freebsd-dev/stand/geli/geliboot.c
Mariusz Zaborski 31f7586d73 Introduce the 'n' flag for the geli attach command.
If the 'n' flag is provided the provided key number will be used to
decrypt device. This can be used combined with dryrun to verify if the key
is set correctly. This can be also used to determine which key slot we want to
change on already attached device.

Reviewed by:	allanjude
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15309
2018-05-09 20:53:38 +00:00

438 lines
11 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2015 Allan Jude <allanjude@FreeBSD.org>
* Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pawel@dawidek.net>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
#include "geliboot_internal.h"
#include "geliboot.h"
SLIST_HEAD(geli_list, geli_entry) geli_head = SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(geli_head);
struct geli_list *geli_headp;
typedef u_char geli_ukey[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN];
static geli_ukey saved_keys[GELI_MAX_KEYS];
static unsigned int nsaved_keys = 0;
/*
* Copy keys from local storage to the keybuf struct.
* Destroy the local storage when finished.
*/
void
geli_fill_keybuf(struct keybuf *fkeybuf)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < nsaved_keys; i++) {
fkeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_type = KEYBUF_TYPE_GELI;
memcpy(fkeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data, saved_keys[i],
G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
}
fkeybuf->kb_nents = nsaved_keys;
explicit_bzero(saved_keys, sizeof(saved_keys));
}
/*
* Copy keys from a keybuf struct into local storage.
* Zero out the keybuf.
*/
void
geli_save_keybuf(struct keybuf *skeybuf)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < skeybuf->kb_nents && i < GELI_MAX_KEYS; i++) {
memcpy(saved_keys[i], skeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data,
G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
explicit_bzero(skeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data,
G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
skeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_type = KEYBUF_TYPE_NONE;
}
nsaved_keys = skeybuf->kb_nents;
skeybuf->kb_nents = 0;
}
static void
save_key(geli_ukey key)
{
/*
* If we run out of key space, the worst that will happen is
* it will ask the user for the password again.
*/
if (nsaved_keys < GELI_MAX_KEYS) {
memcpy(saved_keys[nsaved_keys], key, G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
nsaved_keys++;
}
}
static int
geli_same_device(struct geli_entry *ge, struct dsk *dskp)
{
if (ge->dsk->drive == dskp->drive &&
dskp->part == 255 && ge->dsk->part == dskp->slice) {
/*
* Sometimes slice = slice, and sometimes part = slice
* If the incoming struct dsk has part=255, it means look at
* the slice instead of the part number
*/
return (0);
}
/* Is this the same device? */
if (ge->dsk->drive != dskp->drive ||
ge->dsk->slice != dskp->slice ||
ge->dsk->part != dskp->part) {
return (1);
}
return (0);
}
static int
geli_findkey(struct geli_entry *ge, struct dsk *dskp, u_char *mkey)
{
u_int keynum;
int i;
if (ge->keybuf_slot >= 0) {
if (g_eli_mkey_decrypt_any(&ge->md, saved_keys[ge->keybuf_slot],
mkey, &keynum) == 0) {
return (0);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < nsaved_keys; i++) {
if (g_eli_mkey_decrypt_any(&ge->md, saved_keys[i], mkey,
&keynum) == 0) {
ge->keybuf_slot = i;
return (0);
}
}
return (1);
}
void
geli_init(void)
{
geli_count = 0;
SLIST_INIT(&geli_head);
}
/*
* Read the last sector of the drive or partition pointed to by dsk and see
* if it is GELI encrypted
*/
int
geli_taste(int read_func(void *vdev, void *priv, off_t off, void *buf,
size_t bytes), struct dsk *dskp, daddr_t lastsector)
{
struct g_eli_metadata md;
