freebsd-nq/share/man/man4/random.4

.\" Copyright (c) 2001	Mark R V Murray.  All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
.\" ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd October 3, 2004
.Dt RANDOM 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm random
.Nd the entropy device
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Cd "device random"
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
.Nm
device
returns an endless supply of random bytes when read.
It also accepts and reads data
as any ordinary (and willing) file,
but discards data written to it.
The device will probe for
certain hardware entropy sources,
and use these in preference to the fallback,
which is a generator implemented in software.
.Pp
If the device is using
the software generator,
writing data to
.Nm
would perturb the internal state.
This perturbation of the internal state
is the only userland method of introducing
extra entropy into the device.
If the writer has superuser privilege,
then closing the device after writing
will make the software generator reseed itself.
This can be used for extra security,
as it immediately introduces any/all new entropy
into the PRNG.
The hardware generators will generate
sufficient quantities of entropy,
and will therefore ignore user-supplied input.
The software
.Nm
device may be controlled with
.Xr sysctl 8 .
.Pp
To see the current settings of the software
.Nm
device, use the command line:
.Pp
.Dl sysctl kern.random
.Pp
which results in something like:
.Pp
.Bd -literal -offset indent
kern.random.sys.seeded: 1
kern.random.sys.burst: 20
kern.random.sys.harvest.ethernet: 0
kern.random.sys.harvest.point_to_point: 0
kern.random.sys.harvest.interrupt: 0
kern.random.yarrow.gengateinterval: 10
kern.random.yarrow.bins: 10
kern.random.yarrow.fastthresh: 100
kern.random.yarrow.slowthresh: 160
kern.random.yarrow.slowoverthresh: 2
.Ed
.Pp
(These would not be seen if a
hardware generator is present.)
.Pp
All settings are read/write.
.Pp
The
.Va kern.random.sys.seeded
variable indicates whether or not the
.Nm
device is in an acceptably secure state
as a result of reseeding.
If set to 0, the device will block (on read) until the next reseed
(which can be from an explicit write,
or as a result of entropy harvesting).
A reseed will set the value to 1 (non-blocking).
.Pp
The
.Va kern.random.sys.burst
variable instructs the kernel thread
that processes the harvest queue
to
.Xr tsleep 9
briefly after that many events
have been processed.
This helps prevent the random device
from being so compute-bound
that it takes over all processing ability.
A value of 0 (zero) is treated as
.Em infinity ,
and will only allow the kernel to pause
if the queue is empty.
Only values in the range
.Bq 0..20
are accepted.
.Pp
The
.Va kern.random.sys.harvest.ethernet
variable is used to select LAN traffic as an entropy source.
A 0 (zero) value means that LAN traffic
is not considered as an entropy source.
Set the variable to 1 (one)
if you wish to use LAN traffic for entropy harvesting.
.Pp
The
.Va kern.random.sys.harvest.point_to_point
variable is used to select serial line traffic as an entropy source.
(Serial line traffic includes PPP, SLIP and all tun0 traffic.)
A 0 (zero) value means such traffic
is not considered as an entropy source.
Set the variable to 1 (one)
if you wish to use it for entropy harvesting.
.Pp
The
.Va kern.random.sys.harvest.interrupt
variable is used to select hardware interrupts
as an entropy source.
A 0 (zero) value means interrupts
are not considered as an entropy source.
Set the variable to 1 (one)
if you wish to use them for entropy harvesting.
All interrupt harvesting is setup by the
individual device drivers.
.Pp
The other variables are explained in the paper describing the
.Em Yarrow
algorithm at
.Pa http://www.counterpane.com/yarrow.html .
.Pp
These variables are all limited
in terms of the values they may contain:
.Bl -tag -width "kern.random.yarrow.gengateinterval" -compact -offset indent
.It Va kern.random.yarrow.gengateinterval
.Bq 4..64
.It Va kern.random.yarrow.bins
.Bq 2..16
.It Va kern.random.yarrow.fastthresh
.Bq 64..256
.It Va kern.random.yarrow.slowthresh
.Bq 64..256
.It Va kern.random.yarrow.slowoverthresh
.Bq 1..5
.El
.Pp
Internal
.Xr sysctl 3
handlers force the above variables
into the stated ranges.
.Sh RANDOMNESS
The use of randomness in the field of computing
is a rather subtle issue because randomness means
different things to different people.
