Assorted mdoc(7) fixes.

This commit is contained in:
Ruslan Ermilov 2003-06-01 21:52:59 +00:00
parent d7ea49283c
commit 3cc3bf5282
11 changed files with 312 additions and 194 deletions

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@ -29,7 +29,8 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd JANUARY 8, 2003 .\"
.Dd January 8, 2003
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC 4 .Dt MAC 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
@ -44,7 +45,8 @@ finely control system security by providing for a loadable security policy
architecture. architecture.
It is important to note that due to its nature, MAC security policies may It is important to note that due to its nature, MAC security policies may
only restrict access relative to one another and the base system policy; only restrict access relative to one another and the base system policy;
they cannot override traditional UNIX they cannot override traditional
.Ux
security provisions such as file permissions and superuser checks. security provisions such as file permissions and superuser checks.
.Pp .Pp
Currently, the following MAC policy modules are shipped with Currently, the following MAC policy modules are shipped with
@ -95,10 +97,10 @@ To set the
flag, drop to single-user mode and unmount the file system, flag, drop to single-user mode and unmount the file system,
then execute the following command: then execute the following command:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl "tunefs -l enable" Sy filesystem .Dl "tunefs -l enable" Ar filesystem
.Pp .Pp
where where
.Sy filesystem .Ar filesystem
is either the mount point is either the mount point
(in (in
.Xr fstab 5 ) .Xr fstab 5 )
@ -113,7 +115,7 @@ policies
.Sx "Runtime Configuration" ) . .Sx "Runtime Configuration" ) .
Policy enforcement is divided into the following areas of the system: Policy enforcement is divided into the following areas of the system:
.Bl -ohang .Bl -ohang
.It Sy File System .It Sy "File System"
File system mounts, modifying directories, modifying files, etc. File system mounts, modifying directories, modifying files, etc.
.It Sy KLD .It Sy KLD
Loading, unloading, and retrieving statistics on loaded kernel modules Loading, unloading, and retrieving statistics on loaded kernel modules
@ -130,38 +132,32 @@ Creation of and operation on
objects objects
.It Sy Processes .It Sy Processes
Debugging Debugging
(e.g. (e.g.\&
.Xr ktrace 2 ) , .Xr ktrace 2 ) ,
process visibility process visibility
.Xr ( ps 1 ) , .Pq Xr ps 1 ,
process execution process execution
.Xr ( execve 2 ) , .Pq Xr execve 2 ,
signalling signalling
.Xr ( kill 2 ) .Pq Xr kill 2
.It Sy Sockets .It Sy Sockets
Creation of and operation on Creation of and operation on
.Xr socket 2 .Xr socket 2
objects objects
.It Sy System .It Sy System
Kernel environment Kernel environment
.Xr ( kenv 1 ) , .Pq Xr kenv 1 ,
system accounting system accounting
.Xr ( acct 2 ) , .Pq Xr acct 2 ,
.Xr reboot 2 , .Xr reboot 2 ,
.Xr settimeofday 2 , .Xr settimeofday 2 ,
.Xr swapon 2 , .Xr swapon 2 ,
.Xr sysctl 3 , .Xr sysctl 3 ,
.Sm off .Xr nfsd 8 Ns
.Xr nfsd 8 - -related operations
related
.Sm on
operations
.It Sy VM .It Sy VM
.Sm off .Xr mmap 2 Ns
.Xr mmap 2 - -ed files
ed
.Sm on
files
.El .El
.Ss Setting MAC Labels .Ss Setting MAC Labels
From the command line, each type of system object has its own means for setting From the command line, each type of system object has its own means for setting
@ -195,51 +191,50 @@ man page.
The following The following
.Xr sysctl 8 .Xr sysctl 8
MIBs are available for fine-tuning the enforcement of MAC policies. MIBs are available for fine-tuning the enforcement of MAC policies.
Unless specifically noted, all MIBs default to Unless specifically noted, all MIBs default to 1
.Li 1
