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Remove duplicate "in".

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Suggested by:	Rob Farmer <rfarmer at predatorlabs.net>
MFC after:	3 days
This commit is contained in:
Rebecca Cran 2011-03-01 11:47:51 +00:00
parent 58202d8973
commit ac095af538
6 changed files with 6 additions and 6 deletions
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2
lib/libc/yp/xdryp.c
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@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ extern void *ypresp_data;
* I'm leaving the xdr_datum() function in purely for backwards * I'm leaving the xdr_datum() function in purely for backwards
* compatibility. yplib.c doesn't actually use it, but it's listed * compatibility. yplib.c doesn't actually use it, but it's listed
* in yp_prot.h as being available, so it's probably a good idea to * in yp_prot.h as being available, so it's probably a good idea to
* leave it in in case somebody goes looking for it. * leave it in case somebody goes looking for it.
*/ */
typedef struct { typedef struct {
char *dptr; char *dptr;

2
lib/libelf/libelf_convert.m4
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@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
/* /*
* Read in various integral values. The source pointer could be * Read in various integral values. The source pointer could be
* unaligned. Values are read in in native byte order. The source * unaligned. Values are read in native byte order. The source
* pointer is incremented appropriately. * pointer is incremented appropriately.
*/ */

2
share/man/man7/security.7
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@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ This gives you a convenient way to detect the attacker.
Making Making
it impossible for an attacker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimental it impossible for an attacker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimental
to your security because it will not close off the hole the attacker used to to your security because it will not close off the hole the attacker used to
break in in the first place. break in originally.
.Pp .Pp
Security remedies should always be implemented with a multi-layered Security remedies should always be implemented with a multi-layered
.Dq onion peel .Dq onion peel

2
sys/boot/i386/cdboot/cdboot.s
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@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ lookup_path: push %si # Save file name pointer
lookup_found: # Found a loader file lookup_found: # Found a loader file
# #
# Load the binary into the buffer. Due to real mode addressing limitations # Load the binary into the buffer. Due to real mode addressing limitations
# we have to read it in in 64k chunks. # we have to read it in 64k chunks.
# #
mov DIR_SIZE(%bx),%eax # Read file length mov DIR_SIZE(%bx),%eax # Read file length
add $SECTOR_SIZE-1,%eax # Convert length to sectors add $SECTOR_SIZE-1,%eax # Convert length to sectors

2
sys/boot/pc98/cdboot/cdboot.s
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@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ lookup_path: push %si # Save file name pointer
lookup_found: # Found a loader file lookup_found: # Found a loader file
# #
# Load the binary into the buffer. Due to real mode addressing limitations # Load the binary into the buffer. Due to real mode addressing limitations
# we have to read it in in 64k chunks. # we have to read it in 64k chunks.
# #
mov %es:DIR_SIZE(%bx),%eax # Read file length mov %es:DIR_SIZE(%bx),%eax # Read file length
add $SECTOR_SIZE-1,%eax # Convert length to sectors add $SECTOR_SIZE-1,%eax # Convert length to sectors

2
usr.bin/checknr/checknr.c
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@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ struct stkstr {
int opno; /* number of opening bracket */ int opno; /* number of opening bracket */
int pl; /* '+', '-', ' ' for \s, 1 for \f, 0 for .ft */ int pl; /* '+', '-', ' ' for \s, 1 for \f, 0 for .ft */
int parm; /* parm to size, font, etc */ int parm; /* parm to size, font, etc */
int lno; /* line number the thing came in in */ int lno; /* line number */
} stk[MAXSTK]; } stk[MAXSTK];
int stktop; int stktop;