Commit Graph

65 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Robert Watson
15bcf785ba Audit arguments to POSIX message queues, semaphores, and shared memory.
This requires minor changes to the audit framework to allow capturing
paths that are not filesystem paths (i.e., will not be canonicalised
relative to the process current working directory and/or filesystem
root).

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
MFC after:	3 weeks
Sponsored by:	DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-31 13:43:00 +00:00
Jamie Gritton
44c16975a2 Clean up some style(9) violations. 2016-04-14 17:07:26 +00:00
Jamie Gritton
cc7b259a26 Separate POSIX sem/shm objects in jails, by prepending the jail's path
name to the object's "path".  While the objects don't have real path
names, it's a filesystem-like namespace, which allows jails to be
kept to their own space, but still allows the system / jail parent to
access a jail's IPC.

PR:		208082
2016-04-13 20:14:13 +00:00
Sergey Kandaurov
ef88ae77ea Call ksem_get() with initialized 'rights'.
ksem_get() consumes fget(), and it's mandatory there.

Reported by:	truckman
Reviewed by:	mjg
2015-07-23 23:18:03 +00:00
Mateusz Guzik
90f54cbfeb fd: remove filedesc argument from fdclose
Just accept a thread instead. This makes it consistent with fdalloc.

No functional changes.
2015-04-11 15:40:28 +00:00
Mateusz Guzik
e015b1ab0a Avoid dynamic syscall overhead for statically compiled modules.
The kernel tracks syscall users so that modules can safely unregister them.

But if the module is not unloadable or was compiled into the kernel, there is
no need to do this.

Achieve this by adding SY_THR_STATIC_KLD macro which expands to SY_THR_STATIC
during kernel build and 0 otherwise.

Reviewed by:	kib (previous version)
MFC after:	2 weeks
2014-10-26 19:42:44 +00:00
John Baldwin
9696feebe2 Add a new fo_fill_kinfo fileops method to add type-specific information to
struct kinfo_file.
- Move the various fill_*_info() methods out of kern_descrip.c and into the
  various file type implementations.
- Rework the support for kinfo_ofile to generate a suitable kinfo_file object
  for each file and then convert that to a kinfo_ofile structure rather than
  keeping a second, different set of code that directly manipulates
  type-specific file information.
- Remove the shm_path() and ksem_info() layering violations.

Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D775
Reviewed by:	kib, glebius (earlier version)
2014-09-22 16:20:47 +00:00
John Baldwin
2d69d0dcc2 Fix various issues with invalid file operations:
- Add invfo_rdwr() (for read and write), invfo_ioctl(), invfo_poll(),
  and invfo_kqfilter() for use by file types that do not support the
  respective operations.  Home-grown versions of invfo_poll() were
  universally broken (they returned an errno value, invfo_poll()
  uses poll_no_poll() to return an appropriate event mask).  Home-grown
  ioctl routines also tended to return an incorrect errno (invfo_ioctl
  returns ENOTTY).
- Use the invfo_*() functions instead of local versions for
  unsupported file operations.
- Reorder fileops members to match the order in the structure definition
  to make it easier to spot missing members.
- Add several missing methods to linuxfileops used by the OFED shim
  layer: fo_write(), fo_truncate(), fo_kqfilter(), and fo_stat().  Most
  of these used invfo_*(), but a dummy fo_stat() implementation was
  added.
2014-09-12 21:29:10 +00:00
Robert Watson
4a14441044 Update kernel inclusions of capability.h to use capsicum.h instead; some
further refinement is required as some device drivers intended to be
portable over FreeBSD versions rely on __FreeBSD_version to decide whether
to include capability.h.

MFC after:	3 weeks
2014-03-16 10:55:57 +00:00
Pawel Jakub Dawidek
7008be5bd7 Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.

The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.

The structure definition looks like this:

	struct cap_rights {
		uint64_t	cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
	};

The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.

The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.

The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.

To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.

	#define	CAP_PDKILL	CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)

We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:

	#define	CAP_LOOKUP	CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
	#define	CAP_FCHMOD	CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)

	#define	CAP_FCHMODAT	(CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)

There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:

	cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
	void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
	void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
	bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);

	bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
	void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
	void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
	bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);

Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:

	cap_rights_t rights;

	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);

There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:

	#define	cap_rights_set(rights, ...)				\
		__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
	void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);

Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:

	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);

Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.

This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.

Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
Gleb Smirnoff
ca04d21d5f Make sendfile() a method in the struct fileops. Currently only
vnode backed file descriptors have this method implemented.

