Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
|
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
|
|
|
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by NAI Labs,
|
|
|
|
|
* the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
|
|
|
|
|
* DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA
|
|
|
|
|
* CHATS research program.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
|
* 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
|
|
|
|
|
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
|
|
|
|
|
* permission.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
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|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
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|
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
|
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* $FreeBSD$
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
|
|
|
|
|
* MLS fixed label mandatory confidentiality policy.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/acl.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/conf.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/kernel.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/mac.h>
|
2002-09-10 12:45:02 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/mount.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/proc.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/systm.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysent.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/vnode.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/file.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/socket.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/pipe.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <fs/devfs/devfs.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if_types.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if_var.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/in.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <vm/vm.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/mac_policy.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <security/mac_mls/mac_mls.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mls, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
"TrustedBSD mac_mls policy controls");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int mac_mls_enabled = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_mls, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
|
|
|
|
|
&mac_mls_enabled, 0, "Enforce MAC/MLS policy");
|
2002-09-05 18:52:52 +00:00
|
|
|
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.mls.enabled", &mac_mls_enabled);
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int destroyed_not_inited;
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_mls, OID_AUTO, destroyed_not_inited, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
|
&destroyed_not_inited, 0, "Count of labels destroyed but not inited");
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-21 04:15:40 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ptys_equal = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_mls, OID_AUTO, ptys_equal, CTLFLAG_RW,
|
|
|
|
|
&ptys_equal, 0, "Label pty devices as mls/equal on create");
|
|
|
|
|
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.mls.ptys_equal", &ptys_equal);
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static int mac_mls_revocation_enabled = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_mls, OID_AUTO, revocation_enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
|
|
|
|
|
&mac_mls_revocation_enabled, 0, "Revoke access to objects on relabel");
|
|
|
|
|
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.mls.revocation_enabled",
|
|
|
|
|
&mac_mls_revocation_enabled);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int mac_mls_slot;
|
|
|
|
|
#define SLOT(l) ((struct mac_mls *)LABEL_TO_SLOT((l), mac_mls_slot).l_ptr)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACMLS, "mls label", "MAC/MLS labels");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int mac_mls_check_vnode_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, mode_t acc_mode);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct mac_mls *
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
mls_alloc(int flag)
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *mac_mls;
|
|
|
|
|
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls = malloc(sizeof(struct mac_mls), M_MACMLS, M_ZERO | flag);
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_mls);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mls_free(struct mac_mls *mac_mls)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls != NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
free(mac_mls, M_MACMLS);
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
atomic_add_int(&destroyed_not_inited, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_dominate_element(struct mac_mls_element *a,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls_element *b)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(a->mme_type) {
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_HIGH:
|
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW:
|
|
|
|
|
switch (b->mme_type) {
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LEVEL:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_HIGH:
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW:
|
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
panic("mac_mls_dominate_element: b->mme_type invalid");
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LEVEL:
|
|
|
|
|
switch (b->mme_type) {
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW:
|
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_HIGH:
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LEVEL:
|
|
|
|
|
return (a->mme_level >= b->mme_level);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
panic("mac_mls_dominate_element: b->mme_type invalid");
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
panic("mac_mls_dominate_element: a->mme_type invalid");
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_range_in_range(struct mac_mls *rangea, struct mac_mls *rangeb)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_mls_dominate_element(&rangeb->mm_rangehigh,
|
|
|
|
|
&rangea->mm_rangehigh) &&
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_dominate_element(&rangea->mm_rangelow,
|
|
|
|
|
&rangeb->mm_rangelow));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_single_in_range(struct mac_mls *single, struct mac_mls *range)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-09-21 18:29:37 +00:00
|
|
|
KASSERT((single->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE) != 0,
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
("mac_mls_single_in_range: a not single"));
|
2002-09-21 18:29:37 +00:00
|
|
|
KASSERT((range->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_RANGE) != 0,
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
("mac_mls_single_in_range: b not range"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_mls_dominate_element(&range->mm_rangehigh,
|
|
|
|
|
&single->mm_single) &&
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_dominate_element(&single->mm_single,
|
|
|
|
|
&range->mm_rangelow));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_dominate_single(struct mac_mls *a, struct mac_mls *b)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT((a->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE) != 0,
|
|
|
|
|
("mac_mls_dominate_single: a not single"));
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT((b->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE) != 0,
|
|
|
|
|
("mac_mls_dominate_single: b not single"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_mls_dominate_element(&a->mm_single, &b->mm_single));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_equal_element(struct mac_mls_element *a, struct mac_mls_element *b)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (a->mme_type == MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL ||
|
|
|
|
|
b->mme_type == MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL)
|
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (a->mme_type == b->mme_type && a->mme_level == b->mme_level);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_equal_single(struct mac_mls *a, struct mac_mls *b)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT((a->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE) != 0,
|
|
|
|
|
("mac_mls_equal_single: a not single"));
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT((b->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE) != 0,
|
|
|
|
|
("mac_mls_equal_single: b not single"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_mls_equal_element(&a->mm_single, &b->mm_single));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_valid(struct mac_mls *mac_mls)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE) {
