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freebsd-nq/sys/dev/random/yarrow.c

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New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
/*-
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2000-2013 Mark R V Murray
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
* in this position and unchanged.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
Use __FBSDID(). Also some minor style cleanups.
2003-08-24 17:55:58 +00:00
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#ifdef _KERNEL
Add YARROW_RNG and FORTUNA_RNG to sys/conf/options. Add a SYSINIT that forces a reseed during proc0 setup, which happens fairly late in the boot process. Add a RANDOM_DEBUG option which enables some debugging printf()s. Add a new RANDOM_ATTACH entropy source which harvests entropy from the get_cyclecount() delta across each call to a device attach method.
2013-10-08 11:05:26 +00:00
#include "opt_random.h"
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
#include <sys/param.h>
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
#include <sys/kernel.h>
Catch up to header include changes: - <sys/mutex.h> now requires <sys/systm.h> - <sys/mutex.h> and <sys/sx.h> now require <sys/lock.h>
2001-03-28 09:17:56 +00:00
#include <sys/lock.h>
Overhaul the entropy device: o Each source gets its own queue, which is a FIFO, not a ring buffer. The FIFOs are implemented with the sys/queue.h macros. The separation is so that a low entropy/high rate source can't swamp the harvester with low-grade entropy and destroy the reseeds. o Each FIFO is limited to 256 (set as a macro, so adjustable) events queueable. Full FIFOs are ignored by the harvester. This is to prevent memory wastage, and helps to keep the kernel thread CPU usage within reasonable limits. o There is no need to break up the event harvesting into ${burst} sized chunks, so retire that feature. o Break the device away from its roots with the memory device, and allow it to get its major number automagically.
2003-11-17 23:02:21 +00:00
#include <sys/malloc.h>
Catch up to moving headers: - machine/ipl.h -> sys/ipl.h - machine/mutex.h -> sys/mutex.h
2000-10-20 07:58:15 +00:00
#include <sys/mutex.h>
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
#include <sys/random.h>
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
Overhaul the entropy device: o Each source gets its own queue, which is a FIFO, not a ring buffer. The FIFOs are implemented with the sys/queue.h macros. The separation is so that a low entropy/high rate source can't swamp the harvester with low-grade entropy and destroy the reseeds. o Each FIFO is limited to 256 (set as a macro, so adjustable) events queueable. Full FIFOs are ignored by the harvester. This is to prevent memory wastage, and helps to keep the kernel thread CPU usage within reasonable limits. o There is no need to break up the event harvesting into ${burst} sized chunks, so retire that feature. o Break the device away from its roots with the memory device, and allow it to get its major number automagically.
2003-11-17 23:02:21 +00:00
#include <sys/systm.h>
Stop explicitly using nanotime(9) and use the new get_cyclecounter(9) call instead. This makes a pretty dramatic difference to the amount of work that the harvester needs to do - it is much friendlier on the system. (80386 and 80486 class machines will notice little, as the new get_cyclecounter() call is a wrapper round nanotime(9) for them).
2000-11-25 17:09:01 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#include <machine/cpu.h>
stop including rijndael-api-fst.h from rijndael.h. this is required to integrate opencrypto into crypto.
2005-03-11 15:42:51 +00:00
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h>
Upgrade the random device to use a "real" hash instead of building one out of a block cipher. This has 2 advantages: 1) The code is _much_ simpler 2) We aren't committing our security to one algorithm (much as we may think we trust AES). While I'm here, make an explicit reseed do a slow reseed instead of a fast; this is in line with what the original paper suggested.
2002-07-15 13:58:35 +00:00
#include <crypto/sha2/sha2.h>
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
After some complaints about the dir names, the random device is now in dirs called sys/*/random/ instead of sys/*/randomdev/*. Introduce blocking, but only at startup; the random device will block until the first reseed happens to prevent clients from using untrustworthy output. Provide a read_random() call for the rest of the kernel so that the entropy device does not need to be present. This means that things like IPX no longer need to have "device random" hardcoded into thir kernel config. The downside is that read_random() will provide very poor output until the entropy device is loaded and reseeded. It is recommended that developers do NOT use the read_random() call; instead, they should use arc4random() which internally uses read_random(). Clean up the mutex and locking code a bit; this makes it possible to unload the module again.
