The constant I was using was correct, but I mislabeled it as 256K when
it should have been 512K. This doesn't actually change the code, but
it clarifies things somewhat.
Submitted by: Chuck Cranor <chuck@research.att.com>
sf_hdtr is used to provide writev(2) style headers/trailers on the
sent data the return value is actually either the result of writev(2)
from the trailers or headers of no tailers are specified.
Fix sendfile to comply with the documentation, by returning 0 on
success.
Ok'd by: dg
We are way too inconsistent with our setting of the "schg" flag, and in
our default install, it doesn't really offer any additional security.
Reviewed by: arch@
saves 32 registers) to do on every context switch. This is only required
for SMP, so only do it there.
We should also look at moving the critical enter/exit out to the callers
Long ago, bread() set b_blkno to the disk block number as a side effect
of doing physical i/o (or it just retained the setting from when the
i/o was done). The setting is lost when buffers go away and then are
reconsituted from VM. bread() originally compensated by doing a
VOP_BMAP() to recover b_blkno, but this was no good since it sometimes
caused extra i/o or even deadlock for bread()ing metadata to do the
bmap. This was fixed in vfs_bio.c 1.33 (1995/03/03) and ffs_balloc.c
1.5, etc., by removing the VOP_BMAP() from bread() and breadn(), and
changing all (?) places that used b_blkno to set it if necessary.
ext2fs was not imported until later in 1995 and was still depending on
the old behaviour of bread() in at least ext2_balloc(). This caused
filesystem and file corruption by clobbering direct block numbers in
inodes.
by the inactive routine. Because the freeing causes the filesystem
to be modified, the close must be held up during periods when the
filesystem is suspended.
For snapshots to be consistent across crashes, they must write
blocks that they copy and claim those written blocks in their
on-disk block pointers before the old blocks that they referenced
can be allowed to be written.
Close a loophole that allowed unwritten blocks to be skipped when
doing ffs_sync with a request to wait for all I/O activity to be
completed.
to struct mount.
This makes the "struct netexport *" paramter to the vfs_export
and vfs_checkexport interface unneeded.
Consequently that all non-stacking filesystems can use
vfs_stdcheckexp().
At the same time, make it a pointer to a struct netexport
in struct mount, so that we can remove the bogus AF_MAX
and #include <net/radix.h> from <sys/mount.h>
required by POSIX.1e. This maintains the current 'struct acl'
in the kernel while providing the generic external acl_t
interface required to complete the ACL editing library.
o Add the acl_get_entry() function.
o Convert the existing ACL utilities, getfacl and setfacl, to
fully make use of the ACL editing library.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
structure. This field keeps track of how many levels deep we are nested
into the kernel. The nesting level is bumped at the start of a trap,
interrupt, syscall, or exception and is decremented on return. This is
used to detect the case when the kernel is returning back to a kernel
context in exception_return(). If we are returning to the kernel we need
to update the globaldata pointer register saved in the stack frame in case
we have switched CPU's between taking the initial interrupt that saved the
frame and returning. If we don't do this fixup it is possible for a CPU to
use the wrong per-cpu data. On UP systems this is not a problem, so the
code is conditional on SMP.
A count was used instead of simply checking the process status register in
the frame during exception_return() since there are critical sections at
the very start and end of a trap, exception, or interrupt from userland in
which we could trash the t7 register being used in userland. The counter
is incremented after adn before these critical sections respectively so
that we will not overwrite the saved t7 register if we are interrupted
during one of these critical sections.
nam for an unbound socket instead of leaving nam untouched in that case.
This way, the getsockname() output can be used to determine the address
family of such sockets (AF_LOCAL).
Reviewed by: iedowse
Approved by: rwatson
linuxulator so as to allow privileged processes within a jail() to
invoke the Linux initgroups() system call. This allows the Linux
"su" to work properly (better) when running a complete Linux
environment under jail(). This problem was reported by Attila
Nagy <bra@fsn.hu>.
Reviewed by: marcel
fs_contigdirs, fs_avgfilesize and fs_avgfpdir. This could cause
panics if these fields were zeroed while a filesystem was mounted
read-only, and then remounted read-write.
Add code to ffs_reload() which copies the fs_contigdirs pointer
from the previous superblock, and reinitialises fs_avgf* if necessary.
Reviewed by: mckusick
With the recent changes in the CAM error handling, some problems in
the error handling of sa(4) have been uncovered. Basically, a number
of conditions that are not actually errors have been mistreated as
genuine errors. In particular:
. Trying to read in variable length mode with a mismatched blocksize
between the on-tape (virtual) blocks and the read(2) supplied buffer
size, causing an ILI SCSI condition, have caused an attempt to retry
the supposedly `errored' transfer, causing the tape to be read
continuously until it eventually hit EOM. Since by default any
simple mt(1) operation does an initial test read, an `mt stat' was
sufficient to trigger this bug.
Note that it's Justin's opinion that treating a NO SENSE as an EIO
is another bug in CAM. I feel not authorized to fix cam_periph.c
without another confirmation that i'm on the right track, however.
. Hitting a filemark caused the read(2) syscall to return EIO, instead
of returning a `short read'. Note that the current fix only solves
this problem in variable length mode. Fixed length mode uses a
different code path, and since i didn't grok all the intentions behind
that handling, i did not touch it (IOW: it's still broken, and you get
an EIO upon hitting a filemark).
The solution is to keep track of those conditions inside saerror(),
and upon completion to not call cam_periph_error() in that case. We
need to make sure that the device gets unfrozen if needed though (in
case of actual errors, cam_periph_error() does this on our behalf).
Not objected by: mjacob (who currently doesn't have the time to
review the patch)
semantics don't: in practice, both policy and semantics permit
loop-back debugging operations, only it's just a subset of debugging
operations (i.e., a proc can open its own /dev/mem), and that's at a
higher layer.
This is will be required to prevent lowering the ipl when a critical_enter()
is present in the interrupt path when handling a machine check.
reviewed by: jhb
