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Use correct padding of the ABORT chunk in case of an user initiated

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abort cause is used.

MFC after: 2 weeks
This commit is contained in:
Michael Tuexen 2012-12-08 09:50:38 +00:00
parent 132581aa5d
commit b11f07d86c
1 changed files with 32 additions and 21 deletions
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53
sys/netinet/sctp_output.c
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@ -10733,45 +10733,50 @@ sctp_send_abort_tcb(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct mbuf *operr, int so_locked
#endif
)
{
struct mbuf *m_abort;
struct mbuf *m_out = NULL, *m_end = NULL;
struct sctp_abort_chunk *abort = NULL;
int sz;
uint32_t auth_offset = 0;
struct mbuf *m_abort, *m, *m_last;
struct mbuf *m_out, *m_end = NULL;
struct sctp_abort_chunk *abort;
struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth = NULL;
struct sctp_nets *net;
uint32_t auth_offset = 0;
uint16_t cause_len, chunk_len, padding_len;
SCTP_TCB_LOCK_ASSERT(stcb);
/*-
* Add an AUTH chunk, if chunk requires it and save the offset into
* the chain for AUTH
*/
if (sctp_auth_is_required_chunk(SCTP_ABORT_ASSOCIATION,
stcb->asoc.peer_auth_chunks)) {
m_out = sctp_add_auth_chunk(m_out, &m_end, &auth, &auth_offset,
m_out = sctp_add_auth_chunk(NULL, &m_end, &auth, &auth_offset,
stcb, SCTP_ABORT_ASSOCIATION);
SCTP_STAT_INCR_COUNTER64(sctps_outcontrolchunks);
} else {
m_out = NULL;
}
SCTP_TCB_LOCK_ASSERT(stcb);
m_abort = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_abort_chunk), 0, M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
if (m_abort == NULL) {
/* no mbuf's */
if (m_out)
if (m_out) {
sctp_m_freem(m_out);
}
if (operr) {
sctp_m_freem(operr);
}
return;
}
/* link in any error */
SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_abort) = operr;
sz = 0;
if (operr) {
struct mbuf *n;
n = operr;
while (n) {
sz += SCTP_BUF_LEN(n);
n = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(n);
cause_len = 0;
m_last = NULL;
for (m = operr; m; m = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m)) {
cause_len += (uint16_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m);
if (SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m) == NULL) {
m_last = m;
}
}
SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_abort) = sizeof(*abort);
SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_abort) = sizeof(struct sctp_abort_chunk);
chunk_len = (uint16_t) sizeof(struct sctp_abort_chunk) + cause_len;
padding_len = SCTP_SIZE32(chunk_len) - chunk_len;
if (m_out == NULL) {
/* NO Auth chunk prepended, so reserve space in front */
SCTP_BUF_RESV_UF(m_abort, SCTP_MIN_OVERHEAD);
@ -10785,12 +10790,18 @@ sctp_send_abort_tcb(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct mbuf *operr, int so_locked
} else {
net = stcb->asoc.primary_destination;
}
/* fill in the ABORT chunk */
/* Fill in the ABORT chunk header. */
abort = mtod(m_abort, struct sctp_abort_chunk *);
abort->ch.chunk_type = SCTP_ABORT_ASSOCIATION;
abort->ch.chunk_flags = 0;
abort->ch.chunk_length = htons(sizeof(*abort) + sz);
abort->ch.chunk_length = htons(chunk_len);
/* Add padding, if necessary. */
if (padding_len > 0) {
if ((m_last == NULL) || sctp_add_pad_tombuf(m_last, padding_len)) {
sctp_m_freem(m_out);
return;
}
}
(void)sctp_lowlevel_chunk_output(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, net,
(struct sockaddr *)&net->ro._l_addr,
m_out, auth_offset, auth, stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid, 1, 0, 0,