52cd27cb58
struct inpcbgroup. pcbgroups, or "connection groups", supplement the existing inpcbinfo connection hash table, which when pcbgroups are enabled, might now be thought of more usefully as a per-protocol 4-tuple reservation table. Connections are assigned to connection groups base on a hash of their 4-tuple; wildcard sockets require special handling, and are members of all connection groups. During a connection lookup, a per-connection group lock is employed rather than the global pcbinfo lock. By aligning connection groups with input path processing, connection groups take on an effective CPU affinity, especially when aligned with RSS work placement (see a forthcoming commit for details). This eliminates cache line migration associated with global, protocol-layer data structures in steady state TCP and UDP processing (with the exception of protocol-layer statistics; further commit to follow). Elements of this approach were inspired by Willman, Rixner, and Cox's 2006 USENIX paper, "An Evaluation of Network Stack Parallelization Strategies in Modern Operating Systems". However, there are also significant differences: we maintain the inpcb lock, rather than using the connection group lock for per-connection state. Likewise, the focus of this implementation is alignment with NIC packet distribution strategies such as RSS, rather than pure software strategies. Despite that focus, software distribution is supported through the parallel netisr implementation, and works well in configurations where the number of hardware threads is greater than the number of NIC input queues, such as in the RMI XLR threaded MIPS architecture. Another important difference is the continued maintenance of existing hash tables as "reservation tables" -- these are useful both to distinguish the resource allocation aspect of protocol name management and the more common-case lookup aspect. In configurations where connection tables are aligned with hardware hashes, it is desirable to use the traditional lookup tables for loopback or encapsulated traffic rather than take the expense of hardware hashes that are hard to implement efficiently in software (such as RSS Toeplitz). Connection group support is enabled by compiling "options PCBGROUP" into your kernel configuration; for the time being, this is an experimental feature, and hence is not enabled by default. Subject to the limited MFCability of change dependencies in inpcb, and its change to the inpcbinfo init function signature, this change in principle could be merged to FreeBSD 8.x. Reviewed by: bz Sponsored by: Juniper Networks, Inc.
1843 lines
52 KiB
C
1843 lines
52 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2001 McAfee, Inc.
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* Copyright (c) 2006 Andre Oppermann, Internet Business Solutions AG
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Jonathan Lemon
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* and McAfee Research, the Security Research Division of McAfee, Inc. under
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* DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
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* DARPA CHATS research program.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include "opt_inet.h"
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#include "opt_inet6.h"
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#include "opt_ipsec.h"
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#include "opt_pcbgroup.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/limits.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
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#include <sys/md5.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h> /* for proc0 declaration */
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#include <sys/random.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/socketvar.h>
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#include <sys/syslog.h>
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#include <sys/ucred.h>
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#include <vm/uma.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <net/route.h>
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#include <net/vnet.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
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#include <netinet/ip.h>
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#include <netinet/in_var.h>
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#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_options.h>
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#ifdef INET6
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#include <netinet/ip6.h>
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#include <netinet/icmp6.h>
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#include <netinet6/nd6.h>
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#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
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#include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
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#endif
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#include <netinet/tcp.h>
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#include <netinet/tcp_fsm.h>
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#include <netinet/tcp_seq.h>
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#include <netinet/tcp_timer.h>
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#include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
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#include <netinet/tcp_syncache.h>
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#include <netinet/tcp_offload.h>
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#ifdef INET6
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#include <netinet6/tcp6_var.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef IPSEC
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#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
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#ifdef INET6
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#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
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#endif
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#include <netipsec/key.h>
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#endif /*IPSEC*/
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#include <machine/in_cksum.h>
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#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
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static VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_syncookies) = 1;
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#define V_tcp_syncookies VNET(tcp_syncookies)
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SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, syncookies, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&VNET_NAME(tcp_syncookies), 0,
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"Use TCP SYN cookies if the syncache overflows");
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static VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_syncookiesonly) = 0;
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#define V_tcp_syncookiesonly VNET(tcp_syncookiesonly)
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SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, syncookies_only, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&VNET_NAME(tcp_syncookiesonly), 0,
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"Use only TCP SYN cookies");
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#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD_DISABLE
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#define TOEPCB_ISSET(sc) (0)
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#else
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#define TOEPCB_ISSET(sc) ((sc)->sc_toepcb != NULL)
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#endif
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static void syncache_drop(struct syncache *, struct syncache_head *);
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static void syncache_free(struct syncache *);
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static void syncache_insert(struct syncache *, struct syncache_head *);
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struct syncache *syncache_lookup(struct in_conninfo *, struct syncache_head **);
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static int syncache_respond(struct syncache *);
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static struct socket *syncache_socket(struct syncache *, struct socket *,
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struct mbuf *m);
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static void syncache_timeout(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch,
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int docallout);
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static void syncache_timer(void *);
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static void syncookie_generate(struct syncache_head *, struct syncache *,
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u_int32_t *);
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static struct syncache
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*syncookie_lookup(struct in_conninfo *, struct syncache_head *,
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struct syncache *, struct tcpopt *, struct tcphdr *,
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struct socket *);
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/*
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* Transmit the SYN,ACK fewer times than TCP_MAXRXTSHIFT specifies.
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* 3 retransmits corresponds to a timeout of 3 * (1 + 2 + 4 + 8) == 45 seconds,
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* the odds are that the user has given up attempting to connect by then.
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*/
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#define SYNCACHE_MAXREXMTS 3
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/* Arbitrary values */
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#define TCP_SYNCACHE_HASHSIZE 512
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#define TCP_SYNCACHE_BUCKETLIMIT 30
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static VNET_DEFINE(struct tcp_syncache, tcp_syncache);
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#define V_tcp_syncache VNET(tcp_syncache)
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SYSCTL_NODE(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, syncache, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "TCP SYN cache");
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SYSCTL_VNET_UINT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, bucketlimit, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
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&VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.bucket_limit), 0,
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"Per-bucket hash limit for syncache");
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SYSCTL_VNET_UINT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, cachelimit, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
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&VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.cache_limit), 0,
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"Overall entry limit for syncache");
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SYSCTL_VNET_UINT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, count, CTLFLAG_RD,
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&VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.cache_count), 0,
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"Current number of entries in syncache");
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SYSCTL_VNET_UINT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, hashsize, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
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&VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.hashsize), 0,
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"Size of TCP syncache hashtable");
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SYSCTL_VNET_UINT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, rexmtlimit, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.rexmt_limit), 0,
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"Limit on SYN/ACK retransmissions");
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VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_sc_rst_sock_fail) = 1;
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SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, rst_on_sock_fail,
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CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(tcp_sc_rst_sock_fail), 0,
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"Send reset on socket allocation failure");
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static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SYNCACHE, "syncache", "TCP syncache");
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#define SYNCACHE_HASH(inc, mask) \
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((V_tcp_syncache.hash_secret ^ \
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(inc)->inc_faddr.s_addr ^ \
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((inc)->inc_faddr.s_addr >> 16) ^ \
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(inc)->inc_fport ^ (inc)->inc_lport) & mask)
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#define SYNCACHE_HASH6(inc, mask) \
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((V_tcp_syncache.hash_secret ^ \
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(inc)->inc6_faddr.s6_addr32[0] ^ \
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(inc)->inc6_faddr.s6_addr32[3] ^ \
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(inc)->inc_fport ^ (inc)->inc_lport) & mask)
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#define ENDPTS_EQ(a, b) ( \
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(a)->ie_fport == (b)->ie_fport && \
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(a)->ie_lport == (b)->ie_lport && \
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(a)->ie_faddr.s_addr == (b)->ie_faddr.s_addr && \
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(a)->ie_laddr.s_addr == (b)->ie_laddr.s_addr \
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)
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#define ENDPTS6_EQ(a, b) (memcmp(a, b, sizeof(*a)) == 0)
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#define SCH_LOCK(sch) mtx_lock(&(sch)->sch_mtx)
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#define SCH_UNLOCK(sch) mtx_unlock(&(sch)->sch_mtx)
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#define SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch) mtx_assert(&(sch)->sch_mtx, MA_OWNED)
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/*
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* Requires the syncache entry to be already removed from the bucket list.
