freebsd-nq/sys/kern/kern_proc.c

3458 lines
82 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)kern_proc.c 8.7 (Berkeley) 2/14/95
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
2003-06-11 00:56:59 +00:00
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_ddb.h"
#include "opt_ktrace.h"
#include "opt_kstack_pages.h"
#include "opt_stack.h"
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/bitstring.h>
#include <sys/elf.h>
#include <sys/eventhandler.h>
#include <sys/exec.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/limits.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/loginclass.h>
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/refcount.h>
#include <sys/resourcevar.h>
Switch the vm_object mutex to be a rwlock. This will enable in the future further optimizations where the vm_object lock will be held in read mode most of the time the page cache resident pool of pages are accessed for reading purposes. The change is mostly mechanical but few notes are reported: * The KPI changes as follow: - VM_OBJECT_LOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_WLOCK() - VM_OBJECT_TRYLOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_TRYWLOCK() - VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK() - VM_OBJECT_LOCK_ASSERT(MA_OWNED) -> VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_WLOCKED() (in order to avoid visibility of implementation details) - The read-mode operations are added: VM_OBJECT_RLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_TRYRLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_RLOCKED(), VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_LOCKED() * The vm/vm_pager.h namespace pollution avoidance (forcing requiring sys/mutex.h in consumers directly to cater its inlining functions using VM_OBJECT_LOCK()) imposes that all the vm/vm_pager.h consumers now must include also sys/rwlock.h. * zfs requires a quite convoluted fix to include FreeBSD rwlocks into the compat layer because the name clash between FreeBSD and solaris versions must be avoided. At this purpose zfs redefines the vm_object locking functions directly, isolating the FreeBSD components in specific compat stubs. The KPI results heavilly broken by this commit. Thirdy part ports must be updated accordingly (I can think off-hand of VirtualBox, for example). Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon storage division Reviewed by: jeff Reviewed by: pjd (ZFS specific review) Discussed with: alc Tested by: pho
2013-03-09 02:32:23 +00:00
#include <sys/rwlock.h>
#include <sys/sbuf.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/sched.h>
#include <sys/smp.h>
#include <sys/stack.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/dtrace_bsd.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
#include <sys/tty.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef KTRACE
#include <sys/ktrace.h>
#endif
#ifdef DDB
#include <ddb/ddb.h>
#endif
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/vm_param.h>
#include <vm/vm_extern.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
#include <vm/vm_map.h>
#include <vm/vm_object.h>
#include <vm/vm_page.h>
#include <vm/uma.h>
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
#include <fs/devfs/devfs.h>
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
#include <compat/freebsd32/freebsd32.h>
#include <compat/freebsd32/freebsd32_util.h>
#endif
SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(proc);
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SESSION, "session", "session header");
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PROC, "proc", "Proc structures");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SUBPROC, "subproc", "Proc sub-structures");
static void doenterpgrp(struct proc *, struct pgrp *);
static void orphanpg(struct pgrp *pg);
static void fill_kinfo_aggregate(struct proc *p, struct kinfo_proc *kp);
static void fill_kinfo_proc_only(struct proc *p, struct kinfo_proc *kp);
static void fill_kinfo_thread(struct thread *td, struct kinfo_proc *kp,
int preferthread);
static void pgdelete(struct pgrp *);
static int pgrp_init(void *mem, int size, int flags);
static int proc_ctor(void *mem, int size, void *arg, int flags);
static void proc_dtor(void *mem, int size, void *arg);
static int proc_init(void *mem, int size, int flags);
static void proc_fini(void *mem, int size);
static void pargs_free(struct pargs *pa);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Other process lists
*/
struct pidhashhead *pidhashtbl = NULL;
struct sx *pidhashtbl_lock;
u_long pidhash;
u_long pidhashlock;
struct pgrphashhead *pgrphashtbl;
u_long pgrphash;
struct proclist allproc = LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(allproc);
struct sx __exclusive_cache_line allproc_lock;
struct sx __exclusive_cache_line proctree_lock;
struct mtx __exclusive_cache_line ppeers_lock;
struct mtx __exclusive_cache_line procid_lock;
uma_zone_t proc_zone;
uma_zone_t pgrp_zone;
/*
* The offset of various fields in struct proc and struct thread.
* These are used by kernel debuggers to enumerate kernel threads and
* processes.
*/
const int proc_off_p_pid = offsetof(struct proc, p_pid);
const int proc_off_p_comm = offsetof(struct proc, p_comm);
const int proc_off_p_list = offsetof(struct proc, p_list);
const int proc_off_p_hash = offsetof(struct proc, p_hash);
const int proc_off_p_threads = offsetof(struct proc, p_threads);
const int thread_off_td_tid = offsetof(struct thread, td_tid);
const int thread_off_td_name = offsetof(struct thread, td_name);
const int thread_off_td_oncpu = offsetof(struct thread, td_oncpu);
const int thread_off_td_pcb = offsetof(struct thread, td_pcb);
const int thread_off_td_plist = offsetof(struct thread, td_plist);
EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DEFINE(process_ctor);
EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DEFINE(process_dtor);
EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DEFINE(process_init);
EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DEFINE(process_fini);
EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DEFINE(process_exit);
EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DEFINE(process_fork);
EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DEFINE(process_exec);
int kstack_pages = KSTACK_PAGES;
SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, kstack_pages, CTLFLAG_RD, &kstack_pages, 0,
2010-11-14 16:10:15 +00:00
"Kernel stack size in pages");
static int vmmap_skip_res_cnt = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, proc_vmmap_skip_resident_count, CTLFLAG_RW,
&vmmap_skip_res_cnt, 0,
"Skip calculation of the pages resident count in kern.proc.vmmap");
CTASSERT(sizeof(struct kinfo_proc) == KINFO_PROC_SIZE);
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
CTASSERT(sizeof(struct kinfo_proc32) == KINFO_PROC32_SIZE);
#endif
/*
* Initialize global process hashing structures.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
void
procinit(void)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
u_long i;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
sx_init(&allproc_lock, "allproc");
sx_init(&proctree_lock, "proctree");
mtx_init(&ppeers_lock, "p_peers", NULL, MTX_DEF);
mtx_init(&procid_lock, "procid", NULL, MTX_DEF);
pidhashtbl = hashinit(maxproc / 4, M_PROC, &pidhash);
pidhashlock = (pidhash + 1) / 64;
if (pidhashlock > 0)
pidhashlock--;
pidhashtbl_lock = malloc(sizeof(*pidhashtbl_lock) * (pidhashlock + 1),
M_PROC, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
for (i = 0; i < pidhashlock + 1; i++)
sx_init_flags(&pidhashtbl_lock[i], "pidhash", SX_DUPOK);
pgrphashtbl = hashinit(maxproc / 4, M_PROC, &pgrphash);
proc_zone = uma_zcreate("PROC", sched_sizeof_proc(),
proc_ctor, proc_dtor, proc_init, proc_fini,
UMA_ALIGN_PTR, UMA_ZONE_NOFREE);
pgrp_zone = uma_zcreate("PGRP", sizeof(struct pgrp), NULL, NULL,
pgrp_init, NULL, UMA_ALIGN_PTR, UMA_ZONE_NOFREE);
uihashinit();
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
/*
* Prepare a proc for use.
*/
static int
proc_ctor(void *mem, int size, void *arg, int flags)
{
struct proc *p;
struct thread *td;
p = (struct proc *)mem;
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
kdtrace_proc_ctor(p);
#endif
EVENTHANDLER_DIRECT_INVOKE(process_ctor, p);
td = FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p);
if (td != NULL) {
/* Make sure all thread constructors are executed */
EVENTHANDLER_DIRECT_INVOKE(thread_ctor, td);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Reclaim a proc after use.
*/
static void
proc_dtor(void *mem, int size, void *arg)
{
struct proc *p;
struct thread *td;
/* INVARIANTS checks go here */
p = (struct proc *)mem;
td = FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p);
if (td != NULL) {
Refactor a bunch of scheduler code to give basically the same behaviour but with slightly cleaned up interfaces. The KSE structure has become the same as the "per thread scheduler private data" structure. In order to not make the diffs too great one is #defined as the other at this time. The KSE (or td_sched) structure is now allocated per thread and has no allocation code of its own. Concurrency for a KSEGRP is now kept track of via a simple pair of counters rather than using KSE structures as tokens. Since the KSE structure is different in each scheduler, kern_switch.c is now included at the end of each scheduler. Nothing outside the scheduler knows the contents of the KSE (aka td_sched) structure. The fields in the ksegrp structure that are to do with the scheduler's queueing mechanisms are now moved to the kg_sched structure. (per ksegrp scheduler private data structure). In other words how the scheduler queues and keeps track of threads is no-one's business except the scheduler's. This should allow people to write experimental schedulers with completely different internal structuring. A scheduler call sched_set_concurrency(kg, N) has been added that notifies teh scheduler that no more than N threads from that ksegrp should be allowed to be on concurrently scheduled. This is also used to enforce 'fainess' at this time so that a ksegrp with 10000 threads can not swamp a the run queue and force out a process with 1 thread, since the current code will not set the concurrency above NCPU, and both schedulers will not allow more than that many onto the system run queue at a time. Each scheduler should eventualy develop their own methods to do this now that they are effectively separated. Rejig libthr's kernel interface to follow the same code paths as linkse for scope system threads. This has slightly hurt libthr's performance but I will work to recover as much of it as I can. Thread exit code has been cleaned up greatly. exit and exec code now transitions a process back to 'standard non-threaded mode' before taking the next step. Reviewed by: scottl, peter MFC after: 1 week
2004-09-05 02:09:54 +00:00
#ifdef INVARIANTS
KASSERT((p->p_numthreads == 1),
("bad number of threads in exiting process"));
KASSERT(STAILQ_EMPTY(&p->p_ktr), ("proc_dtor: non-empty p_ktr"));
Refactor a bunch of scheduler code to give basically the same behaviour but with slightly cleaned up interfaces. The KSE structure has become the same as the "per thread scheduler private data" structure. In order to not make the diffs too great one is #defined as the other at this time. The KSE (or td_sched) structure is now allocated per thread and has no allocation code of its own. Concurrency for a KSEGRP is now kept track of via a simple pair of counters rather than using KSE structures as tokens. Since the KSE structure is different in each scheduler, kern_switch.c is now included at the end of each scheduler. Nothing outside the scheduler knows the contents of the KSE (aka td_sched) structure. The fields in the ksegrp structure that are to do with the scheduler's queueing mechanisms are now moved to the kg_sched structure. (per ksegrp scheduler private data structure). In other words how the scheduler queues and keeps track of threads is no-one's business except the scheduler's. This should allow people to write experimental schedulers with completely different internal structuring. A scheduler call sched_set_concurrency(kg, N) has been added that notifies teh scheduler that no more than N threads from that ksegrp should be allowed to be on concurrently scheduled. This is also used to enforce 'fainess' at this time so that a ksegrp with 10000 threads can not swamp a the run queue and force out a process with 1 thread, since the current code will not set the concurrency above NCPU, and both schedulers will not allow more than that many onto the system run queue at a time. Each scheduler should eventualy develop their own methods to do this now that they are effectively separated. Rejig libthr's kernel interface to follow the same code paths as linkse for scope system threads. This has slightly hurt libthr's performance but I will work to recover as much of it as I can. Thread exit code has been cleaned up greatly. exit and exec code now transitions a process back to 'standard non-threaded mode' before taking the next step. Reviewed by: scottl, peter MFC after: 1 week
2004-09-05 02:09:54 +00:00
#endif
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes. This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes: - Delegated Administration Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system creation, snapshot creation, etc. - L2ARC Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache. Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly static content. - slog Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up operations like fsync(2). - vfs.zfs.super_owner Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one. - chflags(2) Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work. - ZFSBoot Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK. Submitted by: dfr - Snapshot properties - New failure modes Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one can select from one of three failure modes: - panic - panic on write error - wait - wait for disk to reappear - continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests - Refquota, refreservation properties Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed by children file systems, clones and snapshots. - Sparse volumes ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool. - External attributes Compatible with extattr(2). - NFSv4-ACLs Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet. Submitted by: trasz - Creation-time properties - Regression tests for zpool(8) command. Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
/* Free all OSD associated to this thread. */
osd_thread_exit(td);
td_softdep_cleanup(td);
MPASS(td->td_su == NULL);
/* Make sure all thread destructors are executed */
EVENTHANDLER_DIRECT_INVOKE(thread_dtor, td);
}
EVENTHANDLER_DIRECT_INVOKE(process_dtor, p);
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
kdtrace_proc_dtor(p);
#endif
if (p->p_ksi != NULL)
KASSERT(! KSI_ONQ(p->p_ksi), ("SIGCHLD queue"));
}
/*
* Initialize type-stable parts of a proc (when newly created).
*/
static int
proc_init(void *mem, int size, int flags)
{
struct proc *p;
p = (struct proc *)mem;
mtx_init(&p->p_mtx, "process lock", NULL, MTX_DEF | MTX_DUPOK | MTX_NEW);
mtx_init(&p->p_slock, "process slock", NULL, MTX_SPIN | MTX_NEW);
mtx_init(&p->p_statmtx, "pstatl", NULL, MTX_SPIN | MTX_NEW);
mtx_init(&p->p_itimmtx, "pitiml", NULL, MTX_SPIN | MTX_NEW);
mtx_init(&p->p_profmtx, "pprofl", NULL, MTX_SPIN | MTX_NEW);
cv_init(&p->p_pwait, "ppwait");
TAILQ_INIT(&p->p_threads); /* all threads in proc */
EVENTHANDLER_DIRECT_INVOKE(process_init, p);
p->p_stats = pstats_alloc();
p->p_pgrp = NULL;
return (0);
}
/*
* UMA should ensure that this function is never called.
* Freeing a proc structure would violate type stability.
*/
static void
proc_fini(void *mem, int size)
{
#ifdef notnow
struct proc *p;
p = (struct proc *)mem;
EVENTHANDLER_DIRECT_INVOKE(process_fini, p);
pstats_free(p->p_stats);
thread_free(FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p));
mtx_destroy(&p->p_mtx);
if (p->p_ksi != NULL)
ksiginfo_free(p->p_ksi);
#else
panic("proc reclaimed");
#endif
}
static int
pgrp_init(void *mem, int size, int flags)
{
struct pgrp *pg;
pg = mem;
mtx_init(&pg->pg_mtx, "process group", NULL, MTX_DEF | MTX_DUPOK);
return (0);
}
/*
* PID space management.
*
* These bitmaps are used by fork_findpid.
