Commit Graph

546 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jeff Roberson
982d11f836 Commit 14/14 of sched_lock decomposition.
- Use thread_lock() rather than sched_lock for per-thread scheduling
   sychronization.
 - Use the per-process spinlock rather than the sched_lock for per-process
   scheduling synchronization.

Tested by:      kris, current@
Tested on:      i386, amd64, ULE, 4BSD, libthr, libkse, PREEMPTION, etc.
Discussed with: kris, attilio, kmacy, jhb, julian, bde (small parts each)
2007-06-05 00:00:57 +00:00
Robert Watson
d8c0f4dc21 Clean up audit comments--formatting, spelling, etc. 2007-06-01 21:58:59 +00:00
Konstantin Belousov
7a31868ed0 Change the VOP_OPEN(), vn_open() vnode operation and d_fdopen() cdev operation
argument from being file descriptor index into the pointer to struct file:
part 2. Convert calls missed in the first big commit.

Noted by:	rwatson
Pointy hat to:	kib
2007-06-01 14:33:11 +00:00
Robert Watson
e1070b644c Remove AUDIT_PRINTF() debugging statements and definition; clean up or
remove associated comments.

Slip audit_file_rotate_wait assignment in audit_rotate_vnode() before
the drop of the global audit mutex.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-06-01 13:53:37 +00:00
Robert Watson
34bf2d2c18 Remove unused !AUDIT audit_proc_*() prototypes: unlike in Mac OS X, we
don't define or use these functions if AUDIT isn't configured.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-05-30 11:41:28 +00:00
Robert Watson
1f84423bdf Synchronize white space to congruent user-space code in OpenBSM.
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-05-30 09:48:37 +00:00
Robert Watson
30474b7260 Remove unused ar_subj_comm field from in-kernel audit record; we never
export this via BSM, so don't pay space/time cost of maintaining it.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-05-30 09:14:14 +00:00
Robert Watson
8f75133bdf Consistent white space after .'s in comments. 2007-05-30 08:39:16 +00:00
Robert Watson
a4a035fd3e No need to force __inline__ of currecord(), as the compiler will usefully
inline it when needed already, and the symbol is also required outside of
audit.c.  This silences a new gcc warning on the topic of using __inline__
instead of __inline.

MFC after:	3 days
2007-05-23 09:32:30 +00:00
Robert Watson
5a9f2d6c56 Short name of kernel audit worker thread from "audit_worker" to "audit".
MFC after:	3 days
2007-05-21 14:08:26 +00:00
Robert Watson
69c4d690b1 Don't expose #ifdef NOTYET parts to userspace via audit_ioctl.h, just
remove them, since the functionality they are associated with isn't there
yet.

MFC after:	3 days
2007-04-29 16:20:32 +00:00
Robert Watson
305759909e Rename mac*devfsdirent*() to mac*devfs*() to synchronize with SEDarwin,
where similar data structures exist to support devfs and the MAC
Framework, but are named differently.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-23 13:36:54 +00:00
Robert Watson
78007886c9 Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions
for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
Robert Watson
26ae2b86b6 Normalize variable naming in the MAC Framework by adopting the normal
variable name conventions for arguments passed into the framework --
for example, name network interfaces 'ifp', sockets 'so', mounts 'mp',
mbufs 'm', processes 'p', etc, wherever possible.  Previously there
was significant variation in this regard.

Normalize copyright lists to ranges where sensible.
2007-04-22 19:55:56 +00:00
Robert Watson
eb542415c0 In the MAC Framework implementation, file systems have two per-mountpoint
labels: the mount label (label of the mountpoint) and the fs label (label
of the file system).  In practice, policies appear to only ever use one,
and the distinction is not helpful.