2000-10-14 10:59:56 +00:00
#include <dev/random/hash.h>
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
* Add random_adaptors.[ch] which is basically a store of random_adaptor's. random_adaptor is basically an adapter that plugs in to random(4). random_adaptor can only be plugged in to random(4) very early in bootup. Unplugging random_adaptor from random(4) is not supported, and is probably a bad idea anyway, due to potential loss of entropy pools. We currently have 3 random_adaptors: + yarrow + rdrand (ivy.c) + nehemeiah * Remove platform dependent logic from probe.c, and move it into corresponding registration routines of each random_adaptor provider. probe.c doesn't do anything other than picking a specific random_adaptor from a list of registered ones. * If the kernel doesn't have any random_adaptor adapters present then the creation of /dev/random is postponed until next random_adaptor is kldload'ed. * Fix randomdev_soft.c to refer to its own random_adaptor, instead of a system wide one. Submitted by: arthurmesh@gmail.com, obrien Obtained from: Juniper Networks Reviewed by: so (des)
2013-08-09 15:31:50 +00:00
#include <dev/random/random_adaptors.h>
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#include <dev/random/random_harvestq.h>
#include <dev/random/uint128.h>
#include <dev/random/yarrow.h>
#else /* !_KERNEL */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <threads.h>
#include "unit_test.h"
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h>
#include <crypto/sha2/sha2.h>
#include <dev/random/hash.h>
#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
#include <dev/random/uint128.h>
After some complaints about the dir names, the random device is now in dirs called sys/*/random/ instead of sys/*/randomdev/*. Introduce blocking, but only at startup; the random device will block until the first reseed happens to prevent clients from using untrustworthy output. Provide a read_random() call for the rest of the kernel so that the entropy device does not need to be present. This means that things like IPX no longer need to have "device random" hardcoded into thir kernel config. The downside is that read_random() will provide very poor output until the entropy device is loaded and reseeded. It is recommended that developers do NOT use the read_random() call; instead, they should use arc4random() which internally uses read_random(). Clean up the mutex and locking code a bit; this makes it possible to unload the module again.
2000-10-14 10:59:56 +00:00
#include <dev/random/yarrow.h>
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#endif /* _KERNEL */
#if !defined(RANDOM_YARROW) && !defined(RANDOM_FORTUNA)
#define RANDOM_YARROW
#elif defined(RANDOM_YARROW) && defined(RANDOM_FORTUNA)
#error "Must define either RANDOM_YARROW or RANDOM_FORTUNA"
#endif
#if defined(RANDOM_YARROW)
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
#define TIMEBIN 16 /* max value for Pt/t */
#define FAST 0
#define SLOW 1
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
/* This algorithm (and code) presumes that KEYSIZE is twice as large as BLOCKSIZE */
CTASSERT(BLOCKSIZE == sizeof(uint128_t));
CTASSERT(KEYSIZE == 2*BLOCKSIZE);
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
/* This is the beastie that needs protecting. It contains all of the
* state that we are excited about.
* Exactly one is instantiated.