*/
bitstr_t bit_decl(proc_id_pidmap, PID_MAX);
bitstr_t bit_decl(proc_id_grpidmap, PID_MAX);
bitstr_t bit_decl(proc_id_sessidmap, PID_MAX);
bitstr_t bit_decl(proc_id_reapmap, PID_MAX);
static bitstr_t *proc_id_array[] = {
proc_id_pidmap,
proc_id_grpidmap,
proc_id_sessidmap,
proc_id_reapmap,
};
void
proc_id_set(int type, pid_t id)
{
KASSERT(type >= 0 && type < nitems(proc_id_array),
("invalid type %d\n", type));
mtx_lock(&procid_lock);
KASSERT(bit_test(proc_id_array[type], id) == 0,
("bit %d already set in %d\n", id, type));
bit_set(proc_id_array[type], id);
mtx_unlock(&procid_lock);
}
void
proc_id_set_cond(int type, pid_t id)
{
KASSERT(type >= 0 && type < nitems(proc_id_array),
("invalid type %d\n", type));
if (bit_test(proc_id_array[type], id))
return;
mtx_lock(&procid_lock);
bit_set(proc_id_array[type], id);
mtx_unlock(&procid_lock);
}
void
proc_id_clear(int type, pid_t id)
{
KASSERT(type >= 0 && type < nitems(proc_id_array),
("invalid type %d\n", type));
mtx_lock(&procid_lock);
KASSERT(bit_test(proc_id_array[type], id) != 0,
("bit %d not set in %d\n", id, type));
bit_clear(proc_id_array[type], id);
mtx_unlock(&procid_lock);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Is p an inferior of the current process?
*/
2000-06-23 07:10:34 +00:00
int
inferior(struct proc *p)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_LOCKED);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
for (; p != curproc; p = proc_realparent(p)) {
if (p->p_pid == 0)
return (0);
}
return (1);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
/*
* Shared lock all the pid hash lists.
*/
void
pidhash_slockall(void)
{
u_long i;
for (i = 0; i < pidhashlock + 1; i++)
sx_slock(&pidhashtbl_lock[i]);
}
/*
* Shared unlock all the pid hash lists.
*/
void
pidhash_sunlockall(void)
{
u_long i;
for (i = 0; i < pidhashlock + 1; i++)
sx_sunlock(&pidhashtbl_lock[i]);
}
/*
* Similar to pfind_any(), this function finds zombies.
*/
struct proc *
pfind_any_locked(pid_t pid)
{
struct proc *p;
sx_assert(PIDHASHLOCK(pid), SX_LOCKED);
LIST_FOREACH(p, PIDHASH(pid), p_hash) {
if (p->p_pid == pid) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (p->p_state == PRS_NEW) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
p = NULL;
}
break;
}
}
return (p);
}
/*
* Locate a process by number.
*
* By not returning processes in the PRS_NEW state, we allow callers to avoid
* testing for that condition to avoid dereferencing p_ucred, et al.
*/
static __always_inline struct proc *
_pfind(pid_t pid, bool zombie)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
struct proc *p;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
p = curproc;
if (p->p_pid == pid) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
return (p);
}
sx_slock(PIDHASHLOCK(pid));
LIST_FOREACH(p, PIDHASH(pid), p_hash) {
if (p->p_pid == pid) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (p->p_state == PRS_NEW ||
(!zombie && p->p_state == PRS_ZOMBIE)) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
p = NULL;
}
break;
}
}
sx_sunlock(PIDHASHLOCK(pid));
return (p);
}
struct proc *
pfind(pid_t pid)
{
return (_pfind(pid, false));
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
/*
* Same as pfind but allow zombies.
*/
struct proc *
pfind_any(pid_t pid)
{
return (_pfind(pid, true));
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Locate a process group by number.
* The caller must hold proctree_lock.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
struct pgrp *
pgfind(pid_t pgid)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
struct pgrp *pgrp;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_LOCKED);
LIST_FOREACH(pgrp, PGRPHASH(pgid), pg_hash) {
if (pgrp->pg_id == pgid) {
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (pgrp);
}
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Locate process and do additional manipulations, depending on flags.
*/
int
pget(pid_t pid, int flags, struct proc **pp)
{
struct proc *p;
struct thread *td1;
int error;
p = curproc;
if (p->p_pid == pid) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
} else {
p = NULL;
if (pid <= PID_MAX) {
if ((flags & PGET_NOTWEXIT) == 0)
p = pfind_any(pid);
else
p = pfind(pid);
} else if ((flags & PGET_NOTID) == 0) {
td1 = tdfind(pid, -1);
if (td1 != NULL)
p = td1->td_proc;
}
if (p == NULL)
return (ESRCH);
if ((flags & PGET_CANSEE) != 0) {
error = p_cansee(curthread, p);
if (error != 0)
goto errout;
}
}
if ((flags & PGET_CANDEBUG) != 0) {
error = p_candebug(curthread, p);
if (error != 0)
goto errout;
}
if ((flags & PGET_ISCURRENT) != 0 && curproc != p) {
error = EPERM;
goto errout;
}
if ((flags & PGET_NOTWEXIT) != 0 && (p->p_flag & P_WEXIT) != 0) {
error = ESRCH;
goto errout;
}
if ((flags & PGET_NOTINEXEC) != 0 && (p->p_flag & P_INEXEC) != 0) {
/*
* XXXRW: Not clear ESRCH is the right error during proc
* execve().
*/
error = ESRCH;
goto errout;
}
if ((flags & PGET_HOLD) != 0) {
_PHOLD(p);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
*pp = p;
return (0);
errout:
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
return (error);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Create a new process group.
* pgid must be equal to the pid of p.
* Begin a new session if required.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
int
enterpgrp(struct proc *p, pid_t pgid, struct pgrp *pgrp, struct session *sess)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_XLOCKED);
KASSERT(pgrp != NULL, ("enterpgrp: pgrp == NULL"));
KASSERT(p->p_pid == pgid,
("enterpgrp: new pgrp and pid != pgid"));
KASSERT(pgfind(pgid) == NULL,
("enterpgrp: pgrp with pgid exists"));
KASSERT(!SESS_LEADER(p),
1999-01-10 01:58:29 +00:00
("enterpgrp: session leader attempted setpgrp"));
if (sess != NULL) {
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* new session
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
mtx_init(&sess->s_mtx, "session", NULL, MTX_DEF);
PROC_LOCK(p);
p->p_flag &= ~P_CONTROLT;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
sess->s_leader = p;
sess->s_sid = p->p_pid;
proc_id_set(PROC_ID_SESSION, p->p_pid);
Integrate the new MPSAFE TTY layer to the FreeBSD operating system. The last half year I've been working on a replacement TTY layer for the FreeBSD kernel. The new TTY layer was designed to improve the following: - Improved driver model: The old TTY layer has a driver model that is not abstract enough to make it friendly to use. A good example is the output path, where the device drivers directly access the output buffers. This means that an in-kernel PPP implementation must always convert network buffers into TTY buffers. If a PPP implementation would be built on top of the new TTY layer (still needs a hooks layer, though), it would allow the PPP implementation to directly hand the data to the TTY driver. - Improved hotplugging: With the old TTY layer, it isn't entirely safe to destroy TTY's from the system. This implementation has a two-step destructing design, where the driver first abandons the TTY. After all threads have left the TTY, the TTY layer calls a routine in the driver, which can be used to free resources (unit numbers, etc). The pts(4) driver also implements this feature, which means posix_openpt() will now return PTY's that are created on the fly. - Improved performance: One of the major improvements is the per-TTY mutex, which is expected to improve scalability when compared to the old Giant locking. Another change is the unbuffered copying to userspace, which is both used on TTY device nodes and PTY masters. Upgrading should be quite straightforward. Unlike previous versions, existing kernel configuration files do not need to be changed, except when they reference device drivers that are listed in UPDATING. Obtained from: //depot/projects/mpsafetty/... Approved by: philip (ex-mentor) Discussed: on the lists, at BSDCan, at the DevSummit Sponsored by: Snow B.V., the Netherlands dcons(4) fixed by: kan
2008-08-20 08:31:58 +00:00
refcount_init(&sess->s_count, 1);
sess->s_ttyvp = NULL;
sess->s_ttydp = NULL;
sess->s_ttyp = NULL;
bcopy(p->p_session->s_login, sess->s_login,
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
sizeof(sess->s_login));
pgrp->pg_session = sess;
KASSERT(p == curproc,
("enterpgrp: mksession and p != curproc"));
} else {
pgrp->pg_session = p->p_session;
Integrate the new MPSAFE TTY layer to the FreeBSD operating system. The last half year I've been working on a replacement TTY layer for the FreeBSD kernel. The new TTY layer was designed to improve the following: - Improved driver model: The old TTY layer has a driver model that is not abstract enough to make it friendly to use. A good example is the output path, where the device drivers directly access the output buffers. This means that an in-kernel PPP implementation must always convert network buffers into TTY buffers. If a PPP implementation would be built on top of the new TTY layer (still needs a hooks layer, though), it would allow the PPP implementation to directly hand the data to the TTY driver. - Improved hotplugging: With the old TTY layer, it isn't entirely safe to destroy TTY's from the system. This implementation has a two-step destructing design, where the driver first abandons the TTY. After all threads have left the TTY, the TTY layer calls a routine in the driver, which can be used to free resources (unit numbers, etc). The pts(4) driver also implements this feature, which means posix_openpt() will now return PTY's that are created on the fly. - Improved performance: One of the major improvements is the per-TTY mutex, which is expected to improve scalability when compared to the old Giant locking. Another change is the unbuffered copying to userspace, which is both used on TTY device nodes and PTY masters. Upgrading should be quite straightforward. Unlike previous versions, existing kernel configuration files do not need to be changed, except when they reference device drivers that are listed in UPDATING. Obtained from: //depot/projects/mpsafetty/... Approved by: philip (ex-mentor) Discussed: on the lists, at BSDCan, at the DevSummit Sponsored by: Snow B.V., the Netherlands dcons(4) fixed by: kan
2008-08-20 08:31:58 +00:00
sess_hold(pgrp->pg_session);
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
}
pgrp->pg_id = pgid;
proc_id_set(PROC_ID_GROUP, p->p_pid);
LIST_INIT(&pgrp->pg_members);
pgrp->pg_flags = 0;
/*
* As we have an exclusive lock of proctree_lock,
* this should not deadlock.
*/
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(PGRPHASH(pgid), pgrp, pg_hash);
SLIST_INIT(&pgrp->pg_sigiolst);
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
doenterpgrp(p, pgrp);
return (0);
}
/*
* Move p to an existing process group
*/
int
enterthispgrp(struct proc *p, struct pgrp *pgrp)
{
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_XLOCKED);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(p->p_pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
SESS_LOCK_ASSERT(p->p_session, MA_NOTOWNED);
KASSERT(pgrp->pg_session == p->p_session,
("%s: pgrp's session %p, p->p_session %p proc %p\n",
__func__, pgrp->pg_session, p->p_session, p));
KASSERT(pgrp != p->p_pgrp,
("%s: p %p belongs to pgrp %p", __func__, p, pgrp));
doenterpgrp(p, pgrp);
return (0);
}
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
/*
* If true, any child of q which belongs to group pgrp, qualifies the
* process group pgrp as not orphaned.
*/
static bool
isjobproc(struct proc *q, struct pgrp *pgrp)
{
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_LOCKED);
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
return (q->p_pgrp != pgrp &&
q->p_pgrp->pg_session == pgrp->pg_session);
}
static struct proc *
jobc_reaper(struct proc *p)
{
struct proc *pp;
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SA_LOCKED);
for (pp = p;;) {
pp = pp->p_reaper;
if (pp->p_reaper == pp ||
(pp->p_treeflag & P_TREE_GRPEXITED) == 0)
return (pp);
}
}
static struct proc *
jobc_parent(struct proc *p, struct proc *p_exiting)
{
struct proc *pp;
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SA_LOCKED);
pp = proc_realparent(p);
if (pp->p_pptr == NULL || pp == p_exiting ||
(pp->p_treeflag & P_TREE_GRPEXITED) == 0)
return (pp);
return (jobc_reaper(pp));
}
static int
pgrp_calc_jobc(struct pgrp *pgrp)
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
{
struct proc *q;
int cnt;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
if (!mtx_owned(&pgrp->pg_mtx))
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SA_LOCKED);
#endif
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
cnt = 0;
LIST_FOREACH(q, &pgrp->pg_members, p_pglist) {
if ((q->p_treeflag & P_TREE_GRPEXITED) != 0 ||
q->p_pptr == NULL)
continue;
if (isjobproc(jobc_parent(q, NULL), pgrp))
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
cnt++;
}
return (cnt);
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
}
/*
* Move p to a process group
*/
static void
doenterpgrp(struct proc *p, struct pgrp *pgrp)
{
struct pgrp *savepgrp;
struct proc *pp;
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_XLOCKED);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(p->p_pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
SESS_LOCK_ASSERT(p->p_session, MA_NOTOWNED);
savepgrp = p->p_pgrp;
pp = jobc_parent(p, NULL);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
PGRP_LOCK(savepgrp);
if (isjobproc(pp, savepgrp) && pgrp_calc_jobc(savepgrp) == 1)
orphanpg(savepgrp);
PROC_LOCK(p);
LIST_REMOVE(p, p_pglist);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
p->p_pgrp = pgrp;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&pgrp->pg_members, p, p_pglist);
if (isjobproc(pp, pgrp))
pgrp->pg_flags &= ~PGRP_ORPHANED;
PGRP_UNLOCK(savepgrp);
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
if (LIST_EMPTY(&savepgrp->pg_members))
pgdelete(savepgrp);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
/*
* remove process from process group
*/
int
leavepgrp(struct proc *p)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
struct pgrp *savepgrp;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_XLOCKED);
savepgrp = p->p_pgrp;
PGRP_LOCK(savepgrp);
PROC_LOCK(p);
LIST_REMOVE(p, p_pglist);
p->p_pgrp = NULL;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
PGRP_UNLOCK(savepgrp);
if (LIST_EMPTY(&savepgrp->pg_members))
pgdelete(savepgrp);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (0);
}
/*
* delete a process group
*/
static void
pgdelete(struct pgrp *pgrp)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
struct session *savesess;
Integrate the new MPSAFE TTY layer to the FreeBSD operating system. The last half year I've been working on a replacement TTY layer for the FreeBSD kernel. The new TTY layer was designed to improve the following: - Improved driver model: The old TTY layer has a driver model that is not abstract enough to make it friendly to use. A good example is the output path, where the device drivers directly access the output buffers. This means that an in-kernel PPP implementation must always convert network buffers into TTY buffers. If a PPP implementation would be built on top of the new TTY layer (still needs a hooks layer, though), it would allow the PPP implementation to directly hand the data to the TTY driver. - Improved hotplugging: With the old TTY layer, it isn't entirely safe to destroy TTY's from the system. This implementation has a two-step destructing design, where the driver first abandons the TTY. After all threads have left the TTY, the TTY layer calls a routine in the driver, which can be used to free resources (unit numbers, etc). The pts(4) driver also implements this feature, which means posix_openpt() will now return PTY's that are created on the fly. - Improved performance: One of the major improvements is the per-TTY mutex, which is expected to improve scalability when compared to the old Giant locking. Another change is the unbuffered copying to userspace, which is both used on TTY device nodes and PTY masters. Upgrading should be quite straightforward. Unlike previous versions, existing kernel configuration files do not need to be changed, except when they reference device drivers that are listed in UPDATING. Obtained from: //depot/projects/mpsafetty/... Approved by: philip (ex-mentor) Discussed: on the lists, at BSDCan, at the DevSummit Sponsored by: Snow B.V., the Netherlands dcons(4) fixed by: kan
2008-08-20 08:31:58 +00:00
struct tty *tp;
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_XLOCKED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
SESS_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp->pg_session, MA_NOTOWNED);
/*
* Reset any sigio structures pointing to us as a result of
* F_SETOWN with our pgid. The proctree lock ensures that
* new sigio structures will not be added after this point.
