I'm not sure what happenned to the original setting of the P_CONTINUED
flag. it appears to have been lost in the paper shuffling...
Submitted by: David Xu <bsddiy@yahoo.com>
argument, not the 'type' argument. As a result of the buf, the
MAC label on some packet header mbufs might not be set in mbufs
allocated using m_getcl(), resulting in a page fault.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
vnode operations. This permits the rights of the user (typically root)
used to turn on accounting to be used when writing out accounting entries,
rather than the credentials of the process generating the accounting
record. This fixes accounting in a number of environments, including
file systems that offer revocation support, MAC environments, some
securelevel scenarios, and in some NFS environments.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
the initproc credential from the proc0 credential. Otherwise, the
proc0 credential is used instead of initproc's credentil when authorizing
start_init() activities prior to initproc hitting userland for the
first time. This could result in the incorrect credential being used
to authorize mounting of the root file system, which could in turn cause
problems for NFS when used in combination with uid/gid ipfw rules, or
with MAC.
Discussed with: julian
to the address of the user's aiocb rather than the kernel's aiocb. (In other
words, prior to this change, the ident field returned by kevent(2) on
completion of an AIO was effectively garbage.)
Submitted by: Romer Gil <rgil@cs.rice.edu>
cninit. This allows a console driver to replace the existing console
by calling cninit again, eg during the device probe. Otherwise the
multiple console code sends output to both, which is unfortunate if
they're using the same hardware.
about calls to SYSCTL_OUT() made with locks held if the buffer has not
been pre-wired. SYSCTL_OUT() should not be called while holding locks,
but if this is not possible, the buffer should be wired by calling
sysctl_wire_old_buffer() before grabbing any locks.
that LIO_READ and LIO_WRITE were requests for kevent()-based
notification of completion. Modify _aio_aqueue() to recognize LIO_READ
and LIO_WRITE.
Notes: (1) The patch provided by the PR perpetuates a second bug in this
code, a direct access to user-space memory. This change fixes that bug
as well. (2) This change is to code that implements a deprecated interface.
It should probably be removed after an MFC.
PR: kern/39556
investigate the problem described below.
I am seeing some strange livelock on recent -current sources with
a slow box under heavy load, which disappears with this change.
This might suggest some kind of problem (either insufficient locking,
or mishandling of priorities) in the poll_idle thread.
- v_vflag is protected by the vnode lock and is used when synchronization
with VOP calls is needed.
- v_iflag is protected by interlock and is used for dealing with vnode
management issues. These flags include X/O LOCK, FREE, DOOMED, etc.
- All accesses to v_iflag and v_vflag have either been locked or marked with
mp_fixme's.
- Many ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED calls have been added where the locking was not
clear.
- Many functions in vfs_subr.c were restructured to provide for stronger
locking.
Idea stolen from: BSD/OS
linker_load_module() instead.
This fixes a bug where the kernel was unable to properly locate and
load a kernel module in vfs_mount() (and probably in the netgraph
code as well since it was using the same function). This is because
the linker_load_file() does not properly search the module path.
Problem found by: peter
Reviewed by: peter
Thanks to: peter
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC framework entry points to authorize readdir()
operations in the native ABI.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Make idle process state more consistant.
Add an assert on thread state.
Clean up idleproc/mi_switch() interaction.
Use a local instead of referencing curthread 7 times in a row
(I've been told curthread can be expensive on some architectures)
Remove some commented out code.
Add a little commented out code (completion coming soon)
Reviewed by: jhb@freebsd.org
kernel access control
Invoke appropriate MAC framework entry points to authorize a number
of vnode operations, including read, write, stat, poll. This permits
MAC policies to revoke access to files following label changes,
and to limit information spread about the file to user processes.
Note: currently the file cached credential is used for some of
these authorization check. We will need to expand some of the
MAC entry point APIs to permit multiple creds to be passed to
the access control check to allow diverse policy behavior.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Restructure the vn_open_cred() access control checks to invoke
the MAC entry point for open authorization. Note that MAC can
reject open requests where existing DAC code skips the open
authorization check due to O_CREAT. However, the failure mode
here is the same as other failure modes following creation,
wherein an empty file may be left behind.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke an appropriate MAC entry point to authorize execution of
a file by a process. The check is placed slightly differently
than it appears in the trustedbsd_mac tree so that it prevents
a little more information leakage about the target of the execve()
operation.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
the inits/destroys are done without the cache locks held even in the
persistent-lock calls. I may be cheating a little by using the MAC
"already initialized" flag for now.
other references to that vnode as a trace vnode in other processes as well
as in any pending requests on the todo list. Thus, it is possible for a
ktrace request structure to have a NULL ktr_vp when it is destroyed in
ktr_freerequest(). We shouldn't call vrele() on the vnode in that case.
