to become negative. This will detect the underflow when it
happens, instead of having it discovered when the vnode is
taken off the freelist, long after the offending process is long
gone.
specific privilege names to a broad range of privileges. These may
require some future tweaking.
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.
This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA
vn_finished_write() should also be called only then.
BTW. I fixed two functions here: vn_rdwr() and vn_write(). The latter seems
to be unused.
MFC after: 3 weeks
and use that instead of testing fdidx against -1 to determine if it should
release Giant if Giant was locked due to the requested file residing on a
non-MPSAFE VFS.
Discussed with: jeff
Fix detection of active unlinked files by checking VI_OWEINACT and
VI_DOINGINACT in addition to v_usecount.
Defer inactive handling for unlinked files if the file system is mostly
suspended (secondary writes being blocked).
Perform deferred inactive handling after the file system is resumed.
replacement for vn_write_suspend_wait() to better account for secondary write
processing.
Close race where secondary writes could be started after ffs_sync() returned
but before the file system was marked as suspended.
Detect if secondary writes or softdep processing occurred during vnode sync
loop in ffs_sync() and retry the loop if needed.
caller by saving the stack of the last locker/unlocker in lockmgr. We
also put the stack in KTR at the moment.
Contributed by: Antoine Brodin <antoine.brodin@laposte.net>
used to ensure that we weren't exiting the syscall with a lock still
held. This wasn't safe, however, because we'd already executed a vput()
and on a loaded system the vnode may have been free'd by the time we
assert. This functionality is also handled by the td_locks assert in
userret, which doesn't tell you what the syscall was, but will at least
panic before you deadlock.
Sponsored by: Isilon Systems, Inc.
Discovred by: Peter Holm
Approved by: re (blanket vfs)
as I'd like to get rid of the vxthread.
- Handle lock requests which don't actually want a lock as this is a
much more convenient place to handle this condition than in vget().
These requests simply want to know that VI_DOOMED isn't set.
- Correct a test at the end of vn_lock, if error !=0 should be
if error == 0, this has been broken since I comitted the VI_DOOMED
changes, but no one ran into it because vget() duplicated this
functionality.
Sponsored by: Isilon Systems, Inc.
on an unlinked file. We can't know if this is the case until after we
have the lock.
- Lock the vnode in vn_close, many filesystems had code which was unsafe
without the lock held, and holding it greatly simplifies vgone().
- Adjust vn_lock() to check for the VI_DOOMED flag where appropriate.
Sponsored by: Isilon Systems, Inc.
vn_extattr_rm. This is meant to catch conditions where IO_NODELOCKED
has been specified without the vnode being locked.
Discussed with: rwatson
MFC after: 1 week
- Protect access to mnt_kern_flag with the mountpoint mutex.
- Use the appropriate nd flags to deal with giant in vn_open_cred().
We currently determine whether the caller is mpsafe by checking
for a valid fdidx. Any caller coming from user-space is now
mpsafe and supplies a valid fd. No kenrel callers have been
converted to mpsafe, so this check is sufficient for now.
- Use VFS_LOCK_GIANT instead of manual giant acquisition where
appropriate.
Sponsored By: Isilon Systems, Inc.
I'm not sure why a credential was added to these in the first place, it is
not used anywhere and it doesn't make much sense:
The credentials for syncing a file (ability to write to the
file) should be checked at the system call level.
Credentials for syncing one or more filesystems ("none")
should be checked at the system call level as well.
If the filesystem implementation needs a particular credential
to carry out the syncing it would logically have to the
cached mount credential, or a credential cached along with
any delayed write data.
Discussed with: rwatson
Don't grab Giant in the upper syscall/wrapper code
NET_LOCK_GIANT in the socket code (sockets/fifos).
mtx_lock(&Giant) in the vnode code.
mtx_lock(&Giant) in the opencrypto code. (This may actually not be
needed, but better safe than sorry).
Devfs grabs Giant if the driver is marked as needing Giant.
Don't grab Giant in the upper syscall/wrapper code
NET_LOCK_GIANT in the socket code (sockets/fifos).
mtx_lock(&Giant) in the vnode code.
Devfs grabs Giant if the driver is marked as needing Giant.
We keep si_bsize_phys around for now as that is the simplest way to pull
the number out of disk device drivers in devfs_open(). The correct solution
would be to do an ioctl(DIOCGSECTORSIZE), but the point is probably mooth
when filesystems sit on GEOM, so don't bother for now.
a more complete subsystem, and removes the knowlege of how things are
implemented from the drivers. Include locking around filter ops, so a
module like aio will know when not to be unloaded if there are outstanding
knotes using it's filter ops.
Currently, it uses the MTX_DUPOK even though it is not always safe to
aquire duplicate locks. Witness currently doesn't support the ability
to discover if a dup lock is ok (in some cases).
Reviewed by: green, rwatson (both earlier versions)
catch leaking into VFS without Giant.
Inch Giant a little lower in several file descriptor operations on
vnodes to cover only VFS operations that need it, rather than file
flag reading, etc.
Giant conditional on debug.mpsafenet in the socket soo_stat() routine,
unconditionally in vn_statfile() for VFS, and otherwise don't acquire
Giant. Accept an unlocked read in kqueue_stat(), and cryptof_stat() is
a no-op. Don't acquire Giant in fstat() system call.
Note: in fdescfs, fo_stat() is called while holding Giant due to the VFS
stack sitting on top, and therefore there will still be Giant recursion
in this case.
individual file object implementations can optionally acquire Giant if
they require it:
- soo_close(): depends on debug.mpsafenet
- pipe_close(): Giant not acquired
- kqueue_close(): Giant required
- vn_close(): Giant required
- cryptof_close(): Giant required (conservative)
Notes:
Giant is still acquired in close() even when closing MPSAFE objects
due to kqueue requiring Giant in the calling closef() code.
Microbenchmarks indicate that this removal of Giant cuts 3%-3% off
of pipe create/destroy pairs from user space with SMP compiled into
the kernel.
The cryptodev and opencrypto code appears MPSAFE, but I'm unable to
test it extensively and so have left Giant over fo_close(). It can
probably be removed given some testing and review.
size_t and size_t *, respectively. Update callers for the new interface.
This is a better fix for overflows that occurred when dumping segments
larger than 2GB to core files.
descriptors out of fdrop_locked() and into vn_closefile(). This
removes all knowledge of vnodes from fdrop_locked(), since the lock
behavior was specific to vnodes. This also removes the specific
requirement for Giant in fdrop_locked(), it's now only required by
code that it calls into.
Add GIANT_REQUIRED to vn_closefile() since VFS requires Giant.