*/
funsetownlst(&pgrp->pg_sigiolst);
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
Integrate the new MPSAFE TTY layer to the FreeBSD operating system. The last half year I've been working on a replacement TTY layer for the FreeBSD kernel. The new TTY layer was designed to improve the following: - Improved driver model: The old TTY layer has a driver model that is not abstract enough to make it friendly to use. A good example is the output path, where the device drivers directly access the output buffers. This means that an in-kernel PPP implementation must always convert network buffers into TTY buffers. If a PPP implementation would be built on top of the new TTY layer (still needs a hooks layer, though), it would allow the PPP implementation to directly hand the data to the TTY driver. - Improved hotplugging: With the old TTY layer, it isn't entirely safe to destroy TTY's from the system. This implementation has a two-step destructing design, where the driver first abandons the TTY. After all threads have left the TTY, the TTY layer calls a routine in the driver, which can be used to free resources (unit numbers, etc). The pts(4) driver also implements this feature, which means posix_openpt() will now return PTY's that are created on the fly. - Improved performance: One of the major improvements is the per-TTY mutex, which is expected to improve scalability when compared to the old Giant locking. Another change is the unbuffered copying to userspace, which is both used on TTY device nodes and PTY masters. Upgrading should be quite straightforward. Unlike previous versions, existing kernel configuration files do not need to be changed, except when they reference device drivers that are listed in UPDATING. Obtained from: //depot/projects/mpsafetty/... Approved by: philip (ex-mentor) Discussed: on the lists, at BSDCan, at the DevSummit Sponsored by: Snow B.V., the Netherlands dcons(4) fixed by: kan
2008-08-20 08:31:58 +00:00
tp = pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp;
LIST_REMOVE(pgrp, pg_hash);
savesess = pgrp->pg_session;
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
Integrate the new MPSAFE TTY layer to the FreeBSD operating system. The last half year I've been working on a replacement TTY layer for the FreeBSD kernel. The new TTY layer was designed to improve the following: - Improved driver model: The old TTY layer has a driver model that is not abstract enough to make it friendly to use. A good example is the output path, where the device drivers directly access the output buffers. This means that an in-kernel PPP implementation must always convert network buffers into TTY buffers. If a PPP implementation would be built on top of the new TTY layer (still needs a hooks layer, though), it would allow the PPP implementation to directly hand the data to the TTY driver. - Improved hotplugging: With the old TTY layer, it isn't entirely safe to destroy TTY's from the system. This implementation has a two-step destructing design, where the driver first abandons the TTY. After all threads have left the TTY, the TTY layer calls a routine in the driver, which can be used to free resources (unit numbers, etc). The pts(4) driver also implements this feature, which means posix_openpt() will now return PTY's that are created on the fly. - Improved performance: One of the major improvements is the per-TTY mutex, which is expected to improve scalability when compared to the old Giant locking. Another change is the unbuffered copying to userspace, which is both used on TTY device nodes and PTY masters. Upgrading should be quite straightforward. Unlike previous versions, existing kernel configuration files do not need to be changed, except when they reference device drivers that are listed in UPDATING. Obtained from: //depot/projects/mpsafetty/... Approved by: philip (ex-mentor) Discussed: on the lists, at BSDCan, at the DevSummit Sponsored by: Snow B.V., the Netherlands dcons(4) fixed by: kan
2008-08-20 08:31:58 +00:00
/* Remove the reference to the pgrp before deallocating it. */
if (tp != NULL) {
tty_lock(tp);
tty_rel_pgrp(tp, pgrp);
}
proc_id_clear(PROC_ID_GROUP, pgrp->pg_id);
uma_zfree(pgrp_zone, pgrp);
Integrate the new MPSAFE TTY layer to the FreeBSD operating system. The last half year I've been working on a replacement TTY layer for the FreeBSD kernel. The new TTY layer was designed to improve the following: - Improved driver model: The old TTY layer has a driver model that is not abstract enough to make it friendly to use. A good example is the output path, where the device drivers directly access the output buffers. This means that an in-kernel PPP implementation must always convert network buffers into TTY buffers. If a PPP implementation would be built on top of the new TTY layer (still needs a hooks layer, though), it would allow the PPP implementation to directly hand the data to the TTY driver. - Improved hotplugging: With the old TTY layer, it isn't entirely safe to destroy TTY's from the system. This implementation has a two-step destructing design, where the driver first abandons the TTY. After all threads have left the TTY, the TTY layer calls a routine in the driver, which can be used to free resources (unit numbers, etc). The pts(4) driver also implements this feature, which means posix_openpt() will now return PTY's that are created on the fly. - Improved performance: One of the major improvements is the per-TTY mutex, which is expected to improve scalability when compared to the old Giant locking. Another change is the unbuffered copying to userspace, which is both used on TTY device nodes and PTY masters. Upgrading should be quite straightforward. Unlike previous versions, existing kernel configuration files do not need to be changed, except when they reference device drivers that are listed in UPDATING. Obtained from: //depot/projects/mpsafetty/... Approved by: philip (ex-mentor) Discussed: on the lists, at BSDCan, at the DevSummit Sponsored by: Snow B.V., the Netherlands dcons(4) fixed by: kan
2008-08-20 08:31:58 +00:00
sess_release(savesess);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
static void
fixjobc_kill(struct proc *p)
{
struct proc *q;
struct pgrp *pgrp;
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_LOCKED);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_NOTOWNED);
pgrp = p->p_pgrp;
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
SESS_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp->pg_session, MA_NOTOWNED);
/*
* p no longer affects process group orphanage for children.
* It is marked by the flag because p is only physically
* removed from its process group on wait(2).
*/
MPASS((p->p_treeflag & P_TREE_GRPEXITED) == 0);
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
p->p_treeflag |= P_TREE_GRPEXITED;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Check if exiting p orphans its own group.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
pgrp = p->p_pgrp;
if (isjobproc(jobc_parent(p, NULL), pgrp)) {
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
if (pgrp_calc_jobc(pgrp) == 0)
orphanpg(pgrp);
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Check this process' children to see whether they qualify
* their process groups after reparenting to reaper.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
LIST_FOREACH(q, &p->p_children, p_sibling) {
pgrp = q->p_pgrp;
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
if (pgrp_calc_jobc(pgrp) == 0) {
/*
* We want to handle exactly the children that
* has p as realparent. Then, when calculating
* jobc_parent for children, we should ignore
* P_TREE_GRPEXITED flag already set on p.
*/
if (jobc_parent(q, p) == p && isjobproc(p, pgrp))
orphanpg(pgrp);
} else
pgrp->pg_flags &= ~PGRP_ORPHANED;
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
}
LIST_FOREACH(q, &p->p_orphans, p_orphan) {
pgrp = q->p_pgrp;
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
if (pgrp_calc_jobc(pgrp) == 0) {
if (isjobproc(p, pgrp))
orphanpg(pgrp);
} else
pgrp->pg_flags &= ~PGRP_ORPHANED;
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
void
killjobc(void)
{
struct session *sp;
struct tty *tp;
struct proc *p;
struct vnode *ttyvp;
p = curproc;
MPASS(p->p_flag & P_WEXIT);
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_LOCKED);
if (SESS_LEADER(p)) {
sp = p->p_session;
/*
* s_ttyp is not zero'd; we use this to indicate that
* the session once had a controlling terminal. (for
* logging and informational purposes)
*/
SESS_LOCK(sp);
ttyvp = sp->s_ttyvp;
tp = sp->s_ttyp;
sp->s_ttyvp = NULL;
sp->s_ttydp = NULL;
sp->s_leader = NULL;
SESS_UNLOCK(sp);
/*
* Signal foreground pgrp and revoke access to
* controlling terminal if it has not been revoked
* already.
*
* Because the TTY may have been revoked in the mean
* time and could already have a new session associated
* with it, make sure we don't send a SIGHUP to a
* foreground process group that does not belong to this
* session.
*/
if (tp != NULL) {
tty_lock(tp);
if (tp->t_session == sp)
tty_signal_pgrp(tp, SIGHUP);
tty_unlock(tp);
}
if (ttyvp != NULL) {
sx_xunlock(&proctree_lock);
if (vn_lock(ttyvp, LK_EXCLUSIVE) == 0) {
VOP_REVOKE(ttyvp, REVOKEALL);
VOP_UNLOCK(ttyvp);
}
devfs_ctty_unref(ttyvp);
sx_xlock(&proctree_lock);
}
}
Fix several issues with process group orphanage. Attempt of adding assertions that pgrp->pg_jobc counters do not underflow in r361967, reverted in r362910, points out bugs in the handling of job control. Peter Holm was able to narrow down the problem to very easy reproduction with timeout(1) which uses reaping. The following list of problems with calculation of pg_jobs which directs SIGHUP/SIGCONT delivery for orphaned process group was identified: - Re-calculation of the orphaned status for children of exiting parent was wrong, but mostly unnoticed when all children were reparented to init(8). When child can be reparented to a different process which could affect the child' job control state, it was not properly accounted for in pg_jobc. - Lockless check for exiting process' parent process group is racy because nothing prevents the parent from changing its group membership. - Exited process is left in the process group, until waited. This affects other calculations of pg_jobc. Split handling of job control status on process changing its process group, and process exiting. Calculate increments and decrements for pg_jobs by exact checking the orphanage instead of assuming process group membership for children and parent. Move the call to killjobc() later under the proctree_lock. Mark exiting process in killjobc() with a new flag P_TREE_GRPEXITED and skip it for all pg_jobc calculations after the flag is set. Add checker that independently recalculates pg_jobc value and compares it with the memoized process group state. This is enabled under INVARIANTS. Reviewed by: jilles Discussed with: kevans Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26116
2020-08-22 21:32:11 +00:00
fixjobc_kill(p);
}
1995-05-30 08:16:23 +00:00
/*
* A process group has become orphaned, mark it as such for signal
* delivery code. If there are any stopped processes in the group,
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* hang-up all process in that group.
*/
static void
orphanpg(struct pgrp *pg)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
struct proc *p;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pg, MA_OWNED);
pg->pg_flags |= PGRP_ORPHANED;
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pg->pg_members, p_pglist) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (P_SHOULDSTOP(p) == P_STOPPED_SIG) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pg->pg_members, p_pglist) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
kern_psignal(p, SIGHUP);
kern_psignal(p, SIGCONT);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
return;
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
}
void
Integrate the new MPSAFE TTY layer to the FreeBSD operating system. The last half year I've been working on a replacement TTY layer for the FreeBSD kernel. The new TTY layer was designed to improve the following: - Improved driver model: The old TTY layer has a driver model that is not abstract enough to make it friendly to use. A good example is the output path, where the device drivers directly access the output buffers. This means that an in-kernel PPP implementation must always convert network buffers into TTY buffers. If a PPP implementation would be built on top of the new TTY layer (still needs a hooks layer, though), it would allow the PPP implementation to directly hand the data to the TTY driver. - Improved hotplugging: With the old TTY layer, it isn't entirely safe to destroy TTY's from the system. This implementation has a two-step destructing design, where the driver first abandons the TTY. After all threads have left the TTY, the TTY layer calls a routine in the driver, which can be used to free resources (unit numbers, etc). The pts(4) driver also implements this feature, which means posix_openpt() will now return PTY's that are created on the fly. - Improved performance: One of the major improvements is the per-TTY mutex, which is expected to improve scalability when compared to the old Giant locking. Another change is the unbuffered copying to userspace, which is both used on TTY device nodes and PTY masters. Upgrading should be quite straightforward. Unlike previous versions, existing kernel configuration files do not need to be changed, except when they reference device drivers that are listed in UPDATING. Obtained from: //depot/projects/mpsafetty/... Approved by: philip (ex-mentor) Discussed: on the lists, at BSDCan, at the DevSummit Sponsored by: Snow B.V., the Netherlands dcons(4) fixed by: kan
2008-08-20 08:31:58 +00:00
sess_hold(struct session *s)
{
Integrate the new MPSAFE TTY layer to the FreeBSD operating system. The last half year I've been working on a replacement TTY layer for the FreeBSD kernel. The new TTY layer was designed to improve the following: - Improved driver model: The old TTY layer has a driver model that is not abstract enough to make it friendly to use. A good example is the output path, where the device drivers directly access the output buffers. This means that an in-kernel PPP implementation must always convert network buffers into TTY buffers. If a PPP implementation would be built on top of the new TTY layer (still needs a hooks layer, though), it would allow the PPP implementation to directly hand the data to the TTY driver. - Improved hotplugging: With the old TTY layer, it isn't entirely safe to destroy TTY's from the system. This implementation has a two-step destructing design, where the driver first abandons the TTY. After all threads have left the TTY, the TTY layer calls a routine in the driver, which can be used to free resources (unit numbers, etc). The pts(4) driver also implements this feature, which means posix_openpt() will now return PTY's that are created on the fly. - Improved performance: One of the major improvements is the per-TTY mutex, which is expected to improve scalability when compared to the old Giant locking. Another change is the unbuffered copying to userspace, which is both used on TTY device nodes and PTY masters. Upgrading should be quite straightforward. Unlike previous versions, existing kernel configuration files do not need to be changed, except when they reference device drivers that are listed in UPDATING. Obtained from: //depot/projects/mpsafetty/... Approved by: philip (ex-mentor) Discussed: on the lists, at BSDCan, at the DevSummit Sponsored by: Snow B.V., the Netherlands dcons(4) fixed by: kan
2008-08-20 08:31:58 +00:00
refcount_acquire(&s->s_count);
}
void
sess_release(struct session *s)
{
if (refcount_release(&s->s_count)) {
if (s->s_ttyp != NULL) {
tty_lock(s->s_ttyp);
tty_rel_sess(s->s_ttyp, s);
}
proc_id_clear(PROC_ID_SESSION, s->s_sid);
mtx_destroy(&s->s_mtx);
free(s, M_SESSION);
}
}
#ifdef DDB
static void
db_print_pgrp_one(struct pgrp *pgrp, struct proc *p)
{
db_printf(
" pid %d at %p pr %d pgrp %p e %d jc %d\n",
p->p_pid, p, p->p_pptr == NULL ? -1 : p->p_pptr->p_pid,
p->p_pgrp, (p->p_treeflag & P_TREE_GRPEXITED) != 0,
p->p_pptr == NULL ? 0 : isjobproc(p->p_pptr, pgrp));
}
DB_SHOW_COMMAND(pgrpdump, pgrpdump)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
struct pgrp *pgrp;
struct proc *p;
int i;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
for (i = 0; i <= pgrphash; i++) {
if (!LIST_EMPTY(&pgrphashtbl[i])) {
db_printf("indx %d\n", i);
LIST_FOREACH(pgrp, &pgrphashtbl[i], pg_hash) {
db_printf(
" pgrp %p, pgid %d, sess %p, sesscnt %d, mem %p\n",
pgrp, (int)pgrp->pg_id, pgrp->pg_session,
pgrp->pg_session->s_count,
LIST_FIRST(&pgrp->pg_members));
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pgrp->pg_members, p_pglist)
db_print_pgrp_one(pgrp, p);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
}
}
#endif /* DDB */
/*
* Calculate the kinfo_proc members which contain process-wide
* informations.