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*/
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static void
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syncache_free(struct syncache *sc)
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{
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if (sc->sc_ipopts)
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(void) m_free(sc->sc_ipopts);
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if (sc->sc_cred)
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crfree(sc->sc_cred);
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#ifdef MAC
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mac_syncache_destroy(&sc->sc_label);
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#endif
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uma_zfree(V_tcp_syncache.zone, sc);
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}
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void
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syncache_init(void)
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{
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int i;
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V_tcp_syncache.cache_count = 0;
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V_tcp_syncache.hashsize = TCP_SYNCACHE_HASHSIZE;
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V_tcp_syncache.bucket_limit = TCP_SYNCACHE_BUCKETLIMIT;
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V_tcp_syncache.rexmt_limit = SYNCACHE_MAXREXMTS;
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V_tcp_syncache.hash_secret = arc4random();
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TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.hashsize",
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&V_tcp_syncache.hashsize);
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TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.bucketlimit",
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&V_tcp_syncache.bucket_limit);
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if (!powerof2(V_tcp_syncache.hashsize) ||
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V_tcp_syncache.hashsize == 0) {
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printf("WARNING: syncache hash size is not a power of 2.\n");
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V_tcp_syncache.hashsize = TCP_SYNCACHE_HASHSIZE;
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}
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V_tcp_syncache.hashmask = V_tcp_syncache.hashsize - 1;
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/* Set limits. */
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V_tcp_syncache.cache_limit =
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V_tcp_syncache.hashsize * V_tcp_syncache.bucket_limit;
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TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.cachelimit",
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&V_tcp_syncache.cache_limit);
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/* Allocate the hash table. */
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V_tcp_syncache.hashbase = malloc(V_tcp_syncache.hashsize *
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sizeof(struct syncache_head), M_SYNCACHE, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
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/* Initialize the hash buckets. */
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for (i = 0; i < V_tcp_syncache.hashsize; i++) {
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#ifdef VIMAGE
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V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_vnet = curvnet;
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#endif
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TAILQ_INIT(&V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_bucket);
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mtx_init(&V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_mtx, "tcp_sc_head",
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NULL, MTX_DEF);
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callout_init_mtx(&V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_timer,
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&V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_mtx, 0);
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V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_length = 0;
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}
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/* Create the syncache entry zone. */
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V_tcp_syncache.zone = uma_zcreate("syncache", sizeof(struct syncache),
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NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, UMA_ALIGN_PTR, 0);
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uma_zone_set_max(V_tcp_syncache.zone, V_tcp_syncache.cache_limit);
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}
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#ifdef VIMAGE
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void
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syncache_destroy(void)
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{
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struct syncache_head *sch;
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struct syncache *sc, *nsc;
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int i;
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/* Cleanup hash buckets: stop timers, free entries, destroy locks. */
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for (i = 0; i < V_tcp_syncache.hashsize; i++) {
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sch = &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i];
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callout_drain(&sch->sch_timer);
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SCH_LOCK(sch);
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TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash, nsc)
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syncache_drop(sc, sch);
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SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
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KASSERT(TAILQ_EMPTY(&sch->sch_bucket),
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("%s: sch->sch_bucket not empty", __func__));
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KASSERT(sch->sch_length == 0, ("%s: sch->sch_length %d not 0",
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__func__, sch->sch_length));
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mtx_destroy(&sch->sch_mtx);
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}
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KASSERT(V_tcp_syncache.cache_count == 0, ("%s: cache_count %d not 0",
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__func__, V_tcp_syncache.cache_count));
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|
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/* Free the allocated global resources. */
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uma_zdestroy(V_tcp_syncache.zone);
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free(V_tcp_syncache.hashbase, M_SYNCACHE);
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}
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#endif
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|
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/*
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* Inserts a syncache entry into the specified bucket row.
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* Locks and unlocks the syncache_head autonomously.
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*/
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static void
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syncache_insert(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch)
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{
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struct syncache *sc2;
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SCH_LOCK(sch);
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|
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/*
|
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* Make sure that we don't overflow the per-bucket limit.
|
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* If the bucket is full, toss the oldest element.
|
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*/
|
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if (sch->sch_length >= V_tcp_syncache.bucket_limit) {
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KASSERT(!TAILQ_EMPTY(&sch->sch_bucket),
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("sch->sch_length incorrect"));
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sc2 = TAILQ_LAST(&sch->sch_bucket, sch_head);
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syncache_drop(sc2, sch);
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TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_bucketoverflow);
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}
|
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|
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/* Put it into the bucket. */
|
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TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&sch->sch_bucket, sc, sc_hash);
|
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sch->sch_length++;
|
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|
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/* Reinitialize the bucket row's timer. */
|
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if (sch->sch_length == 1)
|
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sch->sch_nextc = ticks + INT_MAX;
|
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syncache_timeout(sc, sch, 1);
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|
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SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
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|
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V_tcp_syncache.cache_count++;
|
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TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_added);
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}
|
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|
|
/*
|
|
* Remove and free entry from syncache bucket row.
|
|
* Expects locked syncache head.
|
|
*/
|
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static void
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syncache_drop(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch)
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{
|
|
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
|
|
|
|
TAILQ_REMOVE(&sch->sch_bucket, sc, sc_hash);
|
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sch->sch_length--;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef TCP_OFFLOAD_DISABLE
|
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if (sc->sc_tu)
|
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sc->sc_tu->tu_syncache_event(TOE_SC_DROP, sc->sc_toepcb);
|
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#endif
|
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syncache_free(sc);
|
|
V_tcp_syncache.cache_count--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Engage/reengage time on bucket row.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
syncache_timeout(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch, int docallout)
|
|
{
|
|
sc->sc_rxttime = ticks +
|
|
TCPTV_RTOBASE * (tcp_backoff[sc->sc_rxmits]);
|
|
sc->sc_rxmits++;
|
|
if (TSTMP_LT(sc->sc_rxttime, sch->sch_nextc)) {
|
|
sch->sch_nextc = sc->sc_rxttime;
|
|
if (docallout)
|
|
callout_reset(&sch->sch_timer, sch->sch_nextc - ticks,
|
|
syncache_timer, (void *)sch);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Walk the timer queues, looking for SYN,ACKs that need to be retransmitted.
|
|
* If we have retransmitted an entry the maximum number of times, expire it.
|
|
* One separate timer for each bucket row.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
syncache_timer(void *xsch)
|
|
{
|
|
struct syncache_head *sch = (struct syncache_head *)xsch;
|
|
struct syncache *sc, *nsc;
|
|
int tick = ticks;
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
CURVNET_SET(sch->sch_vnet);
|
|
|
|
/* NB: syncache_head has already been locked by the callout. */
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the following cycle we may remove some entries and/or
|
|
* advance some timeouts, so re-initialize the bucket timer.