Combine mnt_mntlabel and mnt_fslabel into a single mnt_label, and
eliminate extra machinery required to maintain the additional label.
Update policies to reflect removal of extra entry points and label.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-22 16:18:10 +00:00
Robert Watson
c14d15ae3e Remove MAC Framework access control check entry points made redundant with
the introduction of priv(9) and MAC Framework entry points for privilege
checking/granting.  These entry points exactly aligned with privileges and
provided no additional security context:

- mac_check_sysarch_ioperm()
- mac_check_kld_unload()
- mac_check_settime()
- mac_check_system_nfsd()

Add mpo_priv_check() implementations to Biba and LOMAC policies, which,
for each privilege, determine if they can be granted to processes
considered unprivileged by those two policies.  These mostly, but not
entirely, align with the set of privileges granted in jails.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 15:31:22 +00:00
Robert Watson
269ad13024 Further MAC test policy cleanup and enhancement:
- Redistribute counter declarations to where they are used, rather than at
  the file header, so it's more clear where we do (and don't) have
  counters.

- Add many more counters, one per policy entry point, so that many
  individual access controls and object life cycle events are tracked.

- Perform counter increments for label destruction explicitly in entry
  point functions rather than in LABEL_DESTROY().

- Use LABEL_INIT() instead of SLOT_SET() directly in label init functions
  to be symmetric with destruction.

- Align counter names more carefully with entry point names.

- More constant and variable name normalization.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 13:29:37 +00:00
Robert Watson
6827d0294e Perform overdue clean up mac_test policy:
- Add a more detailed comment describing the mac_test policy.

- Add COUNTER_DECL() and COUNTER_INC() macros to declare and manage
  various test counters, reducing the verbosity of the test policy
  quite a bit.

- Add LABEL_CHECK() macro to abbreviate normal validation of labels.
  Unlike the previous check macros, this checks for a NULL label and
  doesn't test NULL labels.  This means that optionally passed labels
  will now be handled automatically, although in the case of optional
  credentials, NULL-checks are still required.

- Add LABEL_DESTROY() macro to abbreviate the handling of label
  validation and tear-down.

- Add LABEL_NOTFREE() macro to abbreviate check for non-free labels.

- Normalize the names of counters, magic values.

- Remove unused policy "enabled" flag.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 11:35:15 +00:00
Robert Watson
18717f69b1 Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system
calls.  Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for
audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid().

MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where
additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other
audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9)
entry points.

Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in
some cases, other missing system-related checks.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
Robert Watson
8b65d3135a Remove $P4$ that snuck into CVS from Perforce. 2007-04-17 12:24:18 +00:00
Robert Watson
0e92f0d7dd Merge OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 14 changes to src/sys/security/audit:
- au_to_attr64(), au_to_process64(), au_to_subject64(),
  au_to_subject64_ex(), au_to_zonename(), au_to_header64_tm().
- Extended address token fixes.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-16 16:20:45 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
f0cbfcc468 Fix the handling of IPv6 addresses for subject and process BSM audit
tokens. Currently, we do not support the set{get}audit_addr(2) system
calls which allows processes like sshd to set extended or ip6
information for subject tokens.

The approach that was taken was to change the process audit state
slightly to use an extended terminal ID in the kernel. This allows
us to store both IPv4 IPv6 addresses. In the case that an IPv4 address
is in use, we convert the terminal ID from an struct auditinfo_addr to
a struct auditinfo.

If getaudit(2) is called when the subject is bound to an ip6 address,
we return E2BIG.

- Change the internal audit record to store an extended terminal ID
- Introduce ARG_TERMID_ADDR
- Change the kaudit <-> BSM conversion process so that we are using
  the appropriate subject token. If the address associated with the
  subject is IPv4, we use the standard subject32 token. If the subject
  has an IPv6 address associated with them, we use an extended subject32
  token.
- Fix a couple of endian issues where we do a couple of byte swaps when
  we shouldn't be. IP addresses are already in the correct byte order,
  so reading the ip6 address 4 bytes at a time and swapping them results
  in in-correct address data. It should be noted that the same issue was
  found in the openbsm library and it has been changed there too on the
  vendor branch
- Change A_GETPINFO to use the appropriate structures
- Implement A_GETPINFO_ADDR which basically does what A_GETPINFO does,
  but can also handle ip6 addresses
- Adjust get{set}audit(2) syscalls to convert the data
  auditinfo <-> auditinfo_addr
- Fully implement set{get}audit_addr(2)

NOTE: This adds the ability for processes to correctly set extended subject
information. The appropriate userspace utilities still need to be updated.

