of explicit calls to lockmgr. Also provides macros for the flags
pased to specify shared, exclusive or release which map to the
lockmgr flags. This is so that the use of lockmgr can be easily
replaced with optimized reader-writer locks.
- Add some locking that I missed the first time.
rather than implementing its own {uid,gid,other} checks against vnode
mode. Similar change to linprocfs currently under review.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
There's no excuse to have code in synthetic filestores that allows direct
references to the textvp anymore.
Feature requested by: msmith
Feature agreed to by: warner
Move requested by: phk
Move agreed to by: bde
p_trespass(struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2)
which returns zero or an errno depending on the legality of p1 trespassing
on p2.
Replace kern_sig.c:CANSIGNAL() with call to p_trespass() and one
extra signal related check.
Replace procfs.h:CHECKIO() macros with calls to p_trespass().
Only show command lines to process which can trespass on the target
process.
continue doing it despite objections by me (the principal author).
Note that this doesn't fix the real problem -- the real problem is generally
bad setup by ignorant users, and education is the right way to fix it.
So while this doesn't actually solve the prolem mentioned in the complaint
(since it's still possible to do it via other methods, although they mostly
involve a bit more complicity), and there are better methods to do this,
nobody was willing or able to provide me with a real world example that
couldn't be worked around using the existing permissions and group
mechanism. And therefore, security by removing features is the method of
the day.
I only had three applications that used it, in any event. One of them would
have made debugging easier, but I still haven't finished it, and won't
now, so it doesn't really matter.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1:
s/suser/suser_xxx/
2:
Add new function: suser(struct proc *), prototyped in <sys/proc.h>.
3:
s/suser_xxx(\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)->p_ucred, \&\1->p_acflag)/suser(\1)/
The remaining suser_xxx() calls will be scrutinized and dealt with
later.
There may be some unneeded #include <sys/cred.h>, but they are left
as an exercise for Bruce.
More changes to the suser() API will come along with the "jail" code.
is enough to satisfy things like StarOffice. This is a hack, but doing
it properly would be a LOT of work, and would require extensive grovelling
around in the user address space to find the argv[].
Obtained from: Mostly from Andrzej Bialecki <abial@nask.pl>.
for possible buffer overflow problems. Replaced most sprintf()'s
with snprintf(); for others cases, added terminating NUL bytes where
appropriate, replaced constants like "16" with sizeof(), etc.
These changes include several bug fixes, but most changes are for
maintainability's sake. Any instance where it wasn't "immediately
obvious" that a buffer overflow could not occur was made safer.
Reviewed by: Bruce Evans <bde@zeta.org.au>
Reviewed by: Matthew Dillon <dillon@apollo.backplane.com>
Reviewed by: Mike Spengler <mks@networkcs.com>
emulators. The emulators assume that filesystem may just ignore cookies, and
handle this case correctly. So we just ignore cookies.
Also sync *_readdir "prototypes" with reality.
Check args using the same expression as in fdesc and kernfs. The check
was actually already correct, modulo overflow. It could be tightened
up to either allow huge (aligned) offsets, treating them as EOF, or
disallow all offsets beyond EOF.
Didn't fix invalid address calculation &foo[i] where i may be out of
bounds.
Didn't fix shooting of foot using a private unportable dirent struct.
They are atomic, but return in essence what is in the "time" variable.
gettime() is now a macro front for getmicrotime().
Various patches to use the two new functions instead of the various
hacks used in their absence.
Some puntuation and grammer patches from Bruce.
A couple of XXX comments.
original BSD code. The association between the vnode and the vm_object
no longer includes reference counts. The major difference is that
vm_object's are no longer freed gratuitiously from the vnode, and so
once an object is created for the vnode, it will last as long as the
vnode does.
When a vnode object reference count is incremented, then the underlying
vnode reference count is incremented also. The two "objects" are now
more intimately related, and so the interactions are now much less
complex.
When vnodes are now normally placed onto the free queue with an object still
attached. The rundown of the object happens at vnode rundown time, and
happens with exactly the same filesystem semantics of the original VFS
code. There is absolutely no need for vnode_pager_uncache and other
travesties like that anymore.
A side-effect of these changes is that SMP locking should be much simpler,
the I/O copyin/copyout optimizations work, NFS should be more ponderable,
and further work on layered filesystems should be less frustrating, because
of the totally coherent management of the vnode objects and vnodes.
Please be careful with your system while running this code, but I would
greatly appreciate feedback as soon a reasonably possible.
flag is set in the p_pfsflags field. This, essentially, prevents an SUID
proram from hanging after being traced. (E.g., "truss /usr/bin/rlogin" would
fail, but leave rlogin in a stopevent state.) Yet another case where procctl
is (hopefully ;)) no longer needed in the general case.
Reviewed by: bde (thanks bruce :))
change from
ioctl(fd, PIOC<foo>, &i);
to
ioctl(fd, PIOC<foo>, i);
This is going from the _IOW to _IO ioctl macro. The kernel, procctl, and
truss must be in synch for it all to work (not doing so will get errors about
inappropriate ioctl's, fortunately). Hopefully I didn't forget anything :).
nodes; this also apparantly caused a panic in some circumstances.
Also, since procfs_exit() is getting rid of the nodes when a process
exits, don't bother checking for the process' existance in procfs_inactive().
me; unfortunately, also makes it hard ot check for errors); second, I had
managed to forget a change to PIOCSFL (it should be _IOW, not _IOR) I had
in my local copy, and Bruce called me on it.
Submitted by: bde
procfs/mem file. While this doesn't prevent an unkillable process, it
means that a broken truss prorgam won't do it accidently now (well,
there's a small window of opportunity). Note that this requires the
change to truss I am about to commit.
Rename vn_default_error to vop_defaultop all over the place.
Move vn_bwrite from vfs_bio.c to vfs_default.c and call it vop_stdbwrite.
Use vop_null instead of nullop.
Move vop_nopoll from vfs_subr.c to vfs_default.c
Move vop_sharedlock from vfs_subr.c to vfs_default.c
Move vop_nolock from vfs_subr.c to vfs_default.c
Move vop_nounlock from vfs_subr.c to vfs_default.c
Move vop_noislocked from vfs_subr.c to vfs_default.c
Use vop_ebadf instead of *_ebadf.
Add vop_defaultop for getpages on master vnode in MFS.
1. Add defaults for more VOPs
VOP_LOCK vop_nolock
VOP_ISLOCKED vop_noislocked
VOP_UNLOCK vop_nounlock
and remove direct reference in filesystems.
2. Rename the nfsv2 vnop tables to improve sorting order.
1. Remove VOP_UPDATE, it is (also) an UFS/{FFS,LFS,EXT2FS,MFS}
intereface function, and now lives in the ufsmount structure.
2. Remove VOP_SEEK, it was unused.
3. Add mode default vops:
VOP_ADVLOCK vop_einval
VOP_CLOSE vop_null
VOP_FSYNC vop_null
VOP_IOCTL vop_enotty
VOP_MMAP vop_einval
VOP_OPEN vop_null
VOP_PATHCONF vop_einval
VOP_READLINK vop_einval
VOP_REALLOCBLKS vop_eopnotsupp
And remove identical functionality from filesystems
4. Add vop_stdpathconf, which returns the canonical stuff. Use
it in the filesystems. (XXX: It's probably wrong that specfs
and fifofs sets this vop, shouldn't it come from the "host"
filesystem, for instance ufs or cd9660 ?)
5. Try to make system wide VOP functions have vop_* names.
6. Initialize the um_* vectors in LFS.
(Recompile your LKMS!!!)
