freebsd-nq/lib/libc/gen/getpwent.c

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1994-05-27 05:00:24 +00:00
/*
* Copyright (c) 1988, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
static char sccsid[] = "@(#)getpwent.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93";
#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <db.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
static struct passwd _pw_passwd; /* password structure */
static DB *_pw_db; /* password database */
static int _pw_keynum; /* key counter */
static int _pw_stayopen; /* keep fd's open */
#ifdef YP
static struct passwd _pw_copy;
static int _yp_enabled; /* set true when yp enabled */
static int _pw_stepping_yp; /* set true when stepping thru map */
#endif
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static int __hashpw(), __initdb();
static int _havemaster(const char *);
static int _getyppass(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
static int _nextyppass(struct passwd *);
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struct passwd *
getpwent()
{
DBT key;
char bf[sizeof(_pw_keynum) + 1];
int rv;
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if (!_pw_db && !__initdb())
return((struct passwd *)NULL);
#ifdef YP
if(_pw_stepping_yp) {
_pw_passwd = _pw_copy;
return (_nextyppass(&_pw_passwd) ? &_pw_passwd : 0);
}
#endif
tryagain:
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++_pw_keynum;
bf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNUM;
bcopy((char *)&_pw_keynum, bf + 1, sizeof(_pw_keynum));
key.data = (u_char *)bf;
key.size = sizeof(_pw_keynum) + 1;
rv = __hashpw(&key);
if(!rv) return (struct passwd *)NULL;
#ifdef YP
if(_pw_passwd.pw_name[0] == '+' && _pw_passwd.pw_name[1]) {
_getyppass(&_pw_passwd, &_pw_passwd.pw_name[1],
"passwd.byname");
} else if(_pw_passwd.pw_name[0] == '+') {
_pw_copy = _pw_passwd;
return (_nextyppass(&_pw_passwd) ? &_pw_passwd : 0);
}
#else
/* Ignore YP password file entries when YP is disabled. */
if(_pw_passwd.pw_name[0] == '+') {
goto tryagain;
}
#endif
return(&_pw_passwd);
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}
struct passwd *
getpwnam(name)
const char *name;
{
DBT key;
int len, rval;
char bf[UT_NAMESIZE + 2];
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if (!_pw_db && !__initdb())
return((struct passwd *)NULL);
bf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNAME;
len = strlen(name);
bcopy(name, bf + 1, MIN(len, UT_NAMESIZE));
key.data = (u_char *)bf;
key.size = len + 1;
rval = __hashpw(&key);
#ifdef YP
if (!rval && _yp_enabled) {
bf[1] = '+';
bcopy(name, bf + 2, MIN(len, UT_NAMESIZE - 1));
key.data = (u_char *)bf;
key.size = len + 2;
rval = __hashpw(&key);
if (!rval && _yp_enabled < 0) {
key.size = 2;
rval = __hashpw(&key);
}
if(rval)
rval = _getyppass(&_pw_passwd, name, "passwd.byname");
}
#endif
/*
* Prevent login attempts when YP is not enabled but YP entries
* are in /etc/master.passwd.
