is useless for threaded programs, multiple threads can not share same
stack.
The alternative signal stack is private for thread, no lock is needed,
the orignal P_ALTSTACK is now moved into td_pflags and renamed to
TDP_ALTSTACK.
For single thread or Linux clone() based threaded program, there is no
semantic changed, because those programs only have one kernel thread
in every process.
Reviewed by: deischen, dfr
- This is heavily derived from John Baldwin's apic/pci cleanup on i386.
- I have completely rewritten or drastically cleaned up some other parts.
(in particular, bootstrap)
- This is still a WIP. It seems that there are some highly bogus bioses
on nVidia nForce3-150 boards. I can't stress how broken these boards
are. I have a workaround in mind, but right now the Asus SK8N is broken.
The Gigabyte K8NPro (nVidia based) is also mind-numbingly hosed.
- Most of my testing has been with SCHED_ULE. SCHED_4BSD works.
- the apic and acpi components are 'standard'.
- If you have an nVidia nForce3-150 board, you are stuck with 'device
atpic' in addition, because they somehow managed to forget to connect the
8254 timer to the apic, even though its in the same silicon! ARGH!
This directly violates the ACPI spec.
is highly MD in an emulation environment since it operates on the host
environment. Although the setregs functions are really for exec support
rather than signals, they deal with the same sorts of context and include
files. So I put it there rather than create yet another file.
from the ia32 specific stuff. Some of this still needs to move to the MI
freebsd32 area, and some needs to move to the MD area. This is still
work-in-progress.
having their stack at the 512GB mark. Give 4GB of user VM space for 32
bit apps. Note that this is significantly more than on i386 which gives
only about 2.9GB of user VM to a process (1GB for kernel, plus page
table pages which eat user VM space).
Approved by: re (blanket)
load_gs() calls into a single place that is less likely to go wrong.
Eliminate the per-process context switching of MSR_GSBASE, because it
should be constant for a single cpu. Instead, save/restore it during
the loading of the new %gs selector for the new process.
Approved by: re (amd64/* blanket)
stolen from the ia64/ia32 code (indeed there was a repocopy), but I've
redone the MD parts and added and fixed a few essential syscalls. It
is sufficient to run i386 binaries like /bin/ls, /usr/bin/id (dynamic)
and p4. The ia64 code has not implemented signal delivery, so I had
to do that.
Before you say it, yes, this does need to go in a common place. But
we're in a freeze at the moment and I didn't want to risk breaking ia64.
I will sort this out after the freeze so that the common code is in a
common place.
On the AMD64 side, this required adding segment selector context switch
support and some other support infrastructure. The %fs/%gs etc code
is hairy because loading %gs will clobber the kernel's current MSR_GSBASE
setting. The segment selectors are not used by the kernel, so they're only
changed at context switch time or when changing modes. This still needs
to be optimized.
Approved by: re (amd64/* blanket)
kern_sigprocmask() in the various binary compatibility emulators.
- Replace calls to sigsuspend(), sigaltstack(), sigaction(), and
sigprocmask() that used the stackgap with calls to the corresponding
kern_sig*() functions instead without using the stackgap.
by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path
fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store
the chroot() point of each jail.
o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail.
o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified
vnode.
o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls
to callers of change_dir().
o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of
struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails.
Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
This is for the not-quite-ready signal/fpu abi stuff. It may not see
the light of day, but I'm certainly not going to be able to validate it
when getting shot in the foot due to syscall number conflicts.
execve_secure() system call, which permits a process to pass in a label
for a label change during exec. This permits SELinux to change the
label for the resulting exec without a race following a manual label
change on the process. Because this interface uses our general purpose
MAC label abstraction, we call it execve_mac(), and wrap our port of
SELinux's execve_secure() around it with appropriate sid mappings.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