Reviewed by:	kib
Sponsored by:	Nginx, Inc.
Sponsored by:	Netflix
2013-08-15 07:54:31 +00:00
John Baldwin
958aa57537 Similar to 233760 and 236717, export some more useful info about the
kernel-based POSIX semaphore descriptors to userland via procstat(1) and
fstat(1):
- Change sem file descriptors to track the pathname they are associated
  with and add a ksem_info() method to copy the path out to a
  caller-supplied buffer.
- Use the fo_stat() method of shared memory objects and ksem_info() to
  export the path, mode, and value of a semaphore via struct kinfo_file.
- Add a struct semstat to the libprocstat(3) interface along with a
  procstat_get_sem_info() to export the mode and value of a semaphore.
- Teach fstat about semaphores and to display their path, mode, and value.

MFC after:	2 weeks
2013-05-03 21:11:57 +00:00
Jilles Tjoelker
1e367efa8b sem: Restart the POSIX sem_* calls after signals with SA_RESTART set.
Programs often do not expect an [EINTR] return from sem_wait() and POSIX
only allows it if the signal was installed without SA_RESTART. The timeout
in sem_timedwait() is absolute so it can be restarted normally.

The umtx call can be invoked with a relative timeout and in that case
[ERESTART] must be changed to [EINTR]. However, libc does not do this.

The old POSIX semaphore implementation did this correctly (before r249566),
unlike the new umtx one.

It may be desirable to avoid [EINTR] completely, which matches the pthread
functions and is explicitly permitted by POSIX. However, the kernel must
return [EINTR] at least for signals with SA_RESTART clear, otherwise pthread
cancellation will not abort a semaphore wait. In this commit, only restore
the 8.x behaviour which is also permitted by POSIX.

Discussed with:	jhb
MFC after:	1 week
2013-04-19 10:16:00 +00:00
John Baldwin
8916af883c - Document that sem_wait() can fail with EINTR if it is interrupted by a
signal.
- Fix the old ksem implementation for POSIX semaphores to not restart
  sem_wait() or sem_timedwait() if interrupted by a signal.

MFC after:	1 week
2013-04-16 20:26:31 +00:00
Jilles Tjoelker
b68cf25fe6 mqueue,ksem,shm: Fix race condition with setting UF_EXCLOSE.
POSIX mqueue, compatibility ksem and POSIX shm create a file descriptor that
has close-on-exec set. However, they do this incorrectly, leaving a window
where a thread may fork and exec while the flag has not been set yet. The
race is easily reproduced on a multicore system with one thread doing
shm_open and close and another thread doing posix_spawnp and waitpid.

Set UF_EXCLOSE via falloc()'s flags argument instead. This also simplifies
the code.

MFC after:	1 week
2013-04-07 15:26:09 +00:00
Pawel Jakub Dawidek
2609222ab4 Merge Capsicum overhaul:
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
  has set of its own capability rights.

- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
  should not be used in new code.

- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
  cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
  without creating a new one.

- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).

- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
  ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
  ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.

- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
  that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
  them with cap_fcntls_get(2).

- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
  heavly modified.

- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
  recognize new syscalls.

- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
  backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
  that are described in detail below:

	CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
	- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
	- Allow for linkat(2).
	- Allow for symlinkat(2).
	CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
	- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.

	Added CAP_LINKAT:
	- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
	- Allow to be target for renameat(2).

	Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
	- Allow for symlinkat(2).

	Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
	- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
	- Allow to be source for renameat(2).

	Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
	- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.

	Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
	- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.

	Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
	- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
	- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
	  call.

	Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.

	CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
	- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
	  PROT_WRITE.
	CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
	- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.

	Added CAP_MMAP_R:
	- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
	Added CAP_MMAP_W:
	- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
	Added CAP_MMAP_X:
	- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
	Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
	- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
	Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
	- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
	Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
	- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
	Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
	- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).

	Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
	Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
	Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.

	CAP_READ old behaviour:
	- Allow pread(2).
	- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
	CAP_READ new behaviour:
	- Allow read(2), readv(2).
	- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).

	CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
	- Allow pwrite(2).
	- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
	CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
	- Allow write(2), writev(2).
	- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).

