Give DEVFS a proper inode called struct cdev_priv. It is important
to keep in mind that this "inode" is shared between all DEVFS
mountpoints, therefore it is protected by the global device mutex.
Link the cdev_priv's into a list, protected by the global device
mutex. Keep track of each cdev_priv's state with a flag bit and
of references from mountpoints with a dedicated usecount.
Reap the benefits of much improved kernel memory allocator and the
generally better defined device driver APIs to get rid of the tables
of pointers + serial numbers, their overflow tables, the atomics
to muck about in them and all the trouble that resulted in.
This makes RAM the only limit on how many devices we can have.
The cdev_priv is actually a super struct containing the normal cdev
as the "public" part, and therefore allocation and freeing has moved
to devfs_devs.c from kern_conf.c.
The overall responsibility is (to be) split such that kern/kern_conf.c
is the stuff that deals with drivers and struct cdev and fs/devfs
handles filesystems and struct cdev_priv and their private liason
exposed only in devfs_int.h.
Move the inode number from cdev to cdev_priv and allocate inode
numbers properly with unr. Local dirents in the mountpoints
(directories, symlinks) allocate inodes from the same pool to
guarantee against overlaps.
Various other fields are going to migrate from cdev to cdev_priv
in the future in order to hide them. A few fields may migrate
from devfs_dirent to cdev_priv as well.
Protect the DEVFS mountpoint with an sx lock instead of lockmgr,
this lock also protects the directory tree of the mountpoint.
Give each mountpoint a unique integer index, allocated with unr.
Use it into an array of devfs_dirent pointers in each cdev_priv.
Initially the array points to a single element also inside cdev_priv,
but as more devfs instances are mounted, the array is extended with
malloc(9) as necessary when the filesystem populates its directory
tree.
Retire the cdev alias lists, the cdev_priv now know about all the
relevant devfs_dirents (and their vnodes) and devfs_revoke() will
pick them up from there. We still spelunk into other mountpoints
and fondle their data without 100% good locking. It may make better
sense to vector the revoke event into the tty code and there do a
destroy_dev/make_dev on the tty's devices, but that's for further
study.
Lots of shuffling of stuff and churn of bits for no good reason[2].
XXX: There is still nothing preventing the dev_clone EVENTHANDLER
from being invoked at the same time in two devfs mountpoints. It
is not obvious what the best course of action is here.
XXX: comment out an if statement that lost its body, until I can
find out what should go there so it doesn't do damage in the meantime.
XXX: Leave in a few extra malloc types and KASSERTS to help track
down any remaining issues.
Much testing provided by: Kris
Much confusion caused by (races in): md(4)
[1] You are not supposed to understand anything past this point.
[2] This line should simplify life for the peanut gallery.
running" panics.
Previously, recursion through the "include" feature was prevented by
marking each ruleset as "running" when applied. This doesn't work for
the case where two DEVFS instances try to apply the same ruleset at
the same time.
Instead introduce the sysctl vfs.devfs.rule_depth (default == 1) which
limits how many levels of "include" we will traverse.
Be aware that traversal of "include" is recursive and kernel stack
size is limited.
MFC: after 3 days
event handler, dev_clone, which accepts a credential argument.
Implementors of the event can ignore it if they're not interested,
and most do. This avoids having multiple event handler types and
fall-back/precedence logic in devfs.
This changes the kernel API for /dev cloning, and may affect third
party packages containg cloning kernel modules.
Requested by: phk
MFC after: 3 days
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the
device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid,
gid, and MAC label.
- Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is
instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to
MAC.
- Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally
accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and
make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv().
- Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to
receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired.
- Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an
optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can
inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential
when initializing the skeleton device protections.
- Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(),
so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework.
While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also
a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID
of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the
pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last
close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next
lookup.
Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
MFC after: 1 week
MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons
these filesystems will support shared locks until they are explicitly
modified to do so. Careful review must be done to ensure that this
is safe for each individual filesystem.
Sponsored by: Isilon Systems, Inc.
List devfs_dirents rather than vnodes off their shared struct cdev, this
saves a pointer field in the vnode at the expense of a field in the
devfs_dirent. There are often 100 times more vnodes so this is bargain.
In addition it makes it harder for people to try to do stypid things like
"finding the vnode from cdev".
Since DEVFS handles all VCHR nodes now, we can do the vnode related
cleanup in devfs_reclaim() instead of in dev_rel() and vgonel().
Similarly, we can do the struct cdev related cleanup in dev_rel()
instead of devfs_reclaim().
rename idestroy_dev() to destroy_devl() for consistency.
Add LIST_ENTRY de_alias to struct devfs_dirent.
Remove v_specnext from struct vnode.
Change si_hlist to si_alist in struct cdev.
String new devfs vnodes' devfs_dirent on si_alist when
we create them and take them off in devfs_reclaim().
Fix devfs_revoke() accordingly. Also don't clear fields
devfs_reclaim() will clear when called from vgone();
Let devfs_reclaim() call dev_rel() instead of vgonel().
Move the usecount tracking from dev_rel() to devfs_reclaim(),
and let dev_rel() take a struct cdev argument instead of vnode.
Destroy SI_CHEAPCLONE devices in dev_rel() (instead of
devfs_reclaim()) when they are no longer used. (This
should maybe happen in devfs_close() instead.)
After disscussing things I have decided to take the easy and
consistent 90% solution instead of aiming for the very involved 99%
solution.
If we allow forceful unmounts of DEVFS we need to decide how to handle
the devices which are in use through this filesystem at the time.
We cannot just readopt the open devices in the main /dev instance since
that would open us to security issues.
For the majority of the devices, this is relatively straightforward
as we can just pretend they got revoke(2)'ed.
Some devices get tricky: /dev/console and /dev/tty for instance
does a sort of recursive open of the real console device. Other devices
may be mmap'ed (kill the processes ?).
And then there are disk devices which are mounted.
The correct thing here would be to recursively unmount the filesystems
mounte from devices from our DEVFS instance (forcefully) and if
this succeeds, complete the forcefully unmount of DEVFS. But if
one of the forceful unmounts fail we cannot complete the forceful
unmount of DEVFS, but we are likely to already have severed a lot
of stuff in the process of trying.
Event attempting this would be a lot of code for a very far out
corner-case which most people would never see or get in touch with.
It's just not worth it.
methods:
Read can see O_NONBLOCK and O_DIRECT.
Write can see O_NONBLOCK, O_DIRECT and O_FSYNC.
In addition O_DIRECT is shadowed as IO_DIRECT for now for backwards
compatibility.
fcntl.h.
This is in preparation for making the flags passed to device drivers be
consistently from fcntl.h for all entrypoints.
Today open, close and ioctl uses fcntl.h flags, while read and write
uses vnode.h flags.