*/
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
static struct yarrow_state {
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
union {
uint8_t byte[BLOCKSIZE];
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
uint128_t whole;
} counter; /* C */
struct randomdev_key key; /* K */
u_int gengateinterval; /* Pg */
u_int bins; /* Pt/t */
u_int outputblocks; /* count output blocks for gates */
u_int slowoverthresh; /* slow pool overthreshhold reseed count */
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
struct pool {
struct source {
u_int bits; /* estimated bits of entropy */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
} source[ENTROPYSOURCE];/* ... per source */
u_int thresh; /* pool reseed threshhold */
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
struct randomdev_hash hash; /* accumulated entropy */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
} pool[2]; /* pool[0] is fast, pool[1] is slow */
int seeded;
struct start_cache {
uint8_t junk[KEYSIZE];
struct randomdev_hash hash;
} start_cache;
} yarrow_state;
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
/* The random_reseed_mtx mutex protects seeding and polling/blocking. */
static mtx_t random_reseed_mtx;
#ifdef _KERNEL
static struct sysctl_ctx_list random_clist;
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(gengateinterval, 4, 64);
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(bins, 2, 16);
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(fastthresh, (BLOCKSIZE*8)/4, (BLOCKSIZE*8)); /* Bit counts */
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(slowthresh, (BLOCKSIZE*8)/4, (BLOCKSIZE*8)); /* Bit counts */
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(slowoverthresh, 1, 5);
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#else /* !_KERNEL */
static u_int harvest_destination[ENTROPYSOURCE];
#endif /* _KERNEL */
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
static void generator_gate(void);
static void reseed(u_int);
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
void
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
random_yarrow_init_alg(void)
Add entropy gathering code. This will work whether the module is compiled in or loaded.
2000-07-07 09:03:59 +00:00
{
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
int i, j;
#ifdef _KERNEL
struct sysctl_oid *random_yarrow_o;
#endif /* _KERNEL */
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
memset(yarrow_state.start_cache.junk, 0, KEYSIZE);
randomdev_hash_init(&yarrow_state.start_cache.hash);
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
/* Set up the lock for the reseed/gate state */
#ifdef _KERNEL
mtx_init(&random_reseed_mtx, "reseed mutex", NULL, MTX_DEF);
#else /* !_KERNEL */
mtx_init(&random_reseed_mtx, mtx_plain);
#endif /* _KERNEL */
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
/* Start unseeded, therefore blocked. */
yarrow_state.seeded = 0;
Remove NOBLOCKRANDOM as a compile-time option. Instead, provide exactly the same functionality via a sysctl, making this feature a run-time option. The default is 1(ON), which means that /dev/random device will NOT block at startup. setting kern.random.sys.seeded to 0(OFF) will cause /dev/random to block until the next reseed, at which stage the sysctl will be changed back to 1(ON). While I'm here, clean up the sysctls, and make them dynamic. Reviewed by: des Tested on Alpha by: obrien
2001-01-14 17:50:15 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#ifdef _KERNEL
Make a big improvement to entropy-harvesting speed by not having any locks (only atomic assigns) in the harvest ringbuffer.
2001-02-11 16:21:35 +00:00
/* Yarrow parameters. Do not adjust these unless you have
* have a very good clue about what they do!
*/
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
random_yarrow_o = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(&random_clist,
* Add random_adaptors.[ch] which is basically a store of random_adaptor's. random_adaptor is basically an adapter that plugs in to random(4). random_adaptor can only be plugged in to random(4) very early in bootup. Unplugging random_adaptor from random(4) is not supported, and is probably a bad idea anyway, due to potential loss of entropy pools. We currently have 3 random_adaptors: + yarrow + rdrand (ivy.c) + nehemeiah * Remove platform dependent logic from probe.c, and move it into corresponding registration routines of each random_adaptor provider. probe.c doesn't do anything other than picking a specific random_adaptor from a list of registered ones. * If the kernel doesn't have any random_adaptor adapters present then the creation of /dev/random is postponed until next random_adaptor is kldload'ed. * Fix randomdev_soft.c to refer to its own random_adaptor, instead of a system wide one. Submitted by: arthurmesh@gmail.com, obrien Obtained from: Juniper Networks Reviewed by: so (des)