	Added convinient defines:

	#define	CAP_PREAD		(CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
	#define	CAP_PWRITE		(CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
	#define	CAP_MMAP_R		(CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
	#define	CAP_MMAP_W		(CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
	#define	CAP_MMAP_X		(CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
	#define	CAP_MMAP_RW		(CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
	#define	CAP_MMAP_RX		(CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
	#define	CAP_MMAP_WX		(CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
	#define	CAP_MMAP_RWX		(CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
	#define	CAP_RECV		CAP_READ
	#define	CAP_SEND		CAP_WRITE

	#define	CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
		(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
		 CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
	#define	CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
		(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
		 CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
		 CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)

	Added defines for backward API compatibility:

	#define	CAP_MAPEXEC		CAP_MMAP_X
	#define	CAP_DELETE		CAP_UNLINKAT
	#define	CAP_MKDIR		CAP_MKDIRAT
	#define	CAP_RMDIR		CAP_UNLINKAT
	#define	CAP_MKFIFO		CAP_MKFIFOAT
	#define	CAP_MKNOD		CAP_MKNODAT
	#define	CAP_SOCK_ALL		(CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)

Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by:	Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with:	rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with:	kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
Kip Macy
8451d0dd78 In order to maximize the re-usability of kernel code in user space this
patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility
calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel
entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also
fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function
psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel
psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future
MFCs that change syscalls.

Reviewed by:	rwatson
Approved by:	re (bz)
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
Konstantin Belousov
68889ed699 Fix build breakage. Initialize error variables explicitely for !MAC case.
Pointy hat to:	kib
Approved by:	re (bz)
2011-08-17 12:37:14 +00:00
Konstantin Belousov
9c00bb9190 Add the fo_chown and fo_chmod methods to struct fileops and use them
to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types
that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod done on
posix shared memory and (old) in-kernel posix semaphores.

Based on the submission by:	glebius
Reviewed by:	rwatson
Approved by:	re (bz)
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
Robert Watson
a9d2f8d84f Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD
kernel for FreeBSD 9.0:

Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system
call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file
descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *.  With options
CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability
protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op.

Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve
information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory
map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by
narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar
purposes with file permissions.

In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability
mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there.
This will follow in a later commit.

Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become
CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they
represent.

Approved by:	re (bz)
Submitted by:	jonathan
Sponsored by:	Google Inc
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
Konstantin Belousov
1fe80828e7 After the r219999 is merged to stable/8, rename fallocf(9) to falloc(9)
and remove the falloc() version that lacks flag argument. This is done
to reduce the KPI bloat.

Requested by:	jhb
X-MFC-note:	do not
2011-04-01 13:28:34 +00:00
Alexander Leidinger
9a253c101e Make the description of the feature consistent with another similar
description for another feature.

Noticed by:	trasz
2011-02-25 12:46:43 +00:00
Alexander Leidinger
de5b19526b Add some FEATURE macros for various features (AUDIT/CAM/IPC/KTR/MAC/NFS/NTP/
PMC/SYSV/...).

No FreeBSD version bump, the userland application to query the features will
be committed last and can serve as an indication of the availablility if
needed.

Sponsored by:   Google Summer of Code 2010
Submitted by:   kibab
Reviewed by:    arch@ (parts by rwatson, trasz, jhb)
X-MFC after:    to be determined in last commit with code from this project
2011-02-25 10:11:01 +00:00
John Baldwin
2e7758a8f6 Set the POSIX semaphore capability when the semaphore module is enabled.
This is ignored in HEAD where semaphores are marked as always enabled in
<unistd.h>.

MFC after:	1 week
2010-11-19 17:57:50 +00:00
Konstantin Belousov
3286375480 Add a facility to dynamically adjust or unconfigure p1003_1b mib.
Use it to allow to tune sem_nsem_max at runtime, only when sem.ko
module is present in kernel.

Requested and tested by:	amdmi3
Reviewed by:	jhb
MFC after:	3 days
2010-06-02 09:59:05 +00:00
Ed Schouten
510ea843ba Rename st_*timespec fields to st_*tim for POSIX 2008 compliance.
A nice thing about POSIX 2008 is that it finally standardizes a way to
obtain file access/modification/change times in sub-second precision,
namely using struct timespec, which we already have for a very long
time. Unfortunately POSIX uses different names.

This commit adds compatibility macros, so existing code should still
build properly. Also change all source code in the kernel to work
without any of the compatibility macros. This makes it all a less
ambiguous.

