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freebsd-nq/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c

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Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
/*-
Correct several issues in the integration of POSIX shared memory objects and the new setmode and setowner fileops in FreeBSD 9.0: - Add new MAC Framework entry point mac_posixshm_check_create() to allow MAC policies to authorise shared memory use. Provide a stub policy and test policy templates. - Add missing Biba and MLS implementations of mac_posixshm_check_setmode() and mac_posixshm_check_setowner(). - Add 'accmode' argument to mac_posixshm_check_open() -- unlike the mac_posixsem_check_open() entry point it was modeled on, the access mode is required as shared memory access can be read-only as well as writable; this isn't true of POSIX semaphores. - Implement full range of POSIX shared memory entry points for Biba and MLS. Sponsored by: Google Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Approved by: re (kib)
2011-09-02 17:40:39 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2007-2011 Robert N. M. Watson
Synchronize HEAD copyright/license with RELENG_5 copyright/license: McAfee instead of NETA.
2005-02-13 13:59:34 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2001-2005 McAfee, Inc.
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc.
Introduce two related changes to the TrustedBSD MAC Framework: (1) Abstract interpreter vnode labeling in execve(2) and mac_execve(2) so that the general exec code isn't aware of the details of allocating, copying, and freeing labels, rather, simply passes in a void pointer to start and stop functions that will be used by the framework. This change will be MFC'd. (2) Introduce a new flags field to the MAC_POLICY_SET(9) interface allowing policies to declare which types of objects require label allocation, initialization, and destruction, and define a set of flags covering various supported object types (MPC_OBJECT_PROC, MPC_OBJECT_VNODE, MPC_OBJECT_INPCB, ...). This change reduces the overhead of compiling the MAC Framework into the kernel if policies aren't loaded, or if policies require labels on only a small number or even no object types. Each time a policy is loaded or unloaded, we recalculate a mask of labeled object types across all policies present in the system. Eliminate MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF option as it is no longer required. MFC after: 1 week ((1) only) Reviewed by: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
2008-08-23 15:26:36 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2008 Apple Inc.
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
*
Synchronize HEAD copyright/license with RELENG_5 copyright/license: McAfee instead of NETA.
2005-02-13 13:59:34 +00:00
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by McAfee
* Research, the Security Research Division of McAfee, Inc. under
* DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA
* CHATS research program.
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
*
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
* This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
* N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
*
Improve the consistency of MAC Framework and MAC policy entry point naming by renaming certain "proc" entry points to "cred" entry points, reflecting their manipulation of credentials. For some entry points, the process was passed into the framework but not into policies; in these cases, stop passing in the process since we don't need it. mac_proc_check_setaudit -> mac_cred_check_setaudit mac_proc_check_setaudit_addr -> mac_cred_check_setaudit_addr mac_proc_check_setauid -> mac_cred_check_setauid mac_proc_check_setegid -> mac_cred_check_setegid mac_proc_check_seteuid -> mac_cred_check_seteuid mac_proc_check_setgid -> mac_cred_check_setgid mac_proc_check_setgroups -> mac_cred_ceck_setgroups mac_proc_check_setregid -> mac_cred_check_setregid mac_proc_check_setresgid -> mac_cred_check_setresgid mac_proc_check_setresuid -> mac_cred_check_setresuid mac_proc_check_setreuid -> mac_cred_check_setreuid mac_proc_check_setuid -> mac_cred_check_setuid Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
2009-03-08 10:58:37 +00:00
* This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer
* Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc.
*
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
*
* MAC Test policy - tests MAC Framework labeling by assigning object class
* magic numbers to each label and validates that each time an object label
* is passed into the policy, it has a consistent object type, catching
* incorrectly passed labels, labels passed after free, etc.
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/acl.h>
Update for the KDB framework: o Call kdb_enter() instead of Debugger().
2004-07-10 21:47:53 +00:00
#include <sys/kdb.h>
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
#include <sys/kernel.h>
Merge posix4/* into normal kernel hierarchy. Reviewed by: glanced at by jhb Approved by: silence on -arch@ and -standards@
2006-11-11 16:26:58 +00:00
#include <sys/ksem.h>
Modify mac_test policy to invoke WITNESS_WARN() when a potentially blocking allocation could occur as a result of a label initialization. This will simulate the behavior of allocated label policies such as MLS and Biba when running mac_test from the perspective of WITNESS lock and sleep warnings. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-15 21:20:34 +00:00
#include <sys/malloc.h>
More unnecessary include reduction.
2007-02-23 14:39:04 +00:00
#include <sys/module.h>
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
#include <sys/mount.h>
More unnecessary include reduction.
2007-02-23 14:39:04 +00:00
#include <sys/msg.h>
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
More unnecessary include reduction.
2007-02-23 14:39:04 +00:00
#include <sys/sem.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
Add #include <sys/sx.h>, devfs is going to require this shortly.
2005-09-19 18:52:51 +00:00
#include <sys/sx.h>
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <fs/devfs/devfs.h>
#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/if_types.h>
#include <net/if_var.h>
Move src/sys/sys/mac_policy.h, the kernel interface between the MAC Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h, completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include files from src/sys/sys. Update the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules. Delete the old mac_policy.h. Third party policy modules will need similar updating. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-22 23:34:47 +00:00
#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
Mark all SYSCTL_NODEs static that have no corresponding SYSCTL_DECLs. The SYSCTL_NODE macro defines a list that stores all child-elements of that node. If there's no SYSCTL_DECL macro anywhere else, there's no reason why it shouldn't be static.
2011-11-07 15:43:11 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, test, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
"TrustedBSD mac_test policy controls");
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
#define MAGIC_BPF 0xfe1ad1b6
#define MAGIC_DEVFS 0x9ee79c32
#define MAGIC_IFNET 0xc218b120
#define MAGIC_INPCB 0x4440f7bb
Implement MAC policy support for IPv6 fragment reassembly queues, modeled on IPv4 fragment reassembly queue support. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2008-10-26 22:46:37 +00:00
#define MAGIC_IP6Q 0x0870e1b7
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
#define MAGIC_IPQ 0x206188ef
#define MAGIC_MBUF 0xbbefa5bb
#define MAGIC_MOUNT 0xc7c46e47
#define MAGIC_SOCKET 0x9199c6cd
Add missing mac_test labeling and sleep checks for the syncache. Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 18:33:31 +00:00
#define MAGIC_SYNCACHE 0x7fb838a8
Further MAC test policy cleanup and enhancement: - Redistribute counter declarations to where they are used, rather than at the file header, so it's more clear where we do (and don't) have counters. - Add many more counters, one per policy entry point, so that many individual access controls and object life cycle events are tracked. - Perform counter increments for label destruction explicitly in entry point functions rather than in LABEL_DESTROY(). - Use LABEL_INIT() instead of SLOT_SET() directly in label init functions to be symmetric with destruction. - Align counter names more carefully with entry point names. - More constant and variable name normalization. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 13:29:37 +00:00
#define MAGIC_SYSV_MSG 0x8bbba61e
#define MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ 0xea672391
#define MAGIC_SYSV_SEM 0x896e8a0b
#define MAGIC_SYSV_SHM 0x76119ab0
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
#define MAGIC_PIPE 0xdc6c9919
Further MAC test policy cleanup and enhancement: - Redistribute counter declarations to where they are used, rather than at the file header, so it's more clear where we do (and don't) have counters. - Add many more counters, one per policy entry point, so that many individual access controls and object life cycle events are tracked. - Perform counter increments for label destruction explicitly in entry point functions rather than in LABEL_DESTROY(). - Use LABEL_INIT() instead of SLOT_SET() directly in label init functions to be symmetric with destruction. - Align counter names more carefully with entry point names. - More constant and variable name normalization. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 13:29:37 +00:00
#define MAGIC_POSIX_SEM 0x78ae980c
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
#define MAGIC_POSIX_SHM 0x4e853fc9
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
#define MAGIC_PROC 0x3b4be98f
#define MAGIC_CRED 0x9a5a4987
#define MAGIC_VNODE 0x1a67a45c
#define MAGIC_FREE 0x849ba1fd
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
Introduce accessor functions mac_label_get() and mac_label_set() to replace LABEL_TO_SLOT() macro used by policy modules to query and set label data in struct label. Instead of using a union, store an intptr_t, simplifying the API. Update policies: in most cases this required only small tweaks to current wrapper macros. In two cases, a single wrapper macros had to be split into separate get and set macros. Move struct label definition from _label.h to mac_internal.h and remove _label.h. With this change, policies may now treat struct label * as opaque, allowing us to change the layout of struct label without breaking the policy module ABI. For example, we could make the maximum number of policies with labels modifiable at boot-time rather than just at compile-time. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-02-06 14:19:25 +00:00
#define SLOT(x) mac_label_get((x), test_slot)
#define SLOT_SET(x, v) mac_label_set((x), test_slot, (v))
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int test_slot;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_test, OID_AUTO, slot, CTLFLAG_RD,
&test_slot, 0, "Slot allocated by framework");
Mark all SYSCTL_NODEs static that have no corresponding SYSCTL_DECLs. The SYSCTL_NODE macro defines a list that stores all child-elements of that node. If there's no SYSCTL_DECL macro anywhere else, there's no reason why it shouldn't be static.
2011-11-07 15:43:11 +00:00
static SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac_test, OID_AUTO, counter, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
"TrustedBSD mac_test counters controls");
#define COUNTER_DECL(variable) \
static int counter_##variable; \
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_test_counter, OID_AUTO, variable, \
CTLFLAG_RD, &counter_##variable, 0, #variable)
#define COUNTER_INC(variable) atomic_add_int(&counter_##variable, 1)
Replace direct reference to kdb_enter() with a DEBUGGER() macro that will call printf() if KDB isn't compiled into the kernel. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR
2004-10-22 11:24:50 +00:00
#ifdef KDB
Add a new 'why' argument to kdb_enter(), and a set of constants to use for that argument. This will allow DDB to detect the broad category of reason why the debugger has been entered, which it can use for the purposes of deciding which DDB script to run. Assign approximate why values to all current consumers of the kdb_enter() interface.
2007-12-25 17:52:02 +00:00
#define DEBUGGER(func, string) kdb_enter(KDB_WHY_MAC, (string))
Replace direct reference to kdb_enter() with a DEBUGGER() macro that will call printf() if KDB isn't compiled into the kernel. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR
2004-10-22 11:24:50 +00:00
#else
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
#define DEBUGGER(func, string) printf("mac_test: %s: %s\n", (func), (string))
Replace direct reference to kdb_enter() with a DEBUGGER() macro that will call printf() if KDB isn't compiled into the kernel. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR
2004-10-22 11:24:50 +00:00
#endif
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
#define LABEL_CHECK(label, magic) do { \
if (label != NULL) { \
KASSERT(SLOT(label) == magic || SLOT(label) == 0, \
("%s: bad %s label", __func__, #magic)); \
} \
} while (0)
Further MAC test policy cleanup and enhancement: - Redistribute counter declarations to where they are used, rather than at the file header, so it's more clear where we do (and don't) have counters. - Add many more counters, one per policy entry point, so that many individual access controls and object life cycle events are tracked. - Perform counter increments for label destruction explicitly in entry point functions rather than in LABEL_DESTROY(). - Use LABEL_INIT() instead of SLOT_SET() directly in label init functions to be symmetric with destruction. - Align counter names more carefully with entry point names. - More constant and variable name normalization. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 13:29:37 +00:00
#define LABEL_DESTROY(label, magic) do { \
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
if (SLOT(label) == magic || SLOT(label) == 0) { \
SLOT_SET(label, MAGIC_FREE); \
} else if (SLOT(label) == MAGIC_FREE) { \
DEBUGGER("%s: dup destroy", __func__); \
} else { \
DEBUGGER("%s: corrupted label", __func__); \
} \
} while (0)
Further MAC test policy cleanup and enhancement: - Redistribute counter declarations to where they are used, rather than at the file header, so it's more clear where we do (and don't) have counters. - Add many more counters, one per policy entry point, so that many individual access controls and object life cycle events are tracked. - Perform counter increments for label destruction explicitly in entry point functions rather than in LABEL_DESTROY(). - Use LABEL_INIT() instead of SLOT_SET() directly in label init functions to be symmetric with destruction. - Align counter names more carefully with entry point names. - More constant and variable name normalization. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 13:29:37 +00:00
#define LABEL_INIT(label, magic) do { \
SLOT_SET(label, magic); \
} while (0)
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
#define LABEL_NOTFREE(label) do { \
KASSERT(SLOT(label) != MAGIC_FREE, \
("%s: destroyed label", __func__)); \
} while (0)
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
/*
* Object-specific entry point implementations are sorted alphabetically by
* object type name and then by operation.
