To make it easier to understand how Capsicum interacts with linkat() and
renameat(), rename the rights to CAP_{LINK,RENAME}AT_{SOURCE,TARGET}.
This also addresses a shortcoming in Capsicum, where it isn't possible
to disable linking to files stored in a directory. Creating hardlinks
essentially makes it possible to access files with additional rights.
Reviewed by: rwatson, wblock
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3411
Off by default, build behaves normally.
WITH_META_MODE we get auto objdir creation, the ability to
start build from anywhere in the tree.
Still need to add real targets under targets/ to build packages.
Differential Revision: D2796
Reviewed by: brooks imp
columns available anyway. Also left align as we tend to do for flags
fields, although you can't see that currently as the string fully fills
that available columns.
MFC after: 3 days
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
flag to procstat.
- Add an -H flag to request information about threads rather than processes
when dumping statistics. Currently it is only used for -r to display
resource usage for individual threads instead of the entire process.
Reviewed by: kib (older version without -H)
MFC after: 1 month
a very hard time to fully understand) with much more intuitive rights:
CAP_EVENT - when set on descriptor, the descriptor can be monitored
with syscalls like select(2), poll(2), kevent(2).
CAP_KQUEUE_EVENT - When set on a kqueue descriptor, the kevent(2)
syscall can be called on this kqueue to with the eventlist
argument set to non-NULL value; in other words the given
kqueue descriptor can be used to monitor other descriptors.
CAP_KQUEUE_CHANGE - When set on a kqueue descriptor, the kevent(2)
syscall can be called on this kqueue to with the changelist
argument set to non-NULL value; in other words it allows to
modify events monitored with the given kqueue descriptor.
Add alias CAP_KQUEUE, which allows for both CAP_KQUEUE_EVENT and
CAP_KQUEUE_CHANGE.
Add backward compatibility define CAP_POLL_EVENT which is equal to CAP_EVENT.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 days
user. Kqueue now saves the ucred of the allocating thread, to
correctly decrement the counter on close.
Under some specific and not real-world use scenario for kqueue, it is
possible for the kqueues to consume memory proportional to the square
of the number of the filedescriptors available to the process. Limit
allows administrator to prevent the abuse.
This is kernel-mode side of the change, with the user-mode enabling
commit following.
Reported and tested by: pho
Discussed with: jmg
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
info from a process core file.
So now one can run procstat(1) on a process core e.g. to get a list of
files opened by a process when it crashed:
root@lisa:/ # procstat -f /root/vi.core
PID COMM FD T V FLAGS REF OFFSET PRO NAME
658 vi text v r r-------- - - - /usr/bin/vi
658 vi ctty v c rw------- - - - /dev/pts/0
658 vi cwd v d r-------- - - - /root
658 vi root v d r-------- - - - /
658 vi 0 v c rw------- 11 3208 - /dev/pts/0
658 vi 1 v c rw------- 11 3208 - /dev/pts/0
658 vi 2 v c rw------- 11 3208 - /dev/pts/0
658 vi 3 v r r----n-l- 1 0 - /tmp/vi.0AYKz3Lps7
658 vi 4 v r rw------- 1 0 - /var/tmp/vi.recover/vi.GaGYsz
658 vi 5 v r rw------- 1 0 - -
PR: kern/173723
Suggested by: jhb
MFC after: 1 month
int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen);
int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen);
which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a
path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'.
- Add manual pages for the new syscalls.
- Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox.
- Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on
the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work.
- Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path
in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor.
- Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights.
- Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2).
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