I am also renaming st_birthtime to st_birthtim, even though it was a
local extension anyway. It seems Cygwin also has a st_birthtim.
2010-03-28 13:13:22 +00:00
Konstantin Belousov
0e5d5bc279 Implement compat32 shims for ksem syscalls.
Reviewed by:	jhb
MFC after:	2 weeks
2010-03-19 11:08:43 +00:00
David Xu
9b0f1823b5 Use umtx to implement process sharable semaphore, to make this work,
now type sema_t is a structure which can be put in a shared memory area,
and multiple processes can operate it concurrently.
User can either use mmap(MAP_SHARED) + sem_init(pshared=1) or use sem_open()
to initialize a shared semaphore.
Named semaphore uses file system and is located in /tmp directory, and its
file name is prefixed with 'SEMD', so now it is chroot or jail friendly.
In simplist cases, both for named and un-named semaphore, userland code
does not have to enter kernel to reduce/increase semaphore's count.
The semaphore is designed to be crash-safe, it means even if an application
is crashed in the middle of operating semaphore, the semaphore state is
still safely recovered by later use, there is no waiter counter maintained
by userland code.
The main semaphore code is in libc and libthr only has some necessary stubs,
this makes it possible that a non-threaded application can use semaphore
without linking to thread library.
Old semaphore implementation is kept libc to maintain binary compatibility.
The kernel ksem API is no longer used in the new implemenation.

Discussed on: threads@
2010-01-05 02:37:59 +00:00
Robert Watson
bcf11e8d00 Move "options MAC" from opt_mac.h to opt_global.h, as it's now in GENERIC
and used in a large number of files, but also because an increasing number
of incorrect uses of MAC calls were sneaking in due to copy-and-paste of
MAC-aware code without the associated opt_mac.h include.

Discussed with:	pjd
2009-06-05 14:55:22 +00:00
Bruce M Simpson
77d8bf9cc7 Ensure that the semaphore value is re-checked after sem_lock
is re-acquired, after the condition variable is signalled.

PR:             http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=kern/127545
MFC after:      5 days
Reviewed by:    attilio
2009-03-12 10:36:39 +00:00
Bruce M Simpson
b2966a5a2f Make semaphore debugging output more useful.
PR:             http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=kern/127545
MFC after:      5 days
Submitted by:   Philip Semanchuk
2009-03-12 10:34:16 +00:00
John Baldwin
6bc1e9cd84 Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX
semaphores.  Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file
descriptor type that is set to close on exec.  This removes the need for
all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit
event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of
that for us nicely.  It is also suggested as one possible implementation
in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach.

Some bugs that were fixed as a result include:
- References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after
  the sem_unlink() operation.  Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name
  was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from
  sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc.  This fixes that.
- Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a
  process exited or exec'd.  They were only cleaned up if the process
  did an explicit sem_destroy().  This could result in a leak of semaphore
  objects that could never be cleaned up.
- On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to
  'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had
  write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other
  process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(),
  sem_wait(), etc.
- As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces
  creating the semaphore was not honored.  Thus if your umask denied group
  read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed
  it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the
  same group, for example.  This includes access via the previous bug.
- If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores,
  then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system
  calls before it noticed that there was a problem.  I'm not sure if
  this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the
  kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked.  One can
  make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event
  handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during
  unload after any checks).  This also fixes a race where even if the
  sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the
  syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when
  they are unloaded.

  XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking
  to drain any threads from the calls.
- Some minor fixes to errno values on error.  For example, sem_init()
  isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores
  the way that sem_open() can.  Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that
  case.

Other changes:
- Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of
  named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory
  object file descriptors.  Kernel semaphores can now also have names
  longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories
  in their pathname.
- The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now
  done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks.
- Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various
  MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an
  active credential.  There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it
  is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor.
- A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present
  in src/tools/regression/posixsem.

Reported by:	kris (1)
Tested by:	kris
Reviewed by:	rwatson (lightly)
MFC after:	1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
John Baldwin
c4f3a35a54 Remove the posixsem_check_destroy() MAC check. It is semantically identical
to doing a MAC check for close(), but no other types of close() (including
close(2) and ksem_close(2)) have MAC checks.

Discussed with:	rwatson
2008-06-23 21:37:53 +00:00
Oleksandr Tymoshenko
c9688a603b Keep proper track of nsegs counter: sem_free is called for all
allocated semaphores, so it's wrong to increase it conditionally,
  in this case for every over-the-limit semaphore nsegs is decreased
  without being previously increased.