MFC after:	1 month
Reviewed by:	rwatson
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD
2007-04-13 14:55:19 +00:00
Robert Watson
5e3f7694b1 Replace custom file descriptor array sleep lock constructed using a mutex
and flags with an sxlock.  This leads to a significant and measurable
performance improvement as a result of access to shared locking for
frequent lookup operations, reduced general overhead, and reduced overhead
in the event of contention.  All of these are imported for threaded
applications where simultaneous access to a shared file descriptor array
occurs frequently.  Kris has reported 2x-4x transaction rate improvements
on 8-core MySQL benchmarks; smaller improvements can be expected for many
workloads as a result of reduced overhead.

- Generally eliminate the distinction between "fast" and regular
  acquisisition of the filedesc lock; the plan is that they will now all
  be fast.  Change all locking instances to either shared or exclusive
  locks.

- Correct a bug (pointed out by kib) in fdfree() where previously msleep()
  was called without the mutex held; sx_sleep() is now always called with
  the sxlock held exclusively.

- Universally hold the struct file lock over changes to struct file,
  rather than the filedesc lock or no lock.  Always update the f_ops
  field last. A further memory barrier is required here in the future
  (discussed with jhb).

- Improve locking and reference management in linux_at(), which fails to
  properly acquire vnode references before using vnode pointers.  Annotate
  improper use of vn_fullpath(), which will be replaced at a future date.

In fcntl(), we conservatively acquire an exclusive lock, even though in
some cases a shared lock may be sufficient, which should be revisited.
The dropping of the filedesc lock in fdgrowtable() is no longer required
as the sxlock can be held over the sleep operation; we should consider
removing that (pointed out by attilio).

Tested by:	kris
Discussed with:	jhb, kris, attilio, jeff
2007-04-04 09:11:34 +00:00
Robert Watson
0c14ff0eb5 Remove 'MPSAFE' annotations from the comments above most system calls: all
system calls now enter without Giant held, and then in some cases, acquire
Giant explicitly.

Remove a number of other MPSAFE annotations in the credential code and
tweak one or two other adjacent comments.
2007-03-04 22:36:48 +00:00
Robert Watson
7405fcc338 More unnecessary include reduction. 2007-02-23 14:39:04 +00:00
Robert Watson
68cb865905 Remove many unneeded includes, update copyright. 2007-02-23 11:21:26 +00:00
Robert Watson
588ff6c0cc Remove empty entry point functions (init, destroy, syscall) from
policies that don't need them.
2007-02-23 11:15:35 +00:00
Robert Watson
faf00eecd4 mac_none sample policy has nothing to enforce, so remove sysctls.
mac_stub acts as a template policy and holds sample sysctls.
2007-02-23 11:08:45 +00:00
Robert Watson
a1f3b8390c Update auditing of socket information for the inpcb new world order:
so_pcb will always be non-NULL, and lock the inpcb while non-atomically
accessing address data.
2007-02-20 13:38:11 +00:00
Robert Watson
d24c76d1f5 Move mapping of MBI_APPEND to MBI_WRITE from inside the rule loop in
mac_bsdextended_check() to before the loop, as it needs to happen only
once.

MFC after:	1 week
2007-02-20 10:21:27 +00:00
Robert Watson
8bd5639f18 Do allow bypass of mac_seeotheruids in jail in order to be consistent
with other uses of PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS.  This will automatically be
scoped to the jail by the jail policy.
2007-02-19 13:25:17 +00:00
Robert Watson
99535caa41 In mac_biba_check_system_swapoff(), don't extract the object label since
it isn't used in the access control decision.  This became visible to
Coverity with the change to a function call retrieving label values.

Coverity CID:	1723
2007-02-10 08:59:39 +00:00
Robert Watson
1ca8672907 Print intptr_t values by first casting to intmax_t and then printing with
%jd, as intptr_t may not be int-sized.