|
|
|
|
|
switch (mac_mls->mm_single.mme_type) {
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LEVEL:
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_HIGH:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW:
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls->mm_single.mme_level != 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls->mm_single.mme_type != MAC_MLS_TYPE_UNDEF)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_RANGE) {
|
|
|
|
|
switch (mac_mls->mm_rangelow.mme_type) {
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LEVEL:
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_HIGH:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW:
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls->mm_rangelow.mme_level != 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (mac_mls->mm_rangehigh.mme_type) {
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LEVEL:
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_HIGH:
|
|
|
|
|
case MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW:
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls->mm_rangehigh.mme_level != 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_element(&mac_mls->mm_rangehigh,
|
|
|
|
|
&mac_mls->mm_rangelow))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls->mm_rangelow.mme_type != MAC_MLS_TYPE_UNDEF ||
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls->mm_rangehigh.mme_type != MAC_MLS_TYPE_UNDEF)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_range(struct mac_mls *mac_mls, u_short typelow,
|
|
|
|
|
u_short levellow, u_short typehigh, u_short levelhigh)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls->mm_rangelow.mme_type = typelow;
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls->mm_rangelow.mme_level = levellow;
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls->mm_rangehigh.mme_type = typehigh;
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls->mm_rangehigh.mme_level = levelhigh;
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls->mm_flags |= MAC_MLS_FLAG_RANGE;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_single(struct mac_mls *mac_mls, u_short type, u_short level)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls->mm_single.mme_type = type;
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls->mm_single.mme_level = level;
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls->mm_flags |= MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_range(struct mac_mls *labelfrom, struct mac_mls *labelto)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT((labelfrom->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_RANGE) != 0,
|
|
|
|
|
("mac_mls_copy_range: labelfrom not range"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
labelto->mm_rangelow = labelfrom->mm_rangelow;
|
|
|
|
|
labelto->mm_rangehigh = labelfrom->mm_rangehigh;
|
|
|
|
|
labelto->mm_flags |= MAC_MLS_FLAG_RANGE;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(struct mac_mls *labelfrom, struct mac_mls *labelto)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT((labelfrom->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE) != 0,
|
|
|
|
|
("mac_mls_copy_single: labelfrom not single"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
labelto->mm_single = labelfrom->mm_single;
|
|
|
|
|
labelto->mm_flags |= MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single_to_range(struct mac_mls *labelfrom,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *labelto)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT((labelfrom->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE) != 0,
|
|
|
|
|
("mac_mls_copy_single_to_range: labelfrom not single"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
labelto->mm_rangelow = labelfrom->mm_single;
|
|
|
|
|
labelto->mm_rangehigh = labelfrom->mm_single;
|
|
|
|
|
labelto->mm_flags |= MAC_MLS_FLAG_RANGE;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Policy module operations.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *conf)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_init(struct mac_policy_conf *conf)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Label operations.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_init_label(struct label *label)
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SLOT(label) = mls_alloc(M_WAITOK);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_init_label_waitcheck(struct label *label, int flag)
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SLOT(label) = mls_alloc(flag);
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (SLOT(label) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
return (ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_destroy_label(struct label *label)
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mls_free(SLOT(label));
|
|
|
|
|
SLOT(label) = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_externalize(struct label *label, struct mac *extmac)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *mac_mls;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
printf("mac_mls_externalize: NULL pointer\n");
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
extmac->m_mls = *mac_mls;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_internalize(struct label *label, struct mac *extmac)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *mac_mls;
|
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = mac_mls_valid(mac_mls);
|
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*mac_mls = extmac->m_mls;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Labeling event operations: file system objects, and things that look
|
|
|
|
|
* a lot like file system objects.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_devfs_device(dev_t dev, struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *mac_mls;
|
|
|
|
|
int mls_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(dev->si_name, "null") == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
|
strcmp(dev->si_name, "zero") == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
|
strcmp(dev->si_name, "random") == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
|
strncmp(dev->si_name, "fd/", strlen("fd/")) == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
mls_type = MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(dev->si_name, "kmem") == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
|
strcmp(dev->si_name, "mem") == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
mls_type = MAC_MLS_TYPE_HIGH;
|
2002-10-21 04:15:40 +00:00
|
|
|
else if (ptys_equal &&
|
|
|
|
|
(strncmp(dev->si_name, "ttyp", strlen("ttyp")) == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
|
strncmp(dev->si_name, "ptyp", strlen("ptyp")) == 0))
|
|
|
|
|
mls_type = MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
mls_type = MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW;
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_single(mac_mls, mls_type, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_devfs_directory(char *dirname, int dirnamelen,
|
|
|
|
|
struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent, struct label *label)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *mac_mls;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_single(mac_mls, MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-05 18:56:25 +00:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_devfs_symlink(struct ucred *cred, struct devfs_dirent *dd,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *ddlabel, struct devfs_dirent *de, struct label *delabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(delabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_devfs_vnode(struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *direntlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(direntlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *parent,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *parentlabel, struct vnode *child, struct label *childlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(childlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *mntlabel, struct label *fslabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(mntlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(fslabel);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_root_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *mntlabel, struct label *fslabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *mac_mls;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Always mount root as high integrity. */
