Repeating the default WARNS here makes it slightly more difficult to
experiment with default WARNS changes, e.g. if we did something absolutely
bananas and introduced a WARNS=7 and wanted to try lifting the default to
that.
Drop most of them; there is one in the blake2 kernel module, but I suspect
it should be dropped -- the default WARNS in the rest of the build doesn't
currently apply to kernel modules, and I haven't put too much thought into
whether it makes sense to make it so.
Preload OpenSSL ERR string data so that the formatted error messages are
vaguely meaningful. Add OpenSSL error information to the RSA_public_encrypt()
operation failure case in one-time key generation.
For obsolescent OpenSSL versions (*cough* FIPS *cough*), pre-seed the PRNG
before entering Cap mode, as old versions of OpenSSL are unaware of kernel
RNG interfaces aside from /dev/random (such as the long-supported kern.arnd, or
the slightly more recent getentropy(3) or getrandom(2)). (RSA_public_encrypt()
wants a seeded PRNG to randomize the "PS" portion of PKCS 1.5 padding or the
"MGF" pseudo-random function in OAEP padding.)
Switch dumpon to encrypt the one-time key with OAEP padding (recommended since
1998; RFC2437) rather than the obsolescent PKCS 1.5 padding (1993; RFC2313).
Switch decryptcore to attempt OAEP decryption first, and try PKCS 1.5
decryption on failure. This is intended only for transition convenience, and
we should obsolete support for non-OAEP padding in a release or two.
Reviewed by: markj
MFC After: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24534
Load the nls data before the openssl will try to do it in the
capability mode.
On my machine the sa_ossl_private_decrypt is trying to do that.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Add Chacha20 mode to Encrypted Kernel Crash Dumps.
Chacha20 does not require messages to be multiples of block size, so it is
valid to use the cipher on non-block-sized messages without the explicit
padding AES-CBC would require. Therefore, allow use with simultaneous dump
compression. (Continue to disallow use of AES-CBC EKCD with compression.)
dumpon(8) gains a -C cipher flag to select between chacha and aes-cbc.
It defaults to chacha if no -C option is provided. The man page documents this
behavior.
Relnotes: sure
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
- Perform final decryption and write decrypted data in case of non-block aligned
input data;
- Use strlcpy(3) instead of strncpy(3) to verify if paths aren't too long;
- Check errno after calling unlink(2) instead of calling stat(2) in order to
verify if a decrypted core was created by a child process;
- Free dumpkey.
Reported by: Coverity, cem, pfg
Suggested by: cem
CID: 1366936, 1366942, 1366951, 1366952
Approved by: pjd (mentor)
Changes include modifications in kernel crash dump routines, dumpon(8) and
savecore(8). A new tool called decryptcore(8) was added.
A new DIOCSKERNELDUMP I/O control was added to send a kernel crash dump
configuration in the diocskerneldump_arg structure to the kernel.
The old DIOCSKERNELDUMP I/O control was renamed to DIOCSKERNELDUMP_FREEBSD11 for
backward ABI compatibility.
dumpon(8) generates an one-time random symmetric key and encrypts it using
an RSA public key in capability mode. Currently only AES-256-CBC is supported
but EKCD was designed to implement support for other algorithms in the future.
The public key is chosen using the -k flag. The dumpon rc(8) script can do this
automatically during startup using the dumppubkey rc.conf(5) variable. Once the
keys are calculated dumpon sends them to the kernel via DIOCSKERNELDUMP I/O
control.
When the kernel receives the DIOCSKERNELDUMP I/O control it generates a random
IV and sets up the key schedule for the specified algorithm. Each time the
kernel tries to write a crash dump to the dump device, the IV is replaced by
a SHA-256 hash of the previous value. This is intended to make a possible
differential cryptanalysis harder since it is possible to write multiple crash
dumps without reboot by repeating the following commands:
# sysctl debug.kdb.enter=1
db> call doadump(0)
db> continue
# savecore
A kernel dump key consists of an algorithm identifier, an IV and an encrypted
symmetric key. The kernel dump key size is included in a kernel dump header.
The size is an unsigned 32-bit integer and it is aligned to a block size.
The header structure has 512 bytes to match the block size so it was required to
make a panic string 4 bytes shorter to add a new field to the header structure.
If the kernel dump key size in the header is nonzero it is assumed that the
kernel dump key is placed after the first header on the dump device and the core
dump is encrypted.
Separate functions were implemented to write the kernel dump header and the
kernel dump key as they need to be unencrypted. The dump_write function encrypts
data if the kernel was compiled with the EKCD option. Encrypted kernel textdumps
are not supported due to the way they are constructed which makes it impossible
to use the CBC mode for encryption. It should be also noted that textdumps don't
contain sensitive data by design as a user decides what information should be
dumped.
savecore(8) writes the kernel dump key to a key.# file if its size in the header
is nonzero. # is the number of the current core dump.
decryptcore(8) decrypts the core dump using a private RSA key and the kernel
dump key. This is performed by a child process in capability mode.
If the decryption was not successful the parent process removes a partially
decrypted core dump.
Description on how to encrypt crash dumps was added to the decryptcore(8),
dumpon(8), rc.conf(5) and savecore(8) manual pages.
EKCD was tested on amd64 using bhyve and i386, mipsel and sparc64 using QEMU.
The feature still has to be tested on arm and arm64 as it wasn't possible to run
FreeBSD due to the problems with QEMU emulation and lack of hardware.
Designed by: def, pjd
Reviewed by: cem, oshogbo, pjd
Partial review: delphij, emaste, jhb, kib
Approved by: pjd (mentor)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D4712
