when a superblock check-hash error is detected. This change clarifies
a mount that failed due to media hardware failures (EIO) from a mount
that failed due to media errors (EINTEGRITY) that can be corrected by
running fsck(8).
Sponsored by: Netflix
From POSIX,
[ENOTSUP]
The implementation does not support the combination of accesses
requested in the prot argument.
This fits the case that prot contains permissions which are not a subset
of prot_max.
Reviewed by: brooks, cem
Relnotes: Yes
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23843
Also update comments for which architectures use 128 bit long doubles,
as appropriate.
The softfloat specialization routines weren't updated since they
appear to be from an upstream source which we may want to update in
the future to get a more favorable license.
Reviewed by: emaste@
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23658
Update the man page to mention that extending a file with truncate(2)
is required by POSIX as of 2008.
Reviewed by: bcr
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23354
A new syscall sigfastblock(2) is added which registers a uint32_t
variable as containing the count of blocks for signal delivery. Its
content is read by kernel on each syscall entry and on AST processing,
non-zero count of blocks is interpreted same as the signal mask
blocking all signals.
The biggest downside of the feature that I see is that memory
corruption that affects the registered fast sigblock location, would
cause quite strange application misbehavior. For instance, the process
would be immune to ^C (but killable by SIGKILL).
With consumers (rtld and libthr added), benchmarks do not show a
slow-down of the syscalls in micro-measurements, and macro benchmarks
like buildworld do not demonstrate a difference. Part of the reason is
that buildworld time is dominated by compiler, and clang already links
to libthr. On the other hand, small utilities typically used by shell
scripts have the total number of syscalls cut by half.
The syscall is not exported from the stable libc version namespace on
purpose. It is intended to be used only by our C runtime
implementation internals.
Tested by: pho
Disscussed with: cem, emaste, jilles
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12773
O_SEARCH is defined by POSIX [0] to open a directory for searching, skipping
permissions checks on the directory itself after the initial open(). This is
close to the semantics we've historically applied for O_EXEC on a directory,
which is UB according to POSIX. Conveniently, O_SEARCH on a file is also
explicitly undefined behavior according to POSIX, so O_EXEC would be a fine
choice. The spec goes on to state that O_SEARCH and O_EXEC need not be
distinct values, but they're not defined to be the same value.
This was pointed out as an incompatibility with other systems that had made
its way into libarchive, which had assumed that O_EXEC was an alias for
O_SEARCH.
This defines compatibility O_SEARCH/FSEARCH (equivalent to O_EXEC and FEXEC
respectively) and expands our UB for O_EXEC on a directory. O_EXEC on a
directory is checked in vn_open_vnode already, so for completeness we add a
NOEXECCHECK when O_SEARCH has been specified on the top-level fd and do not
re-check that when descending in namei.
[0] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/
Reviewed by: kib
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23247
Prior to introduction of this op libc's readdir would call fstatfs(2), in
effect unnecessarily copying kilobytes of data just to check fs name and a
mount flag.
Reviewed by: kib (previous version)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23162
Treat it as a synonym for GRND_NONBLOCK. The reasoning is this:
We have two choices for handling Linux's GRND_INSECURE API flag.
1. We could ignore it completely (like GRND_RANDOM). However, this might
produce the surprising result of GRND_INSECURE requests blocking, when the
Linux API does not block.
2. Alternatively, we could treat GRND_INSECURE requests as requests for
GRND_NONBLOCk. Here, the surprising result for Linux programs is that
invocations with unseeded random(4) will produce EAGAIN, rather than
garbage.
Honoring the flag in the way Linux does seems fraught. If we actually use
the output of a random(4) implementation prior to seeding, we leak some
entropy (in an information theory and also practical sense) from what will
be the initial seed to attackers (or allow attackers to arbitrary DoS
initial seeding, if we don't leak). This seems unacceptable -- it defeats
the purpose of blocking on initial seeding.
Secondary to that concern, before seeding we may have arbitrarily little
entropy collected; producing output from zero or a handful of entropy bits
does not seem particularly useful to userspace.
If userspace can accept garbage, insecure, non-random bytes, they can create
their own insecure garbage with srandom(time(NULL)) or similar. Any program
which would be satisfied with a 3-bit key CTR stream has no need for CSPRNG
bytes. So asking the kernel to produce such an output from the secure
getrandom(2) API seems inane.
