ccr: Support multiple nonce lengths for AES-CCM.

Sponsored by:	Chelsio Communications, The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D32116
This commit is contained in:
John Baldwin 2021-10-06 14:08:48 -07:00
parent 655eb762c3
commit 3e6a97b3a7

View File

@ -1528,17 +1528,18 @@ static void
generate_ccm_b0(struct cryptop *crp, u_int hash_size_in_response,
const char *iv, char *b0)
{
u_int i, payload_len;
u_int i, payload_len, L;
/* NB: L is already set in the first byte of the IV. */
memcpy(b0, iv, CCM_B0_SIZE);
L = iv[0] + 1;
/* Set length of hash in bits 3 - 5. */
b0[0] |= (((hash_size_in_response - 2) / 2) << 3);
/* Store the payload length as a big-endian value. */
payload_len = crp->crp_payload_length;
for (i = 0; i < iv[0]; i++) {
for (i = 0; i < L; i++) {
b0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN - 1 - i] = payload_len;
payload_len >>= 8;
}
@ -1559,6 +1560,7 @@ static int
ccr_ccm(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
{
char iv[CHCR_MAX_CRYPTO_IV_LEN];
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
struct ulptx_idata *idata;
struct chcr_wr *crwr;
struct wrqe *wr;
@ -1571,6 +1573,8 @@ ccr_ccm(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
int sgl_nsegs, sgl_len;
int error;
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0)
return (EINVAL);
@ -1581,6 +1585,10 @@ ccr_ccm(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
if (crp->crp_payload_length == 0)
return (EMSGSIZE);
/* The length has to fit within the length field in block 0. */
if (crp->crp_payload_length > ccm_max_payload_length(csp))
return (EMSGSIZE);
/*
* CCM always includes block 0 in the AAD before AAD from the
* request.
@ -1598,9 +1606,8 @@ ccr_ccm(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
return (EINVAL);
/*
* Always assume a 12 byte input nonce for now since that is
* what OCF always generates. The full IV in the work request
* is 16 bytes.
* The IV in the work request is 16 bytes and not just the
* nonce.
*/
iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
@ -1745,7 +1752,7 @@ ccr_ccm(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
* the full IV with the counter set to 0.
*/
memset(iv, 0, iv_len);
iv[0] = (15 - AES_CCM_IV_LEN) - 1;
iv[0] = (15 - csp->csp_ivlen) - 1;
crypto_read_iv(crp, iv + 1);
ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, 0,
@ -1868,6 +1875,7 @@ ccr_ccm_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s,
static void
ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
{
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
const struct auth_hash *axf;
const struct enc_xform *exf;
union authctx *auth_ctx;
@ -1879,6 +1887,12 @@ ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
auth_ctx = NULL;
kschedule = NULL;
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
if (crp->crp_payload_length > ccm_max_payload_length(csp)) {
error = EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
/* Initialize the MAC. */
switch (s->blkcipher.key_len) {
case 16:
@ -1921,7 +1935,7 @@ ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length;
auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, crp->crp_iv, AES_CCM_IV_LEN);
axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, crp->crp_iv, csp->csp_ivlen);
/* MAC the AAD. */
if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
@ -1933,7 +1947,7 @@ ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
if (error)
goto out;
exf->reinit(kschedule, crp->crp_iv, AES_CCM_IV_LEN);
exf->reinit(kschedule, crp->crp_iv, csp->csp_ivlen);
/* Do encryption/decryption with MAC */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += sizeof(block)) {
@ -1968,7 +1982,7 @@ ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
error = 0;
/* Tag matches, decrypt data. */
exf->reinit(kschedule, crp->crp_iv, AES_CCM_IV_LEN);
exf->reinit(kschedule, crp->crp_iv, csp->csp_ivlen);
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length;
i += sizeof(block)) {
len = imin(crp->crp_payload_length - i,
@ -2445,8 +2459,6 @@ ccr_probesession(device_t dev, const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
return (EINVAL);
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 ||
csp->csp_auth_mlen > AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN)
return (EINVAL);