|
|
*/
|
|
sch->sch_nextc = tick + INT_MAX;
|
|
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash, nsc) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We do not check if the listen socket still exists
|
|
* and accept the case where the listen socket may be
|
|
* gone by the time we resend the SYN/ACK. We do
|
|
* not expect this to happens often. If it does,
|
|
* then the RST will be sent by the time the remote
|
|
* host does the SYN/ACK->ACK.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TSTMP_GT(sc->sc_rxttime, tick)) {
|
|
if (TSTMP_LT(sc->sc_rxttime, sch->sch_nextc))
|
|
sch->sch_nextc = sc->sc_rxttime;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sc->sc_rxmits > V_tcp_syncache.rexmt_limit) {
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Retransmits exhausted, "
|
|
"giving up and removing syncache entry\n",
|
|
s, __func__);
|
|
free(s, M_TCPLOG);
|
|
}
|
|
syncache_drop(sc, sch);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_stale);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Response timeout, "
|
|
"retransmitting (%u) SYN|ACK\n",
|
|
s, __func__, sc->sc_rxmits);
|
|
free(s, M_TCPLOG);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(void) syncache_respond(sc);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_retransmitted);
|
|
syncache_timeout(sc, sch, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!TAILQ_EMPTY(&(sch)->sch_bucket))
|
|
callout_reset(&(sch)->sch_timer, (sch)->sch_nextc - tick,
|
|
syncache_timer, (void *)(sch));
|
|
CURVNET_RESTORE();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Find an entry in the syncache.
|
|
* Returns always with locked syncache_head plus a matching entry or NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct syncache *
|
|
syncache_lookup(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct syncache_head **schp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct syncache *sc;
|
|
struct syncache_head *sch;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
|
|
sch = &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[
|
|
SYNCACHE_HASH6(inc, V_tcp_syncache.hashmask)];
|
|
*schp = sch;
|
|
|
|
SCH_LOCK(sch);
|
|
|
|
/* Circle through bucket row to find matching entry. */
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash) {
|
|
if (ENDPTS6_EQ(&inc->inc_ie, &sc->sc_inc.inc_ie))
|
|
return (sc);
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
sch = &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[
|
|
SYNCACHE_HASH(inc, V_tcp_syncache.hashmask)];
|
|
*schp = sch;
|
|
|
|
SCH_LOCK(sch);
|
|
|
|
/* Circle through bucket row to find matching entry. */
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash) {
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6)
|
|
continue;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (ENDPTS_EQ(&inc->inc_ie, &sc->sc_inc.inc_ie))
|
|
return (sc);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(*schp);
|
|
return (NULL); /* always returns with locked sch */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function is called when we get a RST for a
|
|
* non-existent connection, so that we can see if the
|
|
* connection is in the syn cache. If it is, zap it.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
syncache_chkrst(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcphdr *th)
|
|
{
|
|
struct syncache *sc;
|
|
struct syncache_head *sch;
|
|
char *s = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked sch */
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Any RST to our SYN|ACK must not carry ACK, SYN or FIN flags.
|
|
* See RFC 793 page 65, section SEGMENT ARRIVES.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (th->th_flags & (TH_ACK|TH_SYN|TH_FIN)) {
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Spurious RST with ACK, SYN or "
|
|
"FIN flag set, segment ignored\n", s, __func__);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_badrst);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* No corresponding connection was found in syncache.
|
|
* If syncookies are enabled and possibly exclusively
|
|
* used, or we are under memory pressure, a valid RST
|
|
* may not find a syncache entry. In that case we're
|
|
* done and no SYN|ACK retransmissions will happen.
|
|
* Otherwise the RST was misdirected or spoofed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sc == NULL) {
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Spurious RST without matching "
|
|
"syncache entry (possibly syncookie only), "
|
|
"segment ignored\n", s, __func__);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_badrst);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the RST bit is set, check the sequence number to see
|
|
* if this is a valid reset segment.
|
|
* RFC 793 page 37:
|
|
* In all states except SYN-SENT, all reset (RST) segments
|
|
* are validated by checking their SEQ-fields. A reset is
|
|
* valid if its sequence number is in the window.
|
|
*
|
|
* The sequence number in the reset segment is normally an
|
|
* echo of our outgoing acknowlegement numbers, but some hosts
|
|
* send a reset with the sequence number at the rightmost edge
|
|
* of our receive window, and we have to handle this case.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SEQ_GEQ(th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs) &&
|
|
SEQ_LEQ(th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs + sc->sc_wnd)) {
|
|
syncache_drop(sc, sch);
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Our SYN|ACK was rejected, "
|
|
"connection attempt aborted by remote endpoint\n",
|
|
s, __func__);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_reset);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: RST with invalid SEQ %u != "
|
|
"IRS %u (+WND %u), segment ignored\n",
|
|
s, __func__, th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs, sc->sc_wnd);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_badrst);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (s != NULL)
|
|
free(s, M_TCPLOG);
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
syncache_badack(struct in_conninfo *inc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct syncache *sc;
|
|
struct syncache_head *sch;
|
|
|
|
sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked sch */
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
|
|
if (sc != NULL) {
|
|
syncache_drop(sc, sch);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_badack);
|
|
}
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
syncache_unreach(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcphdr *th)
|
|
{
|
|
struct syncache *sc;
|
|
struct syncache_head *sch;
|
|
|
|
sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked sch */
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
|
|
if (sc == NULL)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
/* If the sequence number != sc_iss, then it's a bogus ICMP msg */
|
|
if (ntohl(th->th_seq) != sc->sc_iss)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we've rertransmitted 3 times and this is our second error,
|
|
* we remove the entry. Otherwise, we allow it to continue on.
|
|
* This prevents us from incorrectly nuking an entry during a
|
|
* spurious network outage.
|
|
*
|
|
* See tcp_notify().
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_UNREACH) == 0 || sc->sc_rxmits < 3 + 1) {
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_UNREACH;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
syncache_drop(sc, sch);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_unreach);
|
|
done:
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Build a new TCP socket structure from a syncache entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct socket *
|
|
syncache_socket(struct syncache *sc, struct socket *lso, struct mbuf *m)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inpcb *inp = NULL;
|
|
struct socket *so;
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
int error;
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
INP_INFO_WLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ok, create the full blown connection, and set things up
|
|
* as they would have been set up if we had created the
|
|
* connection when the SYN arrived. If we can't create
|
|
* the connection, abort it.
|
|
*/
|
|
so = sonewconn(lso, SS_ISCONNECTED);
|
|
if (so == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Drop the connection; we will either send a RST or
|
|
* have the peer retransmit its SYN again after its
|
|
* RTO and try again.
|
|
*/
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_listendrop);
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Socket create failed "
|
|
"due to limits or memory shortage\n",
|
|
s, __func__);
|
|
free(s, M_TCPLOG);
|
|
}
|
|
goto abort2;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
mac_socketpeer_set_from_mbuf(m, so);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
|
|
inp->inp_inc.inc_fibnum = so->so_fibnum;
|
|
INP_WLOCK(inp);
|
|
INP_HASH_WLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
|
|
/* Insert new socket into PCB hash list. */
|
|
inp->inp_inc.inc_flags = sc->sc_inc.inc_flags;
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
|
|
inp->in6p_laddr = sc->sc_inc.inc6_laddr;
|
|
} else {
|
|
inp->inp_vflag &= ~INP_IPV6;
|
|
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV4;
|
|
#endif
|
|
inp->inp_laddr = sc->sc_inc.inc_laddr;
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Install in the reservation hash table for now, but don't yet
|
|
* install a connection group since the full 4-tuple isn't yet
|
|
* configured.
|
|
*/
|
|
inp->inp_lport = sc->sc_inc.inc_lport;
|
|
if ((error = in_pcbinshash_nopcbgroup(inp)) != 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Undo the assignments above if we failed to
|
|
* put the PCB on the hash lists.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6)
|
|
inp->in6p_laddr = in6addr_any;
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
inp->inp_laddr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
|
|
inp->inp_lport = 0;
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: in_pcbinshash failed "
|
|
"with error %i\n",
|
|
s, __func__, error);
|
|
free(s, M_TCPLOG);
|
|
}
|
|
INP_HASH_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef IPSEC
|
|
/* Copy old policy into new socket's. */
|
|
if (ipsec_copy_policy(sotoinpcb(lso)->inp_sp, inp->inp_sp))
|
|
printf("syncache_socket: could not copy policy\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
|
|
struct inpcb *oinp = sotoinpcb(lso);
|
|
struct in6_addr laddr6;
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Inherit socket options from the listening socket.
