diff --git a/sys/amd64/amd64/machdep.c b/sys/amd64/amd64/machdep.c
index 2b2e47f00544..6c39e1cf53ea 100644
--- a/sys/amd64/amd64/machdep.c
+++ b/sys/amd64/amd64/machdep.c
@@ -486,17 +486,7 @@ sys_sigreturn(td, uap)
 	/*
 	 * Don't allow users to change privileged or reserved flags.
 	 */
-	/*
-	 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.
-	 * The cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_rflags for faults.  Debuggers
-	 * should sometimes set it there too.  tf_rflags is kept in
-	 * the signal context during signal handling and there is no
-	 * other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be
-	 * corrupted by the signal handler without us knowing.
-	 * Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
-	 * one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
-	 */
-	if (!EFL_SECURE(rflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_rflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+	if (!EFL_SECURE(rflags, regs->tf_rflags)) {
 		uprintf("pid %d (%s): sigreturn rflags = 0x%lx\n", p->p_pid,
 		    td->td_name, rflags);
 		return (EINVAL);
diff --git a/sys/amd64/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/sys/amd64/ia32/ia32_signal.c
index cff57f6243f6..75a0511480a2 100644
--- a/sys/amd64/ia32/ia32_signal.c
+++ b/sys/amd64/ia32/ia32_signal.c
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ ofreebsd32_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct ofreebsd32_sigreturn_args *uap)
 		return (error);
 	scp = ≻
 	eflags = scp->sc_eflags;
-	if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_rflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+	if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags)) {
 		return (EINVAL);
 	}
 	if (!CS_SECURE(scp->sc_cs)) {
@@ -787,17 +787,7 @@ freebsd4_freebsd32_sigreturn(td, uap)
 	/*
 	 * Don't allow users to change privileged or reserved flags.
 	 */
-	/*
-	 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.
-	 * The cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers
-	 * should sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in
-	 * the signal context during signal handling and there is no
-	 * other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be
-	 * corrupted by the signal handler without us knowing.
-	 * Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
-	 * one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
-	 */
-	if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_rflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+	if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags)) {
 		uprintf("pid %d (%s): freebsd4_freebsd32_sigreturn eflags = 0x%x\n",
 		    td->td_proc->p_pid, td->td_name, eflags);
 		return (EINVAL);
@@ -873,17 +863,7 @@ freebsd32_sigreturn(td, uap)
 	/*
 	 * Don't allow users to change privileged or reserved flags.
 	 */
-	/*
-	 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.
-	 * The cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers
-	 * should sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in
-	 * the signal context during signal handling and there is no
-	 * other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be
-	 * corrupted by the signal handler without us knowing.
-	 * Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
-	 * one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
-	 */
-	if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_rflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+	if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags)) {
 		uprintf("pid %d (%s): freebsd32_sigreturn eflags = 0x%x\n",
 		    td->td_proc->p_pid, td->td_name, eflags);
 		return (EINVAL);
diff --git a/sys/amd64/linux32/linux32_sysvec.c b/sys/amd64/linux32/linux32_sysvec.c
index c4b66deb1a36..c06ce1198f86 100644
--- a/sys/amd64/linux32/linux32_sysvec.c
+++ b/sys/amd64/linux32/linux32_sysvec.c
@@ -587,17 +587,7 @@ linux_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_sigreturn_args *args)
 	 */
 #define	EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef)	((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
 	eflags = frame.sf_sc.sc_eflags;
-	/*
-	 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.  The
-	 * cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers should
-	 * sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in the signal
-	 * context during signal handling and there is no other place
-	 * to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be corrupted by the
-	 * signal handler without us knowing.  Corruption of the PSL_RF
-	 * bit at worst causes one more or one less debugger trap, so
-	 * allowing it is fairly harmless.
-	 */
-	if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_rflags & ~PSL_RF))
+	if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags))
 		return(EINVAL);
 
