nextpt = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We compute the dispersion as per the spec. Note that, to make
|
|
* things simple, both the l_fp and s_fp offsets are retained
|
|
* and that the s_fp could be nonsense if the l_fp is greater
|
|
* than about 32000 s. However, the sanity checks in
|
|
* ntp_loopfilter() require the l_fp offset to be less than 1000
|
|
* s anyway, so not to worry.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->filter_error[ord[0]] >= NTP_MAXDISPERSE) {
|
|
peer->dispersion = NTP_MAXDISPERSE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
s_fp d;
|
|
u_fp y;
|
|
|
|
peer->delay = peer->filter_delay[ord[0]];
|
|
peer->offset = peer->filter_offset[ord[0]];
|
|
peer->soffset = LFPTOFP(&peer->offset);
|
|
peer->dispersion = peer->filter_error[ord[0]];
|
|
|
|
y = 0;
|
|
for (i = NTP_SHIFT - 1; i > 0; i--) {
|
|
if (peer->filter_error[ord[i]] >=
|
|
NTP_MAXDISPERSE)
|
|
d = NTP_MAXDISPERSE;
|
|
else {
|
|
d = peer->filter_soffset[ord[i]] -
|
|
peer->filter_soffset[ord[0]];
|
|
if (d < 0)
|
|
d = -d;
|
|
if (d > NTP_MAXDISPERSE)
|
|
d = NTP_MAXDISPERSE;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX This *knows* NTP_FILTER is 1/2
|
|
*/
|
|
y = ((u_fp)d + y) >> 1;
|
|
}
|
|
peer->dispersion += y;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate synchronization distance backdated to
|
|
* sys_lastselect (clock_select will fix it). We know
|
|
* NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16.
|
|
*/
|
|
d = peer->delay;
|
|
if (d < 0)
|
|
d = -d;
|
|
d += peer->rootdelay;
|
|
peer->synch = (d >> 1) + peer->rootdispersion +
|
|
peer->dispersion - (sys_clock - sys_lastselect);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* clock_select - find the pick-of-the-litter clock
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
clock_select()
|
|
{
|
|
register struct peer *peer;
|
|
register int i;
|
|
register int nlist, nl3;
|
|
register s_fp d, e;
|
|
register int j;
|
|
register int n;
|
|
register int allow, found, k;
|
|
s_fp low = 0x7fffffff;
|
|
s_fp high = -0x7ffffff;
|
|
u_fp synch[NTP_MAXCLOCK], error[NTP_MAXCLOCK];
|
|
struct peer *osys_peer;
|
|
struct peer *typeacts = 0;
|
|
struct peer *typelocal = 0;
|
|
struct peer *typepps = 0;
|
|
struct peer *typeprefer = 0;
|
|
struct peer *typesystem = 0;
|
|
|
|
static int list_alloc = 0;
|
|
static struct endpoint *endpoint;
|
|
static int *index;
|
|
static struct peer **peer_list;
|
|
static int endpoint_size = 0, index_size = 0, peer_list_size = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 1)
|
|
printf("clock_select()\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initizialize. If a prefer peer does not survive this thing,
|
|
* the pps_update switch will remain zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
pps_update = 0;
|
|
nlist = 0;
|
|
for (n = 0; n < HASH_SIZE; n++)
|
|
nlist += peer_hash_count[n];
|
|
if (nlist > list_alloc) {
|
|
if (list_alloc > 0) {
|
|
free(endpoint);
|
|
free(index);
|
|
free(peer_list);
|
|
}
|
|
while (list_alloc < nlist) {
|
|
list_alloc += 5;
|
|
endpoint_size += 5 * 3 * sizeof *endpoint;
|
|
index_size += 5 * 3 * sizeof *index;
|
|
peer_list_size += 5 * sizeof *peer_list;
|
|
}
|
|
endpoint = (struct endpoint *)emalloc(endpoint_size);
|
|
index = (int *)emalloc(index_size);
|
|
peer_list = (struct peer **)emalloc(peer_list_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This first chunk of code is supposed to go through all
|
|
* peers we know about to find the NTP_MAXLIST peers which
|
|
* are most likely to succeed. We run through the list
|
|
* doing the sanity checks and trying to insert anyone who
|
|
* looks okay. We are at all times aware that we should
|
|
* only keep samples from the top two strata and we only need
|
|
* NTP_MAXLIST of them.