|
|
* Note that in6p_inputopts are not (and should not be)
|
|
* copied, since it stores previously received options and is
|
|
* used to detect if each new option is different than the
|
|
* previous one and hence should be passed to a user.
|
|
* If we copied in6p_inputopts, a user would not be able to
|
|
* receive options just after calling the accept system call.
|
|
*/
|
|
inp->inp_flags |= oinp->inp_flags & INP_CONTROLOPTS;
|
|
if (oinp->in6p_outputopts)
|
|
inp->in6p_outputopts =
|
|
ip6_copypktopts(oinp->in6p_outputopts, M_NOWAIT);
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
|
|
sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(sin6);
|
|
sin6.sin6_addr = sc->sc_inc.inc6_faddr;
|
|
sin6.sin6_port = sc->sc_inc.inc_fport;
|
|
sin6.sin6_flowinfo = sin6.sin6_scope_id = 0;
|
|
laddr6 = inp->in6p_laddr;
|
|
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&inp->in6p_laddr))
|
|
inp->in6p_laddr = sc->sc_inc.inc6_laddr;
|
|
if ((error = in6_pcbconnect_mbuf(inp, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6,
|
|
thread0.td_ucred, m)) != 0) {
|
|
inp->in6p_laddr = laddr6;
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: in6_pcbconnect failed "
|
|
"with error %i\n",
|
|
s, __func__, error);
|
|
free(s, M_TCPLOG);
|
|
}
|
|
INP_HASH_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Override flowlabel from in6_pcbconnect. */
|
|
inp->inp_flow &= ~IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
|
|
inp->inp_flow |= sc->sc_flowlabel;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
#if defined(INET) && defined(INET6)
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
{
|
|
struct in_addr laddr;
|
|
struct sockaddr_in sin;
|
|
|
|
inp->inp_options = (m) ? ip_srcroute(m) : NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (inp->inp_options == NULL) {
|
|
inp->inp_options = sc->sc_ipopts;
|
|
sc->sc_ipopts = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
|
|
sin.sin_addr = sc->sc_inc.inc_faddr;
|
|
sin.sin_port = sc->sc_inc.inc_fport;
|
|
bzero((caddr_t)sin.sin_zero, sizeof(sin.sin_zero));
|
|
laddr = inp->inp_laddr;
|
|
if (inp->inp_laddr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY)
|
|
inp->inp_laddr = sc->sc_inc.inc_laddr;
|
|
if ((error = in_pcbconnect_mbuf(inp, (struct sockaddr *)&sin,
|
|
thread0.td_ucred, m)) != 0) {
|
|
inp->inp_laddr = laddr;
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: in_pcbconnect failed "
|
|
"with error %i\n",
|
|
s, __func__, error);
|
|
free(s, M_TCPLOG);
|
|
}
|
|
INP_HASH_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* INET */
|
|
INP_HASH_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
tp = intotcpcb(inp);
|
|
tp->t_state = TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED;
|
|
tp->iss = sc->sc_iss;
|
|
tp->irs = sc->sc_irs;
|
|
tcp_rcvseqinit(tp);
|
|
tcp_sendseqinit(tp);
|
|
tp->snd_wl1 = sc->sc_irs;
|
|
tp->snd_max = tp->iss + 1;
|
|
tp->snd_nxt = tp->iss + 1;
|
|
tp->rcv_up = sc->sc_irs + 1;
|
|
tp->rcv_wnd = sc->sc_wnd;
|
|
tp->rcv_adv += tp->rcv_wnd;
|
|
tp->last_ack_sent = tp->rcv_nxt;
|
|
|
|
tp->t_flags = sototcpcb(lso)->t_flags & (TF_NOPUSH|TF_NODELAY);
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_NOOPT)
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_NOOPT;
|
|
else {
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_WINSCALE) {
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_REQ_SCALE|TF_RCVD_SCALE;
|
|
tp->snd_scale = sc->sc_requested_s_scale;
|
|
tp->request_r_scale = sc->sc_requested_r_scale;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) {
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_REQ_TSTMP|TF_RCVD_TSTMP;
|
|
tp->ts_recent = sc->sc_tsreflect;
|
|
tp->ts_recent_age = ticks;
|
|
tp->ts_offset = sc->sc_tsoff;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef TCP_SIGNATURE
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SIGNATURE)
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_SIGNATURE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SACK)
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_SACK_PERMIT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_ECN)
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_ECN_PERMIT;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set up MSS and get cached values from tcp_hostcache.
|
|
* This might overwrite some of the defaults we just set.
|
|
*/
|
|
tcp_mss(tp, sc->sc_peer_mss);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the SYN,ACK was retransmitted, reset cwnd to 1 segment.
|
|
* NB: sc_rxmits counts all SYN,ACK transmits, not just retransmits.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sc->sc_rxmits > 1)
|
|
tp->snd_cwnd = tp->t_maxseg;
|
|
tcp_timer_activate(tp, TT_KEEP, tcp_keepinit);
|
|
|
|
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
|
|
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_accepts);
|
|
return (so);
|
|
|
|
abort:
|
|
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
|
|
abort2:
|
|
if (so != NULL)
|
|
soabort(so);
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function gets called when we receive an ACK for a
|
|
* socket in the LISTEN state. We look up the connection
|
|
* in the syncache, and if its there, we pull it out of
|
|
* the cache and turn it into a full-blown connection in
|
|
* the SYN-RECEIVED state.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
syncache_expand(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
|
|
struct socket **lsop, struct mbuf *m)
|
|
{
|
|
struct syncache *sc;
|
|
struct syncache_head *sch;
|
|
struct syncache scs;
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Global TCP locks are held because we manipulate the PCB lists
|
|
* and create a new socket.
|
|
*/
|
|
INP_INFO_WLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
KASSERT((th->th_flags & (TH_RST|TH_ACK|TH_SYN)) == TH_ACK,
|
|
("%s: can handle only ACK", __func__));
|
|
|
|
sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked sch */
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
|
|
if (sc == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* There is no syncache entry, so see if this ACK is
|
|
* a returning syncookie. To do this, first:
|
|
* A. See if this socket has had a syncache entry dropped in
|
|
* the past. We don't want to accept a bogus syncookie
|
|
* if we've never received a SYN.
|
|
* B. check that the syncookie is valid. If it is, then
|
|
* cobble up a fake syncache entry, and return.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!V_tcp_syncookies) {
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Spurious ACK, "
|
|
"segment rejected (syncookies disabled)\n",
|
|
s, __func__);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
bzero(&scs, sizeof(scs));
|
|
sc = syncookie_lookup(inc, sch, &scs, to, th, *lsop);
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
if (sc == NULL) {
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Segment failed "
|
|
"SYNCOOKIE authentication, segment rejected "
|
|
"(probably spoofed)\n", s, __func__);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Pull out the entry to unlock the bucket row. */
|
|
TAILQ_REMOVE(&sch->sch_bucket, sc, sc_hash);
|
|
sch->sch_length--;
|
|
V_tcp_syncache.cache_count--;
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Segment validation:
|
|
* ACK must match our initial sequence number + 1 (the SYN|ACK).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (th->th_ack != sc->sc_iss + 1 && !TOEPCB_ISSET(sc)) {
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: ACK %u != ISS+1 %u, segment "
|
|
"rejected\n", s, __func__, th->th_ack, sc->sc_iss);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The SEQ must fall in the window starting at the received
|
|
* initial receive sequence number + 1 (the SYN).