*/
COUNTER_DECL(bpfdesc_check_receive);
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
static int
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
test_bpfdesc_check_receive(struct bpf_d *d, struct label *dlabel,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
struct ifnet *ifp, struct label *ifplabel)
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
{
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dlabel, MAGIC_BPF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(ifplabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
COUNTER_INC(bpfdesc_check_receive);
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(bpfdesc_create);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
static void
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
test_bpfdesc_create(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *d,
struct label *dlabel)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dlabel, MAGIC_BPF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(bpfdesc_create);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(bpfdesc_create_mbuf);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
static void
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
test_bpfdesc_create_mbuf(struct bpf_d *d, struct label *dlabel,
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dlabel, MAGIC_BPF);
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(bpfdesc_create_mbuf);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(bpfdesc_destroy_label);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_bpfdesc_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_BPF);
COUNTER_INC(bpfdesc_destroy_label);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(bpfdesc_init_label);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_bpfdesc_init_label(struct label *label)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_BPF);
COUNTER_INC(bpfdesc_init_label);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_relabel);
Modify the mac_init_ipq() MAC Framework entry point to accept an additional flags argument to indicate blocking disposition, and pass in M_NOWAIT from the IP reassembly code to indicate that blocking is not OK when labeling a new IP fragment reassembly queue. This should eliminate some of the WITNESS warnings that have started popping up since fine-grained IP stack locking started going in; if memory allocation fails, the creation of the fragment queue will be aborted. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-26 15:12:03 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(newlabel, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_relabel);
Modify mac_test policy to invoke WITNESS_WARN() when a potentially blocking allocation could occur as a result of a label initialization. This will simulate the behavior of allocated label policies such as MLS and Biba when running mac_test from the perspective of WITNESS lock and sleep warnings. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-15 21:20:34 +00:00
Modify the mac_init_ipq() MAC Framework entry point to accept an additional flags argument to indicate blocking disposition, and pass in M_NOWAIT from the IP reassembly code to indicate that blocking is not OK when labeling a new IP fragment reassembly queue. This should eliminate some of the WITNESS warnings that have started popping up since fine-grained IP stack locking started going in; if memory allocation fails, the creation of the fragment queue will be aborted. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-26 15:12:03 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Improve the consistency of MAC Framework and MAC policy entry point naming by renaming certain "proc" entry points to "cred" entry points, reflecting their manipulation of credentials. For some entry points, the process was passed into the framework but not into policies; in these cases, stop passing in the process since we don't need it. mac_proc_check_setaudit -> mac_cred_check_setaudit mac_proc_check_setaudit_addr -> mac_cred_check_setaudit_addr mac_proc_check_setauid -> mac_cred_check_setauid mac_proc_check_setegid -> mac_cred_check_setegid mac_proc_check_seteuid -> mac_cred_check_seteuid mac_proc_check_setgid -> mac_cred_check_setgid mac_proc_check_setgroups -> mac_cred_ceck_setgroups mac_proc_check_setregid -> mac_cred_check_setregid mac_proc_check_setresgid -> mac_cred_check_setresgid mac_proc_check_setresuid -> mac_cred_check_setresuid mac_proc_check_setreuid -> mac_cred_check_setreuid mac_proc_check_setuid -> mac_cred_check_setuid Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
2009-03-08 10:58:37 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setaudit);
static int
test_cred_check_setaudit(struct ucred *cred, struct auditinfo *ai)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setaudit);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setaudit_addr);
static int
test_cred_check_setaudit_addr(struct ucred *cred,
struct auditinfo_addr *aia)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setaudit_addr);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setauid);
static int
test_cred_check_setauid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t auid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setauid);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setegid);
static int
test_cred_check_setegid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setegid);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(proc_check_euid);
static int
test_cred_check_seteuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(proc_check_euid);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setregid);
static int
test_cred_check_setregid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setregid);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setreuid);
static int
test_cred_check_setreuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setreuid);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setgid);
static int
test_cred_check_setgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setgid);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setgroups);
static int
test_cred_check_setgroups(struct ucred *cred, int ngroups,
gid_t *gidset)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setgroups);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setresgid);
static int
test_cred_check_setresgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid,
gid_t sgid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setresgid);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setresuid);
static int
test_cred_check_setresuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid,
uid_t suid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setresuid);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_setuid);
static int
test_cred_check_setuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_setuid);
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_check_visible);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(u1->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(u2->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_check_visible);
Modify mac_test policy to invoke WITNESS_WARN() when a potentially blocking allocation could occur as a result of a label initialization. This will simulate the behavior of allocated label policies such as MLS and Biba when running mac_test from the perspective of WITNESS lock and sleep warnings. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-15 21:20:34 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_copy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_cred_copy_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(src, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(dest, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_copy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Rename three MAC entry points from _proc_ to _cred_ to reflect the fact that they operate directly on credentials: mac_proc_create_swapper(), mac_proc_create_init(), and mac_proc_associate_nfsd(). Update policies. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2008-10-28 11:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_create_init);
static void
test_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_create_init);
}
COUNTER_DECL(cred_create_swapper);
static void
test_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_create_swapper);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_destroy_label);
static void
test_cred_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_externalize_label);
Modify label allocation semantics for sockets: pass in soalloc's malloc flags so that we can call malloc with M_NOWAIT if necessary, avoiding potential sleeps while holding mutexes in the TCP syncache code. Similar to the existing support for mbuf label allocation: if we can't allocate all the necessary label store in each policy, we back out the label allocation and fail the socket creation. Sync from MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 21:23:47 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed)
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_externalize_label);
Modify mac_test policy to invoke WITNESS_WARN() when a potentially blocking allocation could occur as a result of a label initialization. This will simulate the behavior of allocated label policies such as MLS and Biba when running mac_test from the perspective of WITNESS lock and sleep warnings. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-15 21:20:34 +00:00
Modify label allocation semantics for sockets: pass in soalloc's malloc flags so that we can call malloc with M_NOWAIT if necessary, avoiding potential sleeps while holding mutexes in the TCP syncache code. Similar to the existing support for mbuf label allocation: if we can't allocate all the necessary label store in each policy, we back out the label allocation and fail the socket creation. Sync from MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 21:23:47 +00:00
return (0);
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_init_label);
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_cred_init_label(struct label *label)
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_init_label);
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
}
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_internalize_label);
static int
test_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
char *element_data, int *claimed)
{
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_internalize_label);
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(cred_relabel);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
Add missing mac_test labeling and sleep checks for the syncache. Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 18:33:31 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(newlabel, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(cred_relabel);
Add missing mac_test labeling and sleep checks for the syncache. Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 18:33:31 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(devfs_create_device);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_devfs_create_device(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct cdev *dev, struct devfs_dirent *de, struct label *delabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
if (cred != NULL)
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(delabel, MAGIC_DEVFS);
COUNTER_INC(devfs_create_device);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(devfs_create_directory);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_devfs_create_directory(struct mount *mp, char *dirname,
int dirnamelen, struct devfs_dirent *de, struct label *delabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(delabel, MAGIC_DEVFS);
COUNTER_INC(devfs_create_directory);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(devfs_create_symlink);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_devfs_create_symlink(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct devfs_dirent *dd, struct label *ddlabel, struct devfs_dirent *de,
struct label *delabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(ddlabel, MAGIC_DEVFS);
LABEL_CHECK(delabel, MAGIC_DEVFS);
COUNTER_INC(devfs_create_symlink);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(devfs_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_devfs_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Further MAC test policy cleanup and enhancement: - Redistribute counter declarations to where they are used, rather than at the file header, so it's more clear where we do (and don't) have counters. - Add many more counters, one per policy entry point, so that many individual access controls and object life cycle events are tracked. - Perform counter increments for label destruction explicitly in entry point functions rather than in LABEL_DESTROY(). - Use LABEL_INIT() instead of SLOT_SET() directly in label init functions to be symmetric with destruction. - Align counter names more carefully with entry point names. - More constant and variable name normalization. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 13:29:37 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_DEVFS);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(devfs_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(devfs_init_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_devfs_init_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_DEVFS);
COUNTER_INC(devfs_init_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(devfs_update);
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_devfs_update(struct mount *mp, struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
struct label *direntlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel)
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(direntlabel, MAGIC_DEVFS);
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(devfs_update);
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(devfs_vnode_associate);
Add missing mac_test labeling and sleep checks for the syncache. Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 18:33:31 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_devfs_vnode_associate(struct mount *mp, struct label *mplabel,
struct devfs_dirent *de, struct label *delabel, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vplabel)
Add missing mac_test labeling and sleep checks for the syncache. Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 18:33:31 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mplabel, MAGIC_MOUNT);
LABEL_CHECK(delabel, MAGIC_DEVFS);
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(devfs_vnode_associate);
Add missing mac_test labeling and sleep checks for the syncache. Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 18:33:31 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_check_relabel);
static int
test_ifnet_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct ifnet *ifp,
struct label *ifplabel, struct label *newlabel)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(ifplabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
LABEL_CHECK(newlabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_check_relabel);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_check_transmit);
static int
test_ifnet_check_transmit(struct ifnet *ifp, struct label *ifplabel,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(ifplabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_check_transmit);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_copy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ifnet_copy_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(src, MAGIC_IFNET);
LABEL_CHECK(dest, MAGIC_IFNET);
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_copy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ifnet_create(struct ifnet *ifp, struct label *ifplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(ifplabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_create_mbuf);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ifnet_create_mbuf(struct ifnet *ifp, struct label *ifplabel,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(ifplabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_create_mbuf);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_destroy_label);
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ifnet_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_IFNET);
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_externalize_label);
static int
test_ifnet_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed)
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_IFNET);
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_externalize_label);
return (0);
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_init_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ifnet_init_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_IFNET);
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_init_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_internalize_label);
static int
test_ifnet_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
char *element_data, int *claimed)
{
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_IFNET);
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_internalize_label);
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ifnet_relabel);
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ifnet_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct ifnet *ifp,
struct label *ifplabel, struct label *newlabel)
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(ifplabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
LABEL_CHECK(newlabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
COUNTER_INC(ifnet_relabel);
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(inpcb_check_deliver);
static int
test_inpcb_check_deliver(struct inpcb *inp, struct label *inplabel,
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(inplabel, MAGIC_INPCB);
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(inpcb_check_deliver);
return (0);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
}
Add a mac_inpcb_check_visible implementation to all MAC policies that handle mac_socket_check_visible. Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 3 months (set timer; decide then)
2008-10-17 15:11:12 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(inpcb_check_visible);
static int
test_inpcb_check_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct inpcb *inp,
struct label *inplabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(inplabel, MAGIC_INPCB);