Reported by: bde
kernel access control.
Instrument chdir() and chroot()-related system calls to invoke
appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the two operations.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Implement two IOCTLs at the socket level to retrieve the primary
and peer labels from a socket. Note that this user process interface
will be changing to improve multi-policy support.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Authorize vop_readlink() and vop_lookup() activities during recursive
path lookup via namei() via calls to appropriate MAC entry points.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Authorize the creation of UNIX domain sockets in the file system
namespace via an appropriate invocation a MAC framework entry
point.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument ctty driver invocations of various vnode operations on the
terminal controlling tty to perform appropriate MAC framework
authorization checks.
Note: VOP_IOCTL() on the ctty appears to be authorized using NOCRED in
the existing code rather than td->td_ucred. Why?
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument the ktrace write operation so that it invokes the MAC
framework's vnode write authorization check.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument the kernel ACL retrieval and modification system calls
to invoke MAC framework entry points to authorize these operations.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument connect(), listen(), and bind() system calls to invoke
MAC framework entry points to permit policies to authorize these
requests. This can be useful for policies that want to limit
the activity of processes involving particular types of IPC and
network activity.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
sysctl purposes. Also add two fields to struct vnode, v_cachedfs and
v_cachedid, which hold the vnode's device and file id and are filled in
by vn_open_cred() and vn_stat().
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on sockets.
In particular, invoke entry points during socket allocation and
destruction, as well as creation by a process or during an
accept-scenario (sonewconn). For UNIX domain sockets, also assign
a peer label. As the socket code isn't locked down yet, locking
interactions are not yet clear. Various protocol stack socket
operations (such as peer label assignment for IPv4) will follow.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on vnodes.
In particular, initialize the label when the vnode is allocated or
reused, and destroy the label when the vnode is going to be released,
or reused. Wow, an object where there really is exactly one place
where it's allocated, and one other where it's freed. Amazing.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke additional MAC entry points when an mbuf packet header is
copied to another mbuf: release the old label if any, reinitialize
the new header, and ask the MAC framework to copy the header label
data. Note that this requires a potential allocation operation,
but m_copy_pkthdr() is not permitted to fail, so we must block.
Since we now use interrupt threads, this is possible, but not
desirable.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on header
mbufs. In particular, invoke entry points during the two mbuf
header allocation cases, and the mbuf freeing case. Pass the "how"
argument at allocation time to the MAC framework so that it can
determine if it is permitted to block (as with policy modules),
and permit the initialization entry point to fail if it needs to
allocate memory but is not permitted to, failing the mbuf
allocation.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Implement MAC framework access control entry points relating to
operations on mountpoints. Currently, this consists only of
access control on mountpoint listing using the various statfs()
variations. In the future, it might also be desirable to
implement checks on mount() and unmount().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on
mount structures. In particular, invoke entry points for
intialization and destruction in various scenarios (root,
non-root). Also introduce an entry point in the boot procedure
following the mount of the root file system, but prior to the
start of the userland init process to permit policies to
perform further initialization.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Implement inter-process access control entry points for the MAC
framework. This permits policy modules to augment the decision
making process for process and socket visibility, process debugging,
re-scheduling, and signaling.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on
process credentials. In particular, invoke entry points for
the initialization and destruction of struct ucred, the copying
of struct ucred, and permit the initial labels to be set for
both process 0 (parent of all kernel processes) and process 1
(parent of all user processes).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Replace 'void *' with 'struct mac *' now that mac.h is in the base
tree. The current POSIX.1e-derived userland MAC interface is
schedule for replacement, but will act as a functional placeholder
until the replacement is done. These system calls allow userland
processes to get and set labels on both the current process, as well
as file system objects and file descriptor backed objects.
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the operating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Introduce two node vnode operations required to support MAC. First,
VOP_REFRESHLABEL(), which will be invoked by callers requiring that
vp->v_label be sufficiently "fresh" for access control purposes.