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((SEQ_LEQ(th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs) ||
|
|
SEQ_GT(th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs + sc->sc_wnd)) &&
|
|
!TOEPCB_ISSET(sc)) {
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: SEQ %u != IRS+1 %u, segment "
|
|
"rejected\n", s, __func__, th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) && (to->to_flags & TOF_TS)) {
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Timestamp not expected, "
|
|
"segment rejected\n", s, __func__);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If timestamps were negotiated the reflected timestamp
|
|
* must be equal to what we actually sent in the SYN|ACK.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((to->to_flags & TOF_TS) && to->to_tsecr != sc->sc_ts &&
|
|
!TOEPCB_ISSET(sc)) {
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: TSECR %u != TS %u, "
|
|
"segment rejected\n",
|
|
s, __func__, to->to_tsecr, sc->sc_ts);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*lsop = syncache_socket(sc, *lsop, m);
|
|
|
|
if (*lsop == NULL)
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_aborted);
|
|
else
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_completed);
|
|
|
|
/* how do we find the inp for the new socket? */
|
|
if (sc != &scs)
|
|
syncache_free(sc);
|
|
return (1);
|
|
failed:
|
|
if (sc != NULL && sc != &scs)
|
|
syncache_free(sc);
|
|
if (s != NULL)
|
|
free(s, M_TCPLOG);
|
|
*lsop = NULL;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
tcp_offload_syncache_expand(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct toeopt *toeo,
|
|
struct tcphdr *th, struct socket **lsop, struct mbuf *m)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tcpopt to;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
bzero(&to, sizeof(struct tcpopt));
|
|
to.to_mss = toeo->to_mss;
|
|
to.to_wscale = toeo->to_wscale;
|
|
to.to_flags = toeo->to_flags;
|
|
|
|
INP_INFO_WLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
rc = syncache_expand(inc, &to, th, lsop, m);
|
|
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
|
|
return (rc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a LISTEN socket and an inbound SYN request, add
|
|
* this to the syn cache, and send back a segment:
|
|
* <SEQ=ISS><ACK=RCV_NXT><CTL=SYN,ACK>
|
|
* to the source.
|
|
*
|
|
* IMPORTANT NOTE: We do _NOT_ ACK data that might accompany the SYN.
|
|
* Doing so would require that we hold onto the data and deliver it
|
|
* to the application. However, if we are the target of a SYN-flood
|
|
* DoS attack, an attacker could send data which would eventually
|
|
* consume all available buffer space if it were ACKed. By not ACKing
|
|
* the data, we avoid this DoS scenario.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
_syncache_add(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
|
|
struct inpcb *inp, struct socket **lsop, struct mbuf *m,
|
|
struct toe_usrreqs *tu, void *toepcb)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
struct socket *so;
|
|
struct syncache *sc = NULL;
|
|
struct syncache_head *sch;
|
|
struct mbuf *ipopts = NULL;
|
|
u_int32_t flowtmp;
|
|
u_int ltflags;
|
|
int win, sb_hiwat, ip_ttl, ip_tos;
|
|
char *s;
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
int autoflowlabel = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
struct label *maclabel;
|
|
#endif
|
|
struct syncache scs;
|
|
struct ucred *cred;
|
|
|
|
INP_INFO_WLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); /* listen socket */
|
|
KASSERT((th->th_flags & (TH_RST|TH_ACK|TH_SYN)) == TH_SYN,
|
|
("%s: unexpected tcp flags", __func__));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Combine all so/tp operations very early to drop the INP lock as
|
|
* soon as possible.
|
|
*/
|
|
so = *lsop;
|
|
tp = sototcpcb(so);
|
|
cred = crhold(so->so_cred);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if ((inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) &&
|
|
(inp->inp_flags & IN6P_AUTOFLOWLABEL))
|
|
autoflowlabel = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
ip_ttl = inp->inp_ip_ttl;
|
|
ip_tos = inp->inp_ip_tos;
|
|
win = sbspace(&so->so_rcv);
|
|
sb_hiwat = so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat;
|
|
ltflags = (tp->t_flags & (TF_NOOPT | TF_SIGNATURE));
|
|
|
|
/* By the time we drop the lock these should no longer be used. */
|
|
so = NULL;
|
|
tp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
if (mac_syncache_init(&maclabel) != 0) {
|
|
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
|
|
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
} else
|
|
mac_syncache_create(maclabel, inp);
|
|
#endif
|
|
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
|
|
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remember the IP options, if any.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (!(inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6))
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
ipopts = (m) ? ip_srcroute(m) : NULL;
|
|
#else
|
|
ipopts = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* See if we already have an entry for this connection.
|
|
* If we do, resend the SYN,ACK, and reset the retransmit timer.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX: should the syncache be re-initialized with the contents
|
|
* of the new SYN here (which may have different options?)
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX: We do not check the sequence number to see if this is a
|
|
* real retransmit or a new connection attempt. The question is
|
|
* how to handle such a case; either ignore it as spoofed, or
|
|
* drop the current entry and create a new one?
|
|
*/
|
|
sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked entry */
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
|
|
if (sc != NULL) {
|
|
#ifndef TCP_OFFLOAD_DISABLE
|
|
if (sc->sc_tu)
|
|
sc->sc_tu->tu_syncache_event(TOE_SC_ENTRY_PRESENT,
|
|
sc->sc_toepcb);
|
|
#endif
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_dupsyn);
|
|
if (ipopts) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we were remembering a previous source route,
|
|
* forget it and use the new one we've been given.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sc->sc_ipopts)
|
|
(void) m_free(sc->sc_ipopts);
|
|
sc->sc_ipopts = ipopts;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update timestamp if present.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) && (to->to_flags & TOF_TS))
|
|
sc->sc_tsreflect = to->to_tsval;
|
|
else
|
|
sc->sc_flags &= ~SCF_TIMESTAMP;
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since we have already unconditionally allocated label
|
|
* storage, free it up. The syncache entry will already
|
|
* have an initialized label we can use.
|
|
*/
|
|
mac_syncache_destroy(&maclabel);
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Retransmit SYN|ACK and reset retransmit count. */
|
|
if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, th, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Received duplicate SYN, "
|
|
"resetting timer and retransmitting SYN|ACK\n",
|
|
s, __func__);
|
|
free(s, M_TCPLOG);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!TOEPCB_ISSET(sc) && syncache_respond(sc) == 0) {
|
|
sc->sc_rxmits = 0;
|
|
syncache_timeout(sc, sch, 1);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndacks);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndtotal);
|
|
}
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sc = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_syncache.zone, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
|
|
if (sc == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The zone allocator couldn't provide more entries.
|
|
* Treat this as if the cache was full; drop the oldest
|
|
* entry and insert the new one.
|
|
*/
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_zonefail);
|
|
if ((sc = TAILQ_LAST(&sch->sch_bucket, sch_head)) != NULL)
|
|
syncache_drop(sc, sch);
|
|
sc = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_syncache.zone, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
|
|
if (sc == NULL) {
|
|
if (V_tcp_syncookies) {
|
|
bzero(&scs, sizeof(scs));
|
|
sc = &scs;
|
|
} else {
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
if (ipopts)
|
|
(void) m_free(ipopts);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fill in the syncache values.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
sc->sc_label = maclabel;
|
|
#endif
|
|
sc->sc_cred = cred;
|
|
cred = NULL;
|
|
sc->sc_ipopts = ipopts;
|
|
bcopy(inc, &sc->sc_inc, sizeof(struct in_conninfo));
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (!(inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6))
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
sc->sc_ip_tos = ip_tos;
|
|
sc->sc_ip_ttl = ip_ttl;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef TCP_OFFLOAD_DISABLE
|
|
sc->sc_tu = tu;
|
|
sc->sc_toepcb = toepcb;
|
|
#endif
|
|
sc->sc_irs = th->th_seq;
|
|
sc->sc_iss = arc4random();
|
|
sc->sc_flags = 0;
|
|
sc->sc_flowlabel = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initial receive window: clip sbspace to [0 .. TCP_MAXWIN].
|
|
* win was derived from socket earlier in the function.