COUNTER_INC(inpcb_check_visible);
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(inpcb_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_inpcb_create(struct socket *so, struct label *solabel,
struct inpcb *inp, struct label *inplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(inplabel, MAGIC_INPCB);
COUNTER_INC(inpcb_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(inpcb_create_mbuf);
Rename mac_create_cred() MAC Framework entry point to mac_copy_cred(), and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation. For a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency. Approved by: re (scottl) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-06 21:48:03 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_inpcb_create_mbuf(struct inpcb *inp, struct label *inplabel,
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Rename mac_create_cred() MAC Framework entry point to mac_copy_cred(), and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation. For a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency. Approved by: re (scottl) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-06 21:48:03 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(inplabel, MAGIC_INPCB);
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(inpcb_create_mbuf);
Rename mac_create_cred() MAC Framework entry point to mac_copy_cred(), and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation. For a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency. Approved by: re (scottl) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-06 21:48:03 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(inpcb_destroy_label);
Introduce a temporary mutex, mac_ifnet_mtx, to lock MAC labels on network interfaces. This global mutex will protect all ifnet labels. Acquire the mutex across various MAC activities on interfaces, such as security checks, propagating interface labels to mbufs generated from the interface, retrieving and setting the interface label. Introduce mpo_copy_ifnet_label MAC policy entry point to copy the value of an interface label from one label to another. Use this to avoid performing a label externalize while holding mac_ifnet_mtx; copy the label to a temporary ifnet label and then externalize that. Implement mpo_copy_ifnet_label for various MAC policies that implement interface labeling using generic label copying routines. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
2004-06-24 03:34:46 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_inpcb_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce a temporary mutex, mac_ifnet_mtx, to lock MAC labels on network interfaces. This global mutex will protect all ifnet labels. Acquire the mutex across various MAC activities on interfaces, such as security checks, propagating interface labels to mbufs generated from the interface, retrieving and setting the interface label. Introduce mpo_copy_ifnet_label MAC policy entry point to copy the value of an interface label from one label to another. Use this to avoid performing a label externalize while holding mac_ifnet_mtx; copy the label to a temporary ifnet label and then externalize that. Implement mpo_copy_ifnet_label for various MAC policies that implement interface labeling using generic label copying routines. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
2004-06-24 03:34:46 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_INPCB);
COUNTER_INC(inpcb_destroy_label);
Introduce a temporary mutex, mac_ifnet_mtx, to lock MAC labels on network interfaces. This global mutex will protect all ifnet labels. Acquire the mutex across various MAC activities on interfaces, such as security checks, propagating interface labels to mbufs generated from the interface, retrieving and setting the interface label. Introduce mpo_copy_ifnet_label MAC policy entry point to copy the value of an interface label from one label to another. Use this to avoid performing a label externalize while holding mac_ifnet_mtx; copy the label to a temporary ifnet label and then externalize that. Implement mpo_copy_ifnet_label for various MAC policies that implement interface labeling using generic label copying routines. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
2004-06-24 03:34:46 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(inpcb_init_label);
static int
test_inpcb_init_label(struct label *label, int flag)
Implement mpo_copy_{mbuf,pipe,vnode}_label() entry points for mac_stub and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 18:28:58 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
if (flag & M_WAITOK)
WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
"test_inpcb_init_label() at %s:%d", __FILE__,
__LINE__);
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_INPCB);
COUNTER_INC(inpcb_init_label);
return (0);
Implement mpo_copy_{mbuf,pipe,vnode}_label() entry points for mac_stub and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 18:28:58 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(inpcb_sosetlabel);
Implement mpo_copy_{mbuf,pipe,vnode}_label() entry points for mac_stub and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 18:28:58 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_inpcb_sosetlabel(struct socket *so, struct label *solabel,
struct inpcb *inp, struct label *inplabel)
Implement mpo_copy_{mbuf,pipe,vnode}_label() entry points for mac_stub and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 18:28:58 +00:00
{
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK_ASSERT(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
LABEL_CHECK(inplabel, MAGIC_INPCB);
COUNTER_INC(inpcb_sosetlabel);
Implement mpo_copy_{mbuf,pipe,vnode}_label() entry points for mac_stub and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 18:28:58 +00:00
}
Implement MAC policy support for IPv6 fragment reassembly queues, modeled on IPv4 fragment reassembly queue support. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2008-10-26 22:46:37 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ip6q_create);
static void
test_ip6q_create(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
struct ip6q *q6, struct label *q6label)
{
LABEL_CHECK(fragmentlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
LABEL_CHECK(q6label, MAGIC_IP6Q);
COUNTER_INC(ip6q_create);
}
COUNTER_DECL(ip6q_destroy_label);
static void
test_ip6q_destroy_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_IP6Q);
COUNTER_INC(ip6q_destroy_label);
}
COUNTER_DECL(ip6q_init_label);
static int
test_ip6q_init_label(struct label *label, int flag)
{
if (flag & M_WAITOK)
WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
"test_ip6q_init_label() at %s:%d", __FILE__,
__LINE__);
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_IP6Q);
COUNTER_INC(ip6q_init_label);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(ip6q_match);
static int
test_ip6q_match(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
struct ip6q *q6, struct label *q6label)
{
LABEL_CHECK(fragmentlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
LABEL_CHECK(q6label, MAGIC_IP6Q);
COUNTER_INC(ip6q_match);
return (1);
}
COUNTER_DECL(ip6q_reassemble);
static void
test_ip6q_reassemble(struct ip6q *q6, struct label *q6label, struct mbuf *m,
struct label *mlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(q6label, MAGIC_IP6Q);
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(ip6q_reassemble);
}
COUNTER_DECL(ip6q_update);
static void
test_ip6q_update(struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel, struct ip6q *q6,
struct label *q6label)
{
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
LABEL_CHECK(q6label, MAGIC_IP6Q);
COUNTER_INC(ip6q_update);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ipq_create);
Implement sockets support for __mac_get_fd() and __mac_set_fd() system calls, and prefer these calls over getsockopt()/setsockopt() for ABI reasons. When addressing UNIX domain sockets, these calls retrieve and modify the socket label, not the label of the rendezvous vnode. - Create mac_copy_socket_label() entry point based on mac_copy_pipe_label() entry point, intended to copy the socket label into temporary storage that doesn't require a socket lock to be held (currently Giant). - Implement mac_copy_socket_label() for various policies. - Expose socket label allocation, free, internalize, externalize entry points as non-static from mac_net.c. - Use mac_socket_label_set() in __mac_set_fd(). MAC-aware applications may now use mac_get_fd(), mac_set_fd(), and mac_get_peer() to retrieve and set various socket labels without directly invoking the getsockopt() interface. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 23:31:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ipq_create(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is the same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name 'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing tools. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: julian
2008-06-13 22:14:15 +00:00
struct ipq *q, struct label *qlabel)
Implement sockets support for __mac_get_fd() and __mac_set_fd() system calls, and prefer these calls over getsockopt()/setsockopt() for ABI reasons. When addressing UNIX domain sockets, these calls retrieve and modify the socket label, not the label of the rendezvous vnode. - Create mac_copy_socket_label() entry point based on mac_copy_pipe_label() entry point, intended to copy the socket label into temporary storage that doesn't require a socket lock to be held (currently Giant). - Implement mac_copy_socket_label() for various policies. - Expose socket label allocation, free, internalize, externalize entry points as non-static from mac_net.c. - Use mac_socket_label_set() in __mac_set_fd(). MAC-aware applications may now use mac_get_fd(), mac_set_fd(), and mac_get_peer() to retrieve and set various socket labels without directly invoking the getsockopt() interface. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 23:31:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(fragmentlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is the same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name 'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing tools. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: julian
2008-06-13 22:14:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(qlabel, MAGIC_IPQ);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(ipq_create);
Implement sockets support for __mac_get_fd() and __mac_set_fd() system calls, and prefer these calls over getsockopt()/setsockopt() for ABI reasons. When addressing UNIX domain sockets, these calls retrieve and modify the socket label, not the label of the rendezvous vnode. - Create mac_copy_socket_label() entry point based on mac_copy_pipe_label() entry point, intended to copy the socket label into temporary storage that doesn't require a socket lock to be held (currently Giant). - Implement mac_copy_socket_label() for various policies. - Expose socket label allocation, free, internalize, externalize entry points as non-static from mac_net.c. - Use mac_socket_label_set() in __mac_set_fd(). MAC-aware applications may now use mac_get_fd(), mac_set_fd(), and mac_get_peer() to retrieve and set various socket labels without directly invoking the getsockopt() interface. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 23:31:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ipq_destroy_label);
Implement mpo_copy_{mbuf,pipe,vnode}_label() entry points for mac_stub and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 18:28:58 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ipq_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Implement mpo_copy_{mbuf,pipe,vnode}_label() entry points for mac_stub and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 18:28:58 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_IPQ);
COUNTER_INC(ipq_destroy_label);
Implement mpo_copy_{mbuf,pipe,vnode}_label() entry points for mac_stub and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 18:28:58 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ipq_init_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ipq_init_label(struct label *label, int flag)
Adapt MAC policies for the new user API changes; teach policies how to parse their own label elements (some cleanup to occur here in the future to use the newly added kernel strsep()). Policies now entirely encapsulate their notion of label in the policy module. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:31:34 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
if (flag & M_WAITOK)
WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
"test_ipq_init_label() at %s:%d", __FILE__,
__LINE__);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_IPQ);
COUNTER_INC(ipq_init_label);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ipq_match);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_ipq_match(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is the same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name 'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing tools. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: julian
2008-06-13 22:14:15 +00:00
struct ipq *q, struct label *qlabel)
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(fragmentlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is the same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name 'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing tools. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: julian
2008-06-13 22:14:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(qlabel, MAGIC_IPQ);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(ipq_match);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (1);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ipq_reassemble);
static void
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is the same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name 'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing tools. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: julian
2008-06-13 22:14:15 +00:00
test_ipq_reassemble(struct ipq *q, struct label *qlabel, struct mbuf *m,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct label *mlabel)
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
{
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is the same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name 'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing tools. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: julian
2008-06-13 22:14:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(qlabel, MAGIC_IPQ);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(ipq_reassemble);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(ipq_update);
static void
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is the same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name 'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing tools. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: julian
2008-06-13 22:14:15 +00:00
test_ipq_update(struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel, struct ipq *q,
struct label *qlabel)
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
{
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is the same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name 'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing tools. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: julian
2008-06-13 22:14:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(qlabel, MAGIC_IPQ);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(ipq_update);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(kenv_check_dump);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_kenv_check_dump(struct ucred *cred)
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(kenv_check_dump);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(kenv_check_get);
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_kenv_check_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(kenv_check_get);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Adapt MAC policies for the new user API changes; teach policies how to parse their own label elements (some cleanup to occur here in the future to use the newly added kernel strsep()). Policies now entirely encapsulate their notion of label in the policy module. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:31:34 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(kenv_check_set);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_kenv_check_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(kenv_check_set);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(kenv_check_unset);
static int
test_kenv_check_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(kenv_check_unset);
return (0);
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(kld_check_load);
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_kld_check_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label)
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(kld_check_load);
Further MAC test policy cleanup and enhancement: - Redistribute counter declarations to where they are used, rather than at the file header, so it's more clear where we do (and don't) have counters. - Add many more counters, one per policy entry point, so that many individual access controls and object life cycle events are tracked. - Perform counter increments for label destruction explicitly in entry point functions rather than in LABEL_DESTROY(). - Use LABEL_INIT() instead of SLOT_SET() directly in label init functions to be symmetric with destruction. - Align counter names more carefully with entry point names. - More constant and variable name normalization. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 13:29:37 +00:00
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(kld_check_stat);
static int
test_kld_check_stat(struct ucred *cred)
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(kld_check_stat);
return (0);
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(mbuf_copy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_mbuf_copy_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(src, MAGIC_MBUF);
LABEL_CHECK(dest, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(mbuf_copy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(mbuf_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_mbuf_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
/*
* If we're loaded dynamically, there may be mbufs in flight that
* didn't have label storage allocated for them. Handle this
* gracefully.