*/
if (rval && _pw_passwd.pw_name[0] == '+') rval = 0;
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if (!_pw_stayopen) {
(void)(_pw_db->close)(_pw_db);
_pw_db = (DB *)NULL;
}
return(rval ? &_pw_passwd : (struct passwd *)NULL);
}
struct passwd *
#ifdef __STDC__
getpwuid(uid_t uid)
#else
getpwuid(uid)
int uid;
#endif
{
DBT key;
int keyuid, rval;
char bf[sizeof(keyuid) + 1];
if (!_pw_db && !__initdb())
return((struct passwd *)NULL);
bf[0] = _PW_KEYBYUID;
keyuid = uid;
bcopy(&keyuid, bf + 1, sizeof(keyuid));
key.data = (u_char *)bf;
key.size = sizeof(keyuid) + 1;
rval = __hashpw(&key);
#ifdef YP
if (!rval && _yp_enabled) {
char ypbuf[16]; /* big enough for 32-bit uids and then some */
snprintf(ypbuf, sizeof ypbuf, "%u", (unsigned)uid);
rval = _getyppass(&_pw_passwd, ypbuf, "passwd.byuid");
}
#endif
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if (!_pw_stayopen) {
(void)(_pw_db->close)(_pw_db);
_pw_db = (DB *)NULL;
}
return(rval ? &_pw_passwd : (struct passwd *)NULL);
}
int
setpassent(stayopen)
int stayopen;
{
_pw_keynum = 0;
#ifdef YP
_pw_stepping_yp = 0;
#endif
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_pw_stayopen = stayopen;
return(1);
}
int
setpwent()
{
_pw_keynum = 0;
#ifdef YP
_pw_stepping_yp = 0;
#endif
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_pw_stayopen = 0;
return(1);
}
void
endpwent()
{
_pw_keynum = 0;
#ifdef YP
_pw_stepping_yp = 0;
#endif
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if (_pw_db) {
(void)(_pw_db->close)(_pw_db);
_pw_db = (DB *)NULL;
}
}
static
__initdb()
{
static int warned;
char *p;
p = (geteuid()) ? _PATH_MP_DB : _PATH_SMP_DB;
_pw_db = dbopen(p, O_RDONLY, 0, DB_HASH, NULL);
if (_pw_db) {
#ifdef YP
DBT key, data;
char buf[] = { _PW_KEYYPENABLED };
key.data = buf;
key.size = 1;
if ((_pw_db->get)(_pw_db, &key, &data, 0)) {
_yp_enabled = 0;
} else {
/* Distinguish between old and new versions of
pwd_mkdb. */
if(data.size != 1) {
_yp_enabled = -1;
} else {
_yp_enabled = (int)*((char *)data.data) - 2;
}
}
#endif
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return(1);
}
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if (!warned)
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m", p);
return(0);
}
static
__hashpw(key)
DBT *key;
{
register char *p, *t;
static u_int max;
static char *line;
DBT data;
Fixed a rather serious bug that presents itself when FreeBSD is configured as an NIS client. The pw_breakout_yp routines that are used to populate the _pw_passwd structire only do anything if the bits in the pw_fields member _pw_passwd are cleared. Unfortunately, we can get into a state where pw_fields has garbage in it right before the YP lookup functions are called, which causes the breakout functions to screw up in a big way. Here's how to duplicate the problem: - Configure FreeBSD as an NIS client - Log in as a user who's password database records reside only in the NIS passwd maps. - Type ps -aux Result: your processes appear to be owned by 'root' or 'deamon.' /bin/ls can exhibit the same problem. The reason this happens: - When ps(1) needs to match a username to a UID, it calls getpwuid(). - root is in the local password file, so getpwuid() calls __hashpw() and __hashpw() populates the _pw_passwd struct, including the pw_fields member. This happens before NIS lookups take place because, by coincidence, ps(1) tends to display processes owned by root before it happens upon a proccess owned by you. - When your UID comes up, __hashpw() fails to find your entry in the local password database, so it bails out, BUT THE BITS IN THE pw_fields STRUCTURE OF _pw_passwd ARE NEVER CLEARED AND STILL CONTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE PREVIOUS CALL TO __hash_pw()!! - If we have NIS enabled, the NIS lookup functions are called. - The pw_breakout_yp routines see that the pw_fields bits are set and decline to place the data retrieved from the NIS passwd maps into the _pw_passwd structure. - getpwuid() returns the results of the last __hashpw() lookup instead of the valid NIS data. - Hijinxs ensue when user_from_uid() caches this bogus information and starts handing out the wrong usernames. AAAARRRRRRRRRGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHH!!! *Please* don't tell me I'm the only person to have noticed this. Fixed by having __hashpw() check the state of pw_fields just before bailing out on a failed lookup and clearing away any leftover garbage. What a fun way to spend an afternoon.