|
|
*/
|
|
nlist = nl3 = 0; /* none yet */
|
|
for (n = 0; n < HASH_SIZE; n++) {
|
|
for (peer = peer_hash[n]; peer != 0; peer = peer->next) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear peer selection stats
|
|
*/
|
|
peer->was_sane = 0;
|
|
peer->correct = 0;
|
|
peer->candidate = 0;
|
|
peer->select = 0;
|
|
|
|
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_SYSPEER;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update synch distance (NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16).
|
|
* Note synch distance check instead of spec
|
|
* dispersion check. Naughty.
|
|
*/
|
|
peer->synch += (sys_clock - sys_lastselect);
|
|
|
|
if (peer->reach == 0)
|
|
continue; /* unreachable */
|
|
if (peer->stratum > 1 && peer->refid ==
|
|
peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr)
|
|
continue; /* sync loop */
|
|
if (peer->stratum >= NTP_MAXSTRATUM ||
|
|
peer->stratum > sys_stratum)
|
|
continue; /* bad stratum */
|
|
|
|
if (peer->dispersion >= NTP_MAXDISTANCE) {
|
|
peer->seldisptoolarge++;
|
|
continue; /* too noisy or broken */
|
|
}
|
|
if (peer->org.l_ui < peer->reftime.l_ui) {
|
|
peer->selbroken++;
|
|
continue; /* very broken host */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't allow the local-clock or acts drivers
|
|
* in the kitchen at this point, unless the
|
|
* prefer peer. Do that later, but only if
|
|
* nobody else is around.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (peer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK) {
|
|
typelocal = peer;
|
|
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_PREFER))
|
|
continue; /* no local clock */
|
|
}
|
|
if (peer->refclktype == REFCLK_NIST_ACTS) {
|
|
typeacts = peer;
|
|
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_PREFER))
|
|
continue; /* no acts */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we get this far, we assume the peer is
|
|
* acceptable.
|
|
*/
|
|
peer->was_sane = 1;
|
|
peer_list[nlist++] = peer;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Insert each interval endpoint on the sorted
|
|
* list.
|
|
*/
|
|
e = peer->soffset + peer->synch; /* Upper end */
|
|
for (i = nl3 - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
if (e >= endpoint[index[i]].val)
|
|
break;
|
|
index[i + 3] = index[i];
|
|
}
|
|
index[i + 3] = nl3;
|
|
endpoint[nl3].type = 1;
|
|
endpoint[nl3++].val = e;
|
|
|
|
e -= peer->synch; /* Center point */
|
|
for ( ; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
if (e >= endpoint[index[i]].val)
|
|
break;
|
|
index[i + 2] = index[i];
|
|
}
|
|
index[i + 2] = nl3;
|
|
endpoint[nl3].type = 0;
|
|
endpoint[nl3++].val = e;
|
|
|
|
e -= peer->synch; /* Lower end */
|
|
for ( ; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
if (e >= endpoint[index[i]].val)
|
|
break;
|
|
index[i + 1] = index[i];
|
|
}
|
|
index[i + 1] = nl3;
|
|
endpoint[nl3].type = -1;
|
|
endpoint[nl3++].val = e;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sys_lastselect = sys_clock;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 2)
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nl3; i++)
|
|
printf("select: endpoint %2d %s\n",
|
|
endpoint[index[i]].type,
|
|
fptoa(endpoint[index[i]].val, 6));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
j = nl3 - 1;
|
|
allow = nlist; /* falsetickers assumed */
|
|
found = 0;
|
|
while (allow > 0) {
|
|
allow--;
|
|
for (n = 0; i <= j; i++) {
|
|
n += endpoint[index[i]].type;
|
|
if (n < 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (endpoint[index[i]].type == 0)
|
|
found++;
|
|
}
|
|
for (n = 0; i <= j; j--) {
|
|
n += endpoint[index[j]].type;
|
|
if (n > 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (endpoint[index[j]].type == 0)
|
|
found++;
|
|
}
|
|
if (found > allow)
|
|
break;
|
|
low = endpoint[index[i++]].val;
|
|
high = endpoint[index[j--]].val;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If no survivors remain at this point, check if the acts or
|
|
* local clock drivers have been found. If so, nominate one of
|
|
* them as the only survivor. Otherwise, give up and declare us
|
|
* unsynchronized.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((allow << 1) >= nlist) {