*/
if (label == NULL)
return;
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(mbuf_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(mbuf_init_label);
static int
test_mbuf_init_label(struct label *label, int flag)
Implement mac_create_devfs_symlink() for policies that interact with vnode labels. Sync from MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 18:56:25 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
if (flag & M_WAITOK)
WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
"test_mbuf_init_label() at %s:%d", __FILE__,
__LINE__);
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(mbuf_init_label);
return (0);
Implement mac_create_devfs_symlink() for policies that interact with vnode labels. Sync from MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 18:56:25 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(mount_check_stat);
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_mount_check_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct label *mplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mplabel, MAGIC_MOUNT);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(mount_check_stat);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(mount_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_mount_create(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *mplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mplabel, MAGIC_MOUNT);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(mount_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(mount_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_mount_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_MOUNT);
COUNTER_INC(mount_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(mount_init_label);
static void
test_mount_init_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_MOUNT);
COUNTER_INC(mount_init_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(netinet_arp_send);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_netinet_arp_send(struct ifnet *ifp, struct label *ifplabel,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(ifplabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(netinet_arp_send);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(netinet_fragment);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
test_netinet_fragment(struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel,
struct mbuf *frag, struct label *fraglabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
LABEL_CHECK(fraglabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(netinet_fragment);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(netinet_icmp_reply);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_netinet_icmp_reply(struct mbuf *mrecv, struct label *mrecvlabel,
struct mbuf *msend, struct label *msendlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mrecvlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
LABEL_CHECK(msendlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(netinet_icmp_reply);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(netinet_icmp_replyinplace);
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_netinet_icmp_replyinplace(struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(netinet_icmp_replyinplace);
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(netinet_igmp_send);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_netinet_igmp_send(struct ifnet *ifp, struct label *ifplabel,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(ifplabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(netinet_igmp_send);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(netinet_tcp_reply);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_netinet_tcp_reply(struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(netinet_tcp_reply);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(netinet6_nd6_send);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_netinet6_nd6_send(struct ifnet *ifp, struct label *ifplabel,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(ifplabel, MAGIC_IFNET);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(netinet6_nd6_send);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_check_ioctl);
static int
test_pipe_check_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipepair *pp,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct label *pplabel, unsigned long cmd, void /* caddr_t */ *data)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(pplabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(pipe_check_ioctl);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_check_poll);
static int
test_pipe_check_poll(struct ucred *cred, struct pipepair *pp,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct label *pplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(pplabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(pipe_check_poll);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_check_read);
static int
test_pipe_check_read(struct ucred *cred, struct pipepair *pp,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct label *pplabel)
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(pplabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(pipe_check_read);
Add missing mac_test labeling and sleep checks for the syncache. Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 18:33:31 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Add missing mac_test labeling and sleep checks for the syncache. Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 18:33:31 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_check_relabel);
static int
test_pipe_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct pipepair *pp,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct label *pplabel, struct label *newlabel)
Add missing mac_test labeling and sleep checks for the syncache. Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 18:33:31 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(pplabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(newlabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
COUNTER_INC(pipe_check_relabel);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_check_stat);
static int
test_pipe_check_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct pipepair *pp,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct label *pplabel)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(pplabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(pipe_check_stat);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_check_write);
static int
test_pipe_check_write(struct ucred *cred, struct pipepair *pp,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct label *pplabel)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(pplabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(pipe_check_write);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_copy_label);
Switch TCP over to using the inpcb label when responding in timed wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking changes. To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond() instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(). Introduce MAC Policy entry point mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to the mbuf. Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we require consistency for the inpcb label reference. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-17 14:55:11 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_pipe_copy_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
Switch TCP over to using the inpcb label when responding in timed wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking changes. To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond() instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(). Introduce MAC Policy entry point mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to the mbuf. Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we require consistency for the inpcb label reference. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-17 14:55:11 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(src, MAGIC_PIPE);
LABEL_CHECK(dest, MAGIC_PIPE);
COUNTER_INC(pipe_copy_label);
Switch TCP over to using the inpcb label when responding in timed wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking changes. To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond() instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(). Introduce MAC Policy entry point mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to the mbuf. Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we require consistency for the inpcb label reference. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-17 14:55:11 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_pipe_create(struct ucred *cred, struct pipepair *pp,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct label *pplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(pplabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(pipe_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_pipe_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_PIPE);
COUNTER_INC(pipe_destroy_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_externalize_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_pipe_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed)
Move towards more explicit support for various network protocol stacks in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework: - Add mac_atalk.c and add explicit entry point mac_netatalk_aarp_send() for AARP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add mac_inet6.c and add explicit entry point mac_netinet6_nd6_send() for ND6 packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add expliict entry point mac_netinet_arp_send() for ARP packet labeling, and mac_netinet_igmp_send() for IGMP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Remove previous genering link layer entry point, mac_mbuf_create_linklayer() as it is no longer used. - Add implementations of new entry points to various policies, largely by replicating the existing link layer entry point for them; remove old link layer entry point implementation. - Make MAC_IFNET_LOCK(), MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(), and mac_ifnet_mtx global to the MAC Framework rather than static to mac_net.c as it is now needed outside of mac_net.c. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 15:55:23 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_PIPE);
COUNTER_INC(pipe_externalize_label);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_init_label);
Continue to move from generic network entry points in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework by moving from mac_mbuf_create_netlayer() to more specific entry points for specific network services: - mac_netinet_firewall_reply() to be used when replying to in-bound TCP segments in pf and ipfw (etc). - Rename mac_netinet_icmp_reply() to mac_netinet_icmp_replyinplace() and add mac_netinet_icmp_reply(), reflecting that in some cases we overwrite a label in place, but in others we apply the label to a new mbuf. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 17:12:48 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_pipe_init_label(struct label *label)
Continue to move from generic network entry points in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework by moving from mac_mbuf_create_netlayer() to more specific entry points for specific network services: - mac_netinet_firewall_reply() to be used when replying to in-bound TCP segments in pf and ipfw (etc). - Rename mac_netinet_icmp_reply() to mac_netinet_icmp_replyinplace() and add mac_netinet_icmp_reply(), reflecting that in some cases we overwrite a label in place, but in others we apply the label to a new mbuf. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 17:12:48 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_PIPE);
COUNTER_INC(pipe_init_label);
Continue to move from generic network entry points in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework by moving from mac_mbuf_create_netlayer() to more specific entry points for specific network services: - mac_netinet_firewall_reply() to be used when replying to in-bound TCP segments in pf and ipfw (etc). - Rename mac_netinet_icmp_reply() to mac_netinet_icmp_replyinplace() and add mac_netinet_icmp_reply(), reflecting that in some cases we overwrite a label in place, but in others we apply the label to a new mbuf. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 17:12:48 +00:00
}
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_internalize_label);
static int
test_pipe_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
char *element_data, int *claimed)
{
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_PIPE);
COUNTER_INC(pipe_internalize_label);
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(pipe_relabel);
Move towards more explicit support for various network protocol stacks in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework: - Add mac_atalk.c and add explicit entry point mac_netatalk_aarp_send() for AARP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add mac_inet6.c and add explicit entry point mac_netinet6_nd6_send() for ND6 packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add expliict entry point mac_netinet_arp_send() for ARP packet labeling, and mac_netinet_igmp_send() for IGMP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Remove previous genering link layer entry point, mac_mbuf_create_linklayer() as it is no longer used. - Add implementations of new entry points to various policies, largely by replicating the existing link layer entry point for them; remove old link layer entry point implementation. - Make MAC_IFNET_LOCK(), MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(), and mac_ifnet_mtx global to the MAC Framework rather than static to mac_net.c as it is now needed outside of mac_net.c. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 15:55:23 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_pipe_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct pipepair *pp,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct label *pplabel, struct label *newlabel)
Move towards more explicit support for various network protocol stacks in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework: - Add mac_atalk.c and add explicit entry point mac_netatalk_aarp_send() for AARP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add mac_inet6.c and add explicit entry point mac_netinet6_nd6_send() for ND6 packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add expliict entry point mac_netinet_arp_send() for ARP packet labeling, and mac_netinet_igmp_send() for IGMP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Remove previous genering link layer entry point, mac_mbuf_create_linklayer() as it is no longer used. - Add implementations of new entry points to various policies, largely by replicating the existing link layer entry point for them; remove old link layer entry point implementation. - Make MAC_IFNET_LOCK(), MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(), and mac_ifnet_mtx global to the MAC Framework rather than static to mac_net.c as it is now needed outside of mac_net.c. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 15:55:23 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(pplabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(newlabel, MAGIC_PIPE);
COUNTER_INC(pipe_relabel);
Move towards more explicit support for various network protocol stacks in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework: - Add mac_atalk.c and add explicit entry point mac_netatalk_aarp_send() for AARP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add mac_inet6.c and add explicit entry point mac_netinet6_nd6_send() for ND6 packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add expliict entry point mac_netinet_arp_send() for ARP packet labeling, and mac_netinet_igmp_send() for IGMP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Remove previous genering link layer entry point, mac_mbuf_create_linklayer() as it is no longer used. - Add implementations of new entry points to various policies, largely by replicating the existing link layer entry point for them; remove old link layer entry point implementation. - Make MAC_IFNET_LOCK(), MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(), and mac_ifnet_mtx global to the MAC Framework rather than static to mac_net.c as it is now needed outside of mac_net.c. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 15:55:23 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_getvalue);
static int
Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach. Some bugs that were fixed as a result include: - References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that. - Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore objects that could never be cleaned up. - On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to 'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(), sem_wait(), etc. - As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug. - If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores, then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when they are unloaded. XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking to drain any threads from the calls. - Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init() isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that case. Other changes: - Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories in their pathname. - The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks. - Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor. - A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present in src/tools/regression/posixsem. Reported by: kris (1) Tested by: kris Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly) MFC after: 1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
test_posixsem_check_getvalue(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct ksem *ks, struct label *kslabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach. Some bugs that were fixed as a result include: - References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that. - Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore objects that could never be cleaned up. - On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to 'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(), sem_wait(), etc. - As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug. - If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores, then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when they are unloaded. XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking to drain any threads from the calls. - Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init() isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that case. Other changes: - Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories in their pathname. - The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks. - Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor. - A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present in src/tools/regression/posixsem. Reported by: kris (1) Tested by: kris Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly) MFC after: 1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_getvalue);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_open);
static int
test_posixsem_check_open(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
struct label *kslabel)
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_open);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_post);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach. Some bugs that were fixed as a result include: - References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that. - Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore objects that could never be cleaned up. - On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to 'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(), sem_wait(), etc. - As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug. - If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores, then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when they are unloaded. XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking to drain any threads from the calls. - Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init() isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that case. Other changes: - Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories in their pathname. - The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks. - Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor. - A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present in src/tools/regression/posixsem. Reported by: kris (1) Tested by: kris Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly) MFC after: 1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
test_posixsem_check_post(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct ksem *ks, struct label *kslabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach. Some bugs that were fixed as a result include: - References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that. - Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore objects that could never be cleaned up. - On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to 'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(), sem_wait(), etc. - As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug. - If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores, then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when they are unloaded. XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking to drain any threads from the calls. - Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init() isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that case. Other changes: - Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories in their pathname. - The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks. - Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor. - A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present in src/tools/regression/posixsem. Reported by: kris (1) Tested by: kris Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly) MFC after: 1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_post);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Add the fo_chown and fo_chmod methods to struct fileops and use them to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod done on posix shared memory and (old) in-kernel posix semaphores. Based on the submission by: glebius Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_setmode);
static int
test_posixsem_check_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
struct label *kslabel, mode_t mode)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_setmode);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_setowner);
static int
test_posixsem_check_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
struct label *kslabel, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_setowner);
return (0);
}
Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach. Some bugs that were fixed as a result include: - References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that. - Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore objects that could never be cleaned up. - On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to 'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(), sem_wait(), etc. - As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug. - If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores, then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when they are unloaded. XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking to drain any threads from the calls. - Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init() isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that case. Other changes: - Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories in their pathname. - The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks. - Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor. - A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present in src/tools/regression/posixsem. Reported by: kris (1) Tested by: kris Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly) MFC after: 1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_stat);
static int
test_posixsem_check_stat(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct ksem *ks, struct label *kslabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_stat);
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_unlink);
static int
test_posixsem_check_unlink(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
struct label *kslabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_unlink);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_check_wait);
static int
Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach. Some bugs that were fixed as a result include: - References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that. - Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore objects that could never be cleaned up. - On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to 'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(), sem_wait(), etc. - As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug. - If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores, then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when they are unloaded. XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking to drain any threads from the calls. - Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init() isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that case. Other changes: - Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories in their pathname. - The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks. - Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor. - A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present in src/tools/regression/posixsem. Reported by: kris (1) Tested by: kris Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly) MFC after: 1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
test_posixsem_check_wait(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct ksem *ks, struct label *kslabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach. Some bugs that were fixed as a result include: - References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that. - Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore objects that could never be cleaned up. - On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to 'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(), sem_wait(), etc. - As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug. - If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores, then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when they are unloaded. XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking to drain any threads from the calls. - Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init() isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that case. Other changes: - Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories in their pathname. - The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks. - Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor. - A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present in src/tools/regression/posixsem. Reported by: kris (1) Tested by: kris Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly) MFC after: 1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_check_wait);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_create);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_posixsem_create(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ks,
struct label *kslabel)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(kslabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_create);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_destroy_label);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_posixsem_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_destroy_label);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixsem_init_label);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
static void
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_posixsem_init_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_POSIX_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(posixsem_init_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Correct several issues in the integration of POSIX shared memory objects and the new setmode and setowner fileops in FreeBSD 9.0: - Add new MAC Framework entry point mac_posixshm_check_create() to allow MAC policies to authorise shared memory use. Provide a stub policy and test policy templates. - Add missing Biba and MLS implementations of mac_posixshm_check_setmode() and mac_posixshm_check_setowner(). - Add 'accmode' argument to mac_posixshm_check_open() -- unlike the mac_posixsem_check_open() entry point it was modeled on, the access mode is required as shared memory access can be read-only as well as writable; this isn't true of POSIX semaphores. - Implement full range of POSIX shared memory entry points for Biba and MLS. Sponsored by: Google Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Approved by: re (kib)
2011-09-02 17:40:39 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_create);
static int
test_posixshm_check_create(struct ucred *cred, const char *path)
{
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_create);
return (0);
}
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_mmap);
static int
test_posixshm_check_mmap(struct ucred *cred, struct shmfd *shmfd,
struct label *shmfdlabel, int prot, int flags)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmfdlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
Add missing counter increments for posix shm checks.