  PR:	kern/123685
  Approved by:	cognet (mentor)
2008-06-10 20:55:10 +00:00
Robert Watson
8e230e30b7 Attempt to improve convergence of POSIX semaphore code with style(9).
MFC after:	3 days
2008-05-16 18:10:07 +00:00
Robert Watson
57d7e86b65 Free MAC label on a POSIX semaphore when the semaphore is freed.
MFC after:	3 days
Submitted by:	jhb
2008-01-07 22:03:19 +00:00
Robert Watson
30d239bc4c Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:

  mac_<object>_<method/action>
  mac_<object>_check_<method/action>

The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme.  Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier.  Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods.  Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.

All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.

Sponsored by:	SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
Robert Watson
873fbcd776 Further system call comment cleanup:
- Remove also "MP SAFE" after prior "MPSAFE" pass. (suggested by bde)
- Remove extra blank lines in some cases.
- Add extra blank lines in some cases.
- Remove no-op comments consisting solely of the function name, the word
  "syscall", or the system call name.
- Add punctuation.
- Re-wrap some comments.
2007-03-05 13:10:58 +00:00
Tom Rhodes
6aeb05d7be Merge posix4/* into normal kernel hierarchy.
Reviewed by:	glanced at by jhb
Approved by:	silence on -arch@ and -standards@
2006-11-11 16:26:58 +00:00
Robert Watson
acd3428b7d Sweep kernel replacing suser(9) calls with priv(9) calls, assigning
specific privilege names to a broad range of privileges.  These may
require some future tweaking.

Sponsored by:           nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from:          TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on:           arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
                        Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
                        Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
                        Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
Robert Watson
aed5570872 Complete break-out of sys/sys/mac.h into sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h.  sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.

This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA
2006-10-22 11:52:19 +00:00
Colin Percival
e2d70dbae1 Swap the names "sem_exithook" and "sem_exechook" in the previous commit to
match up with reality and the prototype definitions.

Register the sem_exechook as the "process_exec" event handler, not
sem_exithook.

Submitted by:	rdivacky
Sponsored by:	SoC 2006
2006-08-16 08:25:40 +00:00
Alexander Leidinger
993182e57c - Change process_exec function handlers prototype to include struct
image_params arg.
- Change struct image_params to include struct sysentvec pointer and
  initialize it.
- Change all consumers of process_exit/process_exec eventhandlers to
  new prototypes (includes splitting up into distinct exec/exit functions).
- Add eventhandler to userret.

Sponsored by:		Google SoC 2006
Submitted by:		rdivacky
Parts suggested by:	jhb (on hackers@)
2006-08-15 12:10:57 +00:00
Robert Watson
c1250af683 Convert remaining functions to ANSI C function declarations.
MFC after:	1 week
2006-01-22 00:30:46 +00:00
Stefan Farfeleder
d60e86c86e Const-qualify ksem_timedwait's parameter abstime as it's only passed in. 2005-10-18 11:46:24 +00:00
Robert Watson
e2f7a83d6b In sem_forkhook(), don't attempt to generate a copy of the process semaphore
list on fork() if the process doesn't actually have references to any
semaphores.  This avoids extra work, as well as potentially asking to
allocate storage for 0 references.

Found by:	avatar
MFC after:	1 week
2005-06-08 07:29:22 +00:00
Robert Watson
5264841183 Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control
access to POSIX Semaphores:

mac_init_posix_sem()            Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem()          Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem()         Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy()   Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue()  Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open()     Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post()      Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink()    Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait()      Check whether may wait on semaphore

Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.

Submitted by:	Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by:	DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
Robert Watson
97cce3269c Move definitions of 'struct kuser' and 'struct ksem' from uipc_sem.c
to ksem.h so that they are accessible from the MAC Framework for the
purposes of labeling and enforcing additional protections.  #error
if these are included without _KERNEL, since they are not intended
(nor installed) for user application use.

Submitted by:	Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by:	DARPA, SPARTA
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-03 20:21:24 +00:00
Robert Watson
fa6fc5b819 Insert missing increment of (i) when walking the temporary semaphore
vector during fork.

Fix assertion which contained an off-by-one error.

Submitted by:	Antoine Brodin < antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net >
2005-02-25 21:00:14 +00:00
Robert Watson
590f242cc0 Add an exit hook, sem_forkhook(), which walks the list of POSIX semaphores
owned by a process when it forks, and creates a matching set of references
for the child process, as prescribed by POSIX.

In order to avoid races with other threads in the parent process during
fork(), it is necessary to allocate a temporary reference list while
holding the sem_lock, then transfer those references to the new process
once the sem_lock is released.  The implementation is inefficient but
appears functional; in order to improve the efficiency, it will be
necessary to modify the existing structures and logic, which generally
rely on O(n) operations over the global set of semaphores.
2005-02-25 19:10:51 +00:00