|
|
if (typeacts != 0) {
|
|
typeacts->was_sane = 1;
|
|
peer_list[0] = typeacts;
|
|
nlist = 1;
|
|
} else if (typelocal != 0) {
|
|
typelocal->was_sane = 1;
|
|
peer_list[0] = typelocal;
|
|
nlist = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (sys_peer != 0)
|
|
report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG,
|
|
(struct peer *)0);
|
|
sys_peer = 0;
|
|
sys_stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 2)
|
|
printf("select: low %s high %s\n", fptoa(low, 6),
|
|
fptoa(high, 6));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clustering algorithm. Process intersection list to discard
|
|
* outlyers. Construct candidate list in cluster order
|
|
* determined by the sum of peer synchronization distance plus
|
|
* scaled stratum. We must find at least one peer.
|
|
*/
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++) {
|
|
peer = peer_list[i];
|
|
if (nlist > 1 && (peer->soffset < low || high <
|
|
peer->soffset))
|
|
continue;
|
|
peer->correct = 1;
|
|
d = peer->synch + ((u_long)peer->stratum <<
|
|
NTP_DISPFACTOR);
|
|
if (j >= NTP_MAXCLOCK) {
|
|
if (d >= synch[j - 1])
|
|
continue;
|
|
else
|
|
j--;
|
|
}
|
|
for (k = j; k > 0; k--) {
|
|
if (d >= synch[k - 1])
|
|
break;
|
|
synch[k] = synch[k - 1];
|
|
peer_list[k] = peer_list[k - 1];
|
|
}
|
|
peer_list[k] = peer;
|
|
synch[k] = d;
|
|
j++;
|
|
}
|
|
nlist = j;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 2)
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++)
|
|
printf("select: candidate %s cdist %s\n",
|
|
ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr),
|
|
fptoa(synch[i], 6));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now, prune outlyers by root dispersion. Continue as long as
|
|
* there are more than NTP_MINCLOCK survivors and the minimum
|
|
* select dispersion is greater than the maximum peer
|
|
* dispersion. Stop if we are about to discard a preferred peer.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++) {
|
|
peer = peer_list[i];
|
|
peer->candidate = i + 1;
|
|
error[i] = peer_list[i]->rootdispersion +
|
|
peer_list[i]->dispersion +
|
|
(sys_clock - peer_list[i]->update);
|
|
}
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
u_fp maxd = 0;
|
|
e = error[0];
|
|
for (k = i = nlist - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
u_fp sdisp = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (j = nlist - 1; j > 0; j--) {
|
|
d = peer_list[i]->soffset
|
|
- peer_list[j]->soffset;
|
|
if (d < 0)
|
|
d = -d;
|
|
sdisp += d;
|
|
sdisp = ((sdisp >> 1) + sdisp) >> 1;
|
|
}
|
|
peer_list[i]->selectdisp = sdisp;
|
|
if (sdisp > maxd) {
|
|
maxd = sdisp;
|
|
k = i;
|
|
}
|
|
if (error[i] < e)
|
|
e = error[i];
|
|
}
|
|
if (nlist <= NTP_MINCLOCK || maxd <= e ||
|
|
peer_list[k]->flags & FLAG_PREFER)
|
|
break;
|
|
for (j = k + 1; j < nlist; j++) {
|
|
peer_list[j - 1] = peer_list[j];
|
|
error[j - 1] = error[j];
|
|
}
|
|
nlist--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 1) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++)
|
|
printf("select: survivor %s offset %s, cdist %s\n",
|
|
ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr),
|
|
lfptoa(&peer_list[i]->offset, 6),
|
|
fptoa(synch[i], 5));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* What remains is a list of not greater than NTP_MINCLOCK
|
|
* peers. We want only a peer at the lowest stratum to become
|
|
* the system peer, although all survivors are eligible for the
|
|
* combining algorithm. First record their order, diddle the
|
|
* flags and clamp the poll intervals. Then, consider the peers
|
|
* at the lowest stratum. Of these, OR the leap bits on the
|
|
* assumption that, if some of them honk nonzero bits, they must
|
|
* know what they are doing. Also, check for prefer and pps
|
|
* peers. If a prefer peer is found within CLOCK_MAX, update the
|
|
* pps switch. Of the other peers not at the lowest stratum,
|
|
* check if the system peer is among them and, if found, zap
|
|
* him. We note that the head of the list is at the lowest
|
|
* stratum and that unsynchronized peers cannot survive this
|
|
* far.