(that is, all areas are enforced by default): (that is, all areas are enforced by default):
.Bl -tag -width "security.mac.enforce_network" .Bl -tag -width ".Va security.mac.enforce_network"
.It Va security.mac.enforce_fs .It Va security.mac.enforce_fs
Enforce MAC policies for file system accesses Enforce MAC policies for file system accesses.
.It Va security.mac.enforce_kld .It Va security.mac.enforce_kld
Enforce MAC policies on Enforce MAC policies on
.Xr kld 4 .Xr kld 4 .
.It Va security.mac.enforce_network .It Va security.mac.enforce_network
Enforce MAC policies on network interfaces Enforce MAC policies on network interfaces.
.It Va security.mac.enforce_pipe .It Va security.mac.enforce_pipe
Enforce MAC policies on pipes Enforce MAC policies on pipes.
.It Va security.mac.enforce_process .It Va security.mac.enforce_process
Enforce MAC policies between system processes Enforce MAC policies between system processes
(e.g. (e.g.\&
.Xr ps 1 , .Xr ps 1 ,
.Xr ktrace 2 ) .Xr ktrace 2 ) .
.It Va security.mac.enforce_socket .It Va security.mac.enforce_socket
Enforce MAC policies on sockets Enforce MAC policies on sockets.
.It Va security.mac.enforce_system .It Va security.mac.enforce_system
Enforce MAC policies on system-related items Enforce MAC policies on system-related items
(e.g. (e.g.\&
.Xr kenv 1 , .Xr kenv 1 ,
.Xr acct 2 , .Xr acct 2 ,
.Xr reboot 2 ) .Xr reboot 2 ) .
.It Va security.mac.enforce_vm .It Va security.mac.enforce_vm
Enforce MAC policies on Enforce MAC policies on
.Xr mmap 2 .Xr mmap 2
and and
.Xr mprotect 2 .Xr mprotect 2 .
.\" *** XXX *** .\" *** XXX ***
.\" Support for this feature is poor and should not be encouraged. .\" Support for this feature is poor and should not be encouraged.
.\" .\"
.\" .It Va security.mac.mmap_revocation .\" .It Va security.mac.mmap_revocation
.\" Revoke .\" Revoke
.\" .Xr mmap 2 .\" .Xr mmap 2
.\" access to files on subject relabel .\" access to files on subject relabel.
.\" .It Va security.mac.mmap_revocation_via_cow .\" .It Va security.mac.mmap_revocation_via_cow
.\" Revoke .\" Revoke
.\" .Xr mmap 2 .\" .Xr mmap 2
.\" access to files via copy-on-write semantics; .\" access to files via copy-on-write semantics;
.\" mapped regions will still appear writable, but will no longer .\" mapped regions will still appear writable, but will no longer
.\" effect a change on the underlying vnode .\" effect a change on the underlying vnode.
.\" (Default: 0) .\" (Default: 0).
.El .El
.Sh SEE ALSO .Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr mac 3 , .Xr mac 3 ,
@ -253,36 +248,41 @@ and
.Xr mac_portacl 4 , .Xr mac_portacl 4 ,
.Xr mac_seeotheruids 4 , .Xr mac_seeotheruids 4 ,
.Xr mac_test 4 , .Xr mac_test 4 ,
.Xr login.5 , .Xr login.conf 5 ,
.Xr maclabel 7 , .Xr maclabel 7 ,
.Xr getfmac 8 , .Xr getfmac 8 ,
.Xr setfmac 8 ,
.Xr getpmac 8 , .Xr getpmac 8 ,
.Xr setfmac 8 ,
.Xr setpmac 8 , .Xr setpmac 8 ,
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
.Rs .Rs
.%B "The FreeBSD Handbook" .%B "The FreeBSD Handbook"
.%T "Mandatory Access Control" .%T "Mandatory Access Control"
.%O http://www.freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac.html .%O http://www.FreeBSD.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac.html
.Re .Re
.Sh HISTORY .Sh HISTORY
The The
.Nm .Nm
implementation first appeared in implementation first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs, Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
.Sh BUGS .Sh BUGS
See See
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
concerning appropriateness for production use. concerning appropriateness for production use.
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in The
.Tn TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in
.Fx . .Fx .
.Pp .Pp
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of