Consider generating a password randomly,
simulating a coin tossing experiment or
choosing a random back-off period when a server does not respond.
Each of these tasks requires random numbers,
but the random numbers in each case have different requirements.
.Pp
Generation of passwords, session keys and the like
requires cryptographic randomness.
A cryptographic random number generator should be designed
so that its output is difficult to guess,
even if a lot of auxiliary information is known
(such as when it was seeded, subsequent or previous output, and so on).
On
.Fx ,
seeding for cryptographic random number generators is provided by the
.Nm
device,
which provides real randomness.
The
.Xr arc4random 3
library call provides a pseudo-random sequence
which is generally reckoned to be suitable for
simple cryptographic use.
The OpenSSL library also provides functions for managing randomness
via functions such as
.Xr RAND_bytes 3
and
.Xr RAND_add 3 .
Note that OpenSSL uses the
.Nm
device for seeding automatically.
.Pp
Randomness for simulation is required in engineering or
scientific software and games.
The first requirement of these applications is
that the random numbers produced conform to some well-known,
usually uniform, distribution.
The sequence of numbers should also appear numerically uncorrelated,
as simulation often assumes independence of its random inputs.
Often it is desirable to reproduce
the results of a simulation exactly,
so that if the generator is seeded in the same way,
it should produce the same results.
A peripheral concern for simulation is
the speed of a random number generator.
.Pp
Another issue in simulation is
the size of the state associated with the random number generator, and
how frequently it repeats itself.
For example,
a program which shuffles a pack of cards should have 52!\& possible outputs,
which requires the random number generator to have 52!\& starting states.
This means the seed should have at least log_2(52!) ~ 226 bits of state
if the program is to stand a chance of outputting all possible sequences,
and the program needs some unbiased way of generating these bits.
Again,
the
.Nm
device could be used for seeding here,
but in practice, smaller seeds are usually considered acceptable.
.Pp
.Fx
provides two families of functions which are considered
suitable for simulation.
The
.Xr random 3
family of functions provides a random integer
between 0 to
.if t 2\u\s731\s10\d\(mi1.
.if n (2**31)\(mi1.
The functions
.Xr srandom 3 ,
.Xr initstate 3
and
.Xr setstate 3
are provided for deterministically setting
the state of the generator and
the function
.Xr srandomdev 3
is provided for setting the state via the
.Nm
device.
The
.Xr drand48 3
family of functions are also provided,
which provide random floating point numbers in various ranges.
.Pp
Randomness that is used for collision avoidance
(for example, in certain network protocols)
has slightly different semantics again.
It is usually expected that the numbers will be uniform,
as this produces the lowest chances of collision.
Here again,
the seeding of the generator is very important,
as it is required that different instances of
the generator produce independent sequences.
However, the guessability or reproducibility of the sequence is unimportant,
unlike the previous cases.
.Pp
One final consideration for the seeding of random number generators
is a bootstrapping problem.
In some cases, it may be difficult to find enough randomness to
seed a random number generator until a system is fully operational,
but the system requires random numbers to become fully operational.
There is no substitute for careful thought here,
but the
.Fx
.Nm
device,
which is based on the Yarrow system,
should be of some help in this area.
.Pp
.Fx
does also provide the traditional
.Xr rand 3
library call,
for compatibility purposes.
However,
it is known to be poor for simulation and
absolutely unsuitable for cryptographic purposes,
so its use is discouraged.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width ".Pa /dev/random"
.It Pa /dev/random
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr arc4random 3 ,
.Xr drand48 3 ,
.Xr rand 3 ,
.Xr RAND_add 3 ,
.Xr RAND_bytes 3 ,
.Xr random 3 ,
.Xr sysctl 8
.Sh HISTORY
A
.Nm
device appeared in
.Fx 2.2 .
The early version was taken from Theodore Ts'o's entropy driver for Linux.
The current software implementation,
introduced in
.Fx 5.0 ,
is a complete rewrite by
.An Mark R V Murray ,
and is an implementation of the
.Em Yarrow
algorithm by Bruce Schneier,
.Em et al .
The only hardware implementation
currently is for the
.Tn VIA C3 Nehemiah
(stepping 3 or greater)
CPU.
More will be added in the future.
.Pp
The author gratefully acknowledges
significant assistance from VIA Technologies, Inc.