Second, VOP_SETLABEL(), which be invoked by callers requiring that
the passed label contents be updated. The file system is responsible
for updating v_label if appropriate in coordination with the MAC
framework, as well as committing to disk. File systems that are
not MAC-aware need not implement these VOPs, as the MAC framework
will default to maintaining a single label for all vnodes based
on the label on the file system mount point.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
kern_mac.c contains the body of the MAC framework. Kernel and
user APIs defined in mac.h are implemented here, providing a front end
to loaded security modules. This code implements a module registration
service, state (label) management, security configuration and policy
composition.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
While I don't think this is the best solution, it certainly is the
fastest and in trying to find bottlenecks in network related code
I want this out of the way, so that I don't have to think about it.
What this means, for mbuf clusters anyway is:
- one less malloc() to do for every cluster allocation (replaced with
a relatively quick calculation + assignment)
- no more free() in the cluster free case (replaced with empty space) :-)
This can offer a substantial throughput improvement, but it may not for
all cases. Particularly noticable for larger buffer sends/recvs.
See http://people.freebsd.org/~bmilekic/code/measure2.txt for a rough
idea.
function. This permits conditionally compiled extensions to the
packet header copying semantic, such as extensions to copy MAC
labels.
Reviewed by: bmilekic
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
with a general purpose front end entry point for user applications
to invoke. The MAC framework will route the system call to the
appropriate policy by name.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
special actions for safety. One of these is to make sure that file descriptors
0..2 are in use, by opening /dev/null for those that are not already open.
Another is to close any file descriptors 0..2 that reference procfs. However,
these checks were made out of order, so that it was still possible for a
set-user-ID or set-group-ID process to be started with some of the file
descriptors 0..2 unused.
Submitted by: Georgi Guninski <guninski@guninski.com>
be swapped out. Do not put such the thread directly back to the run
queue.
Spotted by: David Xu <davidx@viasoft.com.cn>
While I am here, s/PS_TIMEOUT/TDF_TIMEOUT/.
swapped in, we do not have to ask for the scheduler thread to do
that.
- Assert that a process is not swapped out in runq functions and
swapout().
- Introduce thread_safetoswapout() for readability.
- In swapout_procs(), perform a test that may block (check of a
thread working on its vm map) first. This lets us call swapout()
with the sched_lock held, providing a better atomicity.
except for the fact tha they are presently swapped out. Also add a process
flag to indicate that the process has started the struggle to swap
back in. This will be needed for the case where multiple threads
start the swapin action top a collision. Also add code to stop
a process fropm being swapped out if one of the threads in this
process is actually off running on another CPU.. that might hurt...
Submitted by: Seigo Tanimura <tanimura@r.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
so that the data is less likely to be inconsistent if SYSCTL_OUT() blocks.
If the data is large, wire the output buffer instead.
This is somewhat less than optimal, since the handler could skip the copy
if it knew that the data was static.
If the data is dynamic, we are still not guaranteed to get a consistent
copy since another processor could change the data while the copy is in
progress because the data is not locked. This problem could be solved if
the generic handlers had the ability to grab the proper lock before the
copy and release it afterwards.
This may duplicate work done in other sysctl handlers in the kernel which
also copy the data, possibly while a lock is held, before calling they call
a generic handler to output the data. These handlers should probably call
SYSCTL_OUT() directly.
SYSCTL_OUT() from blocking while locks are held. This should
only be done when it would be inconvenient to make a temporary copy of
the data and defer calling SYSCTL_OUT() until after the locks are
released.
not responding) then drop any data on the outgoing queue in
soisdisconnected because there is no way to get it to its destination
any longer.
The only objection to this patch I got on -net was from Terry, who
wasn't sure that the condition in question could arise, so I provided
some example code.
during execve() to use a 'credential_changing' variable. This makes it
easier to have outstanding patchsets against this code, as well as to
add conditionally defined clauses.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
since it breaks mtx_owned() on spin mutexes when used outside of
mtx_assert(). Unfortunately we currently use it in the i386 MD code
and in the sio(4) driver.
Reported by: bde
'single threading thread' when the last other thread suspends.
I had this code in there before but it seems to have been
accidentally deleted somewhere along the way. This would only affect
multithreaded processes.