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/*
* XXX The pw_fields member of _pw_passwd needs to be cleared
* at some point since __hashpw() can be called several times in
* a single program. If we leave here after the second invokation
* with garbage data in pw_fields, it can totally screw up NIS
* lookups (the pw_breakout functions only populate the pw_passwd
* structure if the pw_fields bits are clear).
*/
if ((_pw_db->get)(_pw_db, key, &data, 0)) {
if (_pw_passwd.pw_fields)
_pw_passwd.pw_fields = 0;
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return(0);
Fixed a rather serious bug that presents itself when FreeBSD is configured as an NIS client. The pw_breakout_yp routines that are used to populate the _pw_passwd structire only do anything if the bits in the pw_fields member _pw_passwd are cleared. Unfortunately, we can get into a state where pw_fields has garbage in it right before the YP lookup functions are called, which causes the breakout functions to screw up in a big way. Here's how to duplicate the problem: - Configure FreeBSD as an NIS client - Log in as a user who's password database records reside only in the NIS passwd maps. - Type ps -aux Result: your processes appear to be owned by 'root' or 'deamon.' /bin/ls can exhibit the same problem. The reason this happens: - When ps(1) needs to match a username to a UID, it calls getpwuid(). - root is in the local password file, so getpwuid() calls __hashpw() and __hashpw() populates the _pw_passwd struct, including the pw_fields member. This happens before NIS lookups take place because, by coincidence, ps(1) tends to display processes owned by root before it happens upon a proccess owned by you. - When your UID comes up, __hashpw() fails to find your entry in the local password database, so it bails out, BUT THE BITS IN THE pw_fields STRUCTURE OF _pw_passwd ARE NEVER CLEARED AND STILL CONTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE PREVIOUS CALL TO __hash_pw()!! - If we have NIS enabled, the NIS lookup functions are called. - The pw_breakout_yp routines see that the pw_fields bits are set and decline to place the data retrieved from the NIS passwd maps into the _pw_passwd structure. - getpwuid() returns the results of the last __hashpw() lookup instead of the valid NIS data. - Hijinxs ensue when user_from_uid() caches this bogus information and starts handing out the wrong usernames. AAAARRRRRRRRRGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHH!!! *Please* don't tell me I'm the only person to have noticed this. Fixed by having __hashpw() check the state of pw_fields just before bailing out on a failed lookup and clearing away any leftover garbage. What a fun way to spend an afternoon.
1995-02-03 01:09:35 +00:00
}
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p = (char *)data.data;
Fixed a rather serious bug that presents itself when FreeBSD is configured as an NIS client. The pw_breakout_yp routines that are used to populate the _pw_passwd structire only do anything if the bits in the pw_fields member _pw_passwd are cleared. Unfortunately, we can get into a state where pw_fields has garbage in it right before the YP lookup functions are called, which causes the breakout functions to screw up in a big way. Here's how to duplicate the problem: - Configure FreeBSD as an NIS client - Log in as a user who's password database records reside only in the NIS passwd maps. - Type ps -aux Result: your processes appear to be owned by 'root' or 'deamon.' /bin/ls can exhibit the same problem. The reason this happens: - When ps(1) needs to match a username to a UID, it calls getpwuid(). - root is in the local password file, so getpwuid() calls __hashpw() and __hashpw() populates the _pw_passwd struct, including the pw_fields member. This happens before NIS lookups take place because, by coincidence, ps(1) tends to display processes owned by root before it happens upon a proccess owned by you. - When your UID comes up, __hashpw() fails to find your entry in the local password database, so it bails out, BUT THE BITS IN THE pw_fields STRUCTURE OF _pw_passwd ARE NEVER CLEARED AND STILL CONTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE PREVIOUS CALL TO __hash_pw()!! - If we have NIS enabled, the NIS lookup functions are called. - The pw_breakout_yp routines see that the pw_fields bits are set and decline to place the data retrieved from the NIS passwd maps into the _pw_passwd structure. - getpwuid() returns the results of the last __hashpw() lookup instead of the valid NIS data. - Hijinxs ensue when user_from_uid() caches this bogus information and starts handing out the wrong usernames. AAAARRRRRRRRRGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHH!!! *Please* don't tell me I'm the only person to have noticed this. Fixed by having __hashpw() check the state of pw_fields just before bailing out on a failed lookup and clearing away any leftover garbage. What a fun way to spend an afternoon.
