freebsd-nq/usr.sbin/rndcontrol/random.4

.\"
.\" random.c -- A strong random number generator
.\"
.\" Version 0.92, last modified 21-Sep-95
.\" 
.\" Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995.  All rights reserved.
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.Dd October 21, 1995
.Dt RANDOM 4 i386
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm random ,
.Nm urandom
.Nd random number devices
.Sh DESCRIPTION
This device gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
predict by an attacker.
.Ss Theory of operation
Computers are very predictable devices.  Hence it is extremely hard
to produce truly random numbers on a computer \(em as opposed to
pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
algorithm.  Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
applications this is not acceptable.  So instead, we must try to
gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
generate random numbers.  In a Unix environment, this is best done
from inside the kernel.
.Pp
Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
outside observer to measure.  Randomness from these sources are
added to an "entropy pool", which is periodically mixed using the
MD5 compression function in CBC mode.  As random bytes are mixed
into the entropy pool, the routines keep an
.Em estimate
of how many bits of randomness have been stored into the random number
generator's internal state.
.Pp
When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the MD5
hash of a counter plus the contents of the "entropy pool".  The
reason for the MD5 hash is so that we can avoid exposing the
internal state of random number generator.  Although the MD5 hash
does protect the pool, each random byte which is generated from
the pool reveals some information which was derived from the
internal state, and thus increases the amount of information an
outside attacker has available to try to make some guesses about
the random number generator's internal state.  For this reason,
the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many bits of
"true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it outputs
random numbers.
.Pp
If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate random
numbers; however it may now be possible for an attacker to analyze
the output of the random number generator, and the MD5 algorithm,
and thus have some success in guessing the output of the routine.
Phil Karn (who devised this mechanism of using MD5 plus a counter
to extract random numbers from an entropy pool) calls this
"practical randomness", since in the worse case this is equivalent
to hashing MD5 with a counter and an undisclosed secret.  If MD5 is
a strong cryptographic hash, this should be fairly resistant to attack.
.Ss Exported interfaces \(em output
There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
be used from within the kernel:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Pa -compact
.It Pa void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
.El
.Pp
This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
and place it in the requested buffer.
.Pp
The two other interfaces are two character devices
.Pa /dev/random
and
.Pa /dev/urandom .
The
.Pa /dev/random
device is suitable for use when very high quality randomness is desired
(e.g. for key generation), as it will only return a maximum
of the number of bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number
generator) contained in the entropy pool.
.Pp
The
.Pa /dev/urandom
device does not have this limit, and will return as many bytes as are
requested.  As more and more random bytes are requested without giving
time for the entropy pool to recharge, this will result in lower quality
random numbers.  For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
.Ss Exported interfaces \(em input
The two current exported interfaces for gathering environmental
noise from the devices are:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Pa -compact
.It Pa void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode);
.It Pa void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
.El
.Pp
The first function uses the inter-keypress timing, as well as the
scancode as random inputs into the "entropy pool".
.Pp
The second function uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
inputs to the entropy pool.  Note that not all interrupts are good
sources of randomness!  For example, the timer interrupts is not a
good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is too
regular, and hence predictable to an attacker.  Disk interrupts are
a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
unpredictable.  The routines try to estimate how many bits of
randomness a particular interrupt channel offers, by keeping track
of the first and second order deltas in the interrupt timings.
.Sh ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The original core code was written by
.An Theodore Ts'o ,
and was intended
for the Linux platform. This was ported to
.Bx Free
by
.An Mark Murray ,
who also wrote the
.Xr rndcontrol 8
utility.
.Pp
Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
from the Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from
private discussions with Phil Karn.  This design has been further
modified by myself, so any flaws are solely my responsibility, and
should not be attributed to the authors of PGP or to Phil.
.Pp
The code for MD5 transform was taken from Colin Plumb's
implementation, which has been placed in the public domain.  The
MD5 cryptographic checksum was devised by Ronald Rivest, and is
documented in RFC 1321, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm".
.Pp
Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
.Sh "SEE ALSO"
.Xr rndcontrol 8
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Pa -compact
.It Pa /dev/random
.It Pa /dev/urandom
.El
.Sh HISTORY
The
.Pa random ,
.Pa urandom
files appeared in
.Fx 2.1.5 .