kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on
process credentials. In particular, invoke entry points for
the initialization and destruction of struct ucred, the copying
of struct ucred, and permit the initial labels to be set for
both process 0 (parent of all kernel processes) and process 1
(parent of all user processes).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
uifind() with a proc lock held.
change_ruid() and change_euid() have been modified to take a uidinfo
structure which will be pre-allocated by callers, they will then
call uihold() on the uidinfo structure so that the caller's logic
is simplified.
This allows one to call uifind() before locking the proc struct and
thereby avoid a potential blocking allocation with the proc lock
held.
This may need revisiting, perhaps keeping a spare uidinfo allocated
per process to handle this situation or re-examining if the proc
lock needs to be held over the entire operation of changing real
or effective user id.
Submitted by: Don Lewis <dl-freebsd@catspoiler.org>
pointer instead of a proc pointer and require the process pointed to
by the second argument to be locked. We now use the thread ucred reference
for the credential checks in p_can*() as a result. p_canfoo() should now
no longer need Giant.
allocate a blank cred first, lock the process, perform checks on the
old process credential, copy the old process credential into the new
blank credential, modify the new credential, update the process
credential pointer, unlock the process, and cleanup rather than trying
to allocate a new credential after performing the checks on the old
credential.
- Cleanup _setugid() a little bit.
- setlogin() doesn't need Giant thanks to pgrp/session locking and
td_ucred.
securelevel_*() to be NULL for a while now.
- Use KASSERT() instead of if (foo) panic(); to optimize the
!INVARIANTS case.
Submitted by: Martin Faxer <gmh003532@brfmasthugget.se>
general cleanup of the API. The entire API now consists of two functions
similar to the pre-KSE API. The suser() function takes a thread pointer
as its only argument. The td_ucred member of this thread must be valid
so the only valid thread pointers are curthread and a few kernel threads
such as thread0. The suser_cred() function takes a pointer to a struct
ucred as its first argument and an integer flag as its second argument.
The flag is currently only used for the PRISON_ROOT flag.
Discussed on: smp@
disablement assumptions in kern_fork.c by adding another API call,
cpu_critical_fork_exit(). Cleanup the td_savecrit field by moving it
from MI to MD. Temporarily move cpu_critical*() from <arch>/include/cpufunc.h
to <arch>/<arch>/critical.c (stage-2 will clean this up).
Implement interrupt deferral for i386 that allows interrupts to remain
enabled inside critical sections. This also fixes an IPI interlock bug,
and requires uses of icu_lock to be enclosed in a true interrupt disablement.
This is the stage-1 commit. Stage-2 will occur after stage-1 has stabilized,
and will move cpu_critical*() into its own header file(s) + other things.
This commit may break non-i386 architectures in trivial ways. This should
be temporary.
Reviewed by: core
Approved by: core
code that is still not safe. suser() reads p_ucred so it still needs
Giant for the time being. This should allow kern.giant.proc to be set
to 0 for the time being.
Move the network code from using cr_cansee() to check whether a
socket is visible to a requesting credential to using a new
function, cr_canseesocket(), which accepts a subject credential
and object socket. Implement cr_canseesocket() so that it does a
prison check, a uid check, and add a comment where shortly a MAC
hook will go. This will allow MAC policies to seperately
instrument the visibility of sockets from the visibility of
processes.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
NULL, turn warning printf's into panic's, since this call has been
restructured such that a NULL cred would result in a page fault anyway.
There appears to be one case where NULL is explicitly passed in in the
sysctl code, and this is believed to be in error, so will be modified.
Securelevels now always require a credential context so that per-jail
securelevels are properly implemented.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: NAI Labs
Discussed with: bde
method-based inter-process security checks. To do this, introduce
a new cr_seeotheruids(u1, u2) function, which encapsulates the
"see_other_uids" logic. Call out to this policy following the
jail security check for all of {debug,sched,see,signal} inter-process
checks. This more consistently enforces the check, and makes the
check easy to modify. Eventually, it may be that this check should
become a MAC policy, loaded via a module.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
- Add a cred_free_thread() function (conditional on DIAGNOSTICS) that drops
a per-thread ucred reference to be used in debugging code when leaving
the kernel.
fully protect p_ucred yet so Giant is needed until all the p_ucred
locking is done. This is the original reason td_ucred was not used
immediately after its addition. Unfortunately, not using td_ucred is
not enough to avoid problems. Since p_ucred could be stale, we could
actually be dereferencing a stale pointer to dink with the refcount, so
we really need Giant to avoid foot-shooting. This allows td_ucred to
be safely used as well.
spares (the size of the field was changed from u_short to u_int to
reflect what it really ends up being). Accordingly, change users of
xucred to set and check this field as appropriate. In the kernel,
this is being done inside the new cru2x() routine which takes a
`struct ucred' and fills out a `struct xucred' according to the
former. This also has the pleasant sideaffect of removing some
duplicate code.