 	/*
@@ -689,17 +679,7 @@ linux_rt_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_rt_sigreturn_args *args)
 	 */
 #define	EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef)	((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
 	eflags = context->sc_eflags;
-	/*
-	 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.  The
-	 * cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers should
-	 * sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in the signal
-	 * context during signal handling and there is no other place
-	 * to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be corrupted by the
-	 * signal handler without us knowing.  Corruption of the PSL_RF
-	 * bit at worst causes one more or one less debugger trap, so
-	 * allowing it is fairly harmless.
-	 */
-	if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_rflags & ~PSL_RF))
+	if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags))
 		return(EINVAL);
 
 	/*
diff --git a/sys/i386/i386/machdep.c b/sys/i386/i386/machdep.c
index ad1f0fe8f183..ca15f2770f8c 100644
--- a/sys/i386/i386/machdep.c
+++ b/sys/i386/i386/machdep.c
@@ -842,17 +842,7 @@ osigreturn(td, uap)
 		/*
 		 * Don't allow users to change privileged or reserved flags.
 		 */
-		/*
-		 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.
-		 * The cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers
-		 * should sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in
-		 * the signal context during signal handling and there is no
-		 * other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be
-		 * corrupted by the signal handler without us knowing.
-		 * Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
-		 * one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
-		 */
-		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_eflags)) {
 	    		return (EINVAL);
 		}
 
@@ -968,17 +958,7 @@ freebsd4_sigreturn(td, uap)
 		/*
 		 * Don't allow users to change privileged or reserved flags.
 		 */
-		/*
-		 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.
-		 * The cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers
-		 * should sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in
-		 * the signal context during signal handling and there is no
-		 * other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be
-		 * corrupted by the signal handler without us knowing.
-		 * Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
-		 * one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
-		 */
-		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_eflags)) {
 			uprintf("pid %d (%s): freebsd4_sigreturn eflags = 0x%x\n",
 			    td->td_proc->p_pid, td->td_name, eflags);
 	    		return (EINVAL);
@@ -1082,17 +1062,7 @@ sys_sigreturn(td, uap)
 		/*
 		 * Don't allow users to change privileged or reserved flags.
 		 */
-		/*
-		 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.
-		 * The cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers
-		 * should sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in
-		 * the signal context during signal handling and there is no
-		 * other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be
-		 * corrupted by the signal handler without us knowing.
-		 * Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
-		 * one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
-		 */
-		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_eflags)) {
 			uprintf("pid %d (%s): sigreturn eflags = 0x%x\n",
 			    td->td_proc->p_pid, td->td_name, eflags);
 	    		return (EINVAL);
diff --git a/sys/i386/include/vm86.h b/sys/i386/include/vm86.h
index e33d72008f23..2253d5c504cd 100644
--- a/sys/i386/include/vm86.h
+++ b/sys/i386/include/vm86.h
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ struct vm86context {
 	} pmap[VM86_PMAPSIZE];
 };
 
-#define VM_USERCHANGE   (PSL_USERCHANGE | PSL_RF)
+#define VM_USERCHANGE   (PSL_USERCHANGE)
 #define VME_USERCHANGE  (VM_USERCHANGE | PSL_VIP | PSL_VIF)
 
 struct vm86_kernel {
diff --git a/sys/i386/linux/linux_sysvec.c b/sys/i386/linux/linux_sysvec.c
index 71417e056763..0ad67910e756 100644
--- a/sys/i386/linux/linux_sysvec.c
+++ b/sys/i386/linux/linux_sysvec.c
@@ -684,17 +684,7 @@ linux_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_sigreturn_args *args)
 	 */
 #define	EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef)	((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
 	eflags = frame.sf_sc.sc_eflags;
-	/*
-	 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.  The
-	 * cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers should
-	 * sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in the signal
-	 * context during signal handling and there is no other place
-	 * to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be corrupted by the
-	 * signal handler without us knowing.  Corruption of the PSL_RF
-	 * bit at worst causes one more or one less debugger trap, so
-	 * allowing it is fairly harmless.
-	 */
-	if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF))
+	if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_eflags))
 		return(EINVAL);
 