1995-02-03 01:09:35 +00:00
if (data.size > max && !(line = realloc(line, max += 1024))) {
if (_pw_passwd.pw_fields)
_pw_passwd.pw_fields = 0;
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return(0);
Fixed a rather serious bug that presents itself when FreeBSD is configured as an NIS client. The pw_breakout_yp routines that are used to populate the _pw_passwd structire only do anything if the bits in the pw_fields member _pw_passwd are cleared. Unfortunately, we can get into a state where pw_fields has garbage in it right before the YP lookup functions are called, which causes the breakout functions to screw up in a big way. Here's how to duplicate the problem: - Configure FreeBSD as an NIS client - Log in as a user who's password database records reside only in the NIS passwd maps. - Type ps -aux Result: your processes appear to be owned by 'root' or 'deamon.' /bin/ls can exhibit the same problem. The reason this happens: - When ps(1) needs to match a username to a UID, it calls getpwuid(). - root is in the local password file, so getpwuid() calls __hashpw() and __hashpw() populates the _pw_passwd struct, including the pw_fields member. This happens before NIS lookups take place because, by coincidence, ps(1) tends to display processes owned by root before it happens upon a proccess owned by you. - When your UID comes up, __hashpw() fails to find your entry in the local password database, so it bails out, BUT THE BITS IN THE pw_fields STRUCTURE OF _pw_passwd ARE NEVER CLEARED AND STILL CONTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE PREVIOUS CALL TO __hash_pw()!! - If we have NIS enabled, the NIS lookup functions are called. - The pw_breakout_yp routines see that the pw_fields bits are set and decline to place the data retrieved from the NIS passwd maps into the _pw_passwd structure. - getpwuid() returns the results of the last __hashpw() lookup instead of the valid NIS data. - Hijinxs ensue when user_from_uid() caches this bogus information and starts handing out the wrong usernames. AAAARRRRRRRRRGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHH!!! *Please* don't tell me I'm the only person to have noticed this. Fixed by having __hashpw() check the state of pw_fields just before bailing out on a failed lookup and clearing away any leftover garbage. What a fun way to spend an afternoon.
1995-02-03 01:09:35 +00:00
}
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t = line;
#define EXPAND(e) e = t; while (*t++ = *p++);
EXPAND(_pw_passwd.pw_name);
EXPAND(_pw_passwd.pw_passwd);
bcopy(p, (char *)&_pw_passwd.pw_uid, sizeof(int));
p += sizeof(int);
bcopy(p, (char *)&_pw_passwd.pw_gid, sizeof(int));
p += sizeof(int);
bcopy(p, (char *)&_pw_passwd.pw_change, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
EXPAND(_pw_passwd.pw_class);
EXPAND(_pw_passwd.pw_gecos);
EXPAND(_pw_passwd.pw_dir);
EXPAND(_pw_passwd.pw_shell);
bcopy(p, (char *)&_pw_passwd.pw_expire, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
bcopy(p, (char *)&_pw_passwd.pw_fields, sizeof _pw_passwd.pw_fields);
p += sizeof _pw_passwd.pw_fields;
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return(1);
}
#ifdef YP
static void
_pw_breakout_yp(struct passwd *pw, char *result)
{
char *s;
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* name */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_NAME) || (pw->pw_name[0] == '+')) {
pw->pw_name = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_NAME;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* password */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_PASSWD)) {
pw->pw_passwd = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_PASSWD;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* uid */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_UID)) {
pw->pw_uid = atoi(s);
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_UID;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* gid */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_GID)) {
pw->pw_gid = atoi(s);
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_GID;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* gecos */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_GECOS)) {
pw->pw_gecos = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_GECOS;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* dir */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_DIR)) {
