This option was used in the early days to allow performance measurements
extrapolating the use of SCTP checksum offloading. Since this feature
is now available, get rid of this option.
This also un-breaks the LINT kernel. Thanks to markj@ for making me
aware of the problem.
Mainly focus on files that use BSD 3-Clause license.
The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.
Special thanks to Wind River for providing access to "The Duke of
Highlander" tool: an older (2014) run over FreeBSD tree was useful as a
starting point.
The inpcb structure has inp_sp pointer that is initialized by
ipsec_init_pcbpolicy() function. This pointer keeps strorage for IPsec
security policies associated with a specific socket.
An application can use IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket
options to configure these security policies. Then ip[6]_output()
uses inpcb pointer to specify that an outgoing packet is associated
with some socket. And IPSEC_OUTPUT() method can use a security policy
stored in the inp_sp. For inbound packet the protocol-specific input
routine uses IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() method to check that a packet conforms
to inbound security policy configured in the inpcb.
SCTP protocol doesn't specify inpcb for ip[6]_output() when it sends
packets. Thus IPSEC_OUTPUT() method does not consider such packets as
associated with some socket and can not apply security policies
from inpcb, even if they are configured. Since IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY()
method is called from protocol-specific input routine, it can specify
inpcb pointer and associated with socket inbound policy will be
checked. But there are two problems:
1. Such check is asymmetric, becasue we can not apply security policy
from inpcb for outgoing packet.
2. IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() expects that caller holds INPCB lock and
access to inp_sp is protected. But for SCTP this is not correct,
becasue SCTP uses own locks to protect inpcb.
To fix these problems remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.
This imply that IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options
will be not applicable to SCTP sockets. To be able correctly check
inbound security policies for SCTP, mark its protocol header with
the PR_LASTHDR flag.
Reported by: tuexen
Reviewed by: tuexen
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9538
Small summary
-------------
o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec.
o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel
option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading
and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules.
o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by
default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type
support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for
inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs.
setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA.
o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is
build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel).
It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs.
o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special
methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
should be included to declare all the needed things to work
with IPsec.
o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed.
Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods.
o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC.
o PF_KEY SADB was reworked:
- now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace,
and all SAs MUST have unique SPI.
- several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB.
- SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads
can do SA lookups in the same time.
- many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes
in SADB.
- SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers:
SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They
can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses.
o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to
avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support
only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported
for both INET and INET6.
o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches
used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet.
o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does
check for full history of applied IPsec transforms.
o References counting rules for security policies and security
associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform
code.
o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms.
tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in
SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting.
Reviewed by: gnn, wblock
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
The tools using to generate the sources has been updated and produces
different whitespaces. Commit this seperately to avoid intermixing
these with real code changes.
MFC after: 3 days
chunk, enable UDP encapsulation for all those addresses.
This helps clients using a userland stack to support multihoming if
they are not behind a NAT.
MFC after: 1 week
The sctp6_ctlinput() function does not properly check the length of the packet
it receives from the ICMP6 input routine. This means that an attacker can craft
a packet that will cause a kernel panic.
When the kernel receives an ICMP6 error message with one of the types/codes
it handles, it calls icmp6_notify_error() to deliver it to the upper-level
protocol. icmp6_notify_error() cycles through the extension headers (if any)
to find the protocol number of the first non-extension header. It does NOT
verify the length of the non-extension header.
It passes information about the packet (including the actual packet) to the
upper-level protocol's pr_ctlinput function. In the case of SCTP for IPv6,
icmp6_notify_error() calls sctp6_ctlinput().
sctp6_ctlinput() assumes that the incoming packet contains a sufficiently-long
SCTP header and calls m_copydata() to extract a copy of that header. In turn,
m_copydata() assumes that the caller has already verified that the offset and
length parameters are correct. If they are incorrect, it will dereference a
NULL pointer and cause a kernel panic.
In short, no one is sufficiently verifying the input, and the result is a
kernel panic.
Submitted by: jtl
Security: SA-16:01.sctp
* When processing a cookie, use the number of
streams announced in the INIT-ACK.
* When sending an INIT-ACK for an existing
association, use the value from the association,
not from the end-point.
MFC after: 1 week
have chosen different (and more traditional) stateless/statuful
NAT64 as translation mechanism. Last non-trivial commits to both
faith(4) and faithd(8) happened more than 12 years ago, so I assume
it is time to drop RFC3142 in FreeBSD.
No objections from: net@
eliminiates some warnings when building in userland.
Thanks to Patrick Laimbock for reporting this issue.
Remove also some unnecessary casts.
There should be no functional change.
MFC after: 1 week
If set to 1, no ABORT is sent back in response to an incoming
INIT. If set to 2, no ABORT is sent back in response to
an out of the blue packet. If set to 0 (the default), ABORTs
are sent.
Discussed with rrs@.
MFC after: 1 month.