|
|
*/
|
|
leap_consensus = 0;
|
|
for (i = nlist - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
peer_list[i]->select = i + 1;
|
|
peer_list[i]->flags |= FLAG_SYSPEER;
|
|
poll_update(peer_list[i], peer_list[i]->hpoll,
|
|
POLL_RANDOMCHANGE);
|
|
if (peer_list[i]->stratum == peer_list[0]->stratum) {
|
|
leap_consensus |= peer_list[i]->leap;
|
|
if (peer_list[i]->refclktype == REFCLK_ATOM_PPS)
|
|
typepps = peer_list[i];
|
|
if (peer_list[i] == sys_peer)
|
|
typesystem = peer_list[i];
|
|
if (peer_list[i]->flags & FLAG_PREFER) {
|
|
typeprefer = peer_list[i];
|
|
if (typeprefer->soffset >= -CLOCK_MAX_FP &&
|
|
typeprefer->soffset < CLOCK_MAX_FP)
|
|
pps_update = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (peer_list[i] == sys_peer)
|
|
sys_peer = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Mitigation rules of the game. There are several types of
|
|
* peers that make a difference here: (1) prefer local peers
|
|
* (type REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK with FLAG_PREFER) or prefer acts
|
|
* peers (type REFCLK_NIST_ATOM with FLAG_PREFER), (2) pps peers
|
|
* (type REFCLK_ATOM_PPS), (3) remaining prefer peers (flag
|
|
* FLAG_PREFER), (4) the existing system peer, if any, (5) the
|
|
* head of the survivor list. Note that only one peer can be
|
|
* declared prefer. The order of preference is in the order
|
|
* stated. Note that all of these must be at the lowest stratum,
|
|
* i.e., the stratum of the head of the survivor list.
|
|
*/
|
|
osys_peer = sys_peer;
|
|
if (typeprefer && (typeprefer == typelocal || typeprefer ==
|
|
typeacts || !typepps)) {
|
|
sys_peer = typeprefer;
|
|
sys_peer->selectdisp = 0;
|
|
sys_offset = sys_peer->offset;
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug)
|
|
printf("select: prefer offset %s\n",
|
|
lfptoa(&sys_offset, 6));
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else if (typepps) {
|
|
sys_peer = typepps;
|
|
sys_peer->selectdisp = 0;
|
|
sys_offset = sys_peer->offset;
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug)
|
|
printf("select: pps offset %s\n",
|
|
lfptoa(&sys_offset, 6));
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!typesystem)
|
|
sys_peer = peer_list[0];
|
|
clock_combine(peer_list, nlist);
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug)
|
|
printf("select: combine offset %s\n",
|
|
lfptoa(&sys_offset, 6));
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we got a new system peer from all of this, report the
|
|
* event and clamp the system poll interval.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (osys_peer != sys_peer) {
|
|
sys_poll = sys_peer->minpoll;
|
|
report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG, (struct peer *)0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* clock_combine - combine offsets from selected peers
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: this routine uses only those peers at the lowest stratum.