Reviewed by: David Xu <bsddiy@yahoo.com>
pnbuf to increase the chances of detecting use of a free'd name buffer
if SAVENAME or SAVESTART wasn't passed in. Curiously, running with these
changes doesn't panic the kernel, and should.
of the inlines, like its cousin, m_free(). Also, make a small (first
step?) optimisation of m_free() to use the MBP_PERSIST{,ENT} interface
to hold the lock across frees when possible. The thing is that right
now, we can only do this easily for at most across one mbuf + one
cluster free, as the comment mentions (it also explains why). Anyway,
some basic tests revealed a 5-10% overall improvement. Some of the
results can be found here:
http://people.freebsd.org/~bmilekic/code/measure.txt
non-default but reasonable values of hz this member overflowed,
breaking NFS over UDP.
Also, as long as I'm plowing up struct sockbuf ... Change certain
members from u_long/long to u_int/int in order to reduce wasted
space on 64-bit machines. This change was requested by Andrew
Gallatin.
Netstat and systat need to be rebuilt. I am incrementing
__FreeBSD_version in case any ports need to change.
is that grouped frees will be done as most often as possible without
dropping the cache lock in between. So, for the most part, they'll be
done without the lock being dropped. This is particularly true if you
have something that does a grouped m_getm() or m_getcl() (a cluster and
mbuf at the same time) - most likely getting the buffers from the
same per-CPU cache - and then frees them with m_free{,m}(). Unless
the buffers' underlying buckets were moved, the free will be done without
the lock getting dropped in between. So far, only m_free() has been
shown how to do this, and m_freem() will shortly follow.
Since I'm here, I also fixed a small (but mostly harmless) type-mismatch
introduced in the last commit.
disk devices. This fixes the problem with these ioctls returning
EINVAL for plain slice devices with no disklabel on them.
The patch incorporates improvements and style fixes from BDE.
Reviewed by: bde
Approved by: obrien (mentor)
do_sendfile(). This allows us to rearrange an if statement in order to
avoid doing an unnecesary call to vm_page_lock_queues(), and an attempt
at re-wiring the pages (which were wired in the vm_page_alloc() call).
Reviewed by: alc, jhb
open() of fhopen(). Currently this has no actual affect due to the
treatment of VAPPEND in vaccess() and vaccess_acl() as a subset of
VWRITE, but when MAC comes in, MAC will distinguish the two. Note:
if any file systems are cutting their own permission models, they
may wish to now take this into account.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
handler in the kernel at the same time. Also, allow for the
exec_new_vmspace() code to build a different sized vmspace depending on
the executable environment. This is a big help for execing i386 binaries
on ia64. The ELF exec code grows the ability to map partial pages when
there is a page size difference, eg: emulating 4K pages on 8K or 16K
hardware pages.
Flesh out the i386 emulation support for ia64. At this point, the only
binary that I know of that fails is cvsup, because the cvsup runtime
tries to execute code in pages not marked executable.
Obtained from: dfr (mostly, many tweaks from me).
- Sanity check the mount options list (remove duplicates) with
vfs_sanitizeopts().
- Fix some malloc(0)/free(NULL) bugs.
Reviewed by: rwatson (some time ago)
As this code is not actually used by any of the existing
interfaces, it seems unlikely to break anything (famous
last words).
The internal kernel interface to manipulate these attributes
is invoked using two new IO_ flags: IO_NORMAL and IO_EXT.
These flags may be specified in the ioflags word of VOP_READ,
VOP_WRITE, and VOP_TRUNCATE. Specifying IO_NORMAL means that
you want to do I/O to the normal data part of the file and
IO_EXT means that you want to do I/O to the extended attributes
part of the file. IO_NORMAL and IO_EXT are mutually exclusive
for VOP_READ and VOP_WRITE, but may be specified individually
or together in the case of VOP_TRUNCATE. For example, when
removing a file, VOP_TRUNCATE is called with both IO_NORMAL
and IO_EXT set. For backward compatibility, if neither IO_NORMAL
nor IO_EXT is set, then IO_NORMAL is assumed.