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls = SLOT(fslabel);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_single(mac_mls, MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls = SLOT(mntlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_single(mac_mls, MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_relabel_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, struct label *label)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_update_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *direntlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(direntlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_update_procfsvnode(struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ucred *cred)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Only copy the single, not the range, since vnodes only have
|
|
|
|
|
* a single.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_update_vnode_from_externalized(struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, struct mac *extmac)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = &extmac->m_mls;
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = mac_mls_valid(source);
|
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((source->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAGS_BOTH) != MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_update_vnode_from_mount(struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mount *mp, struct label *fslabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(fslabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Labeling event operations: IPC object.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_mbuf_from_socket(struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mbuflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(socketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(mbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *socketlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(socketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single_to_range(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(pipelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_socket_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *oldsocketlabel, struct socket *newsocket,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *newsocketlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(oldsocketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(newsocketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_range(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_relabel_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *socketlabel, struct label *newlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(socketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_range(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_relabel_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel, struct label *newlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(pipelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *mbuf, struct label *mbuflabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct socket *socket, struct label *socketpeerlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(mbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(socketpeerlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Labeling event operations: network objects.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_socket_peer_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *oldsocketlabel, struct socket *newsocket,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *newsocketpeerlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(oldsocketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(newsocketpeerlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_bpfdesc(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *bpf_d,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *bpflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(bpflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
int level;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(ifnetlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ifnet->if_type == IFT_LOOP)
|
|
|
|
|
level = MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
level = MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_single(dest, level, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_range(dest, level, 0, level, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(fragmentlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(ipqlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_datagram_from_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *datagram, struct label *datagramlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(ipqlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(datagramlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Just use the head, since we require them all to match. */
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_fragment(struct mbuf *datagram, struct label *datagramlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(datagramlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(fragmentlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *oldmbuflabel, struct mbuf *newmbuf,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *newmbuflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(oldmbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(newmbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_mbuf_linklayer(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *mbuf, struct label *mbuflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(mbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_single(dest, MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct label *bpflabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *mbuf, struct label *mbuflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(bpflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(mbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_mbuf_from_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mbuflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(ifnetlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(mbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_mbuf_multicast_encap(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *oldmbuflabel, struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *newmbuf, struct label *newmbuflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(oldmbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(newmbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_mbuf_netlayer(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct label *oldmbuflabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *newmbuf, struct label *newmbuflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(oldmbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(newmbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_fragment_match(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *a, *b;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
a = SLOT(ipqlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
b = SLOT(fragmentlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_mls_equal_single(a, b));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_relabel_ifnet(struct ucred *cred, struct ifnet *ifnet,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct label *newlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(ifnetlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_range(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_update_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* NOOP: we only accept matching labels, so no need to update */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Labeling event operations: processes.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_cred(struct ucred *cred_parent, struct ucred *cred_child)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(&cred_parent->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(&cred_child->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_range(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_execve_transition(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct mac *vnodelabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(&old->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(&new->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_range(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_execve_will_transition(struct ucred *old, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac *vnodelabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_proc0(struct ucred *cred)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_single(dest, MAC_MLS_TYPE_EQUAL, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_range(dest, MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW, 0, MAC_MLS_TYPE_HIGH, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_create_proc1(struct ucred *cred)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_single(dest, MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_set_range(dest, MAC_MLS_TYPE_LOW, 0, MAC_MLS_TYPE_HIGH, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_relabel_cred(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *source, *dest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source = SLOT(newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