For now, we've elected to emulate GRND_INSECURE as an alternative spelling
of GRND_NONBLOCK (2). Consider this API not-quite stable for now. We
guarantee it will never block. But we will attempt to monitor actual port
uptake of this bizarre API and may revise our plans for the unseeded
behavior (prior stable/13 branching).
Approved by: csprng(markm), manpages(bcr)
See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/cover.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org/
See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/20200107204400.GH3619@mit.edu/
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23130
This opens the door for other descriptor types to implement
posix_fallocate(2) as needed.
Reviewed by: kib, bcr (manpages)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23042
As mandated by POSIX. Also clarify the kill(2) manpage.
While there, restructure the code in killpg1() to use helper which
keeps overall state of the process list iteration in the killpg1_ctx
structued, later used to infer the error returned.
Reported by: amdmi3
Reviewed by: jilles
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22621
o Remove All Rights Reserved from my notices
o imp@FreeBSD.org everywhere
o regularize punctiation, eliminate date ranges
o Make sure that it's clear that I don't claim All Rights reserved by listing
All Rights Reserved on same line as other copyright holders (but not
me). Other such holders are also listed last where it's clear.
While FreeBSD's implementation of these expect an int inside of libc, that's an
implementation detail that we can hide from the user as it's the natural
promotion of the current mode_t type and before it is used in the kernel, it's
converted back to the narrower type that's the current definition of mode_t. As
such, documenting int is at best confusing and at worst misleading. Instead add
a note that these args are variadic and as such calling conventions may differ
from non-variadic arguments.
promoted to ints).
- `mode_t` is `uint16_t` (`sys/sys/_types.h`)
- `openat` takes variadic args
- variadic args cannot be 16-bit, and indeed the code uses int
- the manpage currently kinda implies the argument is 16-bit by saying `mode_t`
Prompted by Rust things: https://github.com/tailhook/openat/issues/21
Submitted by: Greg V at unrelenting
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21816
Add an atomic shm rename operation, similar in spirit to a file
rename. Atomically unlink an shm from a source path and link it to a
destination path. If an existing shm is linked at the destination
path, unlink it as part of the same atomic operation. The caller needs
the same permissions as shm_unlink to the shm being renamed, and the
same permissions for the shm at the destination which is being
unlinked, if it exists. If those fail, EACCES is returned, as with the
other shm_* syscalls.
truss support is included; audit support will come later.
This commit includes only the implementation; the sysent-generated
bits will come in a follow-on commit.
Submitted by: Matthew Bryan <matthew.bryan@isilon.com>
Reviewed by: jilles (earlier revision)
Reviewed by: brueffer (manpages, earlier revision)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21423
Described in [1], signal handlers running in a vfork child have
opportunities to corrupt the parent's state. Address this by adding a new
rfork(2) flag, RFSPAWN, that has vfork(2) semantics but also resets signal
handlers in the child during creation.
x86 uses rfork_thread(3) instead of a direct rfork(2) because rfork with
RFMEM/RFSPAWN cannot work when the return address is stored on the stack --
further information about this problem is described under RFMEM in the
rfork(2) man page.
Addressing this has been identified as a prerequisite to using posix_spawn
in subprocess on FreeBSD [2].
[1] https://ewontfix.com/7/
[2] https://bugs.python.org/issue35823
Reviewed by: jilles, kib
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19058
When RFSPAWN is passed, rfork exhibits vfork(2) semantics but also resets
signal handlers in the child during creation to avoid a point of corruption
of parent state from the child.
This flag will be used by posix_spawn(3) to handle potential signal issues.
Reviewed by: jilles, kib
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19058
memfd_create is effectively a SHM_ANON shm_open(2) mapping with optional
CLOEXEC and file sealing support. This is used by some mesa parts, some
linux libs, and qemu can also take advantage of it and uses the sealing to
prevent resizing the region.
This reimplements shm_open in terms of shm_open2(2) at the same time.
shm_open(2) will be moved to COMPAT12 shortly.
Reviewed by: markj, kib
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21393
The two options are
* nocover/cover: Prevent/allow mounting over an existing root mountpoint.
E.g., "mount -t ufs -o nocover /dev/sd1a /usr/local" will fail if /usr/local
is already a mountpoint.
* emptydir/noemptydir: Prevent/allow mounting on a non-empty directory.
E.g., "mount -t ufs -o emptydir /dev/sd1a /usr" will fail.
