Should work with both regular and fast ipsec (mutually exclusive).
See manpage for more details.
Submitted by: Ari Suutari (ari.suutari@syncrontech.com)
Revised by: sam
MFC after: 1 week
"ipid" options. This feature has been requested by several users.
On passing, fix some minor bugs in the parser. This change is fully
backward compatible so if you have an old /sbin/ipfw and a new
kernel you are not in trouble (but you need to update /sbin/ipfw
if you want to use the new features).
Document the changes in the manpage.
Now you can write things like
ipfw add skipto 1000 iplen 0-500
which some people were asking to give preferential treatment to
short packets.
The 'MFC after' is just set as a reminder, because I still need
to merge the Alpha/Sparc64 fixes for ipfw2 (which unfortunately
change the size of certain kernel structures; not that it matters
a lot since ipfw2 is entirely optional and not the default...)
PR: bin/48015
MFC after: 1 week
this makes connect act more sensibly in these cases.
PR: 50839
Submitted by: Barney Wolff <barney@pit.databus.com>
Patch delayed by laziness of: silby
MFC after: 1 week
is not called, and no static rules match an outgoing packet, the
latter retains its source IP address. This is in support of the
"static NAT only" mode.
only meaningful for fragments. Also don't bother to byte-swap the
ip_id when we do generate it; it is only used at the receiver as a
nonce. I tried several different permutations of this code with no
measurable difference to each other or to the unmodified version, so
I've settled on the one for which gcc seems to generate the best code.
(If anyone cares to microoptimize this differently for an architecture
where it actually matters, feel free.)
Suggested by: Steve Bellovin's paper in IMW'02
sure that the MAC label on TCP responses during TIMEWAIT is
properly set from either the socket (if available), or the mbuf
that it's responding to.
Unfortunately, this is made somewhat difficult by the TCP code,
as tcp_twstart() calls tcp_twrespond() after discarding the socket
but without a reference to the mbuf that causes the "response".
Passing both the socket and the mbuf works arounds this--eventually
it might be good to make sure the mbuf always gets passed in in
"response" scenarios but working through this provided to
complicate things too much.
Approved by: re (scottl)
Reviewed by: hsu
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
copying for mbuf headers now works properly in m_dup_pkthdr(), so
we don't need to do an explicit copy.
Approved by: re (jhb)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
state. Those changed attempted to work around the changed invariant
that inp->in_socket was sometimes now NULL, but the logic wasn't
quite right, meaning that inp->in_socket would be dereferenced by
cr_canseesocket() if security.bsd.see_other_uids, jail, or MAC
were in use. Attempt to clarify and correct the logic.
Note: the work-around originally introduced with the reduced TCP
wait state handling to use cr_cansee() instead of cr_canseesocket()
in this case isn't really right, although it "Does the right thing"
for most of the cases in the base system. We'll need to address
this at some point in the future.
Pointed out by: dcs
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
of asserting that an mbuf has a packet header. Use it instead of hand-
rolled versions wherever applicable.
Submitted by: Hiten Pandya <hiten@unixdaemons.com>
doing Limited Transmit. Only artificially inflate the congestion
window by 1 segment instead of the usual 3 to take into account
the 2 already sent by Limited Transmit.
Approved in principle by: Mark Allman <mallman@grc.nasa.gov>,
Hari Balakrishnan <hari@nms.lcs.mit.edu>, Sally Floyd <floyd@icir.org>
(See: ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3514.txt)
This fulfills the host requirements for userland support by
way of the setsockopt() IP_EVIL_INTENT message.
There are three sysctl tunables provided to govern system behavior.
net.inet.ip.rfc3514:
Enables support for rfc3514. As this is an
Informational RFC and support is not yet widespread
this option is disabled by default.
net.inet.ip.hear_no_evil
If set the host will discard all received evil packets.
net.inet.ip.speak_no_evil
If set the host will discard all transmitted evil packets.
The IP statistics counter 'ips_evil' (available via 'netstat') provides
information on the number of 'evil' packets recieved.
For reference, the '-E' option to 'ping' has been provided to demonstrate
and test the implementation.
Quote from kern/37573:
There is an obvious race in netinet/ip_dummynet.c:config_pipe().
Interrupts are not blocked when changing the params of an
existing pipe. The specific crash observed:
... -> config_pipe -> set_fs_parms -> config_red
malloc a new w_q_lookup table but take an interrupt before
intializing it, interrupt handler does:
... -> dummynet_io -> red_drops
red_drops dereferences the uninitialized (zeroed) w_q_lookup
table.
o Flush accumulated credits for idle pipes.
o Flush accumulated credits when change pipe characteristics.
o Change dn_flow_queue.numbytes type to unsigned long.
Overlapping dn_flow_queue->numbytes in ready_event() leads to
numbytes becomes negative and SET_TICKS() macro returns a very
big value. heap_insert() overlaps dn_key again and inserts a
queue to a ready heap with a sched_time points to the past.
That leads to an "infinity" loop.
PR: kern/33234, kern/37573, misc/42459, kern/43133,
kern/44045, kern/48099
Submitted by: Mike Hibler <mike@cs.utah.edu> (kern/37573)
MFC after: 6 weeks
additional flags argument to indicate blocking disposition, and
pass in M_NOWAIT from the IP reassembly code to indicate that
blocking is not OK when labeling a new IP fragment reassembly
queue. This should eliminate some of the WITNESS warnings that
have started popping up since fine-grained IP stack locking
started going in; if memory allocation fails, the creation of
the fragment queue will be aborted.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
- Don't try to fragment the packet if it's smaller than mbuf_frag_size.
- Preserve the size of the mbuf chain which is modified by m_split().
- Check that m_split() didn't return NULL.
- Make it so we don't end up with two M_PKTHDR mbuf in the chain.
- Use m->m_pkthdr.len instead of m->m_len so that we fragment the whole
chain and not just the first mbuf.
- Fix a nearby style bug and rework the logic of the loops so that it's
more clear.
This is still not quite right, because we're clearly abusing m_split() to
do something it was not designed for, but at least it works now. We
should probably move this code into a m_fragment() function when it's
correct.
allows you to tell ip_output to fragment all outgoing packets
into mbuf fragments of size net.inet.ip.mbuf_frag_size bytes.
This is an excellent way to test if network drivers can properly
handle long mbuf chains being passed to them.
net.inet.ip.mbuf_frag_size defaults to 0 (no fragmentation)
so that you can at least boot before your network driver dies. :)
comes in on is the same interface that we would route out of to get to
the packet's source address. Essentially automates an anti-spoofing
check using the information in the routing table.
Experimental. The usage and rule format for the feature may still be
subject to change.