dest = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_single(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_copy_range(source, dest);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Access control checks.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_bpfdesc_receive(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct label *bpflabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *a, *b;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
a = SLOT(bpflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
b = SLOT(ifnetlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_mls_equal_single(a, b))
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *new;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
new = SLOT(newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((new->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAGS_BOTH) != MAC_MLS_FLAGS_BOTH)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* XXX: Allow processes with root privilege to set labels outside
|
|
|
|
|
* their range, so suid things like "su" work. This WILL go away
|
|
|
|
|
* when we figure out the 'correct' solution...
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!suser_cred(cred, 0))
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* The new single must be in the old range.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_single_in_range(new, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* The new range must be in the old range.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_range_in_range(new, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* XXX: Don't permit EQUAL in a label unless the subject has EQUAL.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&u1->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(&u2->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: range */
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_ifnet_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct ifnet *ifnet,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct label *newlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *new;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
new = SLOT(newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((new->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAGS_BOTH) != MAC_MLS_FLAGS_BOTH)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: privilege model here? */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (suser_cred(cred, 0));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_ifnet_transmit(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mbuflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *p, *i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = SLOT(mbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
i = SLOT(ifnetlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_mls_single_in_range(p, i) ? 0 : EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *mntlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(mntlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel, unsigned long cmd, void /* caddr_t */ *data)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if(!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: This will be implemented soon... */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_pipe_poll(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel)
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT((pipelabel));
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_pipe_read(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT((pipelabel));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_pipe_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel, struct label *newlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj, *new;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
new = SLOT(newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(pipelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((new->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAGS_BOTH) != MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* To relabel a pipe, the old pipe label must be in the subject
|
|
|
|
|
* range.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_single_in_range(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* To relabel a pipe, the new pipe label must be in the subject
|
|
|
|
|
* range.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_single_in_range(new, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* XXX: Don't permit EQUAL in a label unless the subject has EQUAL.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_pipe_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT((pipelabel));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_pipe_write(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT((pipelabel));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(&proc->p_ucred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: range checks */
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(&proc->p_ucred->cr_label);
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/* XXX: range checks */
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(&proc->p_ucred->cr_label);
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/* XXX: range checks */
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_socket_deliver(struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mbuflabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *p, *s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = SLOT(mbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
s = SLOT(socketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_mls_equal_single(p, s) ? 0 : EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_socket_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *socketlabel, struct label *newlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj, *new;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
new = SLOT(newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(socketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((new->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAGS_BOTH) != MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* To relabel a socket, the old socket label must be in the subject
|
|
|
|
|
* range.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_single_in_range(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* To relabel a socket, the new socket label must be in the subject
|
|
|
|
|
* range.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_single_in_range(new, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* XXX: Don't permit EQUAL in a label unless the subject has EQUAL.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *socketlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(socketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, mode_t flags)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_mls_check_vnode_open(cred, vp, label, flags));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_chroot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_create(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel, struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_delete(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
|
|
|
|
|
struct componentname *cnp)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_deleteacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, acl_type_t type)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_exec(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_getacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, acl_type_t type)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_getextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-05 18:25:48 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_link(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
|
|
|
|
|
struct componentname *cnp)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel, struct componentname *cnp)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-09-21 19:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-06 02:46:26 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_mmap(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, int prot)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Rely on the use of open()-time protections to handle
|
|
|
|
|
* non-revocation cases.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled || !mac_mls_revocation_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prot & (VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE)) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (prot & VM_PROT_WRITE) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, mode_t acc_mode)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX privilege override for admin? */
