This fixes a number of possible strcpy() buffer overruns between the various
community strings in trap.c.
Reported by: Coverity
CIDs: 1006820, 1006821, 1006822
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon Storage Division
This will also now detect error conditions with
value->var.subs[sub - 1] == LEAF_ifPhysAddress where `string_get(..)`
could fail if iifp->physaddr and/or iifp->physaddrlen were deemed
invalid.
MFC after: 2 weeks
CID: 1006551
Reported by: Coverity, gcc
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon Storage Division
- xalloc(..) ensures that e will be non-null via malloc + err.
- `e` is already dereferenced above, so logically it's impossible
to hit the lower test without crashing if it was indeed NULL.
MFC after: 3 days
CID: 1007408
Reported by: Coverity
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon Storage Division
struct tcpstat, because the structure can be zeroed out by netstat(1) -z,
and of course running connection counts shouldn't be touched.
Place running connection counts into separate array, and provide
separate read-only sysctl oid for it.
as otherwise platforms with strict alignment would break. It's unclear
to me if there's also a problem with access to the address list following
the structure. However we never copied the address list after the structure
and thus are pointing at random memory. For now just use a pointer to the
original memory for accessing the address list making it at least work on
platforms with weak memory access.
PR: 195445
Reported by: wolfgang lyxys.ka.sub.org
Tested by: wolfgang lyxys.ka.sub.org (x86)
MFC after: 3 days
- Set IP_RECVDSTADDR sockopt on the socket only in case if
it is INADDR_ANY bound.
- Supply IP_SENDSRCADDR control message only if we did receive
IP_RECVDSTADDR control message.
This fixes operation of snmpd bound to a specific local IP address.
PR: bin/171279
IP_SENDSRCADDR control with datagram message we reply with. This makes
bsnmpd reply from exactly same address that request was sent to, thus
successfully bypassing stateful firewalls or other kinds of strict checking.
PR: bin/171279
from the control message, actually never worked. This means check_priv()
didn't work for local dgram sockets.
The SCM_CREDS control messages is received only in two cases:
1) If we did setsockopt(LOCAL_CREDS) on our socket, and in this case
the message is struct sockcred.
2) If sender did supplied SCM_CREDS control message in his sendmsg()
syscall. In this case the message is struct cmsgcred.
We can't rely on 2), so we will use 1) for dgram sockets. For stream
sockets it is more reliable to obtain accept-time credentials, since
SCM_CREDS control message is attached only on first read. Thus:
o Do setsockopt(LOCAL_CREDS) on local dgram sockets.
o Split check_priv() into check_priv_stream() and check_priv_dgram(),
and call them from recv_stream() and recv_dgram() respectively.
o Don't provide space for SCM_CREDS control message in recv_stream().
o Provide space for SCM_CREDS control message in recv_dgram(), but there
is no need to initialize anything in it.
o In recv_dgram() do not blindly expect that first message is SCM_CREDS,
instead use correct search cycle through control messages.