Assistance from:	jhb
Spotted by:		Mr Tinderbox
2007-02-06 17:22:36 +00:00
Robert Watson
0142affc77 Introduce accessor functions mac_label_get() and mac_label_set() to replace
LABEL_TO_SLOT() macro used by policy modules to query and set label data
in struct label.  Instead of using a union, store an intptr_t, simplifying
the API.

Update policies: in most cases this required only small tweaks to current
wrapper macros.  In two cases, a single wrapper macros had to be split into
separate get and set macros.

Move struct label definition from _label.h to mac_internal.h and remove
_label.h.  With this change, policies may now treat struct label * as
opaque, allowing us to change the layout of struct label without breaking
the policy module ABI.  For example, we could make the maximum number of
policies with labels modifiable at boot-time rather than just at
compile-time.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-02-06 14:19:25 +00:00
Robert Watson
c96ae1968a Continue 7-CURRENT MAC Framework rearrangement and cleanup:
Don't perform a nested include of _label.h in mac.h, as mac.h now
describes only  the user API to MAC, and _label.h defines the in-kernel
representation of MAC labels.

Remove mac.h includes from policies and MAC framework components that do
not use userspace MAC API definitions.

Add _KERNEL inclusion checks to mac_internal.h and mac_policy.h, as these
are kernel-only include files

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-02-06 10:59:23 +00:00
Robert Watson
9da038edfd When returning early from audit_arg_file() due to so->so_pcb being NULL
(due to an early reset or the like), remember to unlock the socket lock.
This will not occur in 7-CURRENT, but could in theory occur in 6-STABLE.

MFC after:	1 week
2007-01-06 22:28:28 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
17870c0627 Teach the stub policy about some of the more recent entry points that have
been introduced to the MAC framework:

mpo_associate_nfsd_label
mpo_create_mbuf_from_firewall
mpo_check_system_nfsd
mpo_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade
mpo_check_vnode_mprotect
mpo_init_syncache_label
mpo_destroy_syncache_label
mpo_init_syncache_from_inpcb
mpo_create_mbuf_from_syncache

MFC after:	2 weeks [1]

[1] The syncache related entry points will NOT be MFCed as the changes in
    the syncache subsystem are not present in RELENG_6 yet.
2007-01-01 01:47:18 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
22a0de89ff Remove conditional return of 1. For the MAC_STATIC case at this point in
the code, one being returned is invariant.

Discussed with:	rwatson
MFC after:	1 week
2007-01-01 01:40:29 +00:00
Robert Watson
989d409801 Only signal the CV indicating that the MAC Framework is available for
exclusive access if there is at least one thread waiting for it to
become available.  This may significantly reduce overhead by reducing
the number of unnecessary wakeups issued whenever the framework becomes
idle.

Annotate that we still signal the CV more than necessary and should
fix this.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Reviewed by:	csjp
Tested by:	csjp
2006-12-31 20:26:20 +00:00
Robert Watson
c441d123ef Slightly resort functions in file so that no forward function prototypes
are required.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-29 20:21:21 +00:00
Robert Watson
39b73a30c0 Re-add include of opt_mac.h in mac_framework.c, which was improperly
removed from this file.  It is required to pick up the definition of
MAC_STATIC.
2006-12-29 20:16:29 +00:00
Robert Watson
4cfbab605a Remove two XXX comments that no longer apply.
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-29 11:03:44 +00:00
Robert Watson
aa6fe97ca3 Use p_cansee() to check that a target process for an audit state
manipulation is visible to the subject process.  Remove XXX comments
suggesting this.

Convert one XXX on a difference from Darwin into a note: it's not a
bug, it's a feature.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-29 10:49:13 +00:00
Robert Watson
dc97e8c70a Add a witness sleep warning to canon_path(), which invokes vput() and hence
may perform an unbounded sleep.  Remove an XXX comment suggesting that one
be added.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-29 10:37:32 +00:00
Robert Watson
d02188c146 Add missing include guards to mac_internal.h, update include guards in
mac_policy.h following move to new location in src/sys/security/mac.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-28 23:23:35 +00:00
Robert Watson
1afabae4db Update a number of comments:
- Replace XXX with Note: in several cases where observations are made about
  future functionality rather than problems or bugs.