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@ -29,25 +29,32 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd NOVEMBER 18, 2002 .\"
.Dd November 18, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_BIBA 4 .Dt MAC_BIBA 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
.Nm mac_biba .Nm mac_biba
.Nd Biba data integrity policy .Nd "Biba data integrity policy"
.Sh SYNOPSIS .Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile Biba into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel To compile Biba into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file: configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_BIBA" .Cd "options MAC_BIBA"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the Biba module at boot time, place the following line Alternately, to load the Biba module at boot time, place the following line
in your kernel configuration file: in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf 5 : .Xr loader.conf 5 :
.Cd mac_biba_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_biba_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -66,28 +73,30 @@ components, numbered from 0 to 255.
A complete label consists of both hierarchal and non-hierarchal elements. A complete label consists of both hierarchal and non-hierarchal elements.
.Pp .Pp
Three special label values exist: Three special label values exist:
.Bl -column -offset indent "biba/equal" "lower than all other labels" .Bl -column -offset indent ".Li biba/equal" "lower than all other labels"
.It Sy Label Ta Sy Comparison .It Sy Label Ta Sy Comparison
.It Li biba/low Ta lower than all other labels .It Li biba/low Ta "lower than all other labels"
.It Li biba/equal Ta equal to all other labels .It Li biba/equal Ta "equal to all other labels"
.It Li biba/high Ta higher than all other labels .It Li biba/high Ta "higher than all other labels"
.El .El
.Pp .Pp
The The
.Dq biba/high .Dq Li biba/high
label is assigned to system objects which affect the integrity of the system label is assigned to system objects which affect the integrity of the system
as a whole. as a whole.
.Dq biba/equal The
.Dq Li biba/equal
label
may be used to indicate that a particular subject or object is exempt from may be used to indicate that a particular subject or object is exempt from
the Biba protections. the Biba protections.
These special label values are not specified as containing any compartments, These special label values are not specified as containing any compartments,
although in a label comparison, although in a label comparison,
.Dq biba/high .Dq Li biba/high
appears to contain all compartments, appears to contain all compartments,
.Dq biba/equal .Dq Li biba/equal
the same compartments as the other label to which it is being compared, the same compartments as the other label to which it is being compared,
and and
.Dq biba/low .Dq Li biba/low
none. none.
.Pp .Pp
In general, Biba access control takes the following model: In general, Biba access control takes the following model:
@ -137,7 +146,9 @@ reflecting the integrity of the object, or integrity of the data contained
in the object. in the object.
In general, objects labels are represented in the following form: In general, objects labels are represented in the following form:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl biba/grade:compartments .Sm off
.D1 Li biba / Ar grade : compartments
.Sm on
.Pp .Pp
For example: For example:
.Pp .Pp
@ -154,8 +165,10 @@ greater or equal integrity to the low end of the range, and lesser or equal
integrity to the high end of the range. integrity to the high end of the range.
In general, subject labels are represented in the following form: In general, subject labels are represented in the following form:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl biba/singlegrade:singlecompartments(lograde:locompartments- .Sm off
.Dl higrade:hicompartments) .D1 Li biba / Ar singlegrade : singlecompartments ( lograde : locompartments -
.D1 Ar higrade : hicompartments )
.Sm on
.Pp .Pp
For example: For example:
.Bd -literal -offset indent .Bd -literal -offset indent
@ -166,7 +179,7 @@ biba/high(low-high)
Valid ranged labels must meet the following requirement regarding their Valid ranged labels must meet the following requirement regarding their
elements: elements:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl rangehigh >= single >= rangelow .D1 Ar rangehigh No \[>=] Ar single No \[>=] Ar rangelow
.Pp .Pp
One class of objects with ranges currently exists, the network interface. One class of objects with ranges currently exists, the network interface.
In the case of the network interface, the single label element references the In the case of the network interface, the single label element references the
@ -177,23 +190,20 @@ the interface.
The following The following
.Xr sysctl 8 .Xr sysctl 8
MIBs are available for fine-tuning the enforcement of this MAC policy. MIBs are available for fine-tuning the enforcement of this MAC policy.
.Bl -tag -width 'security.mac.biba.ptys_equal' .Bl -tag -width ".Va security.mac.biba.ptys_equal"
.It Va security.mac.biba.enabled .It Va security.mac.biba.enabled
Enables enforcement of the Biba integrity policy Enables enforcement of the Biba integrity policy.
(Default: 1) (Default: 1).
.It Va security.mac.biba.ptys_equal .It Va security.mac.biba.ptys_equal
Label Label
.Sm off .Xr pty 4 Ns s
.Xr pty 4
s
.Sm on
as as
.Dq biba/equal .Dq Li biba/equal
upon creation upon creation.
(Default: 0) (Default: 0).
.It Va security.mac.biba.revocation_enabled .It Va security.mac.biba.revocation_enabled
Revoke access to objects if the label is changed to dominate the subject Revoke access to objects if the label is changed to dominate the subject.
(Default: 0) (Default: 0).
.El .El
.Sh SEE ALSO .Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr lomac 4 , .Xr lomac 4 ,
@ -214,11 +224,14 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs, Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