2013-08-09 15:31:50 +00:00
SYSCTL_STATIC_CHILDREN(_kern_random),
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
OID_AUTO, "yarrow", CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"Yarrow Parameters");
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"gengateinterval", CTLTYPE_INT|CTLFLAG_RW,
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
&yarrow_state.gengateinterval, 10,
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
random_check_uint_gengateinterval, "I",
"Generation gate interval");
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"bins", CTLTYPE_INT|CTLFLAG_RW,
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
&yarrow_state.bins, 10,
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
random_check_uint_bins, "I",
"Execution time tuner");
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"fastthresh", CTLTYPE_INT|CTLFLAG_RW,
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
&yarrow_state.pool[0].thresh, (3*(BLOCKSIZE*8))/4,
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
random_check_uint_fastthresh, "I",
"Fast reseed threshold");
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"slowthresh", CTLTYPE_INT|CTLFLAG_RW,
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
&yarrow_state.pool[1].thresh, (BLOCKSIZE*8),
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
random_check_uint_slowthresh, "I",
"Slow reseed threshold");
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_yarrow_o), OID_AUTO,
"slowoverthresh", CTLTYPE_INT|CTLFLAG_RW,
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
&yarrow_state.slowoverthresh, 2,
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
random_check_uint_slowoverthresh, "I",
"Slow over-threshold reseed");
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#endif /* _KERNEL */
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
yarrow_state.gengateinterval = 10;
yarrow_state.bins = 10;
yarrow_state.pool[FAST].thresh = (3*(BLOCKSIZE*8))/4;
yarrow_state.pool[SLOW].thresh = (BLOCKSIZE*8);
yarrow_state.slowoverthresh = 2;
/* Ensure that the first time we read, we are gated. */
yarrow_state.outputblocks = yarrow_state.gengateinterval;
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
/* Initialise the fast and slow entropy pools */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
for (i = FAST; i <= SLOW; i++) {
randomdev_hash_init(&yarrow_state.pool[i].hash);
for (j = RANDOM_START; j < ENTROPYSOURCE; j++)
yarrow_state.pool[i].source[j].bits = 0U;
}
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
/* Clear the counter */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
uint128_clear(&yarrow_state.counter.whole);
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
}
void
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
random_yarrow_deinit_alg(void)
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
{
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
mtx_destroy(&random_reseed_mtx);
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
memset(&yarrow_state, 0, sizeof(yarrow_state));
#ifdef _KERNEL
sysctl_ctx_free(&random_clist);
#endif
}
static __inline void
random_yarrow_post_insert(void)
{
u_int pl, overthreshhold[2];
enum random_entropy_source src;
#ifdef _KERNEL
mtx_assert(&random_reseed_mtx, MA_OWNED);
#endif
/* Count the over-threshold sources in each pool */
for (pl = 0; pl < 2; pl++) {
overthreshhold[pl] = 0;
for (src = RANDOM_START; src < ENTROPYSOURCE; src++) {
if (yarrow_state.pool[pl].source[src].bits > yarrow_state.pool[pl].thresh)
overthreshhold[pl]++;
}
}
/* If enough slow sources are over threshhold, then slow reseed
* else if any fast source over threshhold, then fast reseed.
*/
if (overthreshhold[SLOW] >= yarrow_state.slowoverthresh)
reseed(SLOW);
else if (overthreshhold[FAST] > 0 && yarrow_state.seeded)
reseed(FAST);
}
/* Process a single stochastic event off the harvest queue */
void
random_yarrow_process_event(struct harvest_event *event)
{
u_int pl;
mtx_lock(&random_reseed_mtx);
/* Accumulate the event into the appropriate pool
* where each event carries the destination information.
* We lock against pool state modification which can happen
* during accumulation/reseeding and reading/regating
*/
pl = event->he_destination % 2;
randomdev_hash_iterate(&yarrow_state.pool[pl].hash, event, sizeof(*event));
yarrow_state.pool[pl].source[event->he_source].bits += event->he_bits;
random_yarrow_post_insert();
mtx_unlock(&random_reseed_mtx);
}
/* Process a block of data suspected to be slightly stochastic */
static void
random_yarrow_process_buffer(uint8_t *buf, u_int length)
{
static struct harvest_event event;
u_int i, pl;
/* Accumulate the data into the appropriate pools
* where each event carries the destination information.