u_char buf[DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE];
int error;
off_t alignsector;
alignsector = rounddown2(lastsector * DEV_BSIZE, DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE);
if (alignsector + DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE > ((lastsector + 1) * DEV_BSIZE)) {
/* Don't read past the end of the disk */
alignsector = (lastsector * DEV_BSIZE) + DEV_BSIZE
- DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE;
}
error = read_func(NULL, dskp, alignsector, &buf, DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE);
if (error != 0) {
return (error);
}
/* Extract the last 4k sector of the disk. */
error = eli_metadata_decode(buf, &md);
if (error != 0) {
/* Try the last 512 byte sector instead. */
error = eli_metadata_decode(buf +
(DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE - DEV_BSIZE), &md);
if (error != 0) {
return (error);
}
}
if (!(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT)) {
/* The GELIBOOT feature is not activated */
return (1);
}
if ((md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME)) {
/* Swap device, skip it. */
return (1);
}
if (md.md_iterations < 0) {
/* XXX TODO: Support loading key files. */
/* Disk does not have a passphrase, skip it. */
return (1);
}
geli_e = malloc(sizeof(struct geli_entry));
if (geli_e == NULL)
return (2);
geli_e->dsk = malloc(sizeof(struct dsk));
if (geli_e->dsk == NULL)
return (2);
memcpy(geli_e->dsk, dskp, sizeof(struct dsk));
geli_e->part_end = lastsector;
if (dskp->part == 255) {
geli_e->dsk->part = dskp->slice;
}
geli_e->keybuf_slot = -1;
geli_e->md = md;
eli_metadata_softc(&geli_e->sc, &md, DEV_BSIZE,
(lastsector + DEV_BSIZE) * DEV_BSIZE);
SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&geli_head, geli_e, entries);
geli_count++;
return (0);
}
/*
* Attempt to decrypt the device
*/
static int
geli_attach(struct geli_entry *ge, struct dsk *dskp, const char *passphrase,
u_char *mkeyp)
{
u_char key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN], mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN], *mkp;
u_int keynum;
struct hmac_ctx ctx;
int error;
if (mkeyp != NULL) {
memcpy(&mkey, mkeyp, G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN);
explicit_bzero(mkeyp, G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN);
}
if (mkeyp != NULL || geli_findkey(ge, dskp, mkey) == 0) {
goto found_key;
}
g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(&ctx, NULL, 0);
/*
* Prepare Derived-Key from the user passphrase.
*/
if (geli_e->md.md_iterations < 0) {
/* XXX TODO: Support loading key files. */
return (1);
} else if (geli_e->md.md_iterations == 0) {
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, geli_e->md.md_salt,
sizeof(geli_e->md.md_salt));
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, (const uint8_t *)passphrase,
strlen(passphrase));
} else if (geli_e->md.md_iterations > 0) {
printf("Calculating GELI Decryption Key disk%dp%d @ %d"
" iterations...\n", dskp->unit,
(dskp->slice > 0 ? dskp->slice : dskp->part),
geli_e->md.md_iterations);
u_char dkey[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN];
pkcs5v2_genkey(dkey, sizeof(dkey), geli_e->md.md_salt,
sizeof(geli_e->md.md_salt), passphrase,
geli_e->md.md_iterations);
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, dkey, sizeof(dkey));
explicit_bzero(dkey, sizeof(dkey));
}
g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(&ctx, key, 0);
error = g_eli_mkey_decrypt_any(&geli_e->md, key, mkey, &keynum);
if (error == -1) {
explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key));
printf("Bad GELI key: bad password?\n");
return (error);
} else if (error != 0) {
explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key));
printf("Failed to decrypt GELI master key: %d\n", error);
return (error);