* Must be called with the target process locked.
*/
static void
fill_kinfo_aggregate(struct proc *p, struct kinfo_proc *kp)
{
struct thread *td;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
kp->ki_estcpu = 0;
kp->ki_pctcpu = 0;
FOREACH_THREAD_IN_PROC(p, td) {
thread_lock(td);
kp->ki_pctcpu += sched_pctcpu(td);
kp->ki_estcpu += sched_estcpu(td);
thread_unlock(td);
}
}
/*
* Fill in any information that is common to all threads in the process.
* Must be called with the target process locked.
*/
static void
fill_kinfo_proc_only(struct proc *p, struct kinfo_proc *kp)
{
struct thread *td0;
struct ucred *cred;
struct sigacts *ps;
struct timeval boottime;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
kp->ki_structsize = sizeof(*kp);
kp->ki_paddr = p;
kp->ki_addr =/* p->p_addr; */0; /* XXX */
kp->ki_args = p->p_args;
kp->ki_textvp = p->p_textvp;
#ifdef KTRACE
kp->ki_tracep = ktr_get_tracevp(p, false);
kp->ki_traceflag = p->p_traceflag;
#endif
kp->ki_fd = p->p_fd;
kp->ki_pd = p->p_pd;
kp->ki_vmspace = p->p_vmspace;
kp->ki_flag = p->p_flag;
kp->ki_flag2 = p->p_flag2;
cred = p->p_ucred;
if (cred) {
kp->ki_uid = cred->cr_uid;
kp->ki_ruid = cred->cr_ruid;
kp->ki_svuid = cred->cr_svuid;
kp->ki_cr_flags = 0;
if (cred->cr_flags & CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE)
kp->ki_cr_flags |= KI_CRF_CAPABILITY_MODE;
/* XXX bde doesn't like KI_NGROUPS */
if (cred->cr_ngroups > KI_NGROUPS) {
kp->ki_ngroups = KI_NGROUPS;
kp->ki_cr_flags |= KI_CRF_GRP_OVERFLOW;
} else
kp->ki_ngroups = cred->cr_ngroups;
bcopy(cred->cr_groups, kp->ki_groups,
kp->ki_ngroups * sizeof(gid_t));
kp->ki_rgid = cred->cr_rgid;
kp->ki_svgid = cred->cr_svgid;
/* If jailed(cred), emulate the old P_JAILED flag. */
if (jailed(cred)) {
kp->ki_flag |= P_JAILED;
/* If inside the jail, use 0 as a jail ID. */
if (cred->cr_prison != curthread->td_ucred->cr_prison)
kp->ki_jid = cred->cr_prison->pr_id;
}
strlcpy(kp->ki_loginclass, cred->cr_loginclass->lc_name,
sizeof(kp->ki_loginclass));
}
ps = p->p_sigacts;
if (ps) {
mtx_lock(&ps->ps_mtx);
kp->ki_sigignore = ps->ps_sigignore;
kp->ki_sigcatch = ps->ps_sigcatch;
mtx_unlock(&ps->ps_mtx);
}
if (p->p_state != PRS_NEW &&
p->p_state != PRS_ZOMBIE &&
p->p_vmspace != NULL) {
struct vmspace *vm = p->p_vmspace;
kp->ki_size = vm->vm_map.size;
kp->ki_rssize = vmspace_resident_count(vm); /*XXX*/
FOREACH_THREAD_IN_PROC(p, td0) {
if (!TD_IS_SWAPPED(td0))
kp->ki_rssize += td0->td_kstack_pages;
}
kp->ki_swrss = vm->vm_swrss;
kp->ki_tsize = vm->vm_tsize;
kp->ki_dsize = vm->vm_dsize;
kp->ki_ssize = vm->vm_ssize;
} else if (p->p_state == PRS_ZOMBIE)
kp->ki_stat = SZOMB;
if (kp->ki_flag & P_INMEM)
kp->ki_sflag = PS_INMEM;
else
kp->ki_sflag = 0;
/* Calculate legacy swtime as seconds since 'swtick'. */
kp->ki_swtime = (ticks - p->p_swtick) / hz;
kp->ki_pid = p->p_pid;
kp->ki_nice = p->p_nice;
kp->ki_fibnum = p->p_fibnum;
kp->ki_start = p->p_stats->p_start;
getboottime(&boottime);
timevaladd(&kp->ki_start, &boottime);
PROC_STATLOCK(p);
rufetch(p, &kp->ki_rusage);
kp->ki_runtime = cputick2usec(p->p_rux.rux_runtime);
calcru(p, &kp->ki_rusage.ru_utime, &kp->ki_rusage.ru_stime);
PROC_STATUNLOCK(p);
calccru(p, &kp->ki_childutime, &kp->ki_childstime);
2010-11-11 21:53:46 +00:00
/* Some callers want child times in a single value. */
kp->ki_childtime = kp->ki_childstime;
timevaladd(&kp->ki_childtime, &kp->ki_childutime);
2010-11-11 21:53:46 +00:00
FOREACH_THREAD_IN_PROC(p, td0)
kp->ki_cow += td0->td_cow;
if (p->p_comm[0] != '\0')
strlcpy(kp->ki_comm, p->p_comm, sizeof(kp->ki_comm));
if (p->p_sysent && p->p_sysent->sv_name != NULL &&
p->p_sysent->sv_name[0] != '\0')
strlcpy(kp->ki_emul, p->p_sysent->sv_name, sizeof(kp->ki_emul));
kp->ki_siglist = p->p_siglist;
kp->ki_xstat = KW_EXITCODE(p->p_xexit, p->p_xsig);
kp->ki_acflag = p->p_acflag;
kp->ki_lock = p->p_lock;
if (p->p_pptr) {
kp->ki_ppid = p->p_oppid;
if (p->p_flag & P_TRACED)
kp->ki_tracer = p->p_pptr->p_pid;
}
}
/*
* Fill job-related process information.
*/
static void
fill_kinfo_proc_pgrp(struct proc *p, struct kinfo_proc *kp)
{
struct tty *tp;
struct session *sp;
struct pgrp *pgrp;
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SA_LOCKED);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
pgrp = p->p_pgrp;
if (pgrp == NULL)
return;
kp->ki_pgid = pgrp->pg_id;
kp->ki_jobc = pgrp_calc_jobc(pgrp);
sp = pgrp->pg_session;
tp = NULL;
if (sp != NULL) {
kp->ki_sid = sp->s_sid;
SESS_LOCK(sp);
strlcpy(kp->ki_login, sp->s_login, sizeof(kp->ki_login));
if (sp->s_ttyvp)
kp->ki_kiflag |= KI_CTTY;
if (SESS_LEADER(p))
kp->ki_kiflag |= KI_SLEADER;
tp = sp->s_ttyp;
SESS_UNLOCK(sp);
}
if ((p->p_flag & P_CONTROLT) && tp != NULL) {
kp->ki_tdev = tty_udev(tp);
kp->ki_tdev_freebsd11 = kp->ki_tdev; /* truncate */
kp->ki_tpgid = tp->t_pgrp ? tp->t_pgrp->pg_id : NO_PID;
if (tp->t_session)
kp->ki_tsid = tp->t_session->s_sid;
} else {
kp->ki_tdev = NODEV;
kp->ki_tdev_freebsd11 = kp->ki_tdev; /* truncate */
}
}
/*
* Fill in information that is thread specific. Must be called with
* target process locked. If 'preferthread' is set, overwrite certain
* process-related fields that are maintained for both threads and
* processes.
*/
static void
fill_kinfo_thread(struct thread *td, struct kinfo_proc *kp, int preferthread)
{
struct proc *p;
p = td->td_proc;
kp->ki_tdaddr = td;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
if (preferthread)
PROC_STATLOCK(p);
thread_lock(td);
if (td->td_wmesg != NULL)
strlcpy(kp->ki_wmesg, td->td_wmesg, sizeof(kp->ki_wmesg));
else
bzero(kp->ki_wmesg, sizeof(kp->ki_wmesg));
if (strlcpy(kp->ki_tdname, td->td_name, sizeof(kp->ki_tdname)) >=
sizeof(kp->ki_tdname)) {
strlcpy(kp->ki_moretdname,
td->td_name + sizeof(kp->ki_tdname) - 1,
sizeof(kp->ki_moretdname));
} else {
bzero(kp->ki_moretdname, sizeof(kp->ki_moretdname));
}
if (TD_ON_LOCK(td)) {
kp->ki_kiflag |= KI_LOCKBLOCK;
strlcpy(kp->ki_lockname, td->td_lockname,
sizeof(kp->ki_lockname));
} else {
kp->ki_kiflag &= ~KI_LOCKBLOCK;
bzero(kp->ki_lockname, sizeof(kp->ki_lockname));
}
if (p->p_state == PRS_NORMAL) { /* approximate. */
if (TD_ON_RUNQ(td) ||
TD_CAN_RUN(td) ||
TD_IS_RUNNING(td)) {
kp->ki_stat = SRUN;
} else if (P_SHOULDSTOP(p)) {
kp->ki_stat = SSTOP;
} else if (TD_IS_SLEEPING(td)) {
kp->ki_stat = SSLEEP;
} else if (TD_ON_LOCK(td)) {
kp->ki_stat = SLOCK;
} else {
kp->ki_stat = SWAIT;
}
} else if (p->p_state == PRS_ZOMBIE) {
kp->ki_stat = SZOMB;
} else {
kp->ki_stat = SIDL;
}
/* Things in the thread */
kp->ki_wchan = td->td_wchan;
kp->ki_pri.pri_level = td->td_priority;
kp->ki_pri.pri_native = td->td_base_pri;
/*
* Note: legacy fields; clamp at the old NOCPU value and/or
* the maximum u_char CPU value.
*/
if (td->td_lastcpu == NOCPU)
kp->ki_lastcpu_old = NOCPU_OLD;
else if (td->td_lastcpu > MAXCPU_OLD)
kp->ki_lastcpu_old = MAXCPU_OLD;
else
kp->ki_lastcpu_old = td->td_lastcpu;
if (td->td_oncpu == NOCPU)
kp->ki_oncpu_old = NOCPU_OLD;
else if (td->td_oncpu > MAXCPU_OLD)
kp->ki_oncpu_old = MAXCPU_OLD;
else
kp->ki_oncpu_old = td->td_oncpu;
kp->ki_lastcpu = td->td_lastcpu;
kp->ki_oncpu = td->td_oncpu;
kp->ki_tdflags = td->td_flags;
kp->ki_tid = td->td_tid;
kp->ki_numthreads = p->p_numthreads;
kp->ki_pcb = td->td_pcb;
kp->ki_kstack = (void *)td->td_kstack;
kp->ki_slptime = (ticks - td->td_slptick) / hz;
kp->ki_pri.pri_class = td->td_pri_class;
kp->ki_pri.pri_user = td->td_user_pri;
if (preferthread) {
rufetchtd(td, &kp->ki_rusage);
kp->ki_runtime = cputick2usec(td->td_rux.rux_runtime);
kp->ki_pctcpu = sched_pctcpu(td);
kp->ki_estcpu = sched_estcpu(td);
kp->ki_cow = td->td_cow;
}
/* We can't get this anymore but ps etc never used it anyway. */
kp->ki_rqindex = 0;
if (preferthread)
kp->ki_siglist = td->td_siglist;
kp->ki_sigmask = td->td_sigmask;
thread_unlock(td);
if (preferthread)
PROC_STATUNLOCK(p);
}
/*
* Fill in a kinfo_proc structure for the specified process.
* Must be called with the target process locked.
*/
void
fill_kinfo_proc(struct proc *p, struct kinfo_proc *kp)
{
MPASS(FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p) != NULL);
bzero(kp, sizeof(*kp));
fill_kinfo_proc_pgrp(p,kp);
fill_kinfo_proc_only(p, kp);
fill_kinfo_thread(FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p), kp, 0);
fill_kinfo_aggregate(p, kp);
}
struct pstats *
pstats_alloc(void)
{
return (malloc(sizeof(struct pstats), M_SUBPROC, M_ZERO|M_WAITOK));
}
/*
* Copy parts of p_stats; zero the rest of p_stats (statistics).
*/
void
pstats_fork(struct pstats *src, struct pstats *dst)
{
bzero(&dst->pstat_startzero,
__rangeof(struct pstats, pstat_startzero, pstat_endzero));
bcopy(&src->pstat_startcopy, &dst->pstat_startcopy,
__rangeof(struct pstats, pstat_startcopy, pstat_endcopy));
}
void
pstats_free(struct pstats *ps)
{
free(ps, M_SUBPROC);
}
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
/*
* This function is typically used to copy out the kernel address, so
* it can be replaced by assignment of zero.