* We lock against pool state modification which can happen
* during accumulation/reseeding and reading/regating
*/
memset(event.he_entropy + sizeof(uint32_t), 0, HARVESTSIZE - sizeof(uint32_t));
for (i = 0; i < length/sizeof(uint32_t); i++) {
event.he_somecounter = get_cyclecount();
event.he_bits = 0; /* Fake */
event.he_source = RANDOM_CACHED;
event.he_destination = harvest_destination[RANDOM_CACHED]++;
event.he_size = sizeof(uint32_t);
*((uint32_t *)event.he_entropy) = *((uint32_t *)buf + i);
/* Do the actual entropy insertion */
pl = event.he_destination % 2;
randomdev_hash_iterate(&yarrow_state.pool[pl].hash, &event, sizeof(event));
#ifdef DONT_DO_THIS_HERE
/* Don't do this here - do it in bulk at the end */
yarrow_state.pool[pl].source[RANDOM_CACHED].bits += bits;
#endif
}
for (pl = FAST; pl <= SLOW; pl++)
yarrow_state.pool[pl].source[RANDOM_CACHED].bits += (length >> 4);
random_yarrow_post_insert();
Add entropy gathering code. This will work whether the module is compiled in or loaded.
2000-07-07 09:03:59 +00:00
}
static void
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
reseed(u_int fastslow)
Add entropy gathering code. This will work whether the module is compiled in or loaded.
2000-07-07 09:03:59 +00:00
{
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
/* Interrupt-context stack is a limited resource; make large
* structures static.
Clean this up with some BDE-inspired fixes. o Make the comments KNF-compliant. o Use nanotime instead of getnanotime; the manpage lies about the kern.timecounter.method - it has been removed. o Fix the ENTROPYSOURCE const permanently. o Make variable names more consistent. o Make function prototypes more consistent. Some more needs to be done; to follow.
2000-07-23 11:08:16 +00:00
*/
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
static uint8_t v[TIMEBIN][KEYSIZE]; /* v[i] */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
static uint8_t hash[KEYSIZE]; /* h' */
static uint8_t temp[KEYSIZE];
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
static struct randomdev_hash context;
Massive lint-inspired cleanup. Remove unneeded includes. Deal with unused function arguments. Resolve a boatload of signed/unsigned imcompatabilities. Etc.
2002-03-03 19:44:22 +00:00
u_int i;
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
enum random_entropy_source j;
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
KASSERT(yarrow_state.pool[FAST].thresh > 0, ("random: Yarrow fast threshold = 0"));
KASSERT(yarrow_state.pool[SLOW].thresh > 0, ("random: Yarrow slow threshold = 0"));
Debug run. This now works, except that the "live" sources haven't been tested. With all sources turned on, this unlocks itself in a couple of seconds! That is no my box, and there is no guarantee that this will be the case everywhere. * Cut debug prints. * Use the same locks/mutexes all the way through. * Be a tad more conservative about entropy estimates.
2013-10-06 12:40:32 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#ifdef RANDOM_DEBUG
#ifdef RANDOM_DEBUG_VERBOSE
printf("random: %s %s\n", __func__, (fastslow == FAST ? "FAST" : "SLOW"));
#endif
if (!yarrow_state.seeded) {
printf("random: %s - fast - thresh %d,1 - ", __func__, yarrow_state.pool[FAST].thresh);
for (i = RANDOM_START; i < ENTROPYSOURCE; i++)
printf(" %d", yarrow_state.pool[FAST].source[i].bits);
printf("\n");
printf("random: %s - slow - thresh %d,%d - ", __func__, yarrow_state.pool[SLOW].thresh, yarrow_state.slowoverthresh);
for (i = RANDOM_START; i < ENTROPYSOURCE; i++)
printf(" %d", yarrow_state.pool[SLOW].source[i].bits);
printf("\n");
}
#endif
#ifdef _KERNEL
mtx_assert(&random_reseed_mtx, MA_OWNED);
#endif
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
/* 1. Hash the accumulated entropy into v[0] */
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
/* Feed the slow pool hash in if slow */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
if (fastslow == SLOW) {
randomdev_hash_finish(&yarrow_state.pool[SLOW].hash, temp);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, temp, sizeof(temp));
}
randomdev_hash_finish(&yarrow_state.pool[FAST].hash, temp);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, temp, sizeof(temp));
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, v[0]);
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
Clean this up with some BDE-inspired fixes. o Make the comments KNF-compliant. o Use nanotime instead of getnanotime; the manpage lies about the kern.timecounter.method - it has been removed. o Fix the ENTROPYSOURCE const permanently. o Make variable names more consistent. o Make function prototypes more consistent. Some more needs to be done; to follow.