- Remove an XXX comment about byte order and au_to_ip() -- IP headers must
  be submitted in network byte order.  Add a comment to this effect.

- Mention that we don't implement select/poll for /dev/audit.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-28 22:18:43 +00:00
Robert Watson
bd8a9c45aa Remove XXX comments about EA transaction support and provide a more
general and detailed comment on the topic of EA transactions and kernel
warnings.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-28 22:02:59 +00:00
Robert Watson
9b637ee9dd Remove an inaccurate comment I added regarding storage for mbuf tag
labels: they are in fact stored in the tag directly.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-28 21:57:59 +00:00
Robert Watson
c982ffa42a In mac_inpcb_sosetlabel(), assert the socket lock rather than commenting
that we should assert the socket lock.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-28 21:56:39 +00:00
Robert Watson
be23ba9aab Centralize definition of MAC_VERSION in mac_policy.h, as it defines the
kernel<->policy ABI version.  Add a comment to the definition describing
it and listing known versions.  Modify MAC_POLICY_SET() to reference the
current kernel version by name rather than by number.

Staticize mac_late, which is used only in mac_framework.c.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-28 21:48:38 +00:00
Robert Watson
d5fb913feb Move mac_init_label() and mac_destroy_label() from mac_framework.c to
mac_label.c, and use these instead of replicated code in the label zone
constructor and destructor.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-28 21:15:37 +00:00
Robert Watson
ef136b272a Trim unneeded includes. 2006-12-28 21:07:45 +00:00
Robert Watson
224a974b9b Break contents of kern_mac.c out into two files following a repo-copy:
mac_framework.c   Contains basic MAC Framework functions, policy
                  registration, sysinits, etc.

mac_syscalls.c    Contains implementations of various MAC system calls,
                  including ENOSYS stubs when compiling without options
                  MAC.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-28 20:52:02 +00:00
Robert Watson
471e5756ad Update MAC Framework general comments, referencing various interfaces it
consumes and implements, as well as the location of the framework and
policy modules.

Refactor MAC Framework versioning a bit so that the current ABI version can
be exported via a read-only sysctl.

Further update comments relating to locking/synchronization.

Update copyright to take into account these and other recent changes.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-28 17:25:57 +00:00
Robert Watson
6baacecd1b Re-wrap comments following de-indentation. 2006-12-23 22:21:13 +00:00
Robert Watson
0efd6615cd Move src/sys/sys/mac_policy.h, the kernel interface between the MAC
Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h,
completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include files from
src/sys/sys.  Update the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules.  Delete
the old mac_policy.h.

Third party policy modules will need similar updating.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-22 23:34:47 +00:00
Robert Watson
e009ba461d Minor style fixes. 2006-12-21 09:58:02 +00:00
Robert Watson
e66fe0e1db Remove mac_enforce_subsystem debugging sysctls. Enforcement on
subsystems will be a property of policy modules, which may require
access control check entry points to be invoked even when not actively
enforcing (i.e., to track information flow without providing
protection).

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Suggested by:	Christopher dot Vance at sparta dot com
2006-12-21 09:51:34 +00:00
Robert Watson
8425ae1208 Comment LABEL_TO_SLOT() macro, including observing that we'd like to improve
this policy API to avoid encoding struct label binary layout in policy
modules.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 23:41:59 +00:00
Robert Watson
19d0ec0330 Trim trailing white space, clean up comment line wrapping and formatting.
Document mac_associate_nfsd_label().

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 23:18:17 +00:00
Robert Watson
27c24b4e88 Trim trailing white space. 2006-12-20 23:17:34 +00:00
Robert Watson
df3c68e479 Document socket labeling model.
Clean up comment white space and wrapping.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 23:16:41 +00:00
Robert Watson
1f00b646ec Clean up comment white space and line wrapping. 2006-12-20 23:16:01 +00:00
Robert Watson
23c3d46ae8 Additional comments regarding the interaction between the kernel privilege
model and the MAC Framework.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 23:15:27 +00:00
Robert Watson
e678cce940 Document that we could allocate the mbuf label as part of the tag rather
than from the slab, but don't.

