The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable
"hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may
have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the
parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via
getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with
the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system
hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at
prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible.
The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and
hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their
associated global variables removed.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
and jail_get(2). Jail(8) can now create jails using a "name=value"
format instead of just specifying a limited set of fixed parameters; it
can also modify parameters of existing jails. Jls(8) can display all
parameters of jails, or a specified set of parameters. The available
parameters are gathered from the kernel, and not hard-coded into these
programs.
Small patches on killall(1) and jexec(8) to support jail names with
jail_get(2).
Approved by: bz (mentor)
Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch.
This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple
addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well.
Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without
an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with
restricted process view, no networking,..
SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well.
Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor
sets after creation.
Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name
in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from
within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes
or as audit-token in the future.
DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging.
Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit
systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where
possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management
utilities.
Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features.
A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been
used by various patches floating around the last years.
Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes.
Special thanks to:
- Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches
and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches.
- Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their
help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support.
- Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions,
suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages.
- John Baldwin (jhb) for his help.
- Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes
on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people
who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and
other channels.
- My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this.
Reviewed by: (see above)
MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail)
X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
unmount jail-friendly file systems from within a jail.
Precisely it grants PRIV_VFS_MOUNT, PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT and
PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER privileges for a jailed super-user.
It is turned off by default.
A jail-friendly file system is a file system which driver registers
itself with VFCF_JAIL flag via VFS_SET(9) API.
The lsvfs(1) command can be used to see which file systems are
jail-friendly ones.
There currently no jail-friendly file systems, ZFS will be the first one.
In the future we may consider marking file systems like nullfs as
jail-friendly.
Reviewed by: rwatson
containing the jailid, path, hostname, ip and the command used to start
the jail.
PR: misc/89883
Submitted by: L. Jason Godsey <lannygodsey -at- yahoo.com>
Reviewed by: phk
MFC after: 1 week
behaviour of chflags within a jail. If set to 0 (the default), then a
jailed root user is treated as an unprivileged user; if set to 1, then
a jailed root user is treated the same as an unjailed root user.
This is necessary to allow "make installworld" to work inside a jail,
since it attempts to manipulate the system immutable flag on certain
files.
Discussed with: csjp, rwatson
MFC after: 2 weeks
hence bump it to 6.
Note that the last commit message was not quite accurate. While the
assumption exists in the code, it's not possible to have an
uninitialized p there because if lflag is set when username is NULL
then execution would be terminated earlier.
seeing status of mounted file system for jailed processes.
Pass full path of jail's root directory to the kernel. mount(8) utility is
doing the same thing already.
about the risks of enabling raw sockets in prisons.
Because raw sockets can be used to configure and interact
with various network subsystems, extra caution should be
used where privileged access to jails is given out to
untrusted parties. As such, by default this option is disabled.
A few others and I are currently auditing the kernel
source code to ensure that the use of raw sockets by
privledged prison users is safe.
Approved by: bmilekic (mentor)
o getpwnam(3) returns NULL and does not set errno when the user does
not exist. Bail out with "no such user" instead of "Unknown error: 0".
PR: bin/67262
Submitted by: demon (-U flag)
MFC after: 3 weeks