|
|
|
|
|
if (acc_mode & (VREAD | VEXEC | VSTAT)) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (acc_mode & (VWRITE | VAPPEND | VADMIN)) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_poll(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled || !mac_mls_revocation_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&active_cred->cr_label);
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_read(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled || !mac_mls_revocation_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&active_cred->cr_label);
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_readdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_readlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, struct label *newlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *old, *new, *subj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
old = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
new = SLOT(newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((new->mm_flags & MAC_MLS_FLAGS_BOTH) != MAC_MLS_FLAG_SINGLE)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* To relabel a vnode, the old vnode label must be in the subject
|
|
|
|
|
* range.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_single_in_range(old, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* To relabel a vnode, the new vnode label must be in the subject
|
|
|
|
|
* range.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_single_in_range(new, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* XXX: Don't permit EQUAL in a label unless the subject has EQUAL.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (suser_cred(cred, 0));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_rename_from(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
|
|
|
|
|
struct componentname *cnp)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_rename_to(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int samedir,
|
|
|
|
|
struct componentname *cnp)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vp != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_revoke(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_setacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, acl_type_t type, struct acl *acl)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_setextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, int attrnamespace, const char *name,
|
|
|
|
|
struct uio *uio)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: protect the MAC EA in a special way? */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_setflags(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, u_long flags)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, mode_t mode)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_setutimes(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *vnodelabel, struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&cred->cr_label);
|
|
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_stat(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel)
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&active_cred->cr_label);
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(vnodelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(subj, obj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_mls_check_vnode_write(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_mls *subj, *obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_enabled || !mac_mls_revocation_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
subj = SLOT(&active_cred->cr_label);
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
obj = SLOT(label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_mls_dominate_single(obj, subj))
|
|
|
|
|
return (EACCES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct mac_policy_op_entry mac_mls_ops[] =
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init },
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_BPFDESC_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_CRED_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_DEVFSDIRENT_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_IFNET_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_IPQ_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_MBUF_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label_waitcheck },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_MOUNT_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_MOUNT_FS_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_PIPE_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_SOCKET_LABEL,
|
2002-10-05 21:23:47 +00:00
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label_waitcheck },
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_SOCKET_PEER_LABEL,
|
2002-10-05 21:23:47 +00:00
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label_waitcheck },
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_TEMP_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INIT_VNODE_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_init_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_BPFDESC_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_CRED_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_DEVFSDIRENT_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_IFNET_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_IPQ_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_MBUF_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_MOUNT_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_MOUNT_FS_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_PIPE_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_SOCKET_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_SOCKET_PEER_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_TEMP_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_DESTROY_VNODE_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_destroy_label },
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_EXTERNALIZE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_externalize },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_INTERNALIZE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_internalize },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_DEVICE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_devfs_device },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_DIRECTORY,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_devfs_directory },
|
2002-10-05 18:56:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_SYMLINK,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_devfs_symlink },
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_VNODE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_devfs_vnode },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_VNODE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_vnode },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_MOUNT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_mount },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_ROOT_MOUNT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_root_mount },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_RELABEL_VNODE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_relabel_vnode },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_UPDATE_DEVFSDIRENT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_update_devfsdirent },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_UPDATE_PROCFSVNODE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_update_procfsvnode },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_UPDATE_VNODE_FROM_EXTERNALIZED,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_update_vnode_from_externalized },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_UPDATE_VNODE_FROM_MOUNT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_update_vnode_from_mount },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_SOCKET,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_mbuf_from_socket },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_PIPE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_pipe },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_SOCKET,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_socket },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_SOCKET_FROM_SOCKET,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_socket_from_socket },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_RELABEL_PIPE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_relabel_pipe },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_RELABEL_SOCKET,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_relabel_socket },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_SET_SOCKET_PEER_FROM_MBUF,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_SET_SOCKET_PEER_FROM_SOCKET,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_set_socket_peer_from_socket },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_BPFDESC,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_bpfdesc },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_DATAGRAM_FROM_IPQ,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_datagram_from_ipq },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_FRAGMENT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_fragment },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_IFNET,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_ifnet },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_IPQ,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_ipq },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_MBUF,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_mbuf_from_mbuf },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_LINKLAYER,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_mbuf_linklayer },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_BPFDESC,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_IFNET,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_mbuf_from_ifnet },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_MULTICAST_ENCAP,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_mbuf_multicast_encap },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_NETLAYER,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_mbuf_netlayer },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_FRAGMENT_MATCH,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_fragment_match },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_RELABEL_IFNET,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_relabel_ifnet },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_UPDATE_IPQ,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_update_ipq },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_CRED,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_cred },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_EXECVE_TRANSITION,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_execve_transition },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_EXECVE_WILL_TRANSITION,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_execve_will_transition },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_PROC0,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_proc0 },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CREATE_PROC1,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_create_proc1 },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_RELABEL_CRED,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_relabel_cred },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_BPFDESC_RECEIVE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_bpfdesc_receive },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_CRED_RELABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_cred_relabel },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_CRED_VISIBLE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_cred_visible },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_IFNET_RELABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_ifnet_relabel },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_IFNET_TRANSMIT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_ifnet_transmit },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_MOUNT_STAT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_mount_stat },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_IOCTL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_pipe_ioctl },
|
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_POLL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_pipe_poll },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_READ,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_pipe_read },
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_RELABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_pipe_relabel },
|
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_STAT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_pipe_stat },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_WRITE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_pipe_write },
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_PROC_DEBUG,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_proc_debug },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_PROC_SCHED,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_proc_sched },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_PROC_SIGNAL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_proc_signal },
|
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_DELIVER,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_socket_deliver },
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_RELABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_socket_relabel },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_VISIBLE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_socket_visible },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_ACCESS,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_access },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CHDIR,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_chdir },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CHROOT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_chroot },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CREATE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_create },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_DELETE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_delete },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_DELETEACL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_deleteacl },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_EXEC,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_exec },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_GETACL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_getacl },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_GETEXTATTR,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_getextattr },
|
2002-10-05 18:25:48 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_LINK,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_link },
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_LOOKUP,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_lookup },
|
2002-10-06 02:46:26 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_MMAP,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_mmap },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_MPROTECT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_mmap },
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_OPEN,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_open },
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_POLL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_poll },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_READ,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_read },
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_READDIR,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_readdir },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_READLINK,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_readlink },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_RELABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_relabel },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_RENAME_FROM,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_rename_from },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_RENAME_TO,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_rename_to },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_REVOKE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_revoke },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETACL,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_setacl },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETEXTATTR,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_setextattr },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETFLAGS,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_setflags },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETMODE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_setmode },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETOWNER,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_setowner },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETUTIMES,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_setutimes },
|
|
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_STAT,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_stat },
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_WRITE,
|
|
|
|
|
(macop_t)mac_mls_check_vnode_write },
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{ MAC_OP_LAST, NULL }
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_POLICY_SET(mac_mls_ops, trustedbsd_mac_mls, "TrustedBSD MAC/MLS",
|
|
|
|
|
MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE, &mac_mls_slot);
|