|
|
*/
|
|
win = imax(win, 0);
|
|
win = imin(win, TCP_MAXWIN);
|
|
sc->sc_wnd = win;
|
|
|
|
if (V_tcp_do_rfc1323) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* A timestamp received in a SYN makes
|
|
* it ok to send timestamp requests and replies.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (to->to_flags & TOF_TS) {
|
|
sc->sc_tsreflect = to->to_tsval;
|
|
sc->sc_ts = ticks;
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_TIMESTAMP;
|
|
}
|
|
if (to->to_flags & TOF_SCALE) {
|
|
int wscale = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pick the smallest possible scaling factor that
|
|
* will still allow us to scale up to sb_max, aka
|
|
* kern.ipc.maxsockbuf.
|
|
*
|
|
* We do this because there are broken firewalls that
|
|
* will corrupt the window scale option, leading to
|
|
* the other endpoint believing that our advertised
|
|
* window is unscaled. At scale factors larger than
|
|
* 5 the unscaled window will drop below 1500 bytes,
|
|
* leading to serious problems when traversing these
|
|
* broken firewalls.
|
|
*
|
|
* With the default maxsockbuf of 256K, a scale factor
|
|
* of 3 will be chosen by this algorithm. Those who
|
|
* choose a larger maxsockbuf should watch out
|
|
* for the compatiblity problems mentioned above.
|
|
*
|
|
* RFC1323: The Window field in a SYN (i.e., a <SYN>
|
|
* or <SYN,ACK>) segment itself is never scaled.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (wscale < TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT &&
|
|
(TCP_MAXWIN << wscale) < sb_max)
|
|
wscale++;
|
|
sc->sc_requested_r_scale = wscale;
|
|
sc->sc_requested_s_scale = to->to_wscale;
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_WINSCALE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef TCP_SIGNATURE
|
|
/*
|
|
* If listening socket requested TCP digests, and received SYN
|
|
* contains the option, flag this in the syncache so that
|
|
* syncache_respond() will do the right thing with the SYN+ACK.
|
|
* XXX: Currently we always record the option by default and will
|
|
* attempt to use it in syncache_respond().
|
|
*/
|
|
if (to->to_flags & TOF_SIGNATURE || ltflags & TF_SIGNATURE)
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_SIGNATURE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (to->to_flags & TOF_SACKPERM)
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_SACK;
|
|
if (to->to_flags & TOF_MSS)
|
|
sc->sc_peer_mss = to->to_mss; /* peer mss may be zero */
|
|
if (ltflags & TF_NOOPT)
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_NOOPT;
|
|
if ((th->th_flags & (TH_ECE|TH_CWR)) && V_tcp_do_ecn)
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_ECN;
|
|
|
|
if (V_tcp_syncookies) {
|
|
syncookie_generate(sch, sc, &flowtmp);
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (autoflowlabel)
|
|
sc->sc_flowlabel = flowtmp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (autoflowlabel)
|
|
sc->sc_flowlabel =
|
|
(htonl(ip6_randomflowlabel()) & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do a standard 3-way handshake.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TOEPCB_ISSET(sc) || syncache_respond(sc) == 0) {
|
|
if (V_tcp_syncookies && V_tcp_syncookiesonly && sc != &scs)
|
|
syncache_free(sc);
|
|
else if (sc != &scs)
|
|
syncache_insert(sc, sch); /* locks and unlocks sch */
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndacks);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndtotal);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (sc != &scs)
|
|
syncache_free(sc);
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_dropped);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (cred != NULL)
|
|
crfree(cred);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
if (sc == &scs)
|
|
mac_syncache_destroy(&maclabel);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (m) {
|
|
|
|
*lsop = NULL;
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
syncache_respond(struct syncache *sc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ip *ip = NULL;
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
struct tcphdr *th = NULL;
|
|
int optlen, error = 0; /* Make compiler happy */
|
|
u_int16_t hlen, tlen, mssopt;
|
|
struct tcpopt to;
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
hlen =
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
(sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) ? sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) :
|
|
#endif
|
|
sizeof(struct ip);
|
|
tlen = hlen + sizeof(struct tcphdr);
|
|
|
|
/* Determine MSS we advertize to other end of connection. */
|
|
mssopt = tcp_mssopt(&sc->sc_inc);
|
|
if (sc->sc_peer_mss)
|
|
mssopt = max( min(sc->sc_peer_mss, mssopt), V_tcp_minmss);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: Assume that the entire packet will fit in a header mbuf. */
|
|
KASSERT(max_linkhdr + tlen + TCP_MAXOLEN <= MHLEN,
|
|
("syncache: mbuf too small"));
|
|
|
|
/* Create the IP+TCP header from scratch. */
|
|
m = m_gethdr(M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
|
|
if (m == NULL)
|
|
return (ENOBUFS);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
mac_syncache_create_mbuf(sc->sc_label, m);
|
|
#endif
|
|
m->m_data += max_linkhdr;
|
|
m->m_len = tlen;
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.len = tlen;
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
|
|
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
|
|
ip6->ip6_vfc = IPV6_VERSION;
|
|
ip6->ip6_nxt = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
ip6->ip6_src = sc->sc_inc.inc6_laddr;
|
|
ip6->ip6_dst = sc->sc_inc.inc6_faddr;
|
|
ip6->ip6_plen = htons(tlen - hlen);
|
|
/* ip6_hlim is set after checksum */
|
|
ip6->ip6_flow &= ~IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
|
|
ip6->ip6_flow |= sc->sc_flowlabel;
|
|
|
|
th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip6 + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(INET6) && defined(INET)
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
{
|
|
ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
|
|
ip->ip_v = IPVERSION;
|
|
ip->ip_hl = sizeof(struct ip) >> 2;
|
|
ip->ip_len = tlen;
|
|
ip->ip_id = 0;
|
|
ip->ip_off = 0;
|
|
ip->ip_sum = 0;
|
|
ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
ip->ip_src = sc->sc_inc.inc_laddr;
|
|
ip->ip_dst = sc->sc_inc.inc_faddr;
|
|
ip->ip_ttl = sc->sc_ip_ttl;
|
|
ip->ip_tos = sc->sc_ip_tos;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* See if we should do MTU discovery. Route lookups are
|
|
* expensive, so we will only unset the DF bit if:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1) path_mtu_discovery is disabled
|
|
* 2) the SCF_UNREACH flag has been set
|
|
*/
|
|
if (V_path_mtu_discovery && ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_UNREACH) == 0))
|
|
ip->ip_off |= IP_DF;
|
|
|
|
th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* INET */
|
|
th->th_sport = sc->sc_inc.inc_lport;
|
|
th->th_dport = sc->sc_inc.inc_fport;
|
|
|
|
th->th_seq = htonl(sc->sc_iss);
|
|
th->th_ack = htonl(sc->sc_irs + 1);
|
|
th->th_off = sizeof(struct tcphdr) >> 2;
|
|
th->th_x2 = 0;
|
|
th->th_flags = TH_SYN|TH_ACK;
|
|
th->th_win = htons(sc->sc_wnd);
|
|
th->th_urp = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_ECN) {
|
|
th->th_flags |= TH_ECE;
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_ecn_shs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Tack on the TCP options. */
|
|
if ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_NOOPT) == 0) {
|
|
to.to_flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
to.to_mss = mssopt;
|
|
to.to_flags = TOF_MSS;