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@ -29,25 +29,32 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd OCTOBER 16, 2002 .\"
.Dd October 16, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_BSDEXTENDED 4 .Dt MAC_BSDEXTENDED 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
.Nm mac_bsdextended .Nm mac_bsdextended
.Nd file system firewall policy .Nd "file system firewall policy"
.Sh SYNOPSIS .Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile the file system firewall policy into your kernel, To compile the file system firewall policy into your kernel,
place the following lines in your kernel configuration file: place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_BSDEXTENDED" .Cd "options MAC_BSDEXTENDED"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the file system firewall policy module at boot time, Alternately, to load the file system firewall policy module at boot time,
place the following line in your kernel configuration file: place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf 5 : .Xr loader.conf 5 :
.Cd mac_bsdextended_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_bsdextended_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -91,10 +98,13 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Project by NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

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@ -29,26 +29,33 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd DECEMBER 10, 2002 .\"
.Dd December 10, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_IFOFF 4 .Dt MAC_IFOFF 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
.Nm mac_ifoff .Nm mac_ifoff
.Nd interface silencing policy .Nd "interface silencing policy"
.Sh SYNOPSIS .Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile the interface silencing policy into your kernel, To compile the interface silencing policy into your kernel,
place the following lines in your kernel place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file: configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_IFOFF" .Cd "options MAC_IFOFF"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the interface silencing policy module at boot time, Alternately, to load the interface silencing policy module at boot time,
place the following line in your kernel configuration file: place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf 5 : .Xr loader.conf 5 :
.Cd mac_ifoff_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_ifoff_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -59,25 +66,19 @@ via the
interface. interface.
.Pp .Pp
To disable network traffic over the loopback To disable network traffic over the loopback
.Xr ( lo 4 ) .Pq Xr lo 4
interface, set the interface, set the
.Xr sysctl 8 .Xr sysctl 8
OID OID
.Va security.mac.ifoff.lo_enabled .Va security.mac.ifoff.lo_enabled
to to 0 (default 1).
.Li 0
(default
.Li 1 ) .
.Pp .Pp
To enable network traffic over other interfaces, To enable network traffic over other interfaces,
set the set the
.Xr sysctl 8 .Xr sysctl 8
OID OID
.Va security.mac.ifoff.other_enabled .Va security.mac.ifoff.other_enabled
to to 1 (default 0).
.Li 1
(default
.Li 0 ) .
.Pp .Pp
To allow BPF traffic to be received, To allow BPF traffic to be received,
even while other traffic is disabled, even while other traffic is disabled,
@ -85,10 +86,7 @@ set the
.Xr sysctl 8 .Xr sysctl 8
OID OID
.Va security.mac.ifoff.bpfrecv_enabled .Va security.mac.ifoff.bpfrecv_enabled
to to 1 (default 0).
.Li 1
(default
.Li 0 ) .
.Ss Label Format .Ss Label Format
No labels are defined. No labels are defined.
.Sh SEE ALSO .Sh SEE ALSO
@ -108,19 +106,24 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs, Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
.Sh BUGS .Sh BUGS
See See
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
concerning appropriateness for production use. concerning appropriateness for production use.
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in The
.Tn TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in
.Fx . .Fx .
.Pp .Pp
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of