*/
static inline uint32_t
ptr32_trim(const void *ptr)
{
uintptr_t uptr;
uptr = (uintptr_t)ptr;
return ((uptr > UINT_MAX) ? 0 : uptr);
}
#define PTRTRIM_CP(src,dst,fld) \
do { (dst).fld = ptr32_trim((src).fld); } while (0)
static void
freebsd32_kinfo_proc_out(const struct kinfo_proc *ki, struct kinfo_proc32 *ki32)
{
int i;
bzero(ki32, sizeof(struct kinfo_proc32));
ki32->ki_structsize = sizeof(struct kinfo_proc32);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_layout);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_args);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_paddr);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_addr);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tracep);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_textvp);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_fd);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_vmspace);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_wchan);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_pid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_ppid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_pgid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tpgid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_sid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tsid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_jobc);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tdev);
Commit the 64-bit inode project. Extend the ino_t, dev_t, nlink_t types to 64-bit ints. Modify struct dirent layout to add d_off, increase the size of d_fileno to 64-bits, increase the size of d_namlen to 16-bits, and change the required alignment. Increase struct statfs f_mntfromname[] and f_mntonname[] array length MNAMELEN to 1024. ABI breakage is mitigated by providing compatibility using versioned symbols, ingenious use of the existing padding in structures, and by employing other tricks. Unfortunately, not everything can be fixed, especially outside the base system. For instance, third-party APIs which pass struct stat around are broken in backward and forward incompatible ways. Kinfo sysctl MIBs ABI is changed in backward-compatible way, but there is no general mechanism to handle other sysctl MIBS which return structures where the layout has changed. It was considered that the breakage is either in the management interfaces, where we usually allow ABI slip, or is not important. Struct xvnode changed layout, no compat shims are provided. For struct xtty, dev_t tty device member was reduced to uint32_t. It was decided that keeping ABI compat in this case is more useful than reporting 64-bit dev_t, for the sake of pstat. Update note: strictly follow the instructions in UPDATING. Build and install the new kernel with COMPAT_FREEBSD11 option enabled, then reboot, and only then install new world. Credits: The 64-bit inode project, also known as ino64, started life many years ago as a project by Gleb Kurtsou (gleb). Kirk McKusick (mckusick) then picked up and updated the patch, and acted as a flag-waver. Feedback, suggestions, and discussions were carried by Ed Maste (emaste), John Baldwin (jhb), Jilles Tjoelker (jilles), and Rick Macklem (rmacklem). Kris Moore (kris) performed an initial ports investigation followed by an exp-run by Antoine Brodin (antoine). Essential and all-embracing testing was done by Peter Holm (pho). The heavy lifting of coordinating all these efforts and bringing the project to completion were done by Konstantin Belousov (kib). Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation (emaste, kib) Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10439
2017-05-23 09:29:05 +00:00
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tdev_freebsd11);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_siglist);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_sigmask);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_sigignore);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_sigcatch);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_uid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_ruid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_svuid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_rgid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_svgid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_ngroups);
for (i = 0; i < KI_NGROUPS; i++)
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_groups[i]);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_size);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_rssize);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_swrss);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tsize);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_dsize);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_ssize);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_xstat);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_acflag);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_pctcpu);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_estcpu);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_slptime);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_swtime);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_cow);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_runtime);
TV_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_start);
TV_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_childtime);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_flag);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_kiflag);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_traceflag);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_stat);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_nice);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_lock);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_rqindex);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_oncpu);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_lastcpu);
/* XXX TODO: wrap cpu value as appropriate */
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_oncpu_old);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_lastcpu_old);
bcopy(ki->ki_tdname, ki32->ki_tdname, TDNAMLEN + 1);
bcopy(ki->ki_wmesg, ki32->ki_wmesg, WMESGLEN + 1);
bcopy(ki->ki_login, ki32->ki_login, LOGNAMELEN + 1);
bcopy(ki->ki_lockname, ki32->ki_lockname, LOCKNAMELEN + 1);
bcopy(ki->ki_comm, ki32->ki_comm, COMMLEN + 1);
bcopy(ki->ki_emul, ki32->ki_emul, KI_EMULNAMELEN + 1);
bcopy(ki->ki_loginclass, ki32->ki_loginclass, LOGINCLASSLEN + 1);
bcopy(ki->ki_moretdname, ki32->ki_moretdname, MAXCOMLEN - TDNAMLEN + 1);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tracer);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_flag2);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_fibnum);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_cr_flags);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_jid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_numthreads);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tid);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_pri);
freebsd32_rusage_out(&ki->ki_rusage, &ki32->ki_rusage);
freebsd32_rusage_out(&ki->ki_rusage_ch, &ki32->ki_rusage_ch);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_pcb);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_kstack);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_udata);
PTRTRIM_CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tdaddr);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_sflag);
CP(*ki, *ki32, ki_tdflags);
}
#endif
static ssize_t
kern_proc_out_size(struct proc *p, int flags)
{
ssize_t size = 0;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
if ((flags & KERN_PROC_NOTHREADS) != 0) {
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if ((flags & KERN_PROC_MASK32) != 0) {
size += sizeof(struct kinfo_proc32);
} else
#endif
size += sizeof(struct kinfo_proc);
} else {
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if ((flags & KERN_PROC_MASK32) != 0)
size += sizeof(struct kinfo_proc32) * p->p_numthreads;
else
#endif
size += sizeof(struct kinfo_proc) * p->p_numthreads;
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
return (size);
}
int
kern_proc_out(struct proc *p, struct sbuf *sb, int flags)
{
struct thread *td;
struct kinfo_proc ki;
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
struct kinfo_proc32 ki32;
#endif
int error;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
MPASS(FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p) != NULL);
error = 0;
fill_kinfo_proc(p, &ki);
if ((flags & KERN_PROC_NOTHREADS) != 0) {
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if ((flags & KERN_PROC_MASK32) != 0) {
freebsd32_kinfo_proc_out(&ki, &ki32);
if (sbuf_bcat(sb, &ki32, sizeof(ki32)) != 0)
error = ENOMEM;
} else
#endif
if (sbuf_bcat(sb, &ki, sizeof(ki)) != 0)
error = ENOMEM;
} else {
FOREACH_THREAD_IN_PROC(p, td) {
fill_kinfo_thread(td, &ki, 1);
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if ((flags & KERN_PROC_MASK32) != 0) {
freebsd32_kinfo_proc_out(&ki, &ki32);
if (sbuf_bcat(sb, &ki32, sizeof(ki32)) != 0)
error = ENOMEM;
} else
#endif
if (sbuf_bcat(sb, &ki, sizeof(ki)) != 0)
error = ENOMEM;
if (error != 0)
break;
}
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
return (error);
}
static int
sysctl_out_proc(struct proc *p, struct sysctl_req *req, int flags)
{
struct sbuf sb;
struct kinfo_proc ki;
int error, error2;
if (req->oldptr == NULL)
return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, 0, kern_proc_out_size(p, flags)));
sbuf_new_for_sysctl(&sb, (char *)&ki, sizeof(ki), req);
sbuf_clear_flags(&sb, SBUF_INCLUDENUL);
error = kern_proc_out(p, &sb, flags);
error2 = sbuf_finish(&sb);
sbuf_delete(&sb);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
else if (error2 != 0)
return (error2);
return (0);
}
int
proc_iterate(int (*cb)(struct proc *, void *), void *cbarg)
{
struct proc *p;
int error, i, j;
for (i = 0; i < pidhashlock + 1; i++) {
sx_slock(&proctree_lock);
sx_slock(&pidhashtbl_lock[i]);
for (j = i; j <= pidhash; j += pidhashlock + 1) {
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pidhashtbl[j], p_hash) {
if (p->p_state == PRS_NEW)
continue;
error = cb(p, cbarg);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_NOTOWNED);
if (error != 0) {
sx_sunlock(&pidhashtbl_lock[i]);
sx_sunlock(&proctree_lock);
return (error);
}
}
}
sx_sunlock(&pidhashtbl_lock[i]);
sx_sunlock(&proctree_lock);
}
return (0);
}
struct kern_proc_out_args {
struct sysctl_req *req;
int flags;
int oid_number;
int *name;
};
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_iterate(struct proc *p, void *origarg)
{
struct kern_proc_out_args *arg = origarg;
int *name = arg->name;
int oid_number = arg->oid_number;
int flags = arg->flags;
struct sysctl_req *req = arg->req;
int error = 0;
PROC_LOCK(p);
KASSERT(p->p_ucred != NULL,
("process credential is NULL for non-NEW proc"));
/*
* Show a user only appropriate processes.
*/
if (p_cansee(curthread, p))
goto skip;
/*
* TODO - make more efficient (see notes below).
* do by session.
*/
switch (oid_number) {
case KERN_PROC_GID:
if (p->p_ucred->cr_gid != (gid_t)name[0])
goto skip;
break;
case KERN_PROC_PGRP:
/* could do this by traversing pgrp */
if (p->p_pgrp == NULL ||
p->p_pgrp->pg_id != (pid_t)name[0])
goto skip;
break;
case KERN_PROC_RGID:
if (p->p_ucred->cr_rgid != (gid_t)name[0])
goto skip;
break;
case KERN_PROC_SESSION:
if (p->p_session == NULL ||
p->p_session->s_sid != (pid_t)name[0])
goto skip;
break;
case KERN_PROC_TTY:
if ((p->p_flag & P_CONTROLT) == 0 ||
p->p_session == NULL)
goto skip;
/* XXX proctree_lock */
SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
if (p->p_session->s_ttyp == NULL ||
tty_udev(p->p_session->s_ttyp) !=
(dev_t)name[0]) {
SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
goto skip;
}
SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
break;
case KERN_PROC_UID:
if (p->p_ucred->cr_uid != (uid_t)name[0])
goto skip;
break;
case KERN_PROC_RUID:
if (p->p_ucred->cr_ruid != (uid_t)name[0])
goto skip;
break;
case KERN_PROC_PROC:
break;
default:
break;
}
error = sysctl_out_proc(p, req, flags);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_NOTOWNED);
return (error);
skip:
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
return (0);
}
static int
sysctl_kern_proc(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct kern_proc_out_args iterarg;
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
int flags, oid_number;
int error = 0;
oid_number = oidp->oid_number;
if (oid_number != KERN_PROC_ALL &&
(oid_number & KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD) == 0)
flags = KERN_PROC_NOTHREADS;
else {
flags = 0;
oid_number &= ~KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD;
}
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if (req->flags & SCTL_MASK32)
flags |= KERN_PROC_MASK32;
#endif
if (oid_number == KERN_PROC_PID) {
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
error = sysctl_wire_old_buffer(req, 0);
if (error)
return (error);
sx_slock(&proctree_lock);
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], PGET_CANSEE, &p);
if (error == 0)
error = sysctl_out_proc(p, req, flags);
sx_sunlock(&proctree_lock);
return (error);
}
switch (oid_number) {
case KERN_PROC_ALL:
if (namelen != 0)
return (EINVAL);
break;
case KERN_PROC_PROC:
if (namelen != 0 && namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
break;
default:
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
break;
}
if (req->oldptr == NULL) {
/* overestimate by 5 procs */
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, 0, sizeof (struct kinfo_proc) * 5);
if (error)
return (error);
} else {
error = sysctl_wire_old_buffer(req, 0);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
iterarg.flags = flags;
iterarg.oid_number = oid_number;
iterarg.req = req;
iterarg.name = name;
error = proc_iterate(sysctl_kern_proc_iterate, &iterarg);
return (error);
}
struct pargs *
pargs_alloc(int len)
{
struct pargs *pa;
pa = malloc(sizeof(struct pargs) + len, M_PARGS,
M_WAITOK);
refcount_init(&pa->ar_ref, 1);
pa->ar_length = len;
return (pa);
}
static void
pargs_free(struct pargs *pa)
{
free(pa, M_PARGS);
}
void
pargs_hold(struct pargs *pa)
{
if (pa == NULL)
return;
refcount_acquire(&pa->ar_ref);
}
void
pargs_drop(struct pargs *pa)
{
if (pa == NULL)
return;
if (refcount_release(&pa->ar_ref))
pargs_free(pa);
}
static int
proc_read_string(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, const char *sptr, char *buf,
size_t len)
{
ssize_t n;
/*
* This may return a short read if the string is shorter than the chunk
* and is aligned at the end of the page, and the following page is not
* mapped.
*/
n = proc_readmem(td, p, (vm_offset_t)sptr, buf, len);
if (n <= 0)
return (ENOMEM);
return (0);
}
#define PROC_AUXV_MAX 256 /* Safety limit on auxv size. */
enum proc_vector_type {
PROC_ARG,
PROC_ENV,
PROC_AUX,
};
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
static int
get_proc_vector32(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, char ***proc_vectorp,
size_t *vsizep, enum proc_vector_type type)
{
struct freebsd32_ps_strings pss;
Elf32_Auxinfo aux;
vm_offset_t vptr, ptr;
uint32_t *proc_vector32;
char **proc_vector;
size_t vsize, size;
int i, error;
error = 0;
if (proc_readmem(td, p, (vm_offset_t)p->p_sysent->sv_psstrings, &pss,
sizeof(pss)) != sizeof(pss))
return (ENOMEM);
switch (type) {
case PROC_ARG:
vptr = (vm_offset_t)PTRIN(pss.ps_argvstr);
vsize = pss.ps_nargvstr;
if (vsize > ARG_MAX)
return (ENOEXEC);
size = vsize * sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case PROC_ENV:
vptr = (vm_offset_t)PTRIN(pss.ps_envstr);
vsize = pss.ps_nenvstr;
if (vsize > ARG_MAX)
return (ENOEXEC);
size = vsize * sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case PROC_AUX:
vptr = (vm_offset_t)PTRIN(pss.ps_envstr) +
(pss.ps_nenvstr + 1) * sizeof(int32_t);
if (vptr % 4 != 0)
return (ENOEXEC);
for (ptr = vptr, i = 0; i < PROC_AUXV_MAX; i++) {
if (proc_readmem(td, p, ptr, &aux, sizeof(aux)) !=
sizeof(aux))
return (ENOMEM);
if (aux.a_type == AT_NULL)
break;
ptr += sizeof(aux);
}
if (aux.a_type != AT_NULL)
return (ENOEXEC);
vsize = i + 1;
size = vsize * sizeof(aux);
break;
default:
KASSERT(0, ("Wrong proc vector type: %d", type));
return (EINVAL);
}
proc_vector32 = malloc(size, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
if (proc_readmem(td, p, vptr, proc_vector32, size) != size) {
error = ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
if (type == PROC_AUX) {
*proc_vectorp = (char **)proc_vector32;
*vsizep = vsize;
return (0);
}
proc_vector = malloc(vsize * sizeof(char *), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
for (i = 0; i < (int)vsize; i++)
proc_vector[i] = PTRIN(proc_vector32[i]);
*proc_vectorp = proc_vector;
*vsizep = vsize;
done:
free(proc_vector32, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
#endif
static int
get_proc_vector(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, char ***proc_vectorp,
size_t *vsizep, enum proc_vector_type type)
{
struct ps_strings pss;
Elf_Auxinfo aux;
vm_offset_t vptr, ptr;
char **proc_vector;
size_t vsize, size;
int i;
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if (SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_ILP32) != 0)
return (get_proc_vector32(td, p, proc_vectorp, vsizep, type));
#endif
if (proc_readmem(td, p, (vm_offset_t)p->p_sysent->sv_psstrings, &pss,
sizeof(pss)) != sizeof(pss))
return (ENOMEM);
switch (type) {
case PROC_ARG:
vptr = (vm_offset_t)pss.ps_argvstr;
vsize = pss.ps_nargvstr;
if (vsize > ARG_MAX)
return (ENOEXEC);
size = vsize * sizeof(char *);
break;
case PROC_ENV:
vptr = (vm_offset_t)pss.ps_envstr;
vsize = pss.ps_nenvstr;
if (vsize > ARG_MAX)
return (ENOEXEC);
size = vsize * sizeof(char *);
break;
case PROC_AUX:
/*
* The aux array is just above env array on the stack. Check
* that the address is naturally aligned.