2000-07-23 11:08:16 +00:00
/* 2. Compute hash values for all v. _Supposed_ to be computationally
* intensive.
*/
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
if (yarrow_state.bins > TIMEBIN)
yarrow_state.bins = TIMEBIN;
for (i = 1; i < yarrow_state.bins; i++) {
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
/* v[i] #= h(v[i - 1]) */
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, v[i - 1], KEYSIZE);
Add entropy gathering code. This will work whether the module is compiled in or loaded.
2000-07-07 09:03:59 +00:00
/* v[i] #= h(v[0]) */
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, v[0], KEYSIZE);
Add entropy gathering code. This will work whether the module is compiled in or loaded.
2000-07-07 09:03:59 +00:00
/* v[i] #= h(i) */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, &i, sizeof(i));
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
/* Return the hashval */
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, v[i]);
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
}
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
/* 3. Compute a new key; h' is the identity function here;
* it is not being ignored!
*/
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, &yarrow_state.key, KEYSIZE);
for (i = 1; i < yarrow_state.bins; i++)
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, v[i], KEYSIZE);
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, temp);
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
randomdev_encrypt_init(&yarrow_state.key, temp);
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
/* 4. Recompute the counter */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
uint128_clear(&yarrow_state.counter.whole);
randomdev_encrypt(&yarrow_state.key, yarrow_state.counter.byte, temp, BLOCKSIZE);
memcpy(yarrow_state.counter.byte, temp, BLOCKSIZE);
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
Add entropy gathering code. This will work whether the module is compiled in or loaded.
2000-07-07 09:03:59 +00:00
/* 5. Reset entropy estimate accumulators to zero */
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
Snapshot. This passes the build test, but has not yet been finished or debugged. Contains: * Refactor the hardware RNG CPU instruction sources to feed into the software mixer. This is unfinished. The actual harvesting needs to be sorted out. Modified by me (see below). * Remove 'frac' parameter from random_harvest(). This was never used and adds extra code for no good reason. * Remove device write entropy harvesting. This provided a weak attack vector, was not very good at bootstrapping the device. To follow will be a replacement explicit reseed knob. * Separate out all the RANDOM_PURE sources into separate harvest entities. This adds some secuity in the case where more than one is present. * Review all the code and fix anything obviously messy or inconsistent. Address som review concerns while I'm here, like rename the pseudo-rng to 'dummy'. Submitted by: Arthur Mesh <arthurmesh@gmail.com> (the first item)
2013-10-04 06:55:06 +00:00
for (i = 0; i <= fastslow; i++)
for (j = RANDOM_START; j < ENTROPYSOURCE; j++)
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
yarrow_state.pool[i].source[j].bits = 0;
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
/* 6. Wipe memory of intermediate values */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
memset(v, 0, sizeof(v));
memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp));
memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
memset(&context, 0, sizeof(context));
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#ifdef RANDOM_RWFILE_WRITE_IS_OK /* Not defined so writes ain't gonna happen */
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback from many folk. o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone. o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx(). o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines. this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever found necessary. Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.