Document mac_mbuf_to_label(), mac_copy_mbuf_tag().

Clean up white space/wrapping for other comments.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 23:14:33 +00:00
Robert Watson
5c700f29d9 Staticize and comment zone_label.
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 23:13:04 +00:00
Robert Watson
5c5a98199b Clean up comments, trailing white space.
Provide a comment describing MAC_EXTERNALIZE().

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 23:12:36 +00:00
Robert Watson
95c8c170f3 Re-wrap comment at 77 character columns. 2006-12-20 23:11:01 +00:00
Robert Watson
9caab7a262 Comment and white space cleanup.
Exapnd comments on System V IPC labeling methods, which could use improved
consistency with respect to other object types.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 20:43:19 +00:00
Robert Watson
8f3476b39b Externalize local stack copy of the ifnet label, rather than the copy on
the ifnet itself.  The stack copy has been made while holding the mutex
protecting ifnet labels, so copying from the ifnet copy could result in
an inconsistent version being copied out.

Reported by:	Todd.Miller@sparta.com
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
MFC after:	3 weeks
2006-12-20 20:40:29 +00:00
Robert Watson
17041e6708 Expand commenting on label slots, justification for the MAC Framework locking
model, interactions between locking and policy init/destroy methods.

Rewrap some comments to 77 character line wrap.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 20:38:44 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
430fc7560a Teach the MAC policies which utilize mbuf labeling the new syncache
entry points.  Properly initialize the mbuf label based on the label
we copy from the PCB. This fixes an LOR between the PCB and syncache
code.
2006-12-13 06:03:22 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
826cef3d75 Fix LOR between the syncache and inpcb locks when MAC is present in the
kernel.  This LOR snuck in with some of the recent syncache changes.  To
fix this, the inpcb handling was changed:

- Hang a MAC label off the syncache object
- When the syncache entry is initially created, we pickup the PCB lock
  is held because we extract information from it while initializing the
  syncache entry.  While we do this, copy the MAC label associated with
  the PCB and use it for the syncache entry.
- When the packet is transmitted, copy the label from the syncache entry
  to the mbuf so it can be processed by security policies which analyze
  mbuf labels.

This change required that the MAC framework be extended to support the
label copy operations from the PCB to the syncache entry, and then from
the syncache entry to the mbuf.

These functions really should be referencing the syncache structure instead
of the label.  However, due to some of the complexities associated with
exposing this syncache structure we operate directly on it's label pointer.
This should be OK since we aren't making any access control decisions within
this code directly, we are merely allocating and copying label storage so
we can properly initialize mbuf labels for any packets the syncache code
might create.

This also has a nice side effect of caching.  Prior to this change, the
PCB would be looked up/locked for each packet transmitted.  Now the label
is cached at the time the syncache entry is initialized.

Submitted by:	andre [1]
Discussed with:	rwatson

[1] andre submitted the tcp_syncache.c changes
2006-12-13 06:00:57 +00:00
Tom Rhodes
6aeb05d7be Merge posix4/* into normal kernel hierarchy.
Reviewed by:	glanced at by jhb
Approved by:	silence on -arch@ and -standards@
2006-11-11 16:26:58 +00:00
Robert Watson
403b781e2d Add stub entry point implementations of mpo_priv_check and mpo_priv_grant to
the mac_stub policy.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-11-06 13:45:45 +00:00
Robert Watson
acd3428b7d Sweep kernel replacing suser(9) calls with priv(9) calls, assigning
specific privilege names to a broad range of privileges.  These may
require some future tweaking.

Sponsored by:           nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from:          TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on:           arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
                        Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
                        Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
                        Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
Robert Watson
800c940832 Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of
privilege for threads and credentials.  Unlike the existing suser(9)
interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege
checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of
privilege to be expressed.  Two interfaces are provided, replacing the
existing suser(9) interface:

suser(td)                 ->   priv_check(td, priv)
suser_cred(cred, flags)   ->   priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags)

A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be
found in priv.h.  New privileges are easily added as required, but the
comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read
before doing so.

