Trimmed an extra sysctl when I moved kern.suser_permitted from kern_mib.c
to kern_prot.c. This commit should restore it, as well as fix the
resulting build problems.
Submitted by: asmodai
kern_prot, which cleans up some namespace issues
o Don't need a special handler to limit un-setting, as suser is used to
protect suser_permitted, making it one-way by definition.
Suggested by: bde
returning anything but EPERM.
o suser is enabled by default; once disabled, cannot be reenabled
o To be used in alternative security models where uid0 does not connote
additional privileges
o Should be noted that uid0 still has some additional powers as it
owns many important files and executables, so suffers from the same
fundamental security flaws as securelevels. This is fixed with
MAC integrity protection code (in progress)
o Not safe for consumption unless you are *really* sure you don't want
things like shutdown to work, et al :-)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
<sys/bio.h>.
<sys/bio.h> is now a prerequisite for <sys/buf.h> but it shall
not be made a nested include according to bdes teachings on the
subject of nested includes.
Diskdrivers and similar stuff below specfs::strategy() should no
longer need to include <sys/buf.> unless they need caching of data.
Still a few bogus uses of struct buf to track down.
Repocopy by: peter
``jail'', and move the set_hostname_allowed sysctl there, as well as
fixing a bug in the sysctl that resulted in jails being over-limited
(preventing them from reading as well as writing the hostname). Also,
correct some formatting issues, courtesy bde :-).
Reviewed by: phk
Approved by: jkh
or not a process in a jail, with privilege, may set the jail's hostname.
Defaults to 1, which permits this. May be set to 0 by a process with
appropriate privilege outside of jail. Preventing hostname renaming
from within a jail is currently required to make jails manageable, as they
a currently identifiable only by hostname using /proc, which may be
modified without this sysctl being set to 0. This will be documented
in upcoming man commits.
Authorized by: jkh, the ever-patient
discussed on current.
The following variables are defined (for now):
osname (defaults to "Linux")
Allow users to change the name of the OS as returned by uname(2),
specially added for all those Linux Netscape users and statistics
maniacs :-) We now have what we all wanted!
osrelease (defaults to "2.2.5")
Allow users to change the version of the OS as returned by uname(2).
Since -current supports glibc2.1 now, change the default to 2.2.5
(was 2.0.36).
oss_version (defaults to 198144 [0x030600])
This one will be used by the OSS_GETVERSION ioctl (PR 12917) which I
can commit now that we have the MIB. The default version number is the
lowest version possible with the current 'encoding'.
A note about imprisoned processes (see jail(2)):
These variables are copy-on-write (as suggested by phk). This means that
imprisoned processes will use the system wide value unless it is written/set
by the process. From that moment on, a copy local to the prison will be
used.
A note about the implementation:
I choose to add a single pointer to struct prison, because I didn't like the
idea of changing struct prison every time I come up with a new variable. As
a side effect, the extra storage is only needed when a variable is set from
within the prison. This also minimizes kernel bloat when the Linuxulator is
not used; both compiled in or as a module.
Reviewed by: bde (first version only) and phk
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
directory containing rc.conf.local and rc.local, and possibly other
things in the future.
This sysctl is used by the diskless startup code and new rc.conf. If
it cannot be found or is empty, the system should revert to using /etc.
- moved definition of MACHINE_ARCH from cpu.h to parm.h as alpha.
- Added definitions of _MACHINE and _MACHINE_ARCH.
- Added hw.ispc98. The hw.ispc98 is 1 in PC98 kernel and is 0 in
IBM-PC kernel.
Discussed with: John Birrell <jb@FreeBSD.ORG>
_KPOSIX_PRIORITY_SCHEDULING options to work. Changes:
Change all "posix4" to "p1003_1b". Misnamed files are left
as "posix4" until I'm told if I can simply delete them and add
new ones;
Add _POSIX_PRIORITY_SCHEDULING system calls for FreeBSD and Linux;
Add man pages for _POSIX_PRIORITY_SCHEDULING system calls;
Add options to LINT;
Minor fixes to P1003_1B code during testing.
Fix for RTPRIO scheduler to eliminate invalid context switches.
POSIX.4 headers and sysctl variables. Nothing should change
unless POSIX4 is defined or _POSIX_VERSION is set to 199309.
nothing good except of opening a can of (potential or real) security
holes. People maintaining a machine with higher security requirements
need to be on the console anyway, so there's no point in not forcing
them to reboot before starting maintenance.
Agreed by: hackers, guido
(phk's) sysctl framework, and I needed special code to disambiguate
the VFS_GENERIC node from the VFS_VFSCONF leaf, so I only converted
the leaves to the FreeBSD framework. The error handling isn't quite
right. CSRGS's sysctls seem to return ENOTDIR too much and FreeBSD's
sysctls don't agree with the man page.
This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
- kern.maxproc and kern.maxprocperuid were read-only (and thus essentially
useless. Apparently no one uses them).
- all the user sysctls were read-write (and thus it was possible for them
to be inconsistent with the authoritative fixed values in the library).
Removed unused #include.