2000-09-10 13:52:19 +00:00
/* 7. Dump to seed file */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
/* This pseudo-code is documentation. Please leave it alone. */
seed_file = "<some file>";
error = randomdev_write_file(seed_file, <generated entropy>, PAGE_SIZE);
if (error == 0)
printf("random: entropy seed file '%s' successfully written\n", seed_file);
#endif
Remove GIANT from device random. Submitted by: ups
2005-12-20 21:41:52 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
/* Unblock the device if it was blocked due to being unseeded */
if (!yarrow_state.seeded) {
yarrow_state.seeded = 1;
random_adaptor_unblock();
}
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
}
Upgrade the random device to use a "real" hash instead of building one out of a block cipher. This has 2 advantages: 1) The code is _much_ simpler 2) We aren't committing our security to one algorithm (much as we may think we trust AES). While I'm here, make an explicit reseed do a slow reseed instead of a fast; this is in line with what the original paper suggested.
2002-07-15 13:58:35 +00:00
/* Internal function to return processed entropy from the PRNG */
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
void
random_yarrow_read(uint8_t *buf, u_int bytecount)
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
{
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
u_int blockcount, i;
Provide more splsofttq() protection for the reseed task (running out of taskqueue_swi).
2000-07-10 06:40:23 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
/* Check for initial/final read requests */
if (buf == NULL)
return;
Snapshot. This passes the build test, but has not yet been finished or debugged. Contains: * Refactor the hardware RNG CPU instruction sources to feed into the software mixer. This is unfinished. The actual harvesting needs to be sorted out. Modified by me (see below). * Remove 'frac' parameter from random_harvest(). This was never used and adds extra code for no good reason. * Remove device write entropy harvesting. This provided a weak attack vector, was not very good at bootstrapping the device. To follow will be a replacement explicit reseed knob. * Separate out all the RANDOM_PURE sources into separate harvest entities. This adds some secuity in the case where more than one is present. * Review all the code and fix anything obviously messy or inconsistent. Address som review concerns while I'm here, like rename the pseudo-rng to 'dummy'. Submitted by: Arthur Mesh <arthurmesh@gmail.com> (the first item)
2013-10-04 06:55:06 +00:00
Provide more splsofttq() protection for the reseed task (running out of taskqueue_swi).
2000-07-10 06:40:23 +00:00
/* The reseed task must not be jumped on */
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_lock(&random_reseed_mtx);
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
blockcount = (bytecount + BLOCKSIZE - 1)/BLOCKSIZE;
for (i = 0; i < blockcount; i++) {
if (yarrow_state.outputblocks++ >= yarrow_state.gengateinterval) {
generator_gate();
yarrow_state.outputblocks = 0;
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
}
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
uint128_increment(&yarrow_state.counter.whole);
randomdev_encrypt(&yarrow_state.key, yarrow_state.counter.byte, buf, BLOCKSIZE);
buf += BLOCKSIZE;
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
}
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&random_reseed_mtx);
}
/* Internal function to hand external entropy to the PRNG */
void
random_yarrow_write(uint8_t *buf, u_int count)
{
uintmax_t timestamp;
/* We must be locked for all this as plenty of state gets messed with */
mtx_lock(&random_reseed_mtx);
timestamp = get_cyclecount();
randomdev_hash_iterate(&yarrow_state.start_cache.hash, &timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
randomdev_hash_iterate(&yarrow_state.start_cache.hash, buf, count);
timestamp = get_cyclecount();
randomdev_hash_iterate(&yarrow_state.start_cache.hash, &timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
randomdev_hash_finish(&yarrow_state.start_cache.hash, yarrow_state.start_cache.junk);
randomdev_hash_init(&yarrow_state.start_cache.hash);
#ifdef RANDOM_DEBUG_VERBOSE
{
int i;
printf("random: %s - ", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < KEYSIZE; i++)
printf("%02X", yarrow_state.start_cache.junk[i]);
printf("\n");
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
}
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
#endif
random_yarrow_process_buffer(yarrow_state.start_cache.junk, KEYSIZE);
memset(yarrow_state.start_cache.junk, 0, KEYSIZE);
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&random_reseed_mtx);
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
}
Add entropy gathering code. This will work whether the module is compiled in or loaded.