The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the
privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to
determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine,
rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the
SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag.  For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail
check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used
by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted
in jail.  As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail
is now present in kern_jail.c.

The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both
to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant
privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy
modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader
range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with
root privilege.

The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms
of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition
and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not
been updated.  The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to
check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier.

This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it
modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security
policy become more feasible.

Sponsored by:		nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from:		TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on:		arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by:	mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
			Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
			Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
			Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
130b146814 Change the type of ar_arg_sockaddr from struct sockaddr to struct
sockaddr_storage.  This structure is defined in RFC 2553 and is a more
semantically correct structure for holding IP and IP6 sockaddr information.
struct sockaddr is not big enough to hold all the required information for
IP6, resulting in truncated addresses et al when auditing IP6 sockaddr
information.

We also need to assume that the sa->sa_len has been validated before the call to
audit_arg_sockaddr() is made, otherwise it could result in a buffer overflow.
This is being done to accommodate auditing of network related arguments (like
connect, bind et al) that will be added soon.

Discussed with:	rwatson
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
MFC after:	2 weeks
2006-11-06 00:15:44 +00:00
Robert Watson
17451386d0 Forward declare struct cdev, since arguments of this type are used in
function prototypes.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-10-30 15:20:49 +00:00
Robert Watson
f776aa327d Remove extra _MAC_ from #ifdef guard. 2006-10-25 13:14:25 +00:00
Robert Watson
aed5570872 Complete break-out of sys/sys/mac.h into sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h.  sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.

This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA
2006-10-22 11:52:19 +00:00
Robert Watson
d7dd2bd6ed Do allow jailed superuser to override the port ACL.
MFC after:	3 days
Submitted by:	Michal Mertl <mime at traveller dot cz>
2006-10-10 17:04:19 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
06399e90bc Mark the audit system calls as being un-implemented in jails. Currently we do
not trust jails enough to execute audit related system calls. An example of
this is with su(1), or login(1) within prisons. So, if the syscall request
comes from a jail return ENOSYS. This will cause these utilities to operate
as if audit is not present in the kernel.

Looking forward, this problem will be remedied by allowing non privileged
users to maintain and their own audit streams, but the details on exactly how
this will be implemented needs to be worked out.

This change should fix situations when options AUDIT has been compiled into
the kernel, and utilities like su(1), or login(1) fail due to audit system
call failures within jails.

This is a RELENG_6 candidate.

Reported by:	Christian Brueffer
Discussed with:	rwatson
MFC after:	3 days
2006-10-10 15:49:10 +00:00
Robert Watson
42edcb0058 Add BSM conversion switch entries for a number of system calls, many
administrative, to prevent console warnings and enable basic event
auditing (generally without arguments).

MFC after:	3 days
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-10-03 20:43:48 +00:00
Robert Watson
3c1b7e8b4d Trim some no longer XXX comments.
Remove some commented out debugging printfs.

MFC after:	3  days
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-10-02 11:32:23 +00:00
Robert Watson
5d8ea5963c Audit path argument when changing audit trails.
Call NDFREE(), which while not currently strictly necessary, isn't a
bad idea.

MFC after:	3 days
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-10-02 06:56:10 +00:00
Robert Watson
22b7bca620 Rework the way errors are handled with respect to how audit records are
written to the audit trail file:

- audit_record_write() now returns void, and all file system specific
  error handling occurs inside this function.  This pushes error handling
  complexity out of the record demux routine that hands off to both the
  trail and audit pipes, and makes trail behavior more consistent with
  pipes as a record destination.

- Rate limit kernel printfs associated with running low on space.  Rate
  limit audit triggers for low space.  Rate limit printfs for fail stop
  events.  Rate limit audit worker write error printfs.

- Document in detail the types of limits and space checks we perform, and
  combine common cases.

