by renaming it to kern.security.suser_enabled. This makes the name
consistent with other use: "permitted" now refers to a specific right
or privilege, whereas "enabled" refers to a feature. As this hasn't
been MFC'd, and using this destroys a running system currently, I believe
the user base of the sysctl will not be too unhappy.
o While I'm at it, un-staticize and export the supporting variable, as it
will be used by kern_cap.c shortly.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
some reworking (and consequent cleanup) of the interrupt service code.
Also begin to start a cleanup of target mode support that will (eventually)
not require more inforamtion routed with the ATIO to come back with the
CTIO other than tag.
MFC after: 4 weeks
Allow non-superuser to open, listen to, and send safe commands on the
routing socket. Superuser priviledge is required for all commands
but RTM_GET.
Lose `setuid root' bit of route(8).
Reviewed by: wollman, dd
(I could have sworn I committed this before, but apparently I missed it
during the merge, breaking world)
Submitted by: tmm
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Pointed out by: Mike Barcroft <mike@FreeBSD.org>
Instead introduce the [M] prefix to existing keywords. e.g.
MSTD is the MP SAFE version of STD. This is prepatory for a
massive Giant lock pushdown. The old MPSAFE keyword made
syscalls.master too messy.
Begin comments MP-Safe procedures with the comment:
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
This comments means that the procedure may be called without
Giant held (The procedure itself may still need to obtain
Giant temporarily to do its thing).
sv_prepsyscall() is now MP SAFE and assumed to be MP SAFE
sv_transtrap() is now MP SAFE and assumed to be MP SAFE
ktrsyscall() and ktrsysret() are now MP SAFE (Giant Pushdown)
trapsignal() is now MP SAFE (Giant Pushdown)
Places which used to do the if (mtx_owned(&Giant)) mtx_unlock(&Giant)
test in syscall[2]() in */*/trap.c now do not. Instead they
explicitly unlock Giant if they previously obtained it, and then
assert that it is no longer held to catch broken system calls.
Rebuild syscall tables.
Clear residual counts after a successful samount (the user doesn't
care that we got an N-kbyte residual on our test read).
Change a lot of error handling code.
1. If we end up in saerror, check more carefully about the kind of
error. If it is a CAM_SCSI_STATUS_ERROR and it is a read/write
command, we'll be handling this in saerror. If it isn't a read/write
command, check to see whether this is just an EOM/EOP check condition-
if it is, just set residual and return normally. A residual and
then a NO SENSE check condiftion with the ASC of 0 and ASCQ of
between 1 and 4 are normal 'signifying' events, not errors per se,
and we shouldn't give the command to cam_periph_error to do something
relatively unpredictable with.
2. If we get a Bus Reset, had a BDR sent, or get the cam status of
CAM_REQUEUE_REQ, check the retry count on the command. The default
error handler, cam_periph_error, doesn't honor retry count in these
cases. This may change in the future, but for now, make sure we
set EIO and return without calling cam_periph_error if the retry
count for the command with an error is zero.
3. Clean up the pending error case goop and handle cases more
sensibly.
The rules are:
If command was a Write:
If we got a SSD_KEY_VOLUME_OVERFLOW, the resid is
propagated and we set ENOSPC as the error.
Else if we got an EOM condition- just mark EOM pending.
And set a residual of zero. For the longest time I was just
propagating residual from the sense data- but my tape
comparison tests were always failing because all drives I
tested with actually *do* write the data anyway- the EOM
(early warning) condition occurred *prior* to all of the
data going out to media- that is, it was still buffered by
the drive. This case is described in SCSI-2, 10.2.14,
paragraph #d for the meaning of 'information field'. A
better fix for this would be to issue a WFM command of zero
to cause the drive to flush any buffered data, but this
would require a fairly extensive rewrite.
Else if the command was a READ:
If we got a SSD_KEY_BLANK_CHECK-
If we have a One Filemark EOT model- mark EOM as pending,
otherwise set EIO as the erorr.
Else if we found a Filemark-
If we're in Fixed Block mode- mark EOF pending.
If we had an ILI (Incorrect Length Indicator)-
If the residual is less than zero, whine about tape record
being too big for user's buffer, otherwise if we were in
Fixed Block mode, mark EIO as pending.
All 'pending' conditions mean that the command in question completes
without error indication. It had succeeded, but a signifying event
occurred during its execution which will apply to the *next* command
that would be exexcuted. Except for the one EOM case above, we always
propagate residual.
Now, way back in sastart- if we notice any of the PENDING bits set,
we don't run the command we've just pulled off the wait queue. Instead,
we then figure out it's disposition based upon a previous command's
association with a signifying event.
If SA_FLAG_EOM_PENDING is set, we don't set an error. We just complete
the command with residual set to the request count (not data moved,
but no error). We continue on.
If SA_FLAG_EOF_PENDING- if we have this, it's only because we're in
Fixed Block mode- in which case we traverse all waiting buffers (which
we can get in fixed block mode because physio has split things up) and
mark them all as no error, but no data moved and complete them.
If SA_FLAG_EIO_PENDING, just mark the buffer with an EIO error
and complete it.
Then we clear all of the pending state bits- we're done.
MFC after: 4 weeks