|
|
* Strictly speaking, this is at variance with the spec.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
clock_combine(peers, npeers)
|
|
struct peer **peers;
|
|
int npeers;
|
|
{
|
|
register int i, j, k;
|
|
register u_fp a, b, d;
|
|
u_fp synch[NTP_MAXCLOCK];
|
|
l_fp coffset[NTP_MAXCLOCK];
|
|
l_fp diff;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sort the offsets by synch distance.
|
|
*/
|
|
k = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < npeers; i++) {
|
|
if (peers[i]->stratum > sys_peer->stratum)
|
|
continue;
|
|
d = peers[i]->synch;
|
|
for (j = k; j > 0; j--) {
|
|
if (synch[j - 1] <= d)
|
|
break;
|
|
synch[j] = synch[j - 1];
|
|
coffset[j] = coffset[j - 1];
|
|
}
|
|
synch[j] = d;
|
|
coffset[j] = peers[i]->offset;
|
|
k++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Succesively combine the two offsets with the highest
|
|
* distance and enter the result into the sorted list.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = k - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The possible weights for the most distant offset
|
|
* are 1/2, 1/4, 1/8 and zero. We combine the synch
|
|
* distances as if they were variances of the offsets;
|
|
* the given weights allow us to stay within 16/15 of
|
|
* the optimum combined variance at each step, and
|
|
* within 8/7 on any series.
|
|
*
|
|
* The breakeven points for the weigths are found
|
|
* where the smaller distance is 3/8, 3/16 and 1/16
|
|
* of the sum, respectively.
|
|
*/
|
|
d = synch[i];
|
|
a = (d + synch[i + 1]) >> 2; /* (d1+d2)/4 */
|
|
b = a>>1; /* (d1+d2)/8 */
|
|
if (d <= (b>>1)) /* d1 <= (d1+d2)/16 */
|
|
/*
|
|
* Below 1/16, no combination is done,
|
|
* we just drop the distant offset.
|
|
*/
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The offsets are combined by shifting their
|
|
* difference the appropriate number of times and
|
|
* adding it back in.
|
|
*/
|
|
diff = coffset[i + 1];
|
|
L_SUB(&diff, &coffset[i]);
|
|
L_RSHIFT(&diff);
|
|
if (d >= a + b) { /* d1 >= 3(d1+d2)/8 */
|
|
/*
|
|
* Above 3/8, the weight is 1/2, and the
|
|
* combined distance is (d1+d2)/4
|
|
*/
|
|
d = a;
|
|
} else {
|
|
a >>= 2; /* (d1+d2)/16 */
|
|
L_RSHIFT(&diff);
|
|
if (d >= a + b) { /* d1 >= 3(d1+d2)/16 */
|
|
/*
|
|
* Between 3/16 and 3/8, the weight
|
|
* is 1/4, and the combined distance
|
|
* is (9d1+d2)/16 = d1/2 + (d1+d2)/16
|
|
*/
|
|
d = (d>>1) + a;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Between 1/16 and 3/16, the weight
|
|
* is 1/8, and the combined distance
|
|
* is (49d1+d2)/64 = 3d1/4+(d1+d2)/64
|
|
* (We know d > a, so the shift is safe).
|
|
*/
|
|
L_RSHIFT(&diff);
|
|
d -= (d - a)>>2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now we can make the combined offset and insert it
|
|
* in the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
L_ADD(&diff, &coffset[i]);
|
|
for (j = i; j > 0; j--) {
|
|
if (d >= synch[j - 1])
|
|
break;
|
|
synch[j] = synch[j - 1];
|
|
coffset[j] = coffset[j - 1];
|
|
}
|
|
synch[j] = d;
|
|
coffset[j] = diff;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The result is put where clock_update() can find it.