2008-06-26 13:49:32 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_mmap);
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_open);
static int
test_posixshm_check_open(struct ucred *cred, struct shmfd *shmfd,
Correct several issues in the integration of POSIX shared memory objects and the new setmode and setowner fileops in FreeBSD 9.0: - Add new MAC Framework entry point mac_posixshm_check_create() to allow MAC policies to authorise shared memory use. Provide a stub policy and test policy templates. - Add missing Biba and MLS implementations of mac_posixshm_check_setmode() and mac_posixshm_check_setowner(). - Add 'accmode' argument to mac_posixshm_check_open() -- unlike the mac_posixsem_check_open() entry point it was modeled on, the access mode is required as shared memory access can be read-only as well as writable; this isn't true of POSIX semaphores. - Implement full range of POSIX shared memory entry points for Biba and MLS. Sponsored by: Google Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Approved by: re (kib)
2011-09-02 17:40:39 +00:00
struct label *shmfdlabel, accmode_t accmode)
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmfdlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
Add missing counter increments for posix shm checks.
2008-06-26 13:49:32 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_open);
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
return (0);
}
Implement read(2)/write(2) and neccessary lseek(2) for posix shmfd. Add MAC framework entries for posix shm read and write. Do not allow implicit extension of the underlying memory segment past the limit set by ftruncate(2) by either of the syscalls. Read and write returns short i/o, lseek(2) fails with EINVAL when resulting offset does not fit into the limit. Discussed with: alc Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-08-21 17:45:00 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_read);
static int
test_posixshm_check_read(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct shmfd *shm, struct label *shmlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
if (file_cred != NULL)
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_read);
return (0);
}
Add the fo_chown and fo_chmod methods to struct fileops and use them to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod done on posix shared memory and (old) in-kernel posix semaphores. Based on the submission by: glebius Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_setmode);
static int
test_posixshm_check_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct shmfd *shmfd,
struct label *shmfdlabel, mode_t mode)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmfdlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_setmode);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_setowner);
static int
test_posixshm_check_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct shmfd *shmfd,
struct label *shmfdlabel, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmfdlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_setowner);
return (0);
}
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_stat);
static int
test_posixshm_check_stat(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct shmfd *shmfd, struct label *shmfdlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmfdlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
Add missing counter increments for posix shm checks.
2008-06-26 13:49:32 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_stat);
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_truncate);
static int
test_posixshm_check_truncate(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct shmfd *shmfd, struct label *shmfdlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmfdlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
Add missing counter increments for posix shm checks.
2008-06-26 13:49:32 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_truncate);
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_unlink);
static int
test_posixshm_check_unlink(struct ucred *cred, struct shmfd *shmfd,
struct label *shmfdlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmfdlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
Add missing counter increments for posix shm checks.
2008-06-26 13:49:32 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_unlink);
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
return (0);
}
Implement read(2)/write(2) and neccessary lseek(2) for posix shmfd. Add MAC framework entries for posix shm read and write. Do not allow implicit extension of the underlying memory segment past the limit set by ftruncate(2) by either of the syscalls. Read and write returns short i/o, lseek(2) fails with EINVAL when resulting offset does not fit into the limit. Discussed with: alc Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-08-21 17:45:00 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_check_write);
static int
test_posixshm_check_write(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct shmfd *shm, struct label *shmlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
if (file_cred != NULL)
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_check_write);
return (0);
}
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_create);
static void
test_posixshm_create(struct ucred *cred, struct shmfd *shmfd,
struct label *shmfdlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(shmfdlabel, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_create);
}
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_destroy_label);
static void
test_posixshm_destroy_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_destroy_label);
}
COUNTER_DECL(posixshm_init_label);
static void
test_posixshm_init_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_POSIX_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(posixshm_init_label);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(proc_check_debug);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(p->p_ucred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(proc_check_debug);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(proc_check_sched);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_proc_check_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(p->p_ucred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(proc_check_sched);
Further MAC test policy cleanup and enhancement: - Redistribute counter declarations to where they are used, rather than at the file header, so it's more clear where we do (and don't) have counters. - Add many more counters, one per policy entry point, so that many individual access controls and object life cycle events are tracked. - Perform counter increments for label destruction explicitly in entry point functions rather than in LABEL_DESTROY(). - Use LABEL_INIT() instead of SLOT_SET() directly in label init functions to be symmetric with destruction. - Align counter names more carefully with entry point names. - More constant and variable name normalization. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 13:29:37 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(proc_check_signal);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_proc_check_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p, int signum)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(p->p_ucred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(proc_check_signal);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(proc_check_wait);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_proc_check_wait(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(p->p_ucred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(proc_check_wait);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(proc_destroy_label);
static void
test_proc_destroy_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_PROC);
COUNTER_INC(proc_destroy_label);
Update mac_test for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPC objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory), exercising and validating MAC labels on these objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2005-01-22 20:31:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(proc_init_label);
static void
test_proc_init_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_PROC);
COUNTER_INC(proc_init_label);
}
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_accept);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_accept(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_accept);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_bind);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel, struct sockaddr *sa)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_bind);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_connect);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_connect(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel, struct sockaddr *sa)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_connect);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_deliver);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_deliver(struct socket *so, struct label *solabel,
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_deliver);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_listen);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_listen(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_listen);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_poll);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_poll(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_poll);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_receive);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_receive(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_receive);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_relabel);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel, struct label *newlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK_ASSERT(so);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
LABEL_CHECK(newlabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_relabel);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_send);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_send(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel)
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_send);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_stat);
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_stat);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_check_visible);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_check_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_check_visible);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_copy_label);
static void
test_socket_copy_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
{
LABEL_CHECK(src, MAGIC_SOCKET);
LABEL_CHECK(dest, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socket_copy_label);
}
COUNTER_DECL(socket_create);
static void
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
test_socket_create(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel)
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_create);
}
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_create_mbuf);
static void
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
test_socket_create_mbuf(struct socket *so, struct label *solabel,
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel)
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
{
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_create_mbuf);
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_destroy_label);
static void
test_socket_destroy_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socket_destroy_label);
}
COUNTER_DECL(socket_externalize_label);
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed)
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socket_externalize_label);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_init_label);
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socket_init_label(struct label *label, int flag)
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
if (flag & M_WAITOK)
WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
"test_socket_init_label() at %s:%d", __FILE__,
__LINE__);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socket_init_label);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
return (0);
}
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_internalize_label);
static int
test_socket_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
char *element_data, int *claimed)
{
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socket_internalize_label);
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socket_newconn);
static void
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
test_socket_newconn(struct socket *oldso, struct label *oldsolabel,
struct socket *newso, struct label *newsolabel)
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
{
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(oldso);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(oldsolabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(oldso);
SOCK_LOCK(newso);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(newsolabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(newso);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socket_newconn);
}
COUNTER_DECL(socket_relabel);
static void
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
test_socket_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel, struct label *newlabel)
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
{
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK_ASSERT(so);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(solabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(newlabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socket_relabel);
}
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socketpeer_destroy_label);
static void
test_socketpeer_destroy_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socketpeer_destroy_label);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socketpeer_externalize_label);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socketpeer_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed)
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socketpeer_externalize_label);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socketpeer_init_label);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_socketpeer_init_label(struct label *label, int flag)
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
if (flag & M_WAITOK)
WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
"test_socketpeer_init_label() at %s:%d", __FILE__,
__LINE__);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_SOCKET);
COUNTER_INC(socketpeer_init_label);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socketpeer_set_from_mbuf);
static void
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
test_socketpeer_set_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel,
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
struct socket *so, struct label *sopeerlabel)
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
{
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
LABEL_CHECK(sopeerlabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socketpeer_set_from_mbuf);
}
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(socketpeer_set_from_socket);
static void
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
test_socketpeer_set_from_socket(struct socket *oldso,
struct label *oldsolabel, struct socket *newso,
struct label *newsopeerlabel)
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
{
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(oldso);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(oldsolabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(oldso);
SOCK_LOCK(newso);
Canonicalize names of local variables. Add some missing label checks in mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 15:30:47 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(newsopeerlabel, MAGIC_SOCKET);
Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded: - Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other m_tag consumers are in use). - Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label. This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it no longer avoids locking. - Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect ifnet labels. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
SOCK_UNLOCK(newso);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(socketpeer_set_from_socket);
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(syncache_create);
static void
test_syncache_create(struct label *label, struct inpcb *inp)
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_SYNCACHE);
COUNTER_INC(syncache_create);
}
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(syncache_create_mbuf);
static void
test_syncache_create_mbuf(struct label *sc_label, struct mbuf *m,
struct label *mlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(sc_label, MAGIC_SYNCACHE);
LABEL_CHECK(mlabel, MAGIC_MBUF);
COUNTER_INC(syncache_create_mbuf);
Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(syncache_destroy_label);
static void
test_syncache_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_SYNCACHE);
COUNTER_INC(syncache_destroy_label);
}
COUNTER_DECL(syncache_init_label);
static int
test_syncache_init_label(struct label *label, int flag)
{
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
if (flag & M_WAITOK)
WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
"test_syncache_init_label() at %s:%d", __FILE__,
__LINE__);
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_SYNCACHE);
COUNTER_INC(syncache_init_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(system_check_acct);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_system_check_acct(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(system_check_acct);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(system_check_audit);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_system_check_audit(struct ucred *cred, void *record, int length)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(system_check_audit);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(system_check_auditctl);
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_system_check_auditctl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vplabel)
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(system_check_auditctl);