*/
vptr = (vm_offset_t)pss.ps_envstr + (pss.ps_nenvstr + 1)
* sizeof(char *);
#if __ELF_WORD_SIZE == 64
if (vptr % sizeof(uint64_t) != 0)
#else
if (vptr % sizeof(uint32_t) != 0)
#endif
return (ENOEXEC);
/*
* We count the array size reading the aux vectors from the
* stack until AT_NULL vector is returned. So (to keep the code
* simple) we read the process stack twice: the first time here
* to find the size and the second time when copying the vectors
* to the allocated proc_vector.
*/
for (ptr = vptr, i = 0; i < PROC_AUXV_MAX; i++) {
if (proc_readmem(td, p, ptr, &aux, sizeof(aux)) !=
sizeof(aux))
return (ENOMEM);
if (aux.a_type == AT_NULL)
break;
ptr += sizeof(aux);
}
/*
* If the PROC_AUXV_MAX entries are iterated over, and we have
* not reached AT_NULL, it is most likely we are reading wrong
* data: either the process doesn't have auxv array or data has
* been modified. Return the error in this case.
*/
if (aux.a_type != AT_NULL)
return (ENOEXEC);
vsize = i + 1;
size = vsize * sizeof(aux);
break;
default:
KASSERT(0, ("Wrong proc vector type: %d", type));
return (EINVAL); /* In case we are built without INVARIANTS. */
}
proc_vector = malloc(size, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
if (proc_readmem(td, p, vptr, proc_vector, size) != size) {
free(proc_vector, M_TEMP);
return (ENOMEM);
}
*proc_vectorp = proc_vector;
*vsizep = vsize;
return (0);
}
#define GET_PS_STRINGS_CHUNK_SZ 256 /* Chunk size (bytes) for ps_strings operations. */
static int
get_ps_strings(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, struct sbuf *sb,
enum proc_vector_type type)
{
size_t done, len, nchr, vsize;
int error, i;
char **proc_vector, *sptr;
char pss_string[GET_PS_STRINGS_CHUNK_SZ];
PROC_ASSERT_HELD(p);
/*
* We are not going to read more than 2 * (PATH_MAX + ARG_MAX) bytes.
*/
nchr = 2 * (PATH_MAX + ARG_MAX);
error = get_proc_vector(td, p, &proc_vector, &vsize, type);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
for (done = 0, i = 0; i < (int)vsize && done < nchr; i++) {
/*
* The program may have scribbled into its argv array, e.g. to
* remove some arguments. If that has happened, break out
* before trying to read from NULL.
*/
if (proc_vector[i] == NULL)
break;
for (sptr = proc_vector[i]; ; sptr += GET_PS_STRINGS_CHUNK_SZ) {
error = proc_read_string(td, p, sptr, pss_string,
sizeof(pss_string));
if (error != 0)
goto done;
len = strnlen(pss_string, GET_PS_STRINGS_CHUNK_SZ);
if (done + len >= nchr)
len = nchr - done - 1;
sbuf_bcat(sb, pss_string, len);
if (len != GET_PS_STRINGS_CHUNK_SZ)
break;
done += GET_PS_STRINGS_CHUNK_SZ;
}
sbuf_bcat(sb, "", 1);
done += len + 1;
}
done:
free(proc_vector, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
int
proc_getargv(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, struct sbuf *sb)
{
return (get_ps_strings(curthread, p, sb, PROC_ARG));
}
int
proc_getenvv(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, struct sbuf *sb)
{
return (get_ps_strings(curthread, p, sb, PROC_ENV));
}
int
proc_getauxv(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, struct sbuf *sb)
{
size_t vsize, size;
char **auxv;
int error;
error = get_proc_vector(td, p, &auxv, &vsize, PROC_AUX);
if (error == 0) {
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if (SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_ILP32) != 0)
size = vsize * sizeof(Elf32_Auxinfo);
else
#endif
size = vsize * sizeof(Elf_Auxinfo);
if (sbuf_bcat(sb, auxv, size) != 0)
error = ENOMEM;
free(auxv, M_TEMP);
}
return (error);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve the argument list or process
* title for another process without groping around in the address space
* of the other process. It also allow a process to set its own "process
* title to a string of its own choice.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_args(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct pargs *newpa, *pa;
struct proc *p;
struct sbuf sb;
int flags, error = 0, error2;
pid_t pid;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
p = curproc;
pid = (pid_t)name[0];
if (pid == -1) {
pid = p->p_pid;
}
/*
* If the query is for this process and it is single-threaded, there
* is nobody to modify pargs, thus we can just read.
*/
if (pid == p->p_pid && p->p_numthreads == 1 && req->newptr == NULL &&
(pa = p->p_args) != NULL)
return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, pa->ar_args, pa->ar_length));
flags = PGET_CANSEE;
if (req->newptr != NULL)
flags |= PGET_ISCURRENT;
error = pget(pid, flags, &p);
if (error)
return (error);
pa = p->p_args;
if (pa != NULL) {
pargs_hold(pa);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, pa->ar_args, pa->ar_length);
pargs_drop(pa);
} else if ((p->p_flag & (P_WEXIT | P_SYSTEM)) == 0) {
_PHOLD(p);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
sbuf_new_for_sysctl(&sb, NULL, GET_PS_STRINGS_CHUNK_SZ, req);
sbuf_clear_flags(&sb, SBUF_INCLUDENUL);
error = proc_getargv(curthread, p, &sb);
error2 = sbuf_finish(&sb);
PRELE(p);
sbuf_delete(&sb);
if (error == 0 && error2 != 0)
error = error2;
} else {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
if (error != 0 || req->newptr == NULL)
return (error);
if (req->newlen > ps_arg_cache_limit - sizeof(struct pargs))
return (ENOMEM);
if (req->newlen == 0) {
/*
* Clear the argument pointer, so that we'll fetch arguments
* with proc_getargv() until further notice.
*/
newpa = NULL;
} else {
newpa = pargs_alloc(req->newlen);
error = SYSCTL_IN(req, newpa->ar_args, req->newlen);
if (error != 0) {
pargs_free(newpa);
return (error);
}
}
PROC_LOCK(p);
pa = p->p_args;
p->p_args = newpa;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
pargs_drop(pa);
return (0);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve environment of another process.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_env(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
struct sbuf sb;
int error, error2;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], PGET_WANTREAD, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
if ((p->p_flag & P_SYSTEM) != 0) {
PRELE(p);
return (0);
}
sbuf_new_for_sysctl(&sb, NULL, GET_PS_STRINGS_CHUNK_SZ, req);
sbuf_clear_flags(&sb, SBUF_INCLUDENUL);
error = proc_getenvv(curthread, p, &sb);
error2 = sbuf_finish(&sb);
PRELE(p);
sbuf_delete(&sb);
return (error != 0 ? error : error2);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve ELF auxiliary vector of
* another process.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_auxv(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
struct sbuf sb;
int error, error2;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], PGET_WANTREAD, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
if ((p->p_flag & P_SYSTEM) != 0) {
PRELE(p);
return (0);
}
sbuf_new_for_sysctl(&sb, NULL, GET_PS_STRINGS_CHUNK_SZ, req);
sbuf_clear_flags(&sb, SBUF_INCLUDENUL);
error = proc_getauxv(curthread, p, &sb);
error2 = sbuf_finish(&sb);
PRELE(p);
sbuf_delete(&sb);
return (error != 0 ? error : error2);
}
/*
* Look up the canonical executable path running in the specified process.
* It tries to return the same hardlink name as was used for execve(2).
* This allows the programs that modify their behavior based on their progname,
* to operate correctly.
*
* Result is returned in retbuf, it must not be freed, similar to vn_fullpath()
* calling conventions.
* binname is a pointer to temporary string buffer of length MAXPATHLEN,
* allocated and freed by caller.
* freebuf should be freed by caller, from the M_TEMP malloc type.
*/
int
proc_get_binpath(struct proc *p, char *binname, char **retbuf,
char **freebuf)
{
struct nameidata nd;
struct vnode *vp, *dvp;
size_t freepath_size;
int error;
bool do_fullpath;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
vp = p->p_textvp;
if (vp == NULL) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
*retbuf = "";
*freebuf = NULL;
return (0);
}
vref(vp);
dvp = p->p_textdvp;
if (dvp != NULL)
vref(dvp);
if (p->p_binname != NULL)
strlcpy(binname, p->p_binname, MAXPATHLEN);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
do_fullpath = true;
*freebuf = NULL;
if (dvp != NULL && binname[0] != '\0') {
freepath_size = MAXPATHLEN;
if (vn_fullpath_hardlink(vp, dvp, binname, strlen(binname),
retbuf, freebuf, &freepath_size) == 0) {
/*
* Recheck the looked up path. The binary
* might have been renamed or replaced, in
* which case we should not report old name.
*/
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE, *retbuf,
curthread);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error == 0) {
if (nd.ni_vp == vp)
do_fullpath = false;
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
}
}
}
if (do_fullpath) {
free(*freebuf, M_TEMP);
*freebuf = NULL;
error = vn_fullpath(vp, retbuf, freebuf);
}
vrele(vp);
if (dvp != NULL)
vrele(dvp);
return (error);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve the path of the executable for
* itself or another process.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_pathname(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
pid_t *pidp = (pid_t *)arg1;
unsigned int arglen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
char *retbuf, *freebuf, *binname;
int error;
if (arglen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
binname = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
binname[0] = '\0';
if (*pidp == -1) { /* -1 means this process */
error = 0;
p = req->td->td_proc;
PROC_LOCK(p);
} else {
error = pget(*pidp, PGET_CANSEE, &p);
}
if (error == 0)
error = proc_get_binpath(p, binname, &retbuf, &freebuf);
free(binname, M_TEMP);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, retbuf, strlen(retbuf) + 1);
free(freebuf, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_sv_name(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct proc *p;
char *sv_name;
int *name;
int namelen;
int error;
namelen = arg2;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
name = (int *)arg1;
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], PGET_CANSEE, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
sv_name = p->p_sysent->sv_name;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
return (sysctl_handle_string(oidp, sv_name, 0, req));
}
#ifdef KINFO_OVMENTRY_SIZE
CTASSERT(sizeof(struct kinfo_ovmentry) == KINFO_OVMENTRY_SIZE);
#endif
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD7
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_ovmmap(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
vm_map_entry_t entry, tmp_entry;
unsigned int last_timestamp, namelen;
char *fullpath, *freepath;
struct kinfo_ovmentry *kve;
struct vattr va;
struct ucred *cred;
int error, *name;
struct vnode *vp;
struct proc *p;
vm_map_t map;
struct vmspace *vm;
namelen = arg2;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
name = (int *)arg1;
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], PGET_WANTREAD, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
vm = vmspace_acquire_ref(p);
if (vm == NULL) {
PRELE(p);
return (ESRCH);
}
kve = malloc(sizeof(*kve), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
map = &vm->vm_map;
vm_map_lock_read(map);
VM_MAP_ENTRY_FOREACH(entry, map) {
vm_object_t obj, tobj, lobj;
vm_offset_t addr;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_IS_SUB_MAP)
continue;
bzero(kve, sizeof(*kve));
kve->kve_structsize = sizeof(*kve);
kve->kve_private_resident = 0;
obj = entry->object.vm_object;
if (obj != NULL) {
VM_OBJECT_RLOCK(obj);
if (obj->shadow_count == 1)
kve->kve_private_resident =
obj->resident_page_count;
}
kve->kve_resident = 0;
addr = entry->start;
while (addr < entry->end) {
if (pmap_extract(map->pmap, addr))
kve->kve_resident++;
addr += PAGE_SIZE;
}
for (lobj = tobj = obj; tobj; tobj = tobj->backing_object) {
if (tobj != obj) {
VM_OBJECT_RLOCK(tobj);
kve->kve_offset += tobj->backing_object_offset;
}
if (lobj != obj)
VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(lobj);
lobj = tobj;
}
kve->kve_start = (void*)entry->start;
kve->kve_end = (void*)entry->end;
kve->kve_offset += (off_t)entry->offset;
if (entry->protection & VM_PROT_READ)
kve->kve_protection |= KVME_PROT_READ;
if (entry->protection & VM_PROT_WRITE)
kve->kve_protection |= KVME_PROT_WRITE;
if (entry->protection & VM_PROT_EXECUTE)
kve->kve_protection |= KVME_PROT_EXEC;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_COW)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_COW;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_NEEDS_COPY)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_NEEDS_COPY;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_NOCOREDUMP)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_NOCOREDUMP;
last_timestamp = map->timestamp;
vm_map_unlock_read(map);
kve->kve_fileid = 0;
kve->kve_fsid = 0;
freepath = NULL;
fullpath = "";
if (lobj) {
kve->kve_type = vm_object_kvme_type(lobj, &vp);
if (kve->kve_type == KVME_TYPE_MGTDEVICE)
kve->kve_type = KVME_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if (vp != NULL)
vref(vp);
if (lobj != obj)
VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(lobj);
kve->kve_ref_count = obj->ref_count;
kve->kve_shadow_count = obj->shadow_count;
VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(obj);
if (vp != NULL) {
vn_fullpath(vp, &fullpath, &freepath);
cred = curthread->td_ucred;
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
if (VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, cred) == 0) {
kve->kve_fileid = va.va_fileid;
Commit the 64-bit inode project. Extend the ino_t, dev_t, nlink_t types to 64-bit ints. Modify struct dirent layout to add d_off, increase the size of d_fileno to 64-bits, increase the size of d_namlen to 16-bits, and change the required alignment. Increase struct statfs f_mntfromname[] and f_mntonname[] array length MNAMELEN to 1024. ABI breakage is mitigated by providing compatibility using versioned symbols, ingenious use of the existing padding in structures, and by employing other tricks. Unfortunately, not everything can be fixed, especially outside the base system. For instance, third-party APIs which pass struct stat around are broken in backward and forward incompatible ways. Kinfo sysctl MIBs ABI is changed in backward-compatible way, but there is no general mechanism to handle other sysctl MIBS which return structures where the layout has changed. It was considered that the breakage is either in the management interfaces, where we usually allow ABI slip, or is not important. Struct xvnode changed layout, no compat shims are provided. For struct xtty, dev_t tty device member was reduced to uint32_t. It was decided that keeping ABI compat in this case is more useful than reporting 64-bit dev_t, for the sake of pstat. Update note: strictly follow the instructions in UPDATING. Build and install the new kernel with COMPAT_FREEBSD11 option enabled, then reboot, and only then install new world. Credits: The 64-bit inode project, also known as ino64, started life many years ago as a project by Gleb Kurtsou (gleb). Kirk McKusick (mckusick) then picked up and updated the patch, and acted as a flag-waver. Feedback, suggestions, and discussions were carried by Ed Maste (emaste), John Baldwin (jhb), Jilles Tjoelker (jilles), and Rick Macklem (rmacklem). Kris Moore (kris) performed an initial ports investigation followed by an exp-run by Antoine Brodin (antoine). Essential and all-embracing testing was done by Peter Holm (pho). The heavy lifting of coordinating all these efforts and bringing the project to completion were done by Konstantin Belousov (kib). Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation (emaste, kib) Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10439
2017-05-23 09:29:05 +00:00
/* truncate */
kve->kve_fsid = va.va_fsid;
}
vput(vp);
}
} else {
kve->kve_type = KVME_TYPE_NONE;
kve->kve_ref_count = 0;
kve->kve_shadow_count = 0;
}
strlcpy(kve->kve_path, fullpath, sizeof(kve->kve_path));
if (freepath != NULL)
free(freepath, M_TEMP);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, kve, sizeof(*kve));
vm_map_lock_read(map);
if (error)
break;
if (last_timestamp != map->timestamp) {
vm_map_lookup_entry(map, addr - 1, &tmp_entry);
entry = tmp_entry;
}
}
vm_map_unlock_read(map);
vmspace_free(vm);
PRELE(p);
free(kve, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
#endif /* COMPAT_FREEBSD7 */
#ifdef KINFO_VMENTRY_SIZE
CTASSERT(sizeof(struct kinfo_vmentry) == KINFO_VMENTRY_SIZE);
#endif
void
kern_proc_vmmap_resident(vm_map_t map, vm_map_entry_t entry,
int *resident_count, bool *super)
{
vm_object_t obj, tobj;
vm_page_t m, m_adv;
vm_offset_t addr;
vm_paddr_t pa;
vm_pindex_t pi, pi_adv, pindex;
*super = false;
*resident_count = 0;
if (vmmap_skip_res_cnt)
return;
pa = 0;
obj = entry->object.vm_object;
addr = entry->start;
m_adv = NULL;
pi = OFF_TO_IDX(entry->offset);
for (; addr < entry->end; addr += IDX_TO_OFF(pi_adv), pi += pi_adv) {
if (m_adv != NULL) {
m = m_adv;
} else {
pi_adv = atop(entry->end - addr);
pindex = pi;
for (tobj = obj;; tobj = tobj->backing_object) {
m = vm_page_find_least(tobj, pindex);
if (m != NULL) {
if (m->pindex == pindex)
break;
if (pi_adv > m->pindex - pindex) {
pi_adv = m->pindex - pindex;
m_adv = m;
}
}
if (tobj->backing_object == NULL)
goto next;
pindex += OFF_TO_IDX(tobj->
backing_object_offset);
}
}
m_adv = NULL;
if (m->psind != 0 && addr + pagesizes[1] <= entry->end &&
(addr & (pagesizes[1] - 1)) == 0 &&
(pmap_mincore(map->pmap, addr, &pa) & MINCORE_SUPER) != 0) {
*super = true;
pi_adv = atop(pagesizes[1]);
} else {
/*
* We do not test the found page on validity.