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@ -29,25 +29,32 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd December 11, 2002 .Dd December 11, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_LOMAC 4 .Dt MAC_LOMAC 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
.Nm mac_lomac .Nm mac_lomac
.Nd Low-watermark Mandatory Access Control data integrity policy .Nd "Low-watermark Mandatory Access Control data integrity policy"
.Sh SYNOPSIS .Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile LOMAC into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel To compile LOMAC into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file: configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_LOMAC" .Cd "options MAC_LOMAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the LOMAC module at boot time, place the following line Alternately, to load the LOMAC module at boot time, place the following line
in your kernel configuration file: in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf 5 : .Xr loader.conf 5 :
.Cd mac_lomac_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_lomac_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -68,20 +75,22 @@ with higher values reflecting higher integrity.
Three special label component values exist: Three special label component values exist:
.Bl -column -offset indent ".Sy Label" "dominated by all other labels" .Bl -column -offset indent ".Sy Label" "dominated by all other labels"
.It Sy Label Ta Sy Comparison .It Sy Label Ta Sy Comparison
.It Li low Ta dominated by all other labels .It Li low Ta "dominated by all other labels"
.It Li equal Ta equal to all other labels .It Li equal Ta "equal to all other labels"
.It Li high Ta dominates all other labels .It Li high Ta "dominates all other labels"
.El .El
.Pp .Pp
The The
.Dq high .Dq Li high
label is assigned to system objects which affect the integrity of the system label is assigned to system objects which affect the integrity of the system
as a whole. as a whole.
.Dq equal The
.Dq Li equal
label
may be used to indicate that a particular subject or object is exempt from may be used to indicate that a particular subject or object is exempt from
the LOMAC protections. the LOMAC protections.
For example, a label of For example, a label of
.Dq lomac/equal(equal-equal) .Dq Li lomac/equal(equal-equal)
might be used on a subject which is to be used to administratively relabel might be used on a subject which is to be used to administratively relabel
anything on the system. anything on the system.
.Pp .Pp
@ -94,7 +103,9 @@ directory or the alternate label assumed by the subject upon execution of
an executable. an executable.
In general, objects labels are represented in the following form: In general, objects labels are represented in the following form:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl lomac/ Ns Sy grade Ns [ Sy auxgrade ] .Sm off
.D1 Li lomac / Ar grade Bq Ar auxgrade
.Sm on
.Pp .Pp
For example: For example:
.Pp .Pp
@ -111,21 +122,29 @@ greater or equal integrity to the low end of the range, and lesser or equal
integrity to the high end of the range. integrity to the high end of the range.
In general, subject labels are represented in the following form: In general, subject labels are represented in the following form:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl lomac/ Ns Sy singlegrade Ns ( Sy lograde Ns - Ns Sy higrade ) .Sm off
.D1 Li lomac / Ar singlegrade ( lograde No - Ar higrade )
.Sm on
.Pp .Pp
Modification of objects is restricted to access via the following comparison: Modification of objects is restricted to access via the following comparison:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl subject::higrade >= target-object::grade .D1 Ar subject Ns :: Ns Ar higrade No \[>=] Ar target-object Ns :: Ns Ar grade
.Pp .Pp
Modification of subjects is the same, as the target subject's single grade Modification of subjects is the same, as the target subject's single grade
is the only element taken into comparison. is the only element taken into comparison.
.Pp .Pp
Demotion of a subject occurs when the following comparison is true: Demotion of a subject occurs when the following comparison is true:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl subject::singlegrade > object::grade .D1 Ar subject Ns :: Ns Ar singlegrade No > Ar object Ns :: Ns Ar grade
.Pp .Pp
When demotion occurs, the subject's singlegrade and higrade are reduced to the When demotion occurs, the subject's
object's grade, as well as the lograde if necessary. .Ar singlegrade
and
.Ar higrade
are reduced to the
object's grade, as well as the
.Ar lograde
if necessary.
When the demotion occurs, in addition to the permission of the subject being When the demotion occurs, in addition to the permission of the subject being
reduced, shared reduced, shared
.Xr mmap 2 .Xr mmap 2
@ -133,7 +152,8 @@ objects which it has opened in its memory space may be revoked according to
the following the following
.Xr sysctl 2 .Xr sysctl 2
variables: variables:
.Bl -bullet .Pp
.Bl -bullet -compact
.It .It
.Va security.mac.lomac.revocation_enabled .Va security.mac.lomac.revocation_enabled
.It .It
@ -146,7 +166,7 @@ variables:
.Pp .Pp
Upon execution of a file, if the executable has an auxiliary label, and that Upon execution of a file, if the executable has an auxiliary label, and that
label is within the current range of label is within the current range of
.Sy lograde-higrade , .Ar lograde Ns - Ns Ar higrade ,
it will be assumed by the subject immediately. it will be assumed by the subject immediately.
After this, demotion is performed just as with any other read operation, with After this, demotion is performed just as with any other read operation, with
the executable as the target. the executable as the target.
@ -188,11 +208,14 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs, Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