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(system_check_auditon);
Add a new MAC framework and policy entry point, mpo_check_proc_setaudit_addr to be used when controlling use of setaudit_addr(), rather than mpo_check_proc_setaudit(), which takes a different argument type. Reviewed by: csjp Approved by: re (kensmith)
2007-06-26 14:14:01 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_system_check_auditon(struct ucred *cred, int cmd)
Add a new MAC framework and policy entry point, mpo_check_proc_setaudit_addr to be used when controlling use of setaudit_addr(), rather than mpo_check_proc_setaudit(), which takes a different argument type. Reviewed by: csjp Approved by: re (kensmith)
2007-06-26 14:14:01 +00:00
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(system_check_auditon);
Add a new MAC framework and policy entry point, mpo_check_proc_setaudit_addr to be used when controlling use of setaudit_addr(), rather than mpo_check_proc_setaudit(), which takes a different argument type. Reviewed by: csjp Approved by: re (kensmith)
2007-06-26 14:14:01 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(system_check_reboot);
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_system_check_reboot(struct ucred *cred, int how)
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(system_check_reboot);
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(system_check_swapoff);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_system_check_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vplabel)
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(system_check_swapoff);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(system_check_swapon);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_system_check_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vplabel)
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(system_check_swapon);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(system_check_sysctl);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_system_check_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, struct sysctl_oid *oidp,
void *arg1, int arg2, struct sysctl_req *req)
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(system_check_sysctl);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsg_cleanup);
static void
test_sysvmsg_cleanup(struct label *msglabel)
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(msglabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSG);
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsg_cleanup);
}
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsg_create);
static void
test_sysvmsg_create(struct ucred *cred, struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr,
struct label *msqlabel, struct msg *msgptr, struct label *msglabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(msglabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSG);
LABEL_CHECK(msqlabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsg_create);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsg_destroy_label);
static void
test_sysvmsg_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_SYSV_MSG);
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsg_destroy_label);
}
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsg_init_label);
static void
test_sysvmsg_init_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_SYSV_MSG);
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsg_init_label);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_check_msgmsq);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvmsq_check_msgmsq(struct ucred *cred, struct msg *msgptr,
struct label *msglabel, struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr,
struct label *msqklabel)
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(msqklabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
LABEL_CHECK(msglabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSG);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_check_msgmsq);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_check_msgrcv);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvmsq_check_msgrcv(struct ucred *cred, struct msg *msgptr,
struct label *msglabel)
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(msglabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSG);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_check_msgrcv);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_check_msgrmid);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvmsq_check_msgrmid(struct ucred *cred, struct msg *msgptr,
struct label *msglabel)
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(msglabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSG);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_check_msgrmid);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_check_msqget);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvmsq_check_msqget(struct ucred *cred,
struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr, struct label *msqklabel)
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(msqklabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_check_msqget);
Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_check_msqsnd);
Introduce p_canwait() and MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for this reason. The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new entry points. Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-18 13:36:57 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvmsq_check_msqsnd(struct ucred *cred,
struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr, struct label *msqklabel)
Introduce p_canwait() and MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for this reason. The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new entry points. Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-18 13:36:57 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(msqklabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_check_msqsnd);
Introduce p_canwait() and MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for this reason. The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new entry points. Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-18 13:36:57 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_check_msqrcv);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvmsq_check_msqrcv(struct ucred *cred,
struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr, struct label *msqklabel)
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(msqklabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_check_msqrcv);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_check_msqctl);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvmsq_check_msqctl(struct ucred *cred,
struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr, struct label *msqklabel, int cmd)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(msqklabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_check_msqctl);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_cleanup);
static void
test_sysvmsq_cleanup(struct label *msqlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(msqlabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_cleanup);
}
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_create);
static void
test_sysvmsq_create(struct ucred *cred,
struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr, struct label *msqlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(msqlabel, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_destroy_label);
static void
test_sysvmsq_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_destroy_label);
}
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvmsq_init_label);
static void
test_sysvmsq_init_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_SYSV_MSQ);
COUNTER_INC(sysvmsq_init_label);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvsem_check_semctl);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvsem_check_semctl(struct ucred *cred,
struct semid_kernel *semakptr, struct label *semaklabel, int cmd)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(semaklabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvsem_check_semctl);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvsem_check_semget);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvsem_check_semget(struct ucred *cred,
struct semid_kernel *semakptr, struct label *semaklabel)
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(semaklabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvsem_check_semget);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvsem_check_semop);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvsem_check_semop(struct ucred *cred,
struct semid_kernel *semakptr, struct label *semaklabel, size_t accesstype)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(semaklabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvsem_check_semop);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvsem_cleanup);
static void
test_sysvsem_cleanup(struct label *semalabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(semalabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvsem_cleanup);
}
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvsem_create);
static void
test_sysvsem_create(struct ucred *cred, struct semid_kernel *semakptr,
struct label *semalabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(semalabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvsem_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvsem_destroy_label);
static void
test_sysvsem_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_SYSV_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvsem_destroy_label);
}
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvsem_init_label);
static void
test_sysvsem_init_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_SYSV_SEM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvsem_init_label);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvshm_check_shmat);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvshm_check_shmat(struct ucred *cred,
struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr, struct label *shmseglabel, int shmflg)
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(shmseglabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvshm_check_shmat);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvshm_check_shmctl);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvshm_check_shmctl(struct ucred *cred,
struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr, struct label *shmseglabel, int cmd)
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(shmseglabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvshm_check_shmctl);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
return (0);
Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvshm_check_shmdt);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvshm_check_shmdt(struct ucred *cred,
struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr, struct label *shmseglabel)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(shmseglabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvshm_check_shmdt);
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvshm_check_shmget);
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_sysvshm_check_shmget(struct ucred *cred,
struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr, struct label *shmseglabel, int shmflg)
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(shmseglabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvshm_check_shmget);
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvshm_cleanup);
static void
test_sysvshm_cleanup(struct label *shmlabel)
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(shmlabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvshm_cleanup);
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvshm_create);
static void
test_sysvshm_create(struct ucred *cred, struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr,
struct label *shmlabel)
Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(shmlabel, MAGIC_SYSV_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvshm_create);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvshm_destroy_label);
static void
test_sysvshm_destroy_label(struct label *label)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_SYSV_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvshm_destroy_label);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(sysvshm_init_label);
static void
test_sysvshm_init_label(struct label *label)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_SYSV_SHM);
COUNTER_INC(sysvshm_init_label);
}
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(thread_userret);
static void
test_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
{
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(thread_userret);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_associate_extattr);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
static int
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
test_vnode_associate_extattr(struct mount *mp, struct label *mplabel,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mplabel, MAGIC_MOUNT);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_associate_extattr);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_associate_singlelabel);
static void
test_vnode_associate_singlelabel(struct mount *mp, struct label *mplabel,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel)
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(mplabel, MAGIC_MOUNT);
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_associate_singlelabel);
Update the MAC regression test policy to include stubs and testing functionality for the following entry pints: mac_test_init_proc_label() mac_test_destroy_proc_label() For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle. mac_test_thread_userret() mac_test_check_kenv_dump() mac_test_check_kenv_get() mac_test_check_kenv_set() mac_test_check_kenv_unset() mac_test_check_kld_load() mac_test_check_kld_stat() mac_test_check_kld_unload() mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_test_check_system_acct() mac_test_check_system_reboot() mac_test_check_system_settime() mac_test_check_system_swapon() mac_test_check_system_swapoff() mac_test_check_system_sysctl() For other entry points, just provide testing stubs. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:20:56 +00:00
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_access);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Introduce accmode_t. This is required for NFSv4 ACLs - it will be neccessary to add more V* constants, and the variables changed by this patch were often being assigned to mode_t variables, which is 16 bit. Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
2008-10-28 13:44:11 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, accmode_t accmode)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_access);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_chdir);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *dvplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_chdir);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_chroot);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_chroot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *dvplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_chroot);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_create);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_create(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *dvplabel, struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_create);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_deleteacl);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_deleteacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, acl_type_t type)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_deleteacl);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_deleteextattr);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_deleteextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, int attrnamespace, const char *name)
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_deleteextattr);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_exec);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_exec(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, struct image_params *imgp,
Update MAC modules for changes in arguments for exec MAC policy entry points to include an explicit execlabel. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-08 18:04:36 +00:00
struct label *execlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(execlabel, MAGIC_CRED);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_exec);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_getacl);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_getacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, acl_type_t type)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_getacl);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_getextattr);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_getextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Remove 'uio' argument from MAC Framework and MAC policy entry points for extended attribute get/set; in the case of get an uninitialized user buffer was passed before the EA was retrieved, making it of relatively little use; the latter was simply unused by any policies. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
2009-03-08 12:32:06 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, int attrnamespace, const char *name)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_getextattr);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_link);
Merge implementation of mpo_check_vnode_link() for various appropriate file-system aware MAC policies. Sync to MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 18:25:48 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_link(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *dvplabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel,
Merge implementation of mpo_check_vnode_link() for various appropriate file-system aware MAC policies. Sync to MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 18:25:48 +00:00
struct componentname *cnp)
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_link);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_listextattr);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_listextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, int attrnamespace)