2000-07-07 09:03:59 +00:00
static void
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
generator_gate(void)
{
Very large makeover of the /dev/random driver. o Separate the kernel stuff from the Yarrow algorithm. Yarrow is now well contained in one source file and one header. o Replace the Blowfish-based crypto routines with Rijndael-based ones. (Rijndael is the new AES algorithm). The huge improvement in Rijndael's key-agility over Blowfish means that this is an extremely dramatic improvement in speed, and makes a heck of a difference in its (lack of) CPU load. o Clean up the sysctl's. At BDE's prompting, I have gone back to static sysctls. o Bug fixes. The streamlining of the crypto stuff enabled me to find and fix some bugs. DES also found a bug in the reseed routine which is fixed. o Change the way reseeds clear "used" entropy. Previously, only the source(s) that caused a reseed were cleared. Now all sources in the relevant pool(s) are cleared. o Code tidy-up. Mostly to make it (nearly) 80-column compliant.
2001-03-10 12:51:55 +00:00
u_int i;
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
uint8_t temp[KEYSIZE];
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage.
2013-08-26 18:29:51 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < KEYSIZE; i += BLOCKSIZE) {
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
uint128_increment(&yarrow_state.counter.whole);
randomdev_encrypt(&yarrow_state.key, yarrow_state.counter.byte, temp + i, BLOCKSIZE);
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
}
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
randomdev_encrypt_init(&yarrow_state.key, temp);
memset(temp, 0, KEYSIZE);
New machine-independant /dev/random driver. This is work-in-progress, and the entropy-gathering routines are not yet present. As such, this should be viewed as a pretty reasonable PRNG with _ABSOLUTELY_NO_ security!! Entropy gathering will be the subject of ongoing work. This is written as a module, and as such is unloadable, but there is no refcounting done. I would like to use something like device_busy(9) to achieve this (eventually). Lots of useful ideas from: bde, phk, Jeroen van Gelderen Reviewed by: dfr
2000-06-25 08:38:58 +00:00
}
Add entropy gathering code. This will work whether the module is compiled in or loaded.
2000-07-07 09:03:59 +00:00
Greatly improve the boot-up unblocking time of the entropy device.
2000-11-25 19:13:29 +00:00
void
Reorganise the entropy device so that high-yield entropy sources can more easily be used INSTEAD OF the hard-working Yarrow. The only hardware source used at this point is the one inside the VIA C3 Nehemiah (Stepping 3 and above) CPU. More sources will be added in due course. Contributions welcome!
2004-04-09 15:47:10 +00:00
random_yarrow_reseed(void)
Greatly improve the boot-up unblocking time of the entropy device.
2000-11-25 19:13:29 +00:00
{
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
Restore the auto-reseed logic, but move it to a much later point, immediately before kick_init. Approved by: so (self)
2014-11-02 02:01:55 +00:00
mtx_lock(&random_reseed_mtx);
Upgrade the random device to use a "real" hash instead of building one out of a block cipher. This has 2 advantages: 1) The code is _much_ simpler 2) We aren't committing our security to one algorithm (much as we may think we trust AES). While I'm here, make an explicit reseed do a slow reseed instead of a fast; this is in line with what the original paper suggested.
2002-07-15 13:58:35 +00:00
reseed(SLOW);
Restore the auto-reseed logic, but move it to a much later point, immediately before kick_init. Approved by: so (self)
2014-11-02 02:01:55 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&random_reseed_mtx);
Greatly improve the boot-up unblocking time of the entropy device.
2000-11-25 19:13:29 +00:00
}
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random. This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources. The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people. The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway. Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to. My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise. My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence! Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
2014-10-30 21:21:53 +00:00
int
random_yarrow_seeded(void)
{
return (yarrow_state.seeded);
}
#endif /* RANDOM_YARROW */
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