This improves the audit subsystems tolerance to low space conditions by
avoiding toasting the console with printfs are waking up the audit daemon
continuously.

MFC after:	3 days
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-24 13:35:58 +00:00
Robert Watson
2ecf07cb25 Merge OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 11 changes into src/sys/bsm and src/sys/security;
primarily, add new event identifiers and update trigger names.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-21 07:27:02 +00:00
Robert Watson
738f14d4b1 Remove MAC_DEBUG label counters, which were used to debug leaks and
other problems while labels were first being added to various kernel
objects.  They have outlived their usefulness.

MFC after:	1 month
Suggested by:	Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-20 13:33:41 +00:00
Robert Watson
04f11621df Rather than allocating all buffer memory for the completed BSM record
when allocating the record in the first place, allocate the final buffer
when closing the BSM record.  At that point, more size information is
available, so a sufficiently large buffer can be allocated.

This allows the kernel to generate audit records in excess of
MAXAUDITDATA bytes, but is consistent with Solaris's behavior.  This only
comes up when auditing command line arguments, in which case we presume
the administrator really does want the data as they have specified the
policy flag to gather them.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
MFC after:	3 days
2006-09-20 13:23:40 +00:00
Robert Watson
1db97bc63b Add missing white space in au_to_exec_{args,env}().
MFC after:	 3 days
2006-09-20 13:14:47 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
600d74bfa1 Make sure that lutimes(2) gets processed and converted into a BSM record.
Submitted by:	rwatson
MFC after:	1 day
2006-09-18 17:55:32 +00:00
Robert Watson
5702e0965e Declare security and security.bsd sysctl hierarchies in sysctl.h along
with other commonly used sysctl name spaces, rather than declaring them
all over the place.

MFC after:	1 month
Sponsored by:	nCircle Network Security, Inc.
2006-09-17 20:00:36 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
f07b836981 Correct a slight regression which was introduced with the implementation of
audit pipes. If the kernel record was not selected for the trail or the pipe,
any user supplied record attached to it would be tossed away, resulting in
otherwise selected events being lost.

- Introduce two new masks: AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE,
  currently we have AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL and AR_PRESELECT_PIPE, which tells
  the audit worker that we are interested in the kernel record, with
  the additional masks we can determine if either the pipe or trail is
  interested in seeing the kernel or user record.

- In audit(2), we unconditionally set the AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL and
  AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE masks under the assumption that userspace has
  done the preselection [1].

Currently, there is work being done that allows the kernel to parse and
preselect user supplied records, so in the future preselection could occur
in either layer. But there is still a few details to work out here.

[1] At some point we need to teach au_preselect(3) about the interests of
    all the individual audit pipes.

This is a RELENG_6 candidate.

Reviewed by:	rwatson
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
MFC after:	1 week
2006-09-17 17:52:57 +00:00
Robert Watson
31214759fa Add AUE_SYSARCH to the list of audit events during BSM conversion to prevent
a console warning.  Eventually, we will capture more arguments for sysarch.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
MFC after:	3 days
2006-09-17 11:42:40 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
d94f2a68f8 Introduce a new entry point, mac_create_mbuf_from_firewall. This entry point
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep
alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets.

This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels
when the firewall generates packets.

[1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch
    introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically
    equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage
    mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations,
    an example being icmp_error()

    This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC

Submitted by:	mlaier [1]
MFC after:	1 week

This is a RELENG_6 candidate
2006-09-12 04:25:13 +00:00
Robert Watson
198e7d90f9 Add struct msg to the forwarded declared data structures in mac_policy.h.
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-09 16:35:44 +00:00
Robert Watson
af8bc757de Add a BSM conversion switch case for AUE_GETCWD, so that a console
warning isn't generated when __getcwd() is invoked.

MFC after:	3 days
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-09 10:23:44 +00:00
Robert Watson
4b0b93261a Small style cleanup.
MFC after:	3 days
2006-09-09 10:23:00 +00:00
Robert Watson
f9b1dc578a White space cleanup, no functional change. 2006-09-04 06:06:23 +00:00