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_listextattr);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Merge implementation of mpo_check_vnode_link() for various appropriate file-system aware MAC policies. Sync to MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 18:25:48 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_lookup);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *dvplabel, struct componentname *cnp)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Sync from MAC tree: break out the single mmap entry point into seperate entry points for each occasion: mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade should take place following subject relabel. Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding limiting access to vnode mmaping. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-06 02:46:26 +00:00
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_lookup);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Sync from MAC tree: break out the single mmap entry point into seperate entry points for each occasion: mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade should take place following subject relabel. Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding limiting access to vnode mmaping. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-06 02:46:26 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_mmap);
Sync from MAC tree: break out the single mmap entry point into seperate entry points for each occasion: mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade should take place following subject relabel. Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding limiting access to vnode mmaping. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-06 02:46:26 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_mmap(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, int prot, int flags)
Sync from MAC tree: break out the single mmap entry point into seperate entry points for each occasion: mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade should take place following subject relabel. Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding limiting access to vnode mmaping. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-06 02:46:26 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_mmap);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
Sync from MAC tree: break out the single mmap entry point into seperate entry points for each occasion: mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade should take place following subject relabel. Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding limiting access to vnode mmaping. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-06 02:46:26 +00:00
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_open);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Introduce accmode_t. This is required for NFSv4 ACLs - it will be neccessary to add more V* constants, and the variables changed by this patch were often being assigned to mode_t variables, which is 16 bit. Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
2008-10-28 13:44:11 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, accmode_t accmode)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_open);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_poll);
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_poll(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel)
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
if (file_cred != NULL)
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_poll);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_read);
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_read(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel)
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
if (file_cred != NULL)
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_read);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_readdir);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_readdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *dvplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_readdir);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_readlink);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_readlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_readlink);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_relabel);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, struct label *newlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(newlabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_relabel);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_rename_from);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_rename_from(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *dvplabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel,
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
struct componentname *cnp)
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_rename_from);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_rename_to);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_rename_to(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *dvplabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel,
int samedir, struct componentname *cnp)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_rename_to);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_revoke);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_revoke(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_revoke);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_setacl);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_setacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, acl_type_t type, struct acl *acl)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_setacl);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_setextattr);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_setextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Remove 'uio' argument from MAC Framework and MAC policy entry points for extended attribute get/set; in the case of get an uninitialized user buffer was passed before the EA was retrieved, making it of relatively little use; the latter was simply unused by any policies. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
2009-03-08 12:32:06 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, int attrnamespace, const char *name)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_setextattr);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_setflags);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_setflags(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, u_long flags)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_setflags);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_setmode);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, mode_t mode)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_setmode);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_setowner);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_setowner);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_setutimes);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_setutimes(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct label *vplabel, struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_setutimes);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_stat);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_stat(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
if (file_cred != NULL)
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_stat);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_unlink);
Rename mac_check_vnode_delete() MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry point to mac_check_vnode_unlink(), reflecting UNIX naming conventions. This is the first of several commits to synchronize the MAC Framework in FreeBSD 7.0 with the MAC Framework as it will appear in Mac OS X Leopard. Reveiwed by: csjp, Samy Bahra <sbahra at gwu dot edu> Submitted by: Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple dot com> Obtained from: Apple Computer, Inc. Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR Approved by: re (bmah)
2007-09-10 00:00:18 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_unlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
Rename mac_check_vnode_delete() MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry point to mac_check_vnode_unlink(), reflecting UNIX naming conventions. This is the first of several commits to synchronize the MAC Framework in FreeBSD 7.0 with the MAC Framework as it will appear in Mac OS X Leopard. Reveiwed by: csjp, Samy Bahra <sbahra at gwu dot edu> Submitted by: Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple dot com> Obtained from: Apple Computer, Inc. Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR Approved by: re (bmah)
2007-09-10 00:00:18 +00:00
struct label *dvplabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_unlink);
Rename mac_check_vnode_delete() MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry point to mac_check_vnode_unlink(), reflecting UNIX naming conventions. This is the first of several commits to synchronize the MAC Framework in FreeBSD 7.0 with the MAC Framework as it will appear in Mac OS X Leopard. Reveiwed by: csjp, Samy Bahra <sbahra at gwu dot edu> Submitted by: Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple dot com> Obtained from: Apple Computer, Inc. Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR Approved by: re (bmah)
2007-09-10 00:00:18 +00:00
return (0);
}
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_check_write);
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
static int
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
test_vnode_check_write(struct ucred *active_cred,
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel)
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
{
Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy: - Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy. - Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy quite a bit. - Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels. Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and doesn't test NULL labels. This means that optionally passed labels will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional credentials, NULL-checks are still required. - Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label validation and tear-down. - Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels. - Normalize the names of counters, magic values. - Remove unused policy "enabled" flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(active_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
if (file_cred != NULL)
LABEL_CHECK(file_cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
COUNTER_INC(vnode_check_write);
Retrofit of mac_test regression and consistency test module for MAC Framework labels: - Re-work the label state assertions to use a set of central ASSERT_type_LABEL() assertions. - Test to make sure labels passed to externalize/internalize calls haven't been destroyed. - For access control checks, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - For life cycle events, assert the condition of all labels passed in. - Add new entry point implementations for new MAC Framework entry points: mac_test_reflect_mbuf_icmp(), mac_test_reflect_mbuf_tcp(), mac_test_check_vnode_deleteextattr(), mac_test_check_vnode_listextattr(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 17:28:45 +00:00
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_copy_label);
static void
test_vnode_copy_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
{
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
LABEL_CHECK(src, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(dest, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_copy_label);
}
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_create_extattr);
static int
test_vnode_create_extattr(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct label *mplabel, struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dvplabel,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vplabel, struct componentname *cnp)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(mplabel, MAGIC_MOUNT);
LABEL_CHECK(dvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_create_extattr);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_destroy_label);
static void
test_vnode_destroy_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_DESTROY(label, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_destroy_label);
}
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_execve_transition);
static void
test_vnode_execve_transition(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *filelabel,
struct label *interpvplabel, struct image_params *imgp,
struct label *execlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(old->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(new->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(filelabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(interpvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(execlabel, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_execve_transition);
}
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_execve_will_transition);
static int
test_vnode_execve_will_transition(struct ucred *old, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *filelabel, struct label *interpvplabel,
struct image_params *imgp, struct label *execlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(old->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(filelabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(interpvplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(execlabel, MAGIC_CRED);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_execve_will_transition);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_externalize_label);
static int
test_vnode_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed)
{
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_externalize_label);
return (0);
}
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_init_label);
static void
test_vnode_init_label(struct label *label)
{
LABEL_INIT(label, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_init_label);
}
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_internalize_label);
static int
test_vnode_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *element_name,
char *element_data, int *claimed)
{
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_internalize_label);
return (0);
}
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_relabel);
static void
test_vnode_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vplabel, struct label *label)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(label, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_relabel);
}
COUNTER_DECL(vnode_setlabel_extattr);
static int
test_vnode_setlabel_extattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vplabel, struct label *intlabel)
{
LABEL_CHECK(cred->cr_label, MAGIC_CRED);
LABEL_CHECK(vplabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
LABEL_CHECK(intlabel, MAGIC_VNODE);
COUNTER_INC(vnode_setlabel_extattr);
return (0);
}
static struct mac_policy_ops test_ops =
{
.mpo_bpfdesc_check_receive = test_bpfdesc_check_receive,
.mpo_bpfdesc_create = test_bpfdesc_create,
.mpo_bpfdesc_create_mbuf = test_bpfdesc_create_mbuf,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_bpfdesc_destroy_label = test_bpfdesc_destroy_label,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_bpfdesc_init_label = test_bpfdesc_init_label,
.mpo_cred_check_relabel = test_cred_check_relabel,
Improve the consistency of MAC Framework and MAC policy entry point naming by renaming certain "proc" entry points to "cred" entry points, reflecting their manipulation of credentials. For some entry points, the process was passed into the framework but not into policies; in these cases, stop passing in the process since we don't need it. mac_proc_check_setaudit -> mac_cred_check_setaudit mac_proc_check_setaudit_addr -> mac_cred_check_setaudit_addr mac_proc_check_setauid -> mac_cred_check_setauid mac_proc_check_setegid -> mac_cred_check_setegid mac_proc_check_seteuid -> mac_cred_check_seteuid mac_proc_check_setgid -> mac_cred_check_setgid mac_proc_check_setgroups -> mac_cred_ceck_setgroups mac_proc_check_setregid -> mac_cred_check_setregid mac_proc_check_setresgid -> mac_cred_check_setresgid mac_proc_check_setresuid -> mac_cred_check_setresuid mac_proc_check_setreuid -> mac_cred_check_setreuid mac_proc_check_setuid -> mac_cred_check_setuid Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
2009-03-08 10:58:37 +00:00
.mpo_cred_check_setaudit = test_cred_check_setaudit,
.mpo_cred_check_setaudit_addr = test_cred_check_setaudit_addr,
.mpo_cred_check_setauid = test_cred_check_setauid,
.mpo_cred_check_seteuid = test_cred_check_seteuid,
.mpo_cred_check_setegid = test_cred_check_setegid,
.mpo_cred_check_setgid = test_cred_check_setgid,
.mpo_cred_check_setgroups = test_cred_check_setgroups,
.mpo_cred_check_setregid = test_cred_check_setregid,
.mpo_cred_check_setresgid = test_cred_check_setresgid,
.mpo_cred_check_setresuid = test_cred_check_setresuid,
.mpo_cred_check_setreuid = test_cred_check_setreuid,
.mpo_cred_check_setuid = test_cred_check_setuid,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_cred_check_visible = test_cred_check_visible,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_cred_copy_label = test_cred_copy_label,
Rename three MAC entry points from _proc_ to _cred_ to reflect the fact that they operate directly on credentials: mac_proc_create_swapper(), mac_proc_create_init(), and mac_proc_associate_nfsd(). Update policies. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2008-10-28 11:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_cred_create_init = test_cred_create_init,
.mpo_cred_create_swapper = test_cred_create_swapper,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_cred_destroy_label = test_cred_destroy_label,
Perform explicit label type checks for externalize entry points, rather than a generic initialized test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 14:28:33 +00:00
.mpo_cred_externalize_label = test_cred_externalize_label,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_cred_init_label = test_cred_init_label,
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
