Revamp sbuf_put_byte() to sbuf_put_bytes() in the obvious fashion and
fixup callers.
Add a thin shim around sbuf_put_bytes() with the old ABI to avoid ugly
changes to some callers.
Reviewed by: jhb, markj
Obtained from: Dan Sledz
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon Storage Division
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3717
Values smaller than two lead to strange asserts that have nothing to do
with the actual problem (in the case of size=0), or to writing beyond the
end of the allocated buffer in sbuf_finish() (in the case of size=1).
INCLUDENUL is set and sbuf_finish() has been called, the length has been
incremented to count the nulterm byte, and in that case current length is
allowed to be equal to buffer size, otherwise it must be less than.
Add a predicate macro to test for SBUF_INCLUDENUL, and use it in tests, to
be consistant with the style in the rest of this file.
The SBUF_INCLUDENUL flag causes the nulterm byte at the end of the string
to be counted in the length of the data. If copying the data using the
sbuf_data() and sbuf_len() functions, or if writing it automatically with
a drain function, the net effect is that the nulterm byte is copied along
with the rest of the data.
buffer is greater than 1. This triggered panics in at least one spot in
the kernel (the MAC Framework) which passes non-negative, rather than >1
buffer sizes based on the size of a user buffer passed into a system
call. While 0-size buffers aren't particularly useful, they also aren't
strictly incorrect, so loosen the assertion.
Discussed with: phk (fears I might be EDOOFUS but willing to go along)
Spotted by: pho + stress2
Approved by: re (kib)
is no relevant difference for sbufs, and it increases portability of
the source code.
Split the actual initialization of the sbuf into a separate local
function, so that certain static code checkers can understand
what sbuf_new() does, thus eliminating on silly annoyance of
MISRA compliance testing.
Contributed by: An anonymous company in the last business I
expected sbufs to invade.
choice of default size in the first place)
Reverse the order of arguments to the internal static sbuf_put_byte()
function to match everything else in this file.
Move sbuf_putc_func() inside the kernel version of sbuf_vprintf
where it belongs.
sbuf_putc() incorrectly used sbuf_putc_func() which supress NUL
characters, it should use sbuf_put_byte().
Make sbuf_finish() return -1 on error.
Minor stylistic nits fixed.
Add a drain function for struct sysctl_req, and use it for a variety
of handlers, some of which had to do awkward things to get a large
enough SBUF_FIXEDLEN buffer.
Note that some sysctl handlers were explicitly outputting a trailing
NUL byte. This behaviour was preserved, though it should not be
necessary.
Reviewed by: phk (original patch)
unexpected things in copyout(9) and so wiring the user buffer is not
sufficient to perform a copyout(9) while holding a random mutex.
Requested by: nwhitehorn
code associated with overflow or with the drain function. While this
function is not expected to be used often, it produces more information
in the form of an errno that sbuf_overflowed() did.
handlers, some of which had to do awkward things to get a large enough
FIXEDLEN buffer.
Note that some sysctl handlers were explicitly outputting a trailing NUL
byte. This behaviour was preserved, though it should not be necessary.
Reviewed by: phk
called when the sbuf internal buffer is filled. For kernel sbufs with a
drain, the internal buffer will never be expanded. For userland sbufs
with a drain, the internal buffer may still be expanded by
sbuf_[v]printf(3).
Sbufs now have three basic uses:
1) static string manipulation. Overflow is marked.
2) dynamic string manipulation. Overflow triggers string growth.
3) drained string manipulation. Overflow triggers draining.
In all cases the manipulation is 'safe' in that overflow is detected and
managed.
Reviewed by: phk (the previous version)
because we could fail due to a small buffer and loop and rerun. If this
happens, then the vsnprintf() will have already taken the arguments off
the va_list. For i386 and others, this doesn't matter because the
va_list type is a passed as a copy. But on powerpc and amd64, this is
fatal because the va_list is a reference to an external structure that
keeps the vararg state due to the more complicated argument passing system.
On amd64, arguments can be passed as follows:
First 6 int/pointer type arguments go in registers, the rest go on
the memory stack.
Float and double are similar, except using SSE registers.
long double (80 bit precision) are similar except using the x87 stack.
Where the 'next argument' comes from depends on how many have been
processed so far and what type it is. For amd64, gcc keeps this state
somewhere that is referenced by the va_list.
I found a description that showed the va_copy was required here:
http://mirrors.ccs.neu.edu/cgi-bin/unixhelp/man-cgi?va_end+9
The single unix spec doesn't mention va_copy() at all.
Anyway, the problem was that the sysctl kern.geom.conf* nodes would panic
due to walking off the end of the va_arg lists in vsnprintf. A better fix
would be to have sbuf_vprintf() use a single pass and call kvprintf()
with a callback function that stored the results and grew the buffer
as needed.
Approved by: re (scottl)
automatically extended to prevent overflow.
* Added sbuf_vprintf(); sbuf_printf() is now just a wrapper around
sbuf_vprintf().
* Include <stdio.h> and <string.h> when building libsbuf to silence
WARNS=4 warnings.
Reviewed by: des