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_WINSCALE) {
|
|
to.to_wscale = sc->sc_requested_r_scale;
|
|
to.to_flags |= TOF_SCALE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) {
|
|
/* Virgin timestamp or TCP cookie enhanced one. */
|
|
to.to_tsval = sc->sc_ts;
|
|
to.to_tsecr = sc->sc_tsreflect;
|
|
to.to_flags |= TOF_TS;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SACK)
|
|
to.to_flags |= TOF_SACKPERM;
|
|
#ifdef TCP_SIGNATURE
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SIGNATURE)
|
|
to.to_flags |= TOF_SIGNATURE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
optlen = tcp_addoptions(&to, (u_char *)(th + 1));
|
|
|
|
/* Adjust headers by option size. */
|
|
th->th_off = (sizeof(struct tcphdr) + optlen) >> 2;
|
|
m->m_len += optlen;
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.len += optlen;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TCP_SIGNATURE
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SIGNATURE)
|
|
tcp_signature_compute(m, 0, 0, optlen,
|
|
to.to_signature, IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6)
|
|
ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) + optlen);
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
ip->ip_len += optlen;
|
|
} else
|
|
optlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
M_SETFIB(m, sc->sc_inc.inc_fibnum);
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
|
|
th->th_sum = 0;
|
|
th->th_sum = in6_cksum(m, IPPROTO_TCP, hlen,
|
|
tlen + optlen - hlen);
|
|
ip6->ip6_hlim = in6_selecthlim(NULL, NULL);
|
|
error = ip6_output(m, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(INET6) && defined(INET)
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
{
|
|
th->th_sum = in_pseudo(ip->ip_src.s_addr, ip->ip_dst.s_addr,
|
|
htons(tlen + optlen - hlen + IPPROTO_TCP));
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags = CSUM_TCP;
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = offsetof(struct tcphdr, th_sum);
|
|
error = ip_output(m, sc->sc_ipopts, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
syncache_add(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
|
|
struct inpcb *inp, struct socket **lsop, struct mbuf *m)
|
|
{
|
|
_syncache_add(inc, to, th, inp, lsop, m, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
tcp_offload_syncache_add(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct toeopt *toeo,
|
|
struct tcphdr *th, struct inpcb *inp, struct socket **lsop,
|
|
struct toe_usrreqs *tu, void *toepcb)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tcpopt to;
|
|
|
|
bzero(&to, sizeof(struct tcpopt));
|
|
to.to_mss = toeo->to_mss;
|
|
to.to_wscale = toeo->to_wscale;
|
|
to.to_flags = toeo->to_flags;
|
|
|
|
INP_INFO_WLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
|
|
INP_WLOCK(inp);
|
|
|
|
_syncache_add(inc, &to, th, inp, lsop, NULL, tu, toepcb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The purpose of SYN cookies is to avoid keeping track of all SYN's we
|
|
* receive and to be able to handle SYN floods from bogus source addresses
|
|
* (where we will never receive any reply). SYN floods try to exhaust all
|
|
* our memory and available slots in the SYN cache table to cause a denial
|
|
* of service to legitimate users of the local host.
|
|
*
|
|
* The idea of SYN cookies is to encode and include all necessary information
|
|
* about the connection setup state within the SYN-ACK we send back and thus
|
|
* to get along without keeping any local state until the ACK to the SYN-ACK
|
|
* arrives (if ever). Everything we need to know should be available from
|
|
* the information we encoded in the SYN-ACK.
|
|
*
|
|
* More information about the theory behind SYN cookies and its first
|
|
* discussion and specification can be found at:
|
|
* http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html (overview)
|
|
* http://cr.yp.to/syncookies/archive (gory details)
|
|
*
|
|
* This implementation extends the orginal idea and first implementation
|
|
* of FreeBSD by using not only the initial sequence number field to store
|
|
* information but also the timestamp field if present. This way we can
|
|
* keep track of the entire state we need to know to recreate the session in
|
|
* its original form. Almost all TCP speakers implement RFC1323 timestamps
|
|
* these days. For those that do not we still have to live with the known
|
|
* shortcomings of the ISN only SYN cookies.
|
|
*
|
|
* Cookie layers:
|
|
*
|
|
* Initial sequence number we send:
|
|
* 31|................................|0
|
|
* DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDMMMRRRP
|
|
* D = MD5 Digest (first dword)
|
|
* M = MSS index
|
|
* R = Rotation of secret
|
|
* P = Odd or Even secret
|
|
*
|
|
* The MD5 Digest is computed with over following parameters:
|
|
* a) randomly rotated secret
|
|
* b) struct in_conninfo containing the remote/local ip/port (IPv4&IPv6)
|
|
* c) the received initial sequence number from remote host
|
|
* d) the rotation offset and odd/even bit
|
|
*
|
|
* Timestamp we send:
|
|
* 31|................................|0
|
|
* DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDSSSSRRRRA5
|
|
* D = MD5 Digest (third dword) (only as filler)
|
|
* S = Requested send window scale
|
|
* R = Requested receive window scale
|
|
* A = SACK allowed
|
|
* 5 = TCP-MD5 enabled (not implemented yet)
|
|
* XORed with MD5 Digest (forth dword)
|
|
*
|
|
* The timestamp isn't cryptographically secure and doesn't need to be.
|
|
* The double use of the MD5 digest dwords ties it to a specific remote/
|
|
* local host/port, remote initial sequence number and our local time
|
|
* limited secret. A received timestamp is reverted (XORed) and then
|
|
* the contained MD5 dword is compared to the computed one to ensure the
|
|
* timestamp belongs to the SYN-ACK we sent. The other parameters may
|
|
* have been tampered with but this isn't different from supplying bogus
|
|
* values in the SYN in the first place.
|
|
*
|
|
* Some problems with SYN cookies remain however:
|
|
* Consider the problem of a recreated (and retransmitted) cookie. If the
|
|
* original SYN was accepted, the connection is established. The second
|
|
* SYN is inflight, and if it arrives with an ISN that falls within the
|
|
* receive window, the connection is killed.
|
|
*
|
|
* Notes:
|
|
* A heuristic to determine when to accept syn cookies is not necessary.
|
|
* An ACK flood would cause the syncookie verification to be attempted,
|
|
* but a SYN flood causes syncookies to be generated. Both are of equal
|
|
* cost, so there's no point in trying to optimize the ACK flood case.
|
|
* Also, if you don't process certain ACKs for some reason, then all someone
|
|
* would have to do is launch a SYN and ACK flood at the same time, which
|
|
* would stop cookie verification and defeat the entire purpose of syncookies.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tcp_sc_msstab[] = { 0, 256, 468, 536, 996, 1452, 1460, 8960 };
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
syncookie_generate(struct syncache_head *sch, struct syncache *sc,
|
|
u_int32_t *flowlabel)
|
|
{
|
|
MD5_CTX ctx;
|
|
u_int32_t md5_buffer[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(u_int32_t)];
|
|
u_int32_t data;
|
|
u_int32_t *secbits;
|
|
u_int off, pmss, mss;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
|
|
|
|
/* Which of the two secrets to use. */
|
|
secbits = sch->sch_oddeven ?
|
|
sch->sch_secbits_odd : sch->sch_secbits_even;
|
|
|
|
/* Reseed secret if too old. */
|
|
if (sch->sch_reseed < time_uptime) {
|
|
sch->sch_oddeven = sch->sch_oddeven ? 0 : 1; /* toggle */
|
|
secbits = sch->sch_oddeven ?
