PRISON_ROOT to the suser_xxx() check. Since securelevels may now
be raised in specific jails, use of system flags can still be
restricted in jail(), but in a more configurable way.
o Users of jail() expecting system flags (such as schg) to restrict
jail()'s should be sure to set the securelevel appropriately in
jail()'s.
o This fixes activities involving automated system flag removal in
jail(), including installkernel and friends.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
securelevel_gt(), determine first if a local securelevel exists --
if so, perform the check based on imax(local, global). Otherwise,
simply use the global value.
o Note: even though local securelevels might lag below the global one,
if the global value is updated to higher than local values, maximum
will still be used, making the global dominant even if there is local
lag.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
one is present in the current jail, otherwise, to return the global
securelevel.
o If the securelevel is being updated, require that it be greater than
the maximum of local and global, if a local securelevel exists,
otherwise, just maximum of the global. If there is a local
securelevel, update the local one instead of the global one.
o Note: this does allow local securelevels to lag behind the global one
as long as the local one is not updated following a global increase.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
a time change, and callers so that they provide td->td_proc.
o Modify settime() to use securevel_gt() for securelevel checking.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
in vn_rdwr_inchunks(), allowing other processes to gain an exclusive
lock on the vnode. Specifically: directory scanning, to avoid a race to the
root directory, and multiple child processes coring simultaniously so they
can figure out that some other core'ing child has an exclusive adv lock and
just exit instead.
This completely fixes performance problems when large programs core. You
can have hundreds of copies (forked children) of the same binary core all
at once and not notice.
MFC after: 3 days
We still have to account for a copyin. Make sure the copyin will
succeed by passing the FreeBSD syscall a pointer to userspace,
albeit one that's automagically mapped into kernel space.
Reported by: mr, Mitsuru IWASAKI <iwasaki@jp.FreeBSD.org>
Tested by: Mitsuru IWASAKI <iwasaki@jp.FreeBSD.org>
with weird PCI-PCI bridge configurations to work. Defining
PCI_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_IO_RANGE causes the sanity checks to pass even
with out of range values.
Reviewed by: msmith
for securelevel_ge() and securelevel_gt(), I was a little surprised,
but fixed it. Turns out that it was the code that was inverted, during
a whitespace cleanup in my commit tree. This commit inverts the
checks, and restores the comment.
This fixed the problem on the 3 platforms I've been able to test on.
I'm still of the oppinion that the BIOS should take care of this,
however some board makers only apply this when they spot a
SBLive! soundcard, but the problem exists even without a SBLive!.
This fix should probably go somewhere else, but for now I'll
keep it here since we havn't got a central place to put
such things.
problems currently experienced in -CURRENT.
This should fix the problem that the PS/2 mouse is detected
twice if the acpi module is not loaded on some systems.
refering to securelevels; also, update the unprivileged process text
to better indicate the scope of actions permittable when any system
flags are already set (limited).
Submitted by: Udo Schweigert <udo.schweigert@siemens.com>