View File

@ -29,25 +29,32 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd DECEMBER 1, 2002 .\"
.Dd December 1, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_MLS 4 .Dt MAC_MLS 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
.Nm mac_mls .Nm mac_mls
.Nd Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy .Nd "Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy"
.Sh SYNOPSIS .Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile MLS into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel To compile MLS into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file: configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_MLS" .Cd "options MAC_MLS"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the MLS module at boot time, place the following line Alternately, to load the MLS module at boot time, place the following line
in your kernel configuration file: in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf 5 : .Xr loader.conf 5 :
.Cd mac_mls_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_mls_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -74,26 +81,26 @@ With normal labels, dominance is defined as a label having a higher
or equal active sensitivity level, and having at least or equal active sensitivity level, and having at least
all of the same compartments as the label to which it is being compared. all of the same compartments as the label to which it is being compared.
With respect to label comparisons, With respect to label comparisons,
.Dq lower .Dq Li lower
is defined as being dominated by the label to which it is being compared, is defined as being dominated by the label to which it is being compared,
and and
.Dq higher .Dq Li higher
is defined as dominating the label to which it is being compared, is defined as dominating the label to which it is being compared,
and and
.Dq equal .Dq Li equal
is defined as both labels being able to satisfy the dominance requirements is defined as both labels being able to satisfy the dominance requirements
over one another. over one another.
.Pp .Pp
Three special label values exist: Three special label values exist:
.Bl -column -offset indent "mls/equal" "dominated by all other labels" .Bl -column -offset indent ".Li mls/equal" "dominated by all other labels"
.It Sy Label Ta Sy Comparison .It Sy Label Ta Sy Comparison
.It Li mls/low Ta dominated by all other labels .It Li mls/low Ta "dominated by all other labels"
.It Li mls/equal Ta equal to all other labels .It Li mls/equal Ta "equal to all other labels"
.It Li mls/high Ta dominates all other labels .It Li mls/high Ta "dominates all other labels"
.El .El
.Pp .Pp
The The
.Dq mls/equal .Dq Li mls/equal
label may be applied to subjects and objects for which no enforcement of the label may be applied to subjects and objects for which no enforcement of the
MLS security policy is desired. MLS security policy is desired.
.Pp .Pp
@ -132,10 +139,11 @@ reflecting the classification of the object, or classification of the data
contained in the object. contained in the object.
In general, object labels are represented in the following form: In general, object labels are represented in the following form:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl mls/grade:compartments .Sm off
.D1 Li mls / Ar grade : compartments
.Sm on
.Pp .Pp
For example: For example:
.Pp
.Bd -literal -offset indent .Bd -literal -offset indent
mls/10:2+3+6 mls/10:2+3+6
mls/low mls/low
@ -149,8 +157,10 @@ greater or equal integrity to the low end of the range, and lesser or equal
integrity to the high end of the range. integrity to the high end of the range.
In general, subject labels are represented in the following form: In general, subject labels are represented in the following form:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl mls/singlegrade:singlecompartments(lograde:locompartments- .Sm off
.Dl higrade:hicompartments) .D1 Li mls / Ar singlegrade : singlecompartments ( lograde : locompartments No -
.D1 Ar higrade : hicompartments )
.Sm on
.Pp .Pp
For example: For example:
.Bd -literal -offset indent .Bd -literal -offset indent
@ -161,7 +171,7 @@ mls/high(low-high)
Valid ranged labels must meet the following requirement regarding their Valid ranged labels must meet the following requirement regarding their
elements: elements:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl rangehigh >= single >= rangelow .D1 Ar rangehigh No \[>=] Ar single No \[>=] Ar rangelow
.Pp .Pp
One class of objects with ranges currently exists, the network interface. One class of objects with ranges currently exists, the network interface.
In the case of the network interface, the single label element references In the case of the network interface, the single label element references
@ -172,30 +182,27 @@ the interface.
The following The following
.Xr sysctl 8 .Xr sysctl 8
MIBs are available for fine-tuning the enforcement of this MAC policy. MIBs are available for fine-tuning the enforcement of this MAC policy.
.Bl -tag -width security.mac.mls.enabled .Bl -tag -width ".Va security.mac.mls.ptys_equal"
.It Va security.mac.mls.enabled .It Va security.mac.mls.enabled
Enables the enforcement of the MLS confidentiality policy Enables the enforcement of the MLS confidentiality policy.
(Default: 1) (Default: 1).
.It Va security.mac.mls.ptys_equal .It Va security.mac.mls.ptys_equal
Label Label
.Sm off .Xr pty 4 Ns s
.Xr pty 4
s
.Sm on
as as
.Dq mls/equal .Dq Li mls/equal
upon creation upon creation.
(Default: 0) (Default: 0).
.It Va security.mac.mls.revocation_enabled .It Va security.mac.mls.revocation_enabled
Revoke access to objects if the label is changed to a more sensitive Revoke access to objects if the label is changed to a more sensitive
level than the subject level than the subject.
(Default: 0) (Default: 0).
.El .El
.Sh IMPLEMENTATION NOTES .Sh IMPLEMENTATION NOTES
Currently, the Currently, the
.Nm .Nm
policy relies on superuser status policy relies on superuser status
.Xr ( suser 9 ) .Pq Xr suser 9
in order to change network interface MLS labels. in order to change network interface MLS labels.
This will eventually go away, but it is currently a liability and may This will eventually go away, but it is currently a liability and may
allow the superuser to bypass MLS protections. allow the superuser to bypass MLS protections.
@ -218,19 +225,24 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Laboratories, Project by Network Associates Laboratories,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
.Sh BUGS .Sh BUGS
See See
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
concerning appropriateness for production use. concerning appropriateness for production use.
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in The
.Tn TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in
.Fx . .Fx .
.Pp .Pp
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of