pw->pw_dir = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_DIR;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* shell */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_SHELL)) {
pw->pw_shell = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_SHELL;
}
}
static void
_masterpw_breakout_yp(struct passwd *pw, char *result)
{
char *s;
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* name */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_NAME) || (pw->pw_name[0] == '+')) {
pw->pw_name = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_NAME;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* password */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_PASSWD)) {
pw->pw_passwd = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_PASSWD;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* uid */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_UID)) {
pw->pw_uid = atoi(s);
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_UID;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* gid */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_GID)) {
pw->pw_gid = atoi(s);
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_GID;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* class */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_CLASS)) {
pw->pw_class = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_CLASS;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* change */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_CHANGE)) {
pw->pw_change = atol(s);
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_CHANGE;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* expire */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_EXPIRE)) {
pw->pw_expire = atol(s);
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_EXPIRE;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* gecos */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_GECOS)) {
pw->pw_gecos = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_GECOS;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* dir */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_DIR)) {
pw->pw_dir = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_DIR;
}
s = strsep(&result, ":"); /* shell */
if(!(pw->pw_fields & _PWF_SHELL)) {
pw->pw_shell = s;
pw->pw_fields |= _PWF_SHELL;
}
}
static char *_pw_yp_domain;
static int
_havemaster(const char *_pw_yp_domain)
{
char *result;
static char *key;
int resultlen;
static int keylen;
if (yp_first(_pw_yp_domain, "master.passwd.byname",
&key, &keylen, &result, &resultlen))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
_getyppass(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, const char *map)
{
char *result, *s;
static char resultbuf[1024];
int resultlen;
char mastermap[1024];
int gotmaster = 0;
if(!_pw_yp_domain) {
if(yp_get_default_domain(&_pw_yp_domain))
return 0;
}
sprintf(mastermap,"%s",map);
/* Don't even bother with this if we aren't root. */
if (!geteuid())
if (_havemaster(_pw_yp_domain)) {
sprintf(mastermap,"master.%s", map);
gotmaster++;
}
if(yp_match(_pw_yp_domain, &mastermap, name, strlen(name),
&result, &resultlen))
return 0;
s = strchr(result, '\n');
if(s) *s = '\0';
if(resultlen >= sizeof resultbuf) return 0;
strcpy(resultbuf, result);
result = resultbuf;
if (gotmaster)
_masterpw_breakout_yp(pw, resultbuf);
else
_pw_breakout_yp(pw, resultbuf);
return 1;
}
static int
_nextyppass(struct passwd *pw)
{
static char *key;
static int keylen;
char *lastkey, *result;
static char resultbuf[1024];
int resultlen;
int rv;
char *map = "passwd.byname";
int gotmaster = 0;
if(!_pw_yp_domain) {
if(yp_get_default_domain(&_pw_yp_domain))
return 0;
}
/* Don't even bother with this if we aren't root. */
if (!geteuid())
if(_havemaster(_pw_yp_domain)) {
map = "master.passwd.byname";
gotmaster++;
}
if(!_pw_stepping_yp) {
if(key) free(key);
rv = yp_first(_pw_yp_domain, map,
&key, &keylen, &result, &resultlen);
if(rv) {
return 0;
}
_pw_stepping_yp = 1;
goto unpack;
} else {
tryagain:
lastkey = key;
rv = yp_next(_pw_yp_domain, map, key, keylen,
&key, &keylen, &result, &resultlen);
free(lastkey);
unpack:
if(rv) {
_pw_stepping_yp = 0;
return 0;
}
if(resultlen > sizeof(resultbuf)) {
free(result);
goto tryagain;
}
strcpy(resultbuf, result);
free(result);
if(result = strchr(resultbuf, '\n')) *result = '\0';
if (gotmaster)
_masterpw_breakout_yp(pw, resultbuf);
else
_pw_breakout_yp(pw, resultbuf);
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* YP */