Note that the BA_ and IO_ flags have been `merged' so that they
may both be used in the same flags word. This merger is possible
by assigning the IO_ flags to the low sixteen bits and the BA_
flags the high sixteen bits. This works because the high sixteen
bits of the IO_ word is reserved for read-ahead and help with
write clustering so will never be used for flags. This merge
lets us get away from code of the form:
if (ioflags & IO_SYNC)
flags |= BA_SYNC;
For the future, I have considered adding a new field to the
vattr structure, va_extsize. This addition could then be
exported through the stat structure to allow applications to
find out the size of the extended attribute storage and also
would provide a more standard interface for truncating them
(via VOP_SETATTR rather than VOP_TRUNCATE).
I am also contemplating adding a pathconf parameter (for
concreteness, lets call it _PC_MAX_EXTSIZE) which would
let an application determine the maximum size of the extended
atribute storage.
Sponsored by: DARPA & NAI Labs.
so it needs an explicit #include <machine/frame.h> to get 'struct
trapframe'. The fact that it needs this at this level is rather bogus
but it will not compile without it.
the filelist_lock and check nfiles. This closes a race where we had to
unlock the filedesc to re-lock the filelist_lock.
Reported by: David Xu
Reviewed by: bde (mostly)
after a panic which is not an interrupt thread, or the thread which
caused the panic. Also, remove panicstr checks from msleep() and from
cv_wait() in order to allow threads to go to sleep and yeild the cpu
to the panicing thread, or to an interrupt thread which might
be doing the crashdump.
Reviewed by: jhb (and it was mostly his idea too)
support creation times such as UFS2) to the value of the
modification time if the value of the modification time is older
than the current creation time. See utimes(2) for further details.
Sponsored by: DARPA & NAI Labs.
semicolons from the end of macros:
#define FOO() bar(a,b,c);
becomes
#define FOO() bar(a,b,c)
Thus requiring the semicolon in the invocation of FOO. This is much
cleaner syntax and more consistent with expectations when writing
function-like things in source.
With both peril-sensitive sunglasses and flame-proof undies on, tighten
up some types, and work around some warnings generated by this. There
are some _horrible_ const/non-const issues in this code.
and a cluster in one shot.
o Introduce MBP_PERSIST and MBP_PERSISTENT control bits to mb_alloc();
MBP_PERSIST means "if you can allocate, then keep the cache lock
held on exit," and MBP_PERSISTENT means "a cache lock is alredy held
on entry, so allocate from the specified (already locked) cache."
They may be used in combination.
o m_getcl() uses the MBP_PERSIST/MBP_PERSISTENT interface so that it
doesn't drop the cache lock in between the mbuf and cluster allocations.
o m_getm(), which takes a size and allocates an mbuf + cluster "best fit"
chain, has been moved from uipc_mbuf.c to subr_mbuf.c and shown how to
use MBP_PERSIST/MBP_PERSISTENT to attempt to do a grouped allocation
without dropping the cache lock in between.
Why this is good: much less bus-locked lock acquires/drops when they're
not needed. Also, prototype for m_getcl():
struct mbuf * m_getcl(int how, short type, int flags);
"how" and "type" are self-explanatory. "flags" may be M_PKTHDR, in
which case m_getcl() will make the mbuf a pkthdr-mbuf.
While I'm in subr_mbuf.c:
o Every exported routine now has a nice comment with a description of
the expected arguments. Eventually, mbuf(9) needs to be re-vamped
but there's still more code to write/finalize before I get to that.
o internal macros have been changed a bit.
o consistently use 'short' for "type." This somehow slipped through
before (that 'type' was sometimes declared as int).
Alfred has been pushing for the MBP_PERSIST{,ENT} thing for almost a
year now. Luigi asked for m_getcl(), and will probably MFC that
part of this commit.
TODO [Related]: teach mb_free() about MBP_PERSIST{, ENT}.
1/ don't need to set td_state to TDS_RUNNING in fork_return.
it's already set in choosethread().
2/ Set a child process state to "normal" as opposed to "new"
when we allow it to be put on the run queue.
Allows child to receive signals from the parent if the parent
runs first and tries to immediatly signal he child.
Submitted by: (part 2) Thomas Moestl <tmoestl@gmx.net>
formulated. The correct states should be:
IDLE: On the idle KSE list for that KSEG
RUNQ: Linked onto the system run queue.
THREAD: Attached to a thread and slaved to whatever state the thread is in.
This means that most places where we were adjusting kse state can go away
as it is just moving around because the thread is..
The only places we need to adjust the KSE state is in transition to and from
the idle and run queues.
Reviewed by: jhb@freebsd.org