Neither of these options is intended to be a default, for historical and
compatibility reasons.
Reviewed by: allanjude, kib
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21458
When SO_TIMESTAMP is set, the kernel will attempt to attach a timestamp as
ancillary data to each IP datagram that is received on the socket. However,
it may fail, for example due to insufficient memory. In that case the
packet will still be received but not timestamp will be attached.
Reviewed by: kib
MFC after: 3 days
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21607
It allows a process to request that stack gap was not applied to its
stacks, retroactively. Also it is possible to control the gaps in the
process after exec.
PR: 239894
Reviewed by: alc
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21352
Previously userspace would issue one syscall to resolve the sysctl and then
another one to actually use it. Do it all in one trip.
Fallback is provided in case newer libc happens to be running on an older
kernel.
Submitted by: Pawel Biernacki
Reported by: kib, brooks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17282
Although libc syscall wrappers do not get checked in this can aid in
finding the source of generated files when spelunking in the objdir.
Multiple tools use @generated to identify generated files (for example,
in a review Phabricator will by default hide diffs in generated files).
For consistency use the @generated tag in makesyscalls.sh as we've done
for other generated files, even though these wrappers aren't checked in
to the tree.
copy_file_range.2 is a new man page (content change).
Reviewed by: kib, asomers
Relnotes: yes
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20584
This ptrace operation returns a structure containing the error and
return values from the current system call. It is only valid when a
thread is stopped during a system call exit (PL_FLAG_SCX is set).
The sr_error member holds the error value from the system call. Note
that this error value is the native FreeBSD error value that has _not_
been translated to an ABI-specific error value similar to the values
logged to ktrace.
If sr_error is zero, then the return values of the system call will be
set in sr_retval[0] and sr_retval[1].
Reviewed by: kib
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: DARPA
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20901
Take part of the text from POSIX 2018 edition and describe the
atomicity requirements for read and write syscalls. See p1003.1-2018,
Vol.2, 2.9.7 Threads interaction with Regular File Operations.
Reviewed by: asomers
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 days
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20867
feature bit.
In particular, allocate the bit to opt-out the image from implicit
PROTMAX enablement. Provide procctl(2) verbs to set and query
implicit PROTMAX handling. The knobs mimic the same per-image flag
and per-process controls for ASLR.
Reviewed by: emaste, markj (previous version)
Discussed with: brooks
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20795
In the case of mmap(), add a HISTORY section. Mention that mmap() and
mprotect()'s documentation predates an implementation. The
implementation first saw wide use in 4.3-Reno, but there seems to be no
easy way to express that in mdoc so stick with 4.4BSD.
Reviewed by: emaste
Requested by: cem
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20713
A new macro PROT_MAX() alters a protection value so it can be OR'd with
a regular protection value to specify the maximum permissions. If
present, these flags specify the maximum permissions.
While these flags are non-portable, they can be used in portable code
with simple ifdefs to expand PROT_MAX() to 0.
This change allows (e.g.) a region that must be writable during run-time
linking or JIT code generation to be made permanently read+execute after
writes are complete. This complements W^X protections allowing more
precise control by the programmer.
This change alters mprotect argument checking and returns an error when
unhandled protection flags are set. This differs from POSIX (in that
POSIX only specifies an error), but is the documented behavior on Linux
and more closely matches historical mmap behavior.
In addition to explicit setting of the maximum permissions, an
experimental sysctl vm.imply_prot_max causes mmap to assume that the
initial permissions requested should be the maximum when the sysctl is
set to 1. PROT_NONE mappings are excluded from this for compatibility
with rtld and other consumers that use such mappings to reserve
address space before mapping contents into part of the reservation. A
final version this is expected to provide per-binary and per-process
opt-in/out options and this sysctl will go away in its current form.
As such it is undocumented.
Reviewed by: emaste, kib (prior version), markj
Additional suggestions from: alc
Obtained from: CheriBSD
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18880
The man page claims that with O_FSYNC (aka O_SYNC) the kernel will not cache
written data. However, that's not true. Nor does POSIX require it.
Perhaps it was true when that section of the man page was written in r69336
(I haven't checked). But it's not true now. Now the effect is simply that
writes are sent to disk immediately and synchronously, but they're still
cached.
See also: https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/
See also: ffs_write in sys/ufs/ffs/ffs_vnops.c
Reviewed by: cem
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20641