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_offset = coffset[0];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* fast_xmit - fast path send for stateless (non-)associations
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
fast_xmit(rbufp, rmode, authentic)
|
|
struct recvbuf *rbufp;
|
|
int rmode;
|
|
int authentic;
|
|
{
|
|
struct pkt xpkt;
|
|
register struct pkt *rpkt;
|
|
u_char xmode;
|
|
u_short xkey = 0;
|
|
int docrypt = 0;
|
|
l_fp xmt_ts;
|
|
u_fp precision;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG
|
|
if (debug > 1)
|
|
printf("fast_xmit(%s, %d)\n", ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), rmode);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make up new packet and send it quick
|
|
*/
|
|
rpkt = &rbufp->recv_pkt;
|
|
if (rmode == MODE_ACTIVE)
|
|
xmode = MODE_PASSIVE;
|
|
else
|
|
xmode = MODE_SERVER;
|
|
|
|
if (rbufp->recv_length >= LEN_PKT_MAC) {
|
|
docrypt = rbufp->recv_length - LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
|
|
if (authentic)
|
|
xkey = ntohl(rpkt->keyid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xpkt.li_vn_mode = PKT_LI_VN_MODE(sys_leap,
|
|
PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode), xmode);
|
|
xpkt.stratum = STRATUM_TO_PKT(sys_stratum);
|
|
xpkt.ppoll = max(NTP_MINPOLL, rpkt->ppoll);
|
|
xpkt.precision = sys_precision;
|
|
xpkt.rootdelay = HTONS_FP(sys_rootdelay);
|
|
precision = FP_SECOND >> -(int)sys_precision;
|
|
if (precision == 0)
|
|
precision = 1;
|
|
xpkt.rootdispersion = HTONS_FP(sys_rootdispersion +
|
|
precision + LFPTOFP(&sys_refskew));
|
|
xpkt.refid = sys_refid;
|
|
HTONL_FP(&sys_reftime, &xpkt.reftime);
|
|
xpkt.org = rpkt->xmt;
|
|
HTONL_FP(&rbufp->recv_time, &xpkt.rec);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are encrypting, do it. Else don't. Easy.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (docrypt) {
|
|
int maclen;
|
|
|
|
xpkt.keyid = htonl(xkey);
|
|
auth1crypt(xkey, (U_LONG *)&xpkt, LEN_PKT_NOMAC);
|
|
get_systime(&xmt_ts);
|
|
L_ADDUF(&xmt_ts, sys_authdelay);
|
|
HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
|
|
maclen = auth2crypt(xkey, (U_LONG *)&xpkt, LEN_PKT_NOMAC);
|
|
sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, -9, &xpkt,
|
|
LEN_PKT_NOMAC + maclen);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get xmt timestamp, then send it without mac field
|
|
*/
|
|
get_systime(&xmt_ts);
|
|
HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
|
|
sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, -10, &xpkt,
|
|
LEN_PKT_NOMAC);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Find the precision of this particular machine
|
|
*/
|
|
#define DUSECS 1000000 /* us in a s */
|
|
#define HUSECS (1 << 20) /* approx DUSECS for shifting etc */
|
|
#define MINSTEP 5 /* minimum clock increment (ys) */
|
|
#define MAXSTEP 20000 /* maximum clock increment (us) */
|
|
#define MINLOOPS 5 /* minimum number of step samples */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This routine calculates the differences between successive calls to
|
|
* gettimeofday(). If a difference is less than zero, the us field
|
|
* has rolled over to the next second, so we add a second in us. If
|
|
* the difference is greater than zero and less than MINSTEP, the
|
|
* clock has been advanced by a small amount to avoid standing still.
|
|
* If the clock has advanced by a greater amount, then a timer interrupt
|
|
* has occurred and this amount represents the precision of the clock.
|
|
* In order to guard against spurious values, which could occur if we
|
|
* happen to hit a fat interrupt, we do this for MINLOOPS times and
|
|
* keep the minimum value obtained.