} else {
/* Add key to keychain */
save_key(key);
explicit_bzero(&key, sizeof(key));
}
found_key:
/* Store the keys */
bcopy(mkey, geli_e->sc.sc_mkey, sizeof(geli_e->sc.sc_mkey));
bcopy(mkey, geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey, sizeof(geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey));
mkp = mkey + sizeof(geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey);
if ((geli_e->sc.sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) == 0) {
bcopy(mkp, geli_e->sc.sc_ekey, G_ELI_DATAKEYLEN);
} else {
/*
* The encryption key is: ekey = HMAC_SHA512(Data-Key, 0x10)
*/
g_eli_crypto_hmac(mkp, G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN, (const uint8_t *)"\x10", 1,
geli_e->sc.sc_ekey, 0);
}
explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
/* Initialize the per-sector IV. */
switch (geli_e->sc.sc_ealgo) {
case CRYPTO_AES_XTS:
break;
default:
SHA256_Init(&geli_e->sc.sc_ivctx);
SHA256_Update(&geli_e->sc.sc_ivctx, geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey,
sizeof(geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey));
break;
}
return (0);
}
int
is_geli(struct dsk *dskp)
{
SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(geli_e, &geli_head, entries, geli_e_tmp) {
if (geli_same_device(geli_e, dskp) == 0) {
return (0);
}
}
return (1);
}
int
geli_read(struct dsk *dskp, off_t offset, u_char *buf, size_t bytes)
{
u_char iv[G_ELI_IVKEYLEN];
u_char *pbuf;
int error;
off_t dstoff;
uint64_t keyno;
size_t n, nsec, secsize;
struct g_eli_key gkey;
pbuf = buf;
SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(geli_e, &geli_head, entries, geli_e_tmp) {
if (geli_same_device(geli_e, dskp) != 0) {
continue;
}
secsize = geli_e->sc.sc_sectorsize;
nsec = bytes / secsize;
if (nsec == 0) {
/*
* A read of less than the GELI sector size has been
* requested. The caller provided destination buffer may
* not be big enough to boost the read to a full sector,
* so just attempt to decrypt the truncated sector.
*/
secsize = bytes;
nsec = 1;
}
for (n = 0, dstoff = offset; n < nsec; n++, dstoff += secsize) {
g_eli_crypto_ivgen(&geli_e->sc, dstoff, iv,
G_ELI_IVKEYLEN);
/* Get the key that corresponds to this offset. */
keyno = (dstoff >> G_ELI_KEY_SHIFT) / secsize;
g_eli_key_fill(&geli_e->sc, &gkey, keyno);
error = geliboot_crypt(geli_e->sc.sc_ealgo, 0, pbuf,
secsize, gkey.gek_key,
geli_e->sc.sc_ekeylen, iv);
if (error != 0) {
explicit_bzero(&gkey, sizeof(gkey));
printf("Failed to decrypt in geli_read()!");
return (error);
}
pbuf += secsize;
}
explicit_bzero(&gkey, sizeof(gkey));
return (0);
}
printf("GELI provider not found\n");
return (1);
}
int
geli_havekey(struct dsk *dskp)
{
u_char mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN];
SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(geli_e, &geli_head, entries, geli_e_tmp) {
if (geli_same_device(geli_e, dskp) != 0) {
continue;
}
if (geli_findkey(geli_e, dskp, mkey) == 0) {
if (geli_attach(geli_e, dskp, NULL, mkey) == 0) {
return (0);
}
}
}
explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
return (1);
}
int
geli_passphrase(char *pw, int disk, int parttype, int part, struct dsk *dskp)
{
int i;
SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(geli_e, &geli_head, entries, geli_e_tmp) {
if (geli_same_device(geli_e, dskp) != 0) {
continue;
}
/* TODO: Implement GELI keyfile(s) support */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
/* Try cached passphrase */
if (i == 0 && pw[0] != '\0') {
if (geli_attach(geli_e, dskp, pw, NULL) == 0) {
return (0);
}
}
printf("GELI Passphrase for disk%d%c%d: ", disk,
parttype, part);
pwgets(pw, GELI_PW_MAXLEN,
(geli_e->md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS) == 0);
printf("\n");
if (geli_attach(geli_e, dskp, pw, NULL) == 0) {
return (0);
}
}
}
return (1);
}