.mpo_cred_internalize_label = test_cred_internalize_label,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_cred_relabel = test_cred_relabel,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_devfs_create_device = test_devfs_create_device,
.mpo_devfs_create_directory = test_devfs_create_directory,
.mpo_devfs_create_symlink = test_devfs_create_symlink,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_devfs_destroy_label = test_devfs_destroy_label,
.mpo_devfs_init_label = test_devfs_init_label,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_devfs_update = test_devfs_update,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_devfs_vnode_associate = test_devfs_vnode_associate,
.mpo_ifnet_check_relabel = test_ifnet_check_relabel,
.mpo_ifnet_check_transmit = test_ifnet_check_transmit,
.mpo_ifnet_copy_label = test_ifnet_copy_label,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_ifnet_create = test_ifnet_create,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_ifnet_create_mbuf = test_ifnet_create_mbuf,
.mpo_ifnet_destroy_label = test_ifnet_destroy_label,
.mpo_ifnet_externalize_label = test_ifnet_externalize_label,
.mpo_ifnet_init_label = test_ifnet_init_label,
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
.mpo_ifnet_internalize_label = test_ifnet_internalize_label,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_ifnet_relabel = test_ifnet_relabel,
.mpo_syncache_destroy_label = test_syncache_destroy_label,
.mpo_syncache_init_label = test_syncache_init_label,
.mpo_sysvmsg_destroy_label = test_sysvmsg_destroy_label,
.mpo_sysvmsg_init_label = test_sysvmsg_init_label,
.mpo_sysvmsq_destroy_label = test_sysvmsq_destroy_label,
.mpo_sysvmsq_init_label = test_sysvmsq_init_label,
.mpo_sysvsem_destroy_label = test_sysvsem_destroy_label,
.mpo_sysvsem_init_label = test_sysvsem_init_label,
.mpo_sysvshm_destroy_label = test_sysvshm_destroy_label,
.mpo_sysvshm_init_label = test_sysvshm_init_label,
.mpo_inpcb_check_deliver = test_inpcb_check_deliver,
Add a mac_inpcb_check_visible implementation to all MAC policies that handle mac_socket_check_visible. Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 3 months (set timer; decide then)
2008-10-17 15:11:12 +00:00
.mpo_inpcb_check_visible = test_inpcb_check_visible,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_inpcb_create = test_inpcb_create,
.mpo_inpcb_create_mbuf = test_inpcb_create_mbuf,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_inpcb_destroy_label = test_inpcb_destroy_label,
.mpo_inpcb_init_label = test_inpcb_init_label,
.mpo_inpcb_sosetlabel = test_inpcb_sosetlabel,
Implement MAC policy support for IPv6 fragment reassembly queues, modeled on IPv4 fragment reassembly queue support. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2008-10-26 22:46:37 +00:00
.mpo_ip6q_create = test_ip6q_create,
.mpo_ip6q_destroy_label = test_ip6q_destroy_label,
.mpo_ip6q_init_label = test_ip6q_init_label,
.mpo_ip6q_match = test_ip6q_match,
.mpo_ip6q_reassemble = test_ip6q_reassemble,
.mpo_ip6q_update = test_ip6q_update,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_ipq_create = test_ipq_create,
.mpo_ipq_destroy_label = test_ipq_destroy_label,
.mpo_ipq_init_label = test_ipq_init_label,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_ipq_match = test_ipq_match,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_ipq_reassemble = test_ipq_reassemble,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_ipq_update = test_ipq_update,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_kenv_check_dump = test_kenv_check_dump,
.mpo_kenv_check_get = test_kenv_check_get,
.mpo_kenv_check_set = test_kenv_check_set,
.mpo_kenv_check_unset = test_kenv_check_unset,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_kld_check_load = test_kld_check_load,
.mpo_kld_check_stat = test_kld_check_stat,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_mbuf_copy_label = test_mbuf_copy_label,
.mpo_mbuf_destroy_label = test_mbuf_destroy_label,
.mpo_mbuf_init_label = test_mbuf_init_label,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_mount_check_stat = test_mount_check_stat,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_mount_create = test_mount_create,
.mpo_mount_destroy_label = test_mount_destroy_label,
.mpo_mount_init_label = test_mount_init_label,
.mpo_netinet_arp_send = test_netinet_arp_send,
.mpo_netinet_fragment = test_netinet_fragment,
.mpo_netinet_icmp_reply = test_netinet_icmp_reply,
.mpo_netinet_icmp_replyinplace = test_netinet_icmp_replyinplace,
.mpo_netinet_igmp_send = test_netinet_igmp_send,
.mpo_netinet_tcp_reply = test_netinet_tcp_reply,
.mpo_netinet6_nd6_send = test_netinet6_nd6_send,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_pipe_check_ioctl = test_pipe_check_ioctl,
.mpo_pipe_check_poll = test_pipe_check_poll,
.mpo_pipe_check_read = test_pipe_check_read,
.mpo_pipe_check_relabel = test_pipe_check_relabel,
.mpo_pipe_check_stat = test_pipe_check_stat,
.mpo_pipe_check_write = test_pipe_check_write,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_pipe_copy_label = test_pipe_copy_label,
.mpo_pipe_create = test_pipe_create,
.mpo_pipe_destroy_label = test_pipe_destroy_label,
.mpo_pipe_externalize_label = test_pipe_externalize_label,
.mpo_pipe_init_label = test_pipe_init_label,
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
.mpo_pipe_internalize_label = test_pipe_internalize_label,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_pipe_relabel = test_pipe_relabel,
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
.mpo_posixsem_check_getvalue = test_posixsem_check_getvalue,
.mpo_posixsem_check_open = test_posixsem_check_open,
.mpo_posixsem_check_post = test_posixsem_check_post,
Add the fo_chown and fo_chmod methods to struct fileops and use them to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod done on posix shared memory and (old) in-kernel posix semaphores. Based on the submission by: glebius Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
.mpo_posixsem_check_setmode = test_posixsem_check_setmode,
.mpo_posixsem_check_setowner = test_posixsem_check_setowner,
Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach. Some bugs that were fixed as a result include: - References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that. - Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore objects that could never be cleaned up. - On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to 'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(), sem_wait(), etc. - As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug. - If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores, then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when they are unloaded. XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking to drain any threads from the calls. - Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init() isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that case. Other changes: - Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories in their pathname. - The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks. - Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor. - A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present in src/tools/regression/posixsem. Reported by: kris (1) Tested by: kris Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly) MFC after: 1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
.mpo_posixsem_check_stat = test_posixsem_check_stat,
Give each posixsem MAC Framework entry point its own counter and test case in the mac_test policy, rather than sharing a single function for all of the access control checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-27 10:38:57 +00:00
.mpo_posixsem_check_unlink = test_posixsem_check_unlink,
.mpo_posixsem_check_wait = test_posixsem_check_wait,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_posixsem_create = test_posixsem_create,
.mpo_posixsem_destroy_label = test_posixsem_destroy_label,
.mpo_posixsem_init_label = test_posixsem_init_label,
Correct several issues in the integration of POSIX shared memory objects and the new setmode and setowner fileops in FreeBSD 9.0: - Add new MAC Framework entry point mac_posixshm_check_create() to allow MAC policies to authorise shared memory use. Provide a stub policy and test policy templates. - Add missing Biba and MLS implementations of mac_posixshm_check_setmode() and mac_posixshm_check_setowner(). - Add 'accmode' argument to mac_posixshm_check_open() -- unlike the mac_posixsem_check_open() entry point it was modeled on, the access mode is required as shared memory access can be read-only as well as writable; this isn't true of POSIX semaphores. - Implement full range of POSIX shared memory entry points for Biba and MLS. Sponsored by: Google Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Approved by: re (kib)
2011-09-02 17:40:39 +00:00
.mpo_posixshm_check_create = test_posixshm_check_create,
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
.mpo_posixshm_check_mmap = test_posixshm_check_mmap,
.mpo_posixshm_check_open = test_posixshm_check_open,
Implement read(2)/write(2) and neccessary lseek(2) for posix shmfd. Add MAC framework entries for posix shm read and write. Do not allow implicit extension of the underlying memory segment past the limit set by ftruncate(2) by either of the syscalls. Read and write returns short i/o, lseek(2) fails with EINVAL when resulting offset does not fit into the limit. Discussed with: alc Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-08-21 17:45:00 +00:00
.mpo_posixshm_check_read = test_posixshm_check_read,
Add the fo_chown and fo_chmod methods to struct fileops and use them to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod done on posix shared memory and (old) in-kernel posix semaphores. Based on the submission by: glebius Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re (bz)
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
.mpo_posixshm_check_setmode = test_posixshm_check_setmode,
.mpo_posixshm_check_setowner = test_posixshm_check_setowner,
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
.mpo_posixshm_check_stat = test_posixshm_check_stat,
.mpo_posixshm_check_truncate = test_posixshm_check_truncate,
.mpo_posixshm_check_unlink = test_posixshm_check_unlink,
Implement read(2)/write(2) and neccessary lseek(2) for posix shmfd. Add MAC framework entries for posix shm read and write. Do not allow implicit extension of the underlying memory segment past the limit set by ftruncate(2) by either of the syscalls. Read and write returns short i/o, lseek(2) fails with EINVAL when resulting offset does not fit into the limit. Discussed with: alc Tested by: pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-08-21 17:45:00 +00:00
.mpo_posixshm_check_write = test_posixshm_check_write,
Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it to implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
2008-01-08 21:58:16 +00:00
.mpo_posixshm_create = test_posixshm_create,
.mpo_posixshm_destroy_label = test_posixshm_destroy_label,
.mpo_posixshm_init_label = test_posixshm_init_label,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_proc_check_debug = test_proc_check_debug,
.mpo_proc_check_sched = test_proc_check_sched,
.mpo_proc_check_signal = test_proc_check_signal,
.mpo_proc_check_wait = test_proc_check_wait,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_proc_destroy_label = test_proc_destroy_label,
.mpo_proc_init_label = test_proc_init_label,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_socket_check_accept = test_socket_check_accept,
.mpo_socket_check_bind = test_socket_check_bind,
.mpo_socket_check_connect = test_socket_check_connect,
.mpo_socket_check_deliver = test_socket_check_deliver,
.mpo_socket_check_listen = test_socket_check_listen,
.mpo_socket_check_poll = test_socket_check_poll,
.mpo_socket_check_receive = test_socket_check_receive,
.mpo_socket_check_relabel = test_socket_check_relabel,
.mpo_socket_check_send = test_socket_check_send,
.mpo_socket_check_stat = test_socket_check_stat,
.mpo_socket_check_visible = test_socket_check_visible,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_socket_copy_label = test_socket_copy_label,
.mpo_socket_create = test_socket_create,
.mpo_socket_create_mbuf = test_socket_create_mbuf,
.mpo_socket_destroy_label = test_socket_destroy_label,
.mpo_socket_externalize_label = test_socket_externalize_label,
.mpo_socket_init_label = test_socket_init_label,
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
.mpo_socket_internalize_label = test_socket_internalize_label,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_socket_newconn = test_socket_newconn,
.mpo_socket_relabel = test_socket_relabel,
.mpo_socketpeer_destroy_label = test_socketpeer_destroy_label,
.mpo_socketpeer_externalize_label = test_socketpeer_externalize_label,
.mpo_socketpeer_init_label = test_socketpeer_init_label,
.mpo_socketpeer_set_from_mbuf = test_socketpeer_set_from_mbuf,
.mpo_socketpeer_set_from_socket = test_socketpeer_set_from_socket,
.mpo_syncache_create = test_syncache_create,
.mpo_syncache_create_mbuf = test_syncache_create_mbuf,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_system_check_acct = test_system_check_acct,
.mpo_system_check_audit = test_system_check_audit,
.mpo_system_check_auditctl = test_system_check_auditctl,
.mpo_system_check_auditon = test_system_check_auditon,
.mpo_system_check_reboot = test_system_check_reboot,
.mpo_system_check_swapoff = test_system_check_swapoff,
.mpo_system_check_swapon = test_system_check_swapon,
.mpo_system_check_sysctl = test_system_check_sysctl,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_vnode_check_access = test_vnode_check_access,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_sysvmsg_cleanup = test_sysvmsg_cleanup,
.mpo_sysvmsg_create = test_sysvmsg_create,
.mpo_sysvmsq_check_msgmsq = test_sysvmsq_check_msgmsq,
.mpo_sysvmsq_check_msgrcv = test_sysvmsq_check_msgrcv,
.mpo_sysvmsq_check_msgrmid = test_sysvmsq_check_msgrmid,
.mpo_sysvmsq_check_msqget = test_sysvmsq_check_msqget,
.mpo_sysvmsq_check_msqsnd = test_sysvmsq_check_msqsnd,
.mpo_sysvmsq_check_msqrcv = test_sysvmsq_check_msqrcv,
.mpo_sysvmsq_check_msqctl = test_sysvmsq_check_msqctl,
.mpo_sysvmsq_cleanup = test_sysvmsq_cleanup,
.mpo_sysvmsq_create = test_sysvmsq_create,
.mpo_sysvsem_check_semctl = test_sysvsem_check_semctl,
.mpo_sysvsem_check_semget = test_sysvsem_check_semget,
.mpo_sysvsem_check_semop = test_sysvsem_check_semop,
.mpo_sysvsem_cleanup = test_sysvsem_cleanup,
.mpo_sysvsem_create = test_sysvsem_create,
.mpo_sysvshm_check_shmat = test_sysvshm_check_shmat,
.mpo_sysvshm_check_shmctl = test_sysvshm_check_shmctl,
.mpo_sysvshm_check_shmdt = test_sysvshm_check_shmdt,
.mpo_sysvshm_check_shmget = test_sysvshm_check_shmget,
.mpo_sysvshm_cleanup = test_sysvshm_cleanup,
.mpo_sysvshm_create = test_sysvshm_create,
.mpo_thread_userret = test_thread_userret,
.mpo_vnode_associate_extattr = test_vnode_associate_extattr,
.mpo_vnode_associate_singlelabel = test_vnode_associate_singlelabel,
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
.mpo_vnode_check_chdir = test_vnode_check_chdir,
.mpo_vnode_check_chroot = test_vnode_check_chroot,
.mpo_vnode_check_create = test_vnode_check_create,
.mpo_vnode_check_deleteacl = test_vnode_check_deleteacl,
.mpo_vnode_check_deleteextattr = test_vnode_check_deleteextattr,
.mpo_vnode_check_exec = test_vnode_check_exec,
.mpo_vnode_check_getacl = test_vnode_check_getacl,
.mpo_vnode_check_getextattr = test_vnode_check_getextattr,
.mpo_vnode_check_link = test_vnode_check_link,
.mpo_vnode_check_listextattr = test_vnode_check_listextattr,
.mpo_vnode_check_lookup = test_vnode_check_lookup,
.mpo_vnode_check_mmap = test_vnode_check_mmap,
.mpo_vnode_check_open = test_vnode_check_open,
.mpo_vnode_check_poll = test_vnode_check_poll,
.mpo_vnode_check_read = test_vnode_check_read,
.mpo_vnode_check_readdir = test_vnode_check_readdir,
.mpo_vnode_check_readlink = test_vnode_check_readlink,
.mpo_vnode_check_relabel = test_vnode_check_relabel,
.mpo_vnode_check_rename_from = test_vnode_check_rename_from,
.mpo_vnode_check_rename_to = test_vnode_check_rename_to,
.mpo_vnode_check_revoke = test_vnode_check_revoke,
.mpo_vnode_check_setacl = test_vnode_check_setacl,
.mpo_vnode_check_setextattr = test_vnode_check_setextattr,
.mpo_vnode_check_setflags = test_vnode_check_setflags,
.mpo_vnode_check_setmode = test_vnode_check_setmode,
.mpo_vnode_check_setowner = test_vnode_check_setowner,
.mpo_vnode_check_setutimes = test_vnode_check_setutimes,
.mpo_vnode_check_stat = test_vnode_check_stat,
.mpo_vnode_check_unlink = test_vnode_check_unlink,
.mpo_vnode_check_write = test_vnode_check_write,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_vnode_copy_label = test_vnode_copy_label,
.mpo_vnode_create_extattr = test_vnode_create_extattr,
.mpo_vnode_destroy_label = test_vnode_destroy_label,
.mpo_vnode_execve_transition = test_vnode_execve_transition,
.mpo_vnode_execve_will_transition = test_vnode_execve_will_transition,
.mpo_vnode_externalize_label = test_vnode_externalize_label,
.mpo_vnode_init_label = test_vnode_init_label,
Implement per-object type consistency checks for labels passed to 'internalize' operations rather than using a single common check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-30 00:01:28 +00:00
.mpo_vnode_internalize_label = test_vnode_internalize_label,
Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework itself. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
.mpo_vnode_relabel = test_vnode_relabel,
.mpo_vnode_setlabel_extattr = test_vnode_setlabel_extattr,
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
};
Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code a bit easier to read. When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making the code a little easier to read. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
MAC_POLICY_SET(&test_ops, mac_test, "TrustedBSD MAC/Test",
Rather than having MAC policies explicitly declare what object types they label, derive that information implicitly from the set of label initializers in their policy operations set. This avoids a possible class of programmer errors, while retaining the structure that allows us to avoid allocating labels for objects that don't need them. As before, we regenerate a global mask of labeled objects each time a policy is loaded or unloaded, stored in mac_labeled. Discussed with: csjp Suggested by: Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple.com> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
2009-01-10 10:58:41 +00:00
MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, &test_slot);
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