* Either the page is busy and being paged in,
* or it was invalidated. The first case
* should be counted as resident, the second
* is not so clear; we do account both.
*/
pi_adv = 1;
}
*resident_count += pi_adv;
next:;
}
}
/*
* Must be called with the process locked and will return unlocked.
*/
int
kern_proc_vmmap_out(struct proc *p, struct sbuf *sb, ssize_t maxlen, int flags)
{
vm_map_entry_t entry, tmp_entry;
struct vattr va;
vm_map_t map;
vm_object_t lobj, nobj, obj, tobj;
char *fullpath, *freepath;
struct kinfo_vmentry *kve;
struct ucred *cred;
struct vnode *vp;
struct vmspace *vm;
vm_offset_t addr;
unsigned int last_timestamp;
int error;
bool guard, super;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
_PHOLD(p);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
vm = vmspace_acquire_ref(p);
if (vm == NULL) {
PRELE(p);
return (ESRCH);
}
kve = malloc(sizeof(*kve), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
error = 0;
map = &vm->vm_map;
vm_map_lock_read(map);
VM_MAP_ENTRY_FOREACH(entry, map) {
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_IS_SUB_MAP)
continue;
addr = entry->end;
bzero(kve, sizeof(*kve));
obj = entry->object.vm_object;
if (obj != NULL) {
if ((obj->flags & OBJ_ANON) != 0)
kve->kve_obj = (uintptr_t)obj;
for (tobj = obj; tobj != NULL;
tobj = tobj->backing_object) {
VM_OBJECT_RLOCK(tobj);
kve->kve_offset += tobj->backing_object_offset;
lobj = tobj;
}
if (obj->backing_object == NULL)
kve->kve_private_resident =
obj->resident_page_count;
kern_proc_vmmap_resident(map, entry,
&kve->kve_resident, &super);
if (super)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_SUPER;
for (tobj = obj; tobj != NULL; tobj = nobj) {
nobj = tobj->backing_object;
if (tobj != obj && tobj != lobj)
VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(tobj);
}
} else {
lobj = NULL;
}
kve->kve_start = entry->start;
kve->kve_end = entry->end;
kve->kve_offset += entry->offset;
if (entry->protection & VM_PROT_READ)
kve->kve_protection |= KVME_PROT_READ;
if (entry->protection & VM_PROT_WRITE)
kve->kve_protection |= KVME_PROT_WRITE;
if (entry->protection & VM_PROT_EXECUTE)
kve->kve_protection |= KVME_PROT_EXEC;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_COW)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_COW;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_NEEDS_COPY)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_NEEDS_COPY;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_NOCOREDUMP)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_NOCOREDUMP;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_GROWS_UP)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_GROWS_UP;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_GROWS_DOWN)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_GROWS_DOWN;
if (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_USER_WIRED)
kve->kve_flags |= KVME_FLAG_USER_WIRED;
guard = (entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_GUARD) != 0;
last_timestamp = map->timestamp;
vm_map_unlock_read(map);
freepath = NULL;
fullpath = "";
if (lobj != NULL) {
kve->kve_type = vm_object_kvme_type(lobj, &vp);
if (vp != NULL)
vref(vp);
if (lobj != obj)
VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(lobj);
kve->kve_ref_count = obj->ref_count;
kve->kve_shadow_count = obj->shadow_count;
VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(obj);
if (vp != NULL) {
vn_fullpath(vp, &fullpath, &freepath);
kve->kve_vn_type = vntype_to_kinfo(vp->v_type);
cred = curthread->td_ucred;
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
if (VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, cred) == 0) {
kve->kve_vn_fileid = va.va_fileid;
kve->kve_vn_fsid = va.va_fsid;
Commit the 64-bit inode project. Extend the ino_t, dev_t, nlink_t types to 64-bit ints. Modify struct dirent layout to add d_off, increase the size of d_fileno to 64-bits, increase the size of d_namlen to 16-bits, and change the required alignment. Increase struct statfs f_mntfromname[] and f_mntonname[] array length MNAMELEN to 1024. ABI breakage is mitigated by providing compatibility using versioned symbols, ingenious use of the existing padding in structures, and by employing other tricks. Unfortunately, not everything can be fixed, especially outside the base system. For instance, third-party APIs which pass struct stat around are broken in backward and forward incompatible ways. Kinfo sysctl MIBs ABI is changed in backward-compatible way, but there is no general mechanism to handle other sysctl MIBS which return structures where the layout has changed. It was considered that the breakage is either in the management interfaces, where we usually allow ABI slip, or is not important. Struct xvnode changed layout, no compat shims are provided. For struct xtty, dev_t tty device member was reduced to uint32_t. It was decided that keeping ABI compat in this case is more useful than reporting 64-bit dev_t, for the sake of pstat. Update note: strictly follow the instructions in UPDATING. Build and install the new kernel with COMPAT_FREEBSD11 option enabled, then reboot, and only then install new world. Credits: The 64-bit inode project, also known as ino64, started life many years ago as a project by Gleb Kurtsou (gleb). Kirk McKusick (mckusick) then picked up and updated the patch, and acted as a flag-waver. Feedback, suggestions, and discussions were carried by Ed Maste (emaste), John Baldwin (jhb), Jilles Tjoelker (jilles), and Rick Macklem (rmacklem). Kris Moore (kris) performed an initial ports investigation followed by an exp-run by Antoine Brodin (antoine). Essential and all-embracing testing was done by Peter Holm (pho). The heavy lifting of coordinating all these efforts and bringing the project to completion were done by Konstantin Belousov (kib). Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation (emaste, kib) Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10439
2017-05-23 09:29:05 +00:00
kve->kve_vn_fsid_freebsd11 =
kve->kve_vn_fsid; /* truncate */
kve->kve_vn_mode =
MAKEIMODE(va.va_type, va.va_mode);
kve->kve_vn_size = va.va_size;
kve->kve_vn_rdev = va.va_rdev;
Commit the 64-bit inode project. Extend the ino_t, dev_t, nlink_t types to 64-bit ints. Modify struct dirent layout to add d_off, increase the size of d_fileno to 64-bits, increase the size of d_namlen to 16-bits, and change the required alignment. Increase struct statfs f_mntfromname[] and f_mntonname[] array length MNAMELEN to 1024. ABI breakage is mitigated by providing compatibility using versioned symbols, ingenious use of the existing padding in structures, and by employing other tricks. Unfortunately, not everything can be fixed, especially outside the base system. For instance, third-party APIs which pass struct stat around are broken in backward and forward incompatible ways. Kinfo sysctl MIBs ABI is changed in backward-compatible way, but there is no general mechanism to handle other sysctl MIBS which return structures where the layout has changed. It was considered that the breakage is either in the management interfaces, where we usually allow ABI slip, or is not important. Struct xvnode changed layout, no compat shims are provided. For struct xtty, dev_t tty device member was reduced to uint32_t. It was decided that keeping ABI compat in this case is more useful than reporting 64-bit dev_t, for the sake of pstat. Update note: strictly follow the instructions in UPDATING. Build and install the new kernel with COMPAT_FREEBSD11 option enabled, then reboot, and only then install new world. Credits: The 64-bit inode project, also known as ino64, started life many years ago as a project by Gleb Kurtsou (gleb). Kirk McKusick (mckusick) then picked up and updated the patch, and acted as a flag-waver. Feedback, suggestions, and discussions were carried by Ed Maste (emaste), John Baldwin (jhb), Jilles Tjoelker (jilles), and Rick Macklem (rmacklem). Kris Moore (kris) performed an initial ports investigation followed by an exp-run by Antoine Brodin (antoine). Essential and all-embracing testing was done by Peter Holm (pho). The heavy lifting of coordinating all these efforts and bringing the project to completion were done by Konstantin Belousov (kib). Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation (emaste, kib) Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10439
2017-05-23 09:29:05 +00:00
kve->kve_vn_rdev_freebsd11 =
kve->kve_vn_rdev; /* truncate */
kve->kve_status = KF_ATTR_VALID;
}
vput(vp);
}
} else {
kve->kve_type = guard ? KVME_TYPE_GUARD :
KVME_TYPE_NONE;
kve->kve_ref_count = 0;
kve->kve_shadow_count = 0;
}
strlcpy(kve->kve_path, fullpath, sizeof(kve->kve_path));
if (freepath != NULL)
free(freepath, M_TEMP);
/* Pack record size down */
if ((flags & KERN_VMMAP_PACK_KINFO) != 0)
kve->kve_structsize =
offsetof(struct kinfo_vmentry, kve_path) +
strlen(kve->kve_path) + 1;
else
kve->kve_structsize = sizeof(*kve);
kve->kve_structsize = roundup(kve->kve_structsize,
sizeof(uint64_t));
/* Halt filling and truncate rather than exceeding maxlen */
if (maxlen != -1 && maxlen < kve->kve_structsize) {
error = 0;
vm_map_lock_read(map);
break;
} else if (maxlen != -1)
maxlen -= kve->kve_structsize;
if (sbuf_bcat(sb, kve, kve->kve_structsize) != 0)
error = ENOMEM;
vm_map_lock_read(map);
if (error != 0)
break;
if (last_timestamp != map->timestamp) {
vm_map_lookup_entry(map, addr - 1, &tmp_entry);
entry = tmp_entry;
}
}
vm_map_unlock_read(map);
vmspace_free(vm);
PRELE(p);
free(kve, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_vmmap(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct proc *p;
struct sbuf sb;
u_int namelen;
int error, error2, *name;
namelen = arg2;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
name = (int *)arg1;
sbuf_new_for_sysctl(&sb, NULL, sizeof(struct kinfo_vmentry), req);
sbuf_clear_flags(&sb, SBUF_INCLUDENUL);
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], PGET_CANDEBUG | PGET_NOTWEXIT, &p);
if (error != 0) {
sbuf_delete(&sb);
return (error);
}
error = kern_proc_vmmap_out(p, &sb, -1, KERN_VMMAP_PACK_KINFO);
error2 = sbuf_finish(&sb);
sbuf_delete(&sb);
return (error != 0 ? error : error2);
}
#if defined(STACK) || defined(DDB)
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_kstack(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct kinfo_kstack *kkstp;
int error, i, *name, numthreads;
lwpid_t *lwpidarray;
struct thread *td;
struct stack *st;
struct sbuf sb;
struct proc *p;
u_int namelen;
namelen = arg2;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
name = (int *)arg1;
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], PGET_NOTINEXEC | PGET_WANTREAD, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
kkstp = malloc(sizeof(*kkstp), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
st = stack_create(M_WAITOK);
lwpidarray = NULL;
PROC_LOCK(p);
do {
if (lwpidarray != NULL) {
free(lwpidarray, M_TEMP);
lwpidarray = NULL;
}
numthreads = p->p_numthreads;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
lwpidarray = malloc(sizeof(*lwpidarray) * numthreads, M_TEMP,
M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
PROC_LOCK(p);
} while (numthreads < p->p_numthreads);
/*
* XXXRW: During the below loop, execve(2) and countless other sorts
* of changes could have taken place. Should we check to see if the
* vmspace has been replaced, or the like, in order to prevent
* giving a snapshot that spans, say, execve(2), with some threads
* before and some after? Among other things, the credentials could
* have changed, in which case the right to extract debug info might
* no longer be assured.