View File

@ -29,26 +29,33 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd DECEMBER 1, 2002 .\"
.Dd December 1, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_NONE 4 .Dt MAC_NONE 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
.Nm mac_none .Nm mac_none
.Nd sample MAC policy module .Nd "sample MAC policy module"
.Sh SYNOPSIS .Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile the sample policy To compile the sample policy
into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file: configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_NONE" .Cd "options MAC_NONE"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the sample module at boot time, place the following line Alternately, to load the sample module at boot time, place the following line
in your kernel configuration file: in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf 5 : .Xr loader.conf 5 :
.Cd mac_none_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_none_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -76,19 +83,24 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs, Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
.Sh BUGS .Sh BUGS
See See
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
concerning appropriateness for production use. concerning appropriateness for production use.
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in The
.Tn TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in
.Fx . .Fx .
.Pp .Pp
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of

View File

@ -29,26 +29,33 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd DECEMBER 9, 2002 .\"
.Dd December 9, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_PARTITION 4 .Dt MAC_PARTITION 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
.Nm mac_partition .Nm mac_partition
.Nd process partition policy .Nd "process partition policy"
.Sh SYNOPSIS .Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, To compile the process partition policy into your kernel,
place the following lines in your kernel place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file: configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_PARTITION" .Cd "options MAC_PARTITION"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time,
place the following line in your kernel configuration file: place the following line in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf 5 : .Xr loader.conf 5 :
.Cd mac_partition_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_partition_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -62,18 +69,19 @@ same partition.
If no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes If no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes
in the system in the system
(subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page). (subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page).
No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions is available. No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions are available.
.Ss Label Format .Ss Label Format
Partition labels take on the following format: Partition labels take on the following format:
.Pp .Pp
.Dl partition/ Ns Sy value .Sm off
.Dl Li partition / Ar value
.Sm on
.Pp .Pp
Where Where
.Sy value .Ar value
can be any integer value or can be any integer value or
.Dq none . .Dq Li none .
For example: For example:
.Pp
.Bd -literal -offset indent .Bd -literal -offset indent
partition/1 partition/1
partition/20 partition/20
@ -98,19 +106,24 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs, Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
.Sh BUGS .Sh BUGS
See See
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
concerning appropriateness for production use. concerning appropriateness for production use.
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in The
.Tn TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in
.Fx . .Fx .
.Pp .Pp
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of