Reviewed by: rwatson
New locks are:
- pgrpsess_lock which locks the whole pgrps and sessions,
- pg_mtx which protects the pgrp members, and
- s_mtx which protects the session members.
Please refer to sys/proc.h for the coverage of these locks.
Changes on the pgrp/session interface:
- pgfind() needs the pgrpsess_lock held.
- The caller of enterpgrp() is responsible to allocate a new pgrp and
session.
- Call enterthispgrp() in order to enter an existing pgrp.
- pgsignal() requires a pgrp lock held.
Reviewed by: jhb, alfred
Tested on: cvsup.jp.FreeBSD.org
(which is a quad-CPU machine running -current)
reaquiring it. In the same vein, don't bother dropping the thread cred
when goinf ot userland. We are guaranteed to nned it when we come back,
(which we are guaranteed to do).
Reviewed by: jhb@freebsd.org, bde@freebsd.org (slightly different version)
authorized based on a subject credential rather than a subject process.
This will permit the same logic to be reused in situations where only
the credential generating the signal is available, such as in the
delivery of SIGIO.
- Because of two clauses, the automatic success against curproc,
and the session semantics for SIGCONT, not all logic can be pushed
into cr_cansignal(), but those cases should not apply for most other
consumers of cr_cansignal().
- This brings the base system inter-process authorization code more
into line with the MAC implementation.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
- uid's -> uids
- whitespace improvements, linewrap improvements
- reorder copyright more appropriately
- remove redundant MP SAFE comments, add one "NOT MPSAFE?"
for setgroups(), which seems to be the sole un-changed system
call in the file.
- clean up securelevel_g?() functions, improve comments.
Largely submitted by: bde
that new models can inhabit kern.security.<modelname>.
o While I'm there, shorten somewhat excessive variable names, and clean
things up a little.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
- Restore inferior() to being iterative rather than recursive.
- Assert that the proctree_lock is held in inferior() and change the one
caller to get a shared lock of it. This also ensures that we hold the
lock after performing the check so the check can't be made invalid out
from under us after the check but before we act on it.
Requested by: bde
debug another process based on their respective {effective,additional,
saved,real} gid's. p1 is only permitted to debug p2 if its effective
gids (egid + additional groups) are a strict superset of the gids of
p2. This implements properly the security test previously incorrectly
implemented in kern_ktrace.c, and is consistent with the kernel
security policy (although might be slightly confusing for those more
familiar with the userland policy).
o Restructure p_candebug() logic so that various results are generated
comparing uids, gids, credential changes, and then composed in a
single check before testing for privilege. These tests encapsulate
the "BSD" inter-process debugging policy. Other non-BSD checks remain
seperate. Additional comments are added.
Submitted by: tmm, rwatson
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Reviewed by: petef, tmm, rwatson
really be moved elsewhere: p_candebug() encapsulates the security
policy decision, whereas the P_INEXEC check has to do with "correctness"
regarding race conditions, rather than security policy.
Example: even if no security protections were enforced (the "uids are
advisory" model), removing P_INEXEC could result in incorrect operation
due to races on credential evaluation and modification during execve().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
it has not yet returned. Use this flag to deny debugging requests while
the process is execve()ing, and close once and for all any race conditions
that might occur between execve() and various debugging interfaces.
Reviewed by: jhb, rwatson
of Giant during the Giant unwinding phase, and start work on instrumenting
Giant for the file and proc mutexes.
These wrappers allow developers to turn on and off Giant around various
subsystems. DEVELOPERS SHOULD NEVER TURN OFF GIANT AROUND A SUBSYSTEM JUST
BECAUSE THE SYSCTL EXISTS! General developers should only considering
turning on Giant for a subsystem whos default is off (to help track down
bugs). Only developers working on particular subsystems who know what
they are doing should consider turning off Giant.
These wrappers will greatly improve our ability to unwind Giant and test
the kernel on a (mostly) subsystem by subsystem basis. They allow Giant
unwinding developers (GUDs) to emplace appropriate subsystem and structural
mutexes in the main tree and then request that the larger community test
the work by turning off Giant around the subsystem(s), without the larger
community having to mess around with patches. These wrappers also allow
GUDs to boot into a (more likely to be) working system in the midst of
their unwinding work and to test that work under more controlled
circumstances.
There is a master sysctl, kern.giant.all, which defaults to 0 (off). If
turned on it overrides *ALL* other kern.giant sysctls and forces Giant to
be turned on for all wrapped subsystems. If turned off then Giant around
individual subsystems are controlled by various other kern.giant.XXX sysctls.
Code which overlaps multiple subsystems must have all related subsystem Giant
sysctls turned off in order to run without Giant.
- crhold() returns a reference to the ucred whose refcount it bumps.
- crcopy() now simply copies the credentials from one credential to
another and has no return value.
- a new crshared() primitive is added which returns true if a ucred's
refcount is > 1 and false (0) otherwise.