*/
i = 0;
FOREACH_THREAD_IN_PROC(p, td) {
KASSERT(i < numthreads,
("sysctl_kern_proc_kstack: numthreads"));
lwpidarray[i] = td->td_tid;
i++;
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
numthreads = i;
for (i = 0; i < numthreads; i++) {
td = tdfind(lwpidarray[i], p->p_pid);
if (td == NULL) {
continue;
}
bzero(kkstp, sizeof(*kkstp));
(void)sbuf_new(&sb, kkstp->kkst_trace,
sizeof(kkstp->kkst_trace), SBUF_FIXEDLEN);
thread_lock(td);
kkstp->kkst_tid = td->td_tid;
if (TD_IS_SWAPPED(td))
kkstp->kkst_state = KKST_STATE_SWAPPED;
else if (stack_save_td(st, td) == 0)
kkstp->kkst_state = KKST_STATE_STACKOK;
else
kkstp->kkst_state = KKST_STATE_RUNNING;
thread_unlock(td);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
stack_sbuf_print(&sb, st);
sbuf_finish(&sb);
sbuf_delete(&sb);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, kkstp, sizeof(*kkstp));
if (error)
break;
}
PRELE(p);
if (lwpidarray != NULL)
free(lwpidarray, M_TEMP);
stack_destroy(st);
free(kkstp, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
#endif
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve the full list of groups from
* itself or another process.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_groups(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
pid_t *pidp = (pid_t *)arg1;
unsigned int arglen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
struct ucred *cred;
int error;
if (arglen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
if (*pidp == -1) { /* -1 means this process */
p = req->td->td_proc;
PROC_LOCK(p);
} else {
error = pget(*pidp, PGET_CANSEE, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
cred = crhold(p->p_ucred);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, cred->cr_groups,
cred->cr_ngroups * sizeof(gid_t));
crfree(cred);
return (error);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve or/and set the resource limit for
* another process.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_rlimit(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct rlimit rlim;
struct proc *p;
u_int which;
int flags, error;
if (namelen != 2)
return (EINVAL);
which = (u_int)name[1];
if (which >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return (EINVAL);
if (req->newptr != NULL && req->newlen != sizeof(rlim))
return (EINVAL);
flags = PGET_HOLD | PGET_NOTWEXIT;
if (req->newptr != NULL)
flags |= PGET_CANDEBUG;
else
flags |= PGET_CANSEE;
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], flags, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/*
* Retrieve limit.
*/
if (req->oldptr != NULL) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
lim_rlimit_proc(p, which, &rlim);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &rlim, sizeof(rlim));
if (error != 0)
goto errout;
/*
* Set limit.
*/
if (req->newptr != NULL) {
error = SYSCTL_IN(req, &rlim, sizeof(rlim));
if (error == 0)
error = kern_proc_setrlimit(curthread, p, which, &rlim);
}
errout:
PRELE(p);
return (error);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve ps_strings structure location of
* another process.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_ps_strings(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
vm_offset_t ps_strings;
int error;
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
uint32_t ps_strings32;
#endif
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], PGET_CANDEBUG, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if ((req->flags & SCTL_MASK32) != 0) {
/*
* We return 0 if the 32 bit emulation request is for a 64 bit
* process.
*/
ps_strings32 = SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_ILP32) != 0 ?
PTROUT(p->p_sysent->sv_psstrings) : 0;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &ps_strings32, sizeof(ps_strings32));
return (error);
}
#endif
ps_strings = p->p_sysent->sv_psstrings;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &ps_strings, sizeof(ps_strings));
return (error);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve umask of another process.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_umask(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
int error;
u_short cmask;
pid_t pid;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
pid = (pid_t)name[0];
p = curproc;
if (pid == p->p_pid || pid == 0) {
cmask = p->p_pd->pd_cmask;
goto out;
}
error = pget(pid, PGET_WANTREAD, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
cmask = p->p_pd->pd_cmask;
PRELE(p);
out:
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &cmask, sizeof(cmask));
return (error);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to set and retrieve binary osreldate of
* another process.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_osrel(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
int flags, error, osrel;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
if (req->newptr != NULL && req->newlen != sizeof(osrel))
return (EINVAL);
flags = PGET_HOLD | PGET_NOTWEXIT;
if (req->newptr != NULL)
flags |= PGET_CANDEBUG;
else
flags |= PGET_CANSEE;
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], flags, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &p->p_osrel, sizeof(p->p_osrel));
if (error != 0)
goto errout;
if (req->newptr != NULL) {
error = SYSCTL_IN(req, &osrel, sizeof(osrel));
if (error != 0)
goto errout;
if (osrel < 0) {
error = EINVAL;
goto errout;
}
p->p_osrel = osrel;
}
errout:
PRELE(p);
return (error);
}
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_sigtramp(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
struct kinfo_sigtramp kst;
const struct sysentvec *sv;
int error;
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
struct kinfo_sigtramp32 kst32;
#endif
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
error = pget((pid_t)name[0], PGET_CANDEBUG, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
sv = p->p_sysent;
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if ((req->flags & SCTL_MASK32) != 0) {
bzero(&kst32, sizeof(kst32));
if (SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_ILP32)) {
if (sv->sv_sigcode_base != 0) {
kst32.ksigtramp_start = sv->sv_sigcode_base;
kst32.ksigtramp_end = sv->sv_sigcode_base +
*sv->sv_szsigcode;
} else {
kst32.ksigtramp_start = sv->sv_psstrings -
*sv->sv_szsigcode;
kst32.ksigtramp_end = sv->sv_psstrings;
}
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &kst32, sizeof(kst32));
return (error);
}
#endif
bzero(&kst, sizeof(kst));
if (sv->sv_sigcode_base != 0) {
kst.ksigtramp_start = (char *)sv->sv_sigcode_base;
kst.ksigtramp_end = (char *)sv->sv_sigcode_base +
*sv->sv_szsigcode;
} else {
kst.ksigtramp_start = (char *)sv->sv_psstrings -
*sv->sv_szsigcode;
kst.ksigtramp_end = (char *)sv->sv_psstrings;
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &kst, sizeof(kst));
return (error);
}
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_sigfastblk(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int *)arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
pid_t pid;
struct proc *p;
struct thread *td1;
uintptr_t addr;
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
uint32_t addr32;
#endif
int error;
if (namelen != 1 || req->newptr != NULL)
return (EINVAL);
pid = (pid_t)name[0];
error = pget(pid, PGET_HOLD | PGET_NOTWEXIT | PGET_CANDEBUG, &p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
PROC_LOCK(p);
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if (SV_CURPROC_FLAG(SV_ILP32)) {
if (!SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_ILP32)) {
error = EINVAL;
goto errlocked;
}
}
#endif
if (pid <= PID_MAX) {
td1 = FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p);
} else {
FOREACH_THREAD_IN_PROC(p, td1) {
if (td1->td_tid == pid)
break;
}
}
if (td1 == NULL) {
error = ESRCH;
goto errlocked;
}
/*
* The access to the private thread flags. It is fine as far
* as no out-of-thin-air values are read from td_pflags, and
* usermode read of the td_sigblock_ptr is racy inherently,
* since target process might have already changed it
* meantime.
*/
if ((td1->td_pflags & TDP_SIGFASTBLOCK) != 0)
addr = (uintptr_t)td1->td_sigblock_ptr;
else
error = ENOTTY;
errlocked:
_PRELE(p);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if (SV_CURPROC_FLAG(SV_ILP32)) {
addr32 = addr;
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &addr32, sizeof(addr32));
} else
#endif
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &addr, sizeof(addr));
return (error);
}
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern, KERN_PROC, proc, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
"Process table");
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_ALL, all, CTLFLAG_RD|CTLTYPE_STRUCT|
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 0, sysctl_kern_proc, "S,proc",
"Return entire process table");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_GID, gid, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PGRP, pgrp, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_RGID, rgid, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_SESSION, sid, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_TTY, tty, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_UID, uid, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_RUID, ruid, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PID, pid, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PROC, proc, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Return process table, no threads");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_ARGS, args,
CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_CAPWR | CTLFLAG_ANYBODY | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc_args, "Process argument list");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_ENV, env, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
sysctl_kern_proc_env, "Process environment");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_AUXV, auxv, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_auxv, "Process ELF auxiliary vector");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PATHNAME, pathname, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_pathname, "Process executable path");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_SV_NAME, sv_name, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_sv_name,
"Process syscall vector name (ABI type)");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, (KERN_PROC_GID | KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD), gid_td,
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, (KERN_PROC_PGRP | KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD), pgrp_td,
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, (KERN_PROC_RGID | KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD), rgid_td,
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, (KERN_PROC_SESSION | KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD),
sid_td, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, (KERN_PROC_TTY | KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD), tty_td,
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, (KERN_PROC_UID | KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD), uid_td,
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, (KERN_PROC_RUID | KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD), ruid_td,
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, (KERN_PROC_PID | KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD), pid_td,
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
2005-02-10 12:15:49 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, (KERN_PROC_PROC | KERN_PROC_INC_THREAD), proc_td,
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc,
"Return process table, including threads");
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD7
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_OVMMAP, ovmmap, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_ovmmap, "Old Process vm map entries");
#endif
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_VMMAP, vmmap, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_vmmap, "Process vm map entries");
#if defined(STACK) || defined(DDB)
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_KSTACK, kstack, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_kstack, "Process kernel stacks");
#endif
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_GROUPS, groups, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_groups, "Process groups");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_RLIMIT, rlimit, CTLFLAG_RW |
CTLFLAG_ANYBODY | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_rlimit,
"Process resource limits");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PS_STRINGS, ps_strings, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_ps_strings,
"Process ps_strings location");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_UMASK, umask, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_umask, "Process umask");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_OSREL, osrel, CTLFLAG_RW |
CTLFLAG_ANYBODY | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_osrel,
"Process binary osreldate");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_SIGTRAMP, sigtramp, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_sigtramp,
"Process signal trampoline location");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_SIGFASTBLK, sigfastblk, CTLFLAG_RD |
CTLFLAG_ANYBODY | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, sysctl_kern_proc_sigfastblk,
"Thread sigfastblock address");
int allproc_gen;
/*
* stop_all_proc() purpose is to stop all process which have usermode,
* except current process for obvious reasons. This makes it somewhat
* unreliable when invoked from multithreaded process. The service
* must not be user-callable anyway.
*/
void
stop_all_proc(void)
{
struct proc *cp, *p;
int r, gen;
bool restart, seen_stopped, seen_exiting, stopped_some;
cp = curproc;
allproc_loop:
sx_xlock(&allproc_lock);
gen = allproc_gen;
seen_exiting = seen_stopped = stopped_some = restart = false;
LIST_REMOVE(cp, p_list);
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&allproc, cp, p_list);
for (;;) {
p = LIST_NEXT(cp, p_list);
if (p == NULL)
break;
LIST_REMOVE(cp, p_list);
LIST_INSERT_AFTER(p, cp, p_list);
PROC_LOCK(p);
if ((p->p_flag & (P_KPROC | P_SYSTEM | P_TOTAL_STOP)) != 0) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
continue;
}
if ((p->p_flag & P_WEXIT) != 0) {
seen_exiting = true;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
continue;
}
if (P_SHOULDSTOP(p) == P_STOPPED_SINGLE) {
/*
* Stopped processes are tolerated when there
* are no other processes which might continue
* them. P_STOPPED_SINGLE but not
* P_TOTAL_STOP process still has at least one
* thread running.
*/
seen_stopped = true;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
continue;
}
sx_xunlock(&allproc_lock);
_PHOLD(p);
r = thread_single(p, SINGLE_ALLPROC);
if (r != 0)
restart = true;
else
stopped_some = true;
_PRELE(p);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
sx_xlock(&allproc_lock);
}
/* Catch forked children we did not see in iteration. */
if (gen != allproc_gen)
restart = true;
sx_xunlock(&allproc_lock);
if (restart || stopped_some || seen_exiting || seen_stopped) {
kern_yield(PRI_USER);
goto allproc_loop;
}
}
void
resume_all_proc(void)
{
struct proc *cp, *p;
cp = curproc;
sx_xlock(&allproc_lock);
again:
LIST_REMOVE(cp, p_list);
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&allproc, cp, p_list);
for (;;) {
p = LIST_NEXT(cp, p_list);
if (p == NULL)
break;
LIST_REMOVE(cp, p_list);
LIST_INSERT_AFTER(p, cp, p_list);
PROC_LOCK(p);
if ((p->p_flag & P_TOTAL_STOP) != 0) {
sx_xunlock(&allproc_lock);
_PHOLD(p);
thread_single_end(p, SINGLE_ALLPROC);
_PRELE(p);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
sx_xlock(&allproc_lock);
} else {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
}
/* Did the loop above missed any stopped process ? */
FOREACH_PROC_IN_SYSTEM(p) {
/* No need for proc lock. */
if ((p->p_flag & P_TOTAL_STOP) != 0)
goto again;
}
sx_xunlock(&allproc_lock);
}
/* #define TOTAL_STOP_DEBUG 1 */
#ifdef TOTAL_STOP_DEBUG
volatile static int ap_resume;
#include <sys/mount.h>
static int
sysctl_debug_stop_all_proc(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int error, val;
val = 0;
ap_resume = 0;
error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &val, 0, req);
if (error != 0 || req->newptr == NULL)
return (error);
if (val != 0) {
stop_all_proc();
syncer_suspend();
while (ap_resume == 0)
;
syncer_resume();
resume_all_proc();
}
return (0);
}
SYSCTL_PROC(_debug, OID_AUTO, stop_all_proc, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW |
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, __DEVOLATILE(int *, &ap_resume), 0,
sysctl_debug_stop_all_proc, "I",
"");
#endif