|
|
*/
|
|
int default_get_precision()
|
|
{
|
|
struct timeval tp;
|
|
struct timezone tzp;
|
|
long last;
|
|
int i;
|
|
long diff;
|
|
long val;
|
|
long usec;
|
|
|
|
usec = 0;
|
|
val = MAXSTEP;
|
|
GETTIMEOFDAY(&tp, &tzp);
|
|
last = tp.tv_usec;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < MINLOOPS && usec < HUSECS;) {
|
|
GETTIMEOFDAY(&tp, &tzp);
|
|
diff = tp.tv_usec - last;
|
|
last = tp.tv_usec;
|
|
if (diff < 0)
|
|
diff += DUSECS;
|
|
usec += diff;
|
|
if (diff > MINSTEP) {
|
|
i++;
|
|
if (diff < val)
|
|
val = diff;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
syslog(LOG_INFO, "precision = %d usec", val);
|
|
if (usec >= HUSECS)
|
|
val = MINSTEP; /* val <= MINSTEP; fast machine */
|
|
diff = HUSECS;
|
|
for (i = 0; diff > val; i--)
|
|
diff >>= 1;
|
|
return (i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* init_proto - initialize the protocol module's data
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
init_proto()
|
|
{
|
|
l_fp dummy;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fill in the sys_* stuff. Default is don't listen to
|
|
* broadcasting, don't authenticate.
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_leap = LEAP_NOTINSYNC;
|
|
sys_stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
|
|
sys_precision = (s_char)default_get_precision();
|
|
sys_rootdelay = 0;
|
|
sys_rootdispersion = 0;
|
|
sys_refid = 0;
|
|
L_CLR(&sys_reftime);
|
|
sys_refskew.l_i = NTP_MAXSKEW; sys_refskew.l_f = 0;
|
|
sys_peer = 0;
|
|
sys_poll = NTP_MINPOLL;
|
|
get_systime(&dummy);
|
|
sys_lastselect = sys_clock;
|
|
|
|
sys_bclient = 0;
|
|
sys_bdelay = DEFBROADDELAY;
|
|
sys_authenticate = 0;
|
|
sys_authdelay = DEFAUTHDELAY;
|
|
|
|
sys_stattime = 0;
|
|
sys_badstratum = 0;
|
|
sys_oldversionpkt = 0;
|
|
sys_newversionpkt = 0;
|
|
sys_badlength = 0;
|
|
sys_unknownversion = 0;
|
|
sys_processed = 0;
|
|
sys_badauth = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Default these to enable
|
|
*/
|
|
pll_enable = 1;
|
|
stats_control = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* proto_config - configure the protocol module
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
proto_config(item, value)
|
|
int item;
|
|
u_long value;
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Figure out what he wants to change, then do it
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (item) {
|
|
case PROTO_PLL:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Turn on/off pll clock correction
|
|
*/
|
|
pll_enable = (int)value;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROTO_MONITOR:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Turn on/off monitoring
|
|
*/
|
|
if (value)
|
|
mon_start(MON_ON);
|
|
else
|
|
mon_stop(MON_ON);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROTO_FILEGEN:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Turn on/off statistics
|
|
*/
|
|
stats_control = (int)value;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROTO_BROADCLIENT:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Turn on/off facility to listen to broadcasts
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_bclient = (int)value;
|
|
if (value)
|
|
io_setbclient();
|
|
else
|
|
io_unsetbclient();
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add muliticast group address
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_bclient = 1;
|
|
io_multicast_add(value);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROTO_MULTICAST_DEL:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Delete multicast group address
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_bclient = 1;
|
|
io_multicast_del(value);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROTO_PRECISION:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set system precision
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_precision = (s_char)value;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROTO_BROADDELAY:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set default broadcast delay (s_fp)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sys_bdelay < 0)
|
|
sys_bdelay = -(-value >> 16);
|
|
else
|
|
sys_bdelay = value >> 16;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROTO_AUTHENTICATE:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Specify the use of authenticated data
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_authenticate = (int)value;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PROTO_AUTHDELAY:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set authentication delay (l_fp fraction)
|
|
*/
|
|
sys_authdelay = value;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Log this error
|
|
*/
|
|
syslog(LOG_ERR, "proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld",
|
|
item, value);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* proto_clr_stats - clear protocol stat counters
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
proto_clr_stats()
|
|
{
|
|
sys_badstratum = 0;
|
|
sys_oldversionpkt = 0;
|
|
sys_newversionpkt = 0;
|
|
sys_unknownversion = 0;
|
|
sys_badlength = 0;
|
|
sys_processed = 0;
|
|
sys_badauth = 0;
|
|
sys_stattime = current_time;
|
|
sys_limitrejected = 0;
|
|
}
|