View File

@ -29,26 +29,33 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd DECEMBER 8, 2002 .\"
.Dd December 8, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS 4 .Dt MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
.Nm mac_seeotheruids .Nm mac_seeotheruids
.Nd simple policy controlling whether users see other users .Nd "simple policy controlling whether users see other users"
.Sh SYNOPSIS .Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile the mac_seeotheruids To compile the
policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file: configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS" .Cd "options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line
in your kernel configuration file: in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf.5 : .Xr loader.conf.5 :
.Cd mac_seeotheruids_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -59,23 +66,19 @@ To enable
.Nm , .Nm ,
set the sysctl OID set the sysctl OID
.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled .Va security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled
to to 1.
.Li 1 .
.Pp .Pp
To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group, To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group,
set the sysctl OID set the sysctl OID
.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled .Va security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled
to to 1.
.Li 1 .
.Pp .Pp
To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy, To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy,
set the sysctl OID set the sysctl OID
.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled .Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled
to to 1, and
.Li 1 ,
and
.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid .Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid
to the gid to be exempted. to the group ID to be exempted.
.Ss Label Format .Ss Label Format
No labels are defined for No labels are defined for
.Nm . .Nm .
@ -86,9 +89,9 @@ No labels are defined for
.Xr mac_ifoff 4 , .Xr mac_ifoff 4 ,
.Xr mac_lomac 4 , .Xr mac_lomac 4 ,
.Xr mac_mls 4 , .Xr mac_mls 4 ,
.Xr mac_none 4 ,
.Xr mac_partition 4 , .Xr mac_partition 4 ,
.Xr mac_portacl 4 , .Xr mac_portacl 4 ,
.Xr mac_none 4 ,
.Xr mac_test 4 , .Xr mac_test 4 ,
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
.Sh HISTORY .Sh HISTORY
@ -96,19 +99,24 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs, Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
.Sh BUGS .Sh BUGS
See See
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
concerning appropriateness for production use. concerning appropriateness for production use.
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in The
.Tn TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in
.Fx . .Fx .
.Pp .Pp
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of

View File

@ -29,26 +29,33 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd DECEMBER 1, 2002 .\"
.Dd December 1, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_NONE 4 .Dt MAC_NONE 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
.Nm mac_none .Nm mac_none
.Nd sample MAC policy module .Nd "sample MAC policy module"
.Sh SYNOPSIS .Sh SYNOPSIS
To compile the sample policy To compile the sample policy
into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file: configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_NONE" .Cd "options MAC_NONE"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the sample module at boot time, place the following line Alternately, to load the sample module at boot time, place the following line
in your kernel configuration file: in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf 5 : .Xr loader.conf 5 :
.Cd mac_none_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_none_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -76,19 +83,24 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs, Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
.Sh BUGS .Sh BUGS
See See
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
concerning appropriateness for production use. concerning appropriateness for production use.
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in The
.Tn TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in
.Fx . .Fx .
.Pp .Pp
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of

View File

@ -29,7 +29,8 @@
.\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\" .\"
.\" $FreeBSD$ .\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd DECEMBER 1, 2002 .\"
.Dd December 1, 2002
.Os .Os
.Dt MAC_TEST 4 .Dt MAC_TEST 4
.Sh NAME .Sh NAME
@ -39,16 +40,22 @@
To compile the testing policy To compile the testing policy
into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
configuration file: configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Cd "options MAC_TEST" .Cd "options MAC_TEST"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
Alternately, to load the testing module at boot time, place the following line Alternately, to load the testing module at boot time, place the following line
in your kernel configuration file: in your kernel configuration file:
.Bd -ragged -offset indent
.Cd "options MAC" .Cd "options MAC"
.Ed
.Pp .Pp
and in and in
.Xr loader.conf.5 : .Xr loader.conf.5 :
.Cd mac_test_load= Ns \&"YES" .Bd -literal -offset indent
mac_test_load="YES"
.Ed
.Sh DESCRIPTION .Sh DESCRIPTION
The The
.Nm .Nm
@ -82,19 +89,24 @@ The
.Nm .Nm
policy module first appeared in policy module first appeared in
.Fx 5.0 .Fx 5.0
and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. and was developed by the
.Tn TrustedBSD
Project.
.Sh AUTHORS .Sh AUTHORS
This software was contributed to the This software was contributed to the
.Fx .Fx
Project by Network Associates Labs, Project by Network Associates Labs,
the Security Research Division of Network Associates the Security Research Division of Network Associates
Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
.Sh BUGS .Sh BUGS
See See
.Xr mac 9 .Xr mac 9
concerning appropriateness for production use. concerning appropriateness for production use.
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in The
.Tn TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in
.Fx . .Fx .
.Pp .Pp
While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of