 	/*
@@ -785,17 +775,7 @@ linux_rt_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_rt_sigreturn_args *args)
 	 */
 #define	EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef)	((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
 	eflags = context->sc_eflags;
-	/*
-	 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.  The
-	 * cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers should
-	 * sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in the signal
-	 * context during signal handling and there is no other place
-	 * to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be corrupted by the
-	 * signal handler without us knowing.  Corruption of the PSL_RF
-	 * bit at worst causes one more or one less debugger trap, so
-	 * allowing it is fairly harmless.
-	 */
-	if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF))
+	if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_eflags))
 		return(EINVAL);
 
 	/*
diff --git a/sys/pc98/pc98/machdep.c b/sys/pc98/pc98/machdep.c
index 443518697cb1..a4887c6a47dd 100644
--- a/sys/pc98/pc98/machdep.c
+++ b/sys/pc98/pc98/machdep.c
@@ -773,17 +773,7 @@ osigreturn(td, uap)
 		/*
 		 * Don't allow users to change privileged or reserved flags.
 		 */
-		/*
-		 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.
-		 * The cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers
-		 * should sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in
-		 * the signal context during signal handling and there is no
-		 * other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be
-		 * corrupted by the signal handler without us knowing.
-		 * Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
-		 * one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
-		 */
-		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_eflags)) {
 	    		return (EINVAL);
 		}
 
@@ -899,17 +889,7 @@ freebsd4_sigreturn(td, uap)
 		/*
 		 * Don't allow users to change privileged or reserved flags.
 		 */
-		/*
-		 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.
-		 * The cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers
-		 * should sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in
-		 * the signal context during signal handling and there is no
-		 * other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be
-		 * corrupted by the signal handler without us knowing.
-		 * Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
-		 * one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
-		 */
-		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_eflags)) {
 			uprintf("pid %d (%s): freebsd4_sigreturn eflags = 0x%x\n",
 			    td->td_proc->p_pid, td->td_name, eflags);
 	    		return (EINVAL);
@@ -1013,17 +993,7 @@ sys_sigreturn(td, uap)
 		/*
 		 * Don't allow users to change privileged or reserved flags.
 		 */
-		/*
-		 * XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.
-		 * The cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers
-		 * should sometimes set it there too.  tf_eflags is kept in
-		 * the signal context during signal handling and there is no
-		 * other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be
-		 * corrupted by the signal handler without us knowing.
-		 * Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst causes one more or
-		 * one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly harmless.
-		 */
-		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF)) {
+		if (!EFL_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_eflags)) {
 			uprintf("pid %d (%s): sigreturn eflags = 0x%x\n",
 			    td->td_proc->p_pid, td->td_name, eflags);
 	    		return (EINVAL);
diff --git a/sys/x86/include/psl.h b/sys/x86/include/psl.h
index 12d05c5cfdbc..47851e0bb0b1 100644
--- a/sys/x86/include/psl.h
+++ b/sys/x86/include/psl.h
@@ -77,8 +77,16 @@
  * is undesirable but it may as well be allowed since users can inflict
  * it on the kernel directly.  Changes to PSL_AC are silently ignored on
  * 386's.
+ *
+ * Users are allowed to change the privileged flag PSL_RF.  The cpu sets PSL_RF
+ * in tf_eflags for faults.  Debuggers should sometimes set it there too.
+ * tf_eflags is kept in the signal context during signal handling and there is
+ * no other place to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be corrupted by the
+ * signal handler without us knowing.  Corruption of the PSL_RF bit at worst
+ * causes one more or one less debugger trap, so allowing it is fairly
+ * harmless.   
  */
 #define	PSL_USERCHANGE (PSL_C | PSL_PF | PSL_AF | PSL_Z | PSL_N | PSL_T \
-			| PSL_D | PSL_V | PSL_NT | PSL_AC | PSL_ID)
+			| PSL_D | PSL_V | PSL_NT | PSL_RF | PSL_AC | PSL_ID)
 
 #endif /* !_MACHINE_PSL_H_ */