179 lines
6.9 KiB
Groff
179 lines
6.9 KiB
Groff
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.TH TCPD 8
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.SH NAME
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tcpd \- access control facility for internet services
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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.PP
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The \fItcpd\fR program can be set up to monitor incoming requests for
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\fItelnet\fR, \fIfinger\fR, \fIftp\fR, \fIexec\fR, \fIrsh\fR,
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\fIrlogin\fR, \fItftp\fR, \fItalk\fR, \fIcomsat\fR and other services
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that have a one-to-one mapping onto executable files.
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.PP
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The program supports both 4.3BSD-style sockets and System V.4-style
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TLI. Functionality may be limited when the protocol underneath TLI is
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not an internet protocol.
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.PP
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Operation is as follows: whenever a request for service arrives, the
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\fIinetd\fP daemon is tricked into running the \fItcpd\fP program
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instead of the desired server. \fItcpd\fP logs the request and does
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some additional checks. When all is well, \fItcpd\fP runs the
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appropriate server program and goes away.
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.PP
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Optional features are: pattern-based access control, client username
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lookups with the RFC 931 etc. protocol, protection against hosts that
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pretend to have someone elses host name, and protection against hosts
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that pretend to have someone elses network address.
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.SH LOGGING
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Connections that are monitored by
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.I tcpd
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are reported through the \fIsyslog\fR(3) facility. Each record contains
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a time stamp, the client host name and the name of the requested
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service. The information can be useful to detect unwanted activities,
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especially when logfile information from several hosts is merged.
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.PP
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In order to find out where your logs are going, examine the syslog
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configuration file, usually /etc/syslog.conf.
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.SH ACCESS CONTROL
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Optionally,
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.I tcpd
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supports a simple form of access control that is based on pattern
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matching. The access-control software provides hooks for the execution
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of shell commands when a pattern fires. For details, see the
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\fIhosts_access\fR(5) manual page.
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.SH HOST NAME VERIFICATION
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The authentication scheme of some protocols (\fIrlogin, rsh\fR) relies
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on host names. Some implementations believe the host name that they get
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from any random name server; other implementations are more careful but
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use a flawed algorithm.
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.PP
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.I tcpd
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verifies the client host name that is returned by the address->name DNS
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server by looking at the host name and address that are returned by the
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name->address DNS server. If any discrepancy is detected,
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.I tcpd
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concludes that it is dealing with a host that pretends to have someone
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elses host name.
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.PP
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If the sources are compiled with -DPARANOID,
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.I tcpd
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will drop the connection in case of a host name/address mismatch.
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Otherwise, the hostname can be matched with the \fIPARANOID\fR wildcard,
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after which suitable action can be taken.
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.SH HOST ADDRESS SPOOFING
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Optionally,
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.I tcpd
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disables source-routing socket options on every connection that it
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deals with. This will take care of most attacks from hosts that pretend
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to have an address that belongs to someone elses network. UDP services
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do not benefit from this protection. This feature must be turned on
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at compile time.
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.SH RFC 931
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When RFC 931 etc. lookups are enabled (compile-time option) \fItcpd\fR
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will attempt to establish the name of the client user. This will
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succeed only if the client host runs an RFC 931-compliant daemon.
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Client user name lookups will not work for datagram-oriented
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connections, and may cause noticeable delays in the case of connections
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from PCs.
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.SH EXAMPLES
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The details of using \fItcpd\fR depend on pathname information that was
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compiled into the program.
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.SH EXAMPLE 1
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This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the original network
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daemons will be moved to an "other" place.
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.PP
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In order to monitor access to the \fIfinger\fR service, move the
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original finger daemon to the "other" place and install tcpd in the
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place of the original finger daemon. No changes are required to
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configuration files.
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.nf
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.sp
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.in +5
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# mkdir /other/place
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# mv /usr/etc/in.fingerd /other/place
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# cp tcpd /usr/etc/in.fingerd
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.fi
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.PP
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The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
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systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have
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no `in.\' prefix to their name.
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.SH EXAMPLE 2
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This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons
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are left in their original place.
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.PP
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In order to monitor access to the \fIfinger\fR service, perform the
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following edits on the \fIinetd\fR configuration file (usually
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\fI/etc/inetd.conf\fR or \fI/etc/inet/inetd.conf\fR):
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.nf
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.sp
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.ti +5
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finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/etc/in.fingerd in.fingerd
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.sp
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becomes:
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.sp
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.ti +5
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finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd
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.sp
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.fi
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.PP
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The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
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systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the
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daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
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field in the inetd configuration file.
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.PP
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Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be
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covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
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process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to
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execute the `inetimp\' command.
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.SH EXAMPLE 3
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In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret"
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or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it
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specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example:
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.nf
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.sp
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ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd
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.sp
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.fi
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.PP
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Only the last component (ntalkd) of the pathname will be used for
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access control and logging.
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.SH BUGS
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Some UDP (and RPC) daemons linger around for a while after they have
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finished their work, in case another request comes in. In the inetd
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configuration file these services are registered with the \fIwait\fR
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option. Only the request that started such a daemon will be logged.
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.PP
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The program does not work with RPC services over TCP. These services
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are registered as \fIrpc/tcp\fR in the inetd configuration file. The
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only non-trivial service that is affected by this limitation is
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\fIrexd\fR, which is used by the \fIon(1)\fR command. This is no great
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loss. On most systems, \fIrexd\fR is less secure than a wildcard in
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/etc/hosts.equiv.
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.PP
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RPC broadcast requests (for example: \fIrwall, rup, rusers\fR) always
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appear to come from the responding host. What happens is that the
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client broadcasts the request to all \fIportmap\fR daemons on its
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network; each \fIportmap\fR daemon forwards the request to a local
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daemon. As far as the \fIrwall\fR etc. daemons know, the request comes
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from the local host.
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.SH FILES
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.PP
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The default locations of the host access control tables are:
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.PP
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/etc/hosts.allow
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.br
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/etc/hosts.deny
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.SH SEE ALSO
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.na
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.nf
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hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables.
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syslog.conf(5), format of the syslogd control file.
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inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file.
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.SH AUTHORS
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.na
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.nf
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Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl),
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Department of Mathematics and Computing Science,
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Eindhoven University of Technology
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Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513,
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5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
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\" @(#) tcpd.8 1.5 96/02/21 16:39:16
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