When files are read from .rc or .4th, verify_file is asked to
guess the severity (VE_TRY,VE_WANT,VE_MUST)
Reviewed by: stevek
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
The loader.ve.hashed list can easily exceed KENV_MVALLEN.
If so, bump kenv_mvallen to a multiple of KENV_MVALLEN to
accommodate the value.
Reviewed by: stevek
MFC after: 1 week
On slow platforms, it helps to spread the hashing load
over time so that tftp does not timeout.
Also, some .4th files are too big to fit in cache of pkgfs,
so increase cache size and ensure fully populated.
Reviewed by: stevek
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24287
We need a valid st_dev, st_ino and st_mtime
to correctly track which files have been verified
and to update our notion of time.
ve_utc_set(): ignore utc if it would jump our current time
by more than VE_UTC_MAX_JUMP (20 years).
Allow testing of install command via userboot.
Need to fix its stat implementation too.
bhyveload also needs stat fixed - due to change to userboot.h
Call ve_error_get() from vectx_close() when hash is wrong.
Track the names of files we have hashed into pcr
For the purposes of measured boot, it is important
to be able to reproduce the hash reflected in
loader.ve.pcr
so loader.ve.hashed provides a list of names in the order they
were added.
Reviewed by: imp
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D24027
The vectx API, computes the hash for verifying a file as it is read.
This avoids the overhead of reading files twice - once to verify, then
again to load.
For doing an install via loader, avoiding the need to rewind
large files is critical.
This API is only used for modules, kernel and mdimage as these are the
biggest files read by the loader.
The reduction in boot time depends on how expensive the I/O is
on any given platform. On a fast VM we see 6% improvement.
For install via loader the first file to be verified is likely to be the
kernel, so some of the prep work (finding manifest etc) done by
verify_file() needs to be factored so it can be reused for
vectx_open().
For missing or unrecognized fingerprint entries, we fail
in vectx_open() unless verifying is disabled.
Otherwise fingerprint check happens in vectx_close() and
since this API is only used for files which must be verified
(VE_MUST) we panic if we get an incorrect hash.
Reviewed by: imp,tsoome
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D23827
Update a bunch of Makefile.depend files as
a result of adding Makefile.depend.options files
Reviewed by: bdrewery
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22494
For EFI at least, we can seed the environment
with VE_VERBOSE etc.
Reviewed by: stevek imp
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22135
set our guard value immediately.
also replace call to ve_trust_init in opgp_sig.c:initialize with
call to openpgp_trust_init.
Reported by: mindal@semihalf.com
Reviewed by: jhibbits obrien
MFC after: 1 week
Since we can now add OpenPGP trust anchors at runtime,
ensure the latent support is available.
Ensure we do not add duplicate keys to trust store.
Also allow reporting names of trust anchors added/revoked
We only do this for loader and only after initializing trust store.
Thus only changes to initial trust store will be logged.
Reviewed by: stevek
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20700
During boot we only want to measure things which *must*
be verified - this should provide more deterministic ordering.
Reviewed by: stevek
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20297
sbin/veriexec will ignore entries that have no hash anyway,
but loader needs to be explicitly told that such files are
ok to ignore (not verify).
We will report as Unverified depending on verbose level,
but with no reason - because we are not rejecting the file.
Reviewed by: imp, mindal_semihalf
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
MFC After: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D20018
The current approach of injecting manifest into mac_veriexec is to
verify the integrity of it in userspace (veriexec (8)) and pass its
entries into kernel using a char device (/dev/veriexec).
This requires verifying root partition integrity in loader,
for example by using memory disk and checking its hash.
Otherwise if rootfs is compromised an attacker could inject their own data.
This patch introduces an option to parse manifest in kernel based on envs.
The loader sets manifest path and digest.
EVENTHANDLER is used to launch the module right after the rootfs is mounted.
It has to be done this way, since one might want to verify integrity of the init file.
This means that manifest is required to be present on the root partition.
Note that the envs have to be set right before boot to make sure that no one can spoof them.
Submitted by: Kornel Duleba <mindal@semihalf.com>
Reviewed by: sjg
Obtained from: Semihalf
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19281
UEFI related headers were copied from edk2.
A new build option "MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT" was added to allow
loading of trusted anchors from UEFI.
Certificate revocation support is also introduced.
The forbidden certificates are loaded from dbx variable.
Verification fails in two cases:
There is a direct match between cert in dbx and the one in the chain.
The CA used to sign the chain is found in dbx.
One can also insert a hash of TBS section of a certificate into dbx.
In this case verifications fails only if a direct match with a
certificate in chain is found.
Submitted by: Kornel Duleba <mindal@semihalf.com>
Reviewed by: sjg
Obtained from: Semihalf
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19093
Use SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH for BUILD_UTC if MK_REPRODUCIBLE_BUILD is yes.
Default SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH to 2019-01-01
Reviewed by: emaste
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19464