|
|
sch->sch_secbits_odd : sch->sch_secbits_even;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SYNCOOKIE_SECRET_SIZE; i++)
|
|
secbits[i] = arc4random();
|
|
sch->sch_reseed = time_uptime + SYNCOOKIE_LIFETIME;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Secret rotation offset. */
|
|
off = sc->sc_iss & 0x7; /* iss was randomized before */
|
|
|
|
/* Maximum segment size calculation. */
|
|
pmss =
|
|
max( min(sc->sc_peer_mss, tcp_mssopt(&sc->sc_inc)), V_tcp_minmss);
|
|
for (mss = sizeof(tcp_sc_msstab) / sizeof(int) - 1; mss > 0; mss--)
|
|
if (tcp_sc_msstab[mss] <= pmss)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* Fold parameters and MD5 digest into the ISN we will send. */
|
|
data = sch->sch_oddeven;/* odd or even secret, 1 bit */
|
|
data |= off << 1; /* secret offset, derived from iss, 3 bits */
|
|
data |= mss << 4; /* mss, 3 bits */
|
|
|
|
MD5Init(&ctx);
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, ((u_int8_t *)secbits) + off,
|
|
SYNCOOKIE_SECRET_SIZE * sizeof(*secbits) - off);
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, secbits, off);
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, &sc->sc_inc, sizeof(sc->sc_inc));
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, &sc->sc_irs, sizeof(sc->sc_irs));
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, &data, sizeof(data));
|
|
MD5Final((u_int8_t *)&md5_buffer, &ctx);
|
|
|
|
data |= (md5_buffer[0] << 7);
|
|
sc->sc_iss = data;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
*flowlabel = md5_buffer[1] & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Additional parameters are stored in the timestamp if present. */
|
|
if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) {
|
|
data = ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_SIGNATURE) ? 1 : 0); /* TCP-MD5, 1 bit */
|
|
data |= ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_SACK) ? 1 : 0) << 1; /* SACK, 1 bit */
|
|
data |= sc->sc_requested_s_scale << 2; /* SWIN scale, 4 bits */
|
|
data |= sc->sc_requested_r_scale << 6; /* RWIN scale, 4 bits */
|
|
data |= md5_buffer[2] << 10; /* more digest bits */
|
|
data ^= md5_buffer[3];
|
|
sc->sc_ts = data;
|
|
sc->sc_tsoff = data - ticks; /* after XOR */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_sendcookie);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct syncache *
|
|
syncookie_lookup(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct syncache_head *sch,
|
|
struct syncache *sc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
|
|
struct socket *so)
|
|
{
|
|
MD5_CTX ctx;
|
|
u_int32_t md5_buffer[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(u_int32_t)];
|
|
u_int32_t data = 0;
|
|
u_int32_t *secbits;
|
|
tcp_seq ack, seq;
|
|
int off, mss, wnd, flags;
|
|
|
|
SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pull information out of SYN-ACK/ACK and
|
|
* revert sequence number advances.
|
|
*/
|
|
ack = th->th_ack - 1;
|
|
seq = th->th_seq - 1;
|
|
off = (ack >> 1) & 0x7;
|
|
mss = (ack >> 4) & 0x7;
|
|
flags = ack & 0x7f;
|
|
|
|
/* Which of the two secrets to use. */
|
|
secbits = (flags & 0x1) ? sch->sch_secbits_odd : sch->sch_secbits_even;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The secret wasn't updated for the lifetime of a syncookie,
|
|
* so this SYN-ACK/ACK is either too old (replay) or totally bogus.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sch->sch_reseed + SYNCOOKIE_LIFETIME < time_uptime) {
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Recompute the digest so we can compare it. */
|
|
MD5Init(&ctx);
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, ((u_int8_t *)secbits) + off,
|
|
SYNCOOKIE_SECRET_SIZE * sizeof(*secbits) - off);
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, secbits, off);
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, inc, sizeof(*inc));
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, &seq, sizeof(seq));
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, &flags, sizeof(flags));
|
|
MD5Final((u_int8_t *)&md5_buffer, &ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* Does the digest part of or ACK'ed ISS match? */
|
|
if ((ack & (~0x7f)) != (md5_buffer[0] << 7))
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Does the digest part of our reflected timestamp match? */
|
|
if (to->to_flags & TOF_TS) {
|
|
data = md5_buffer[3] ^ to->to_tsecr;
|
|
if ((data & (~0x3ff)) != (md5_buffer[2] << 10))
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fill in the syncache values. */
|
|
bcopy(inc, &sc->sc_inc, sizeof(struct in_conninfo));
|
|
sc->sc_ipopts = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sc->sc_irs = seq;
|
|
sc->sc_iss = ack;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
|
|
if (sotoinpcb(so)->inp_flags & IN6P_AUTOFLOWLABEL)
|
|
sc->sc_flowlabel = md5_buffer[1] & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
sc->sc_ip_ttl = sotoinpcb(so)->inp_ip_ttl;
|
|
sc->sc_ip_tos = sotoinpcb(so)->inp_ip_tos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Additional parameters that were encoded in the timestamp. */
|
|
if (data) {
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_TIMESTAMP;
|
|
sc->sc_tsreflect = to->to_tsval;
|
|
sc->sc_ts = to->to_tsecr;
|
|
sc->sc_tsoff = to->to_tsecr - ticks;
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= (data & 0x1) ? SCF_SIGNATURE : 0;
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= ((data >> 1) & 0x1) ? SCF_SACK : 0;
|
|
sc->sc_requested_s_scale = min((data >> 2) & 0xf,
|
|
TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT);
|
|
sc->sc_requested_r_scale = min((data >> 6) & 0xf,
|
|
TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT);
|
|
if (sc->sc_requested_s_scale || sc->sc_requested_r_scale)
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_WINSCALE;
|
|
} else
|
|
sc->sc_flags |= SCF_NOOPT;
|
|
|
|
wnd = sbspace(&so->so_rcv);
|
|
wnd = imax(wnd, 0);
|
|
wnd = imin(wnd, TCP_MAXWIN);
|
|
sc->sc_wnd = wnd;
|
|
|
|
sc->sc_rxmits = 0;
|
|
sc->sc_peer_mss = tcp_sc_msstab[mss];
|
|
|
|
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_recvcookie);
|
|
return (sc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the current number of syncache entries. This number
|
|
* will probably change before you get around to calling
|
|
* syncache_pcblist.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
syncache_pcbcount(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct syncache_head *sch;
|
|
int count, i;
|
|
|
|
for (count = 0, i = 0; i < V_tcp_syncache.hashsize; i++) {
|
|
/* No need to lock for a read. */
|
|
sch = &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i];
|
|
count += sch->sch_length;
|
|
}
|
|
return count;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Exports the syncache entries to userland so that netstat can display
|
|
* them alongside the other sockets. This function is intended to be
|
|
* called only from tcp_pcblist.
|
|
*
|
|
* Due to concurrency on an active system, the number of pcbs exported
|
|
* may have no relation to max_pcbs. max_pcbs merely indicates the
|
|
* amount of space the caller allocated for this function to use.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
syncache_pcblist(struct sysctl_req *req, int max_pcbs, int *pcbs_exported)
|
|
{
|
|
struct xtcpcb xt;
|
|
struct syncache *sc;
|
|
struct syncache_head *sch;
|
|
int count, error, i;
|
|
|
|
for (count = 0, error = 0, i = 0; i < V_tcp_syncache.hashsize; i++) {
|
|
sch = &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i];
|
|
SCH_LOCK(sch);
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash) {
|
|
if (count >= max_pcbs) {
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
}
|
|
if (cr_cansee(req->td->td_ucred, sc->sc_cred) != 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
bzero(&xt, sizeof(xt));
|
|
xt.xt_len = sizeof(xt);
|
|
if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6)
|
|
xt.xt_inp.inp_vflag = INP_IPV6;
|
|
else
|
|
xt.xt_inp.inp_vflag = INP_IPV4;
|
|
bcopy(&sc->sc_inc, &xt.xt_inp.inp_inc, sizeof (struct in_conninfo));
|
|
xt.xt_tp.t_inpcb = &xt.xt_inp;
|
|
xt.xt_tp.t_state = TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED;
|
|
xt.xt_socket.xso_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
xt.xt_socket.xso_len = sizeof (struct xsocket);
|
|
xt.xt_socket.so_type = SOCK_STREAM;
|
|
xt.xt_socket.so_state = SS_ISCONNECTING;
|
|
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &xt, sizeof xt);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
}
|
|
count++;
|
|
}
|
|
SCH_UNLOCK(sch);
|
|
}
|
|
exit:
|
|
*pcbs_exported = count;
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|