11663004bd
logic here gets a little complex, but the net effect is that the SECURE_SYMLINKS flag will prevent us from ever following a symlink. Without it, we'll only follow symlinks to dirs. bsdtar specifies SECURE_SYMLINKS by default, suppresses it for -P. I've also beefed up the write_disk_secure test to verify this behavior. PR: bin/126849
220 lines
7.9 KiB
C
220 lines
7.9 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2003-2007 Tim Kientzle
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "test.h"
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#define UMASK 022
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/*
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* Exercise security checks that should prevent certain
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* writes.
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*/
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DEFINE_TEST(test_write_disk_secure)
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{
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#if ARCHIVE_VERSION_NUMBER < 1009000
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skipping("archive_write_disk interface");
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#else
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struct archive *a;
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struct archive_entry *ae;
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struct stat st;
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/* Start with a known umask. */
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umask(UMASK);
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/* Create an archive_write_disk object. */
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assert((a = archive_write_disk_new()) != NULL);
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/* Write a regular dir to it. */
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assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "dir");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFDIR | 0777);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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archive_entry_free(ae);
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* Write a symlink to the dir above. */
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assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFLNK | 0777);
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archive_entry_set_symlink(ae, "dir");
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archive_write_disk_set_options(a, 0);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/*
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* Without security checks, we should be able to
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* extract a file through the link.
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*/
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assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir/filea");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* But with security checks enabled, this should fail. */
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assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir/fileb");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
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archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS);
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failure("Extracting a file through a symlink should fail here.");
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assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_WARN, archive_write_header(a, ae));
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archive_entry_free(ae);
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* Create another link. */
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assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir2");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFLNK | 0777);
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archive_entry_set_symlink(ae, "dir");
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archive_write_disk_set_options(a, 0);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/*
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* With symlink check and unlink option, it should remove
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* the link and create the dir.
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*/
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assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir2/filec");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
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archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS | ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_UNLINK);
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assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_write_header(a, ae));
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archive_entry_free(ae);
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/*
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* Without security checks, extracting a dir over a link to a
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* dir should follow the link.
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*/
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/* Create a symlink to a dir. */
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assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir3");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFLNK | 0777);
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archive_entry_set_symlink(ae, "dir");
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archive_write_disk_set_options(a, 0);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* Extract a dir whose name matches the symlink. */
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assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir3");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFDIR | 0777);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* Verify link was followed. */
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assertEqualInt(0, lstat("link_to_dir3", &st));
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assert(S_ISLNK(st.st_mode));
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archive_entry_free(ae);
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/*
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* As above, but a broken link, so the link should get replaced.
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*/
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/* Create a symlink to a dir. */
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assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir4");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFLNK | 0777);
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archive_entry_set_symlink(ae, "nonexistent_dir");
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archive_write_disk_set_options(a, 0);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* Extract a dir whose name matches the symlink. */
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assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir4");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFDIR | 0777);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* Verify link was followed. */
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assertEqualInt(0, lstat("link_to_dir4", &st));
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assert(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode));
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archive_entry_free(ae);
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/*
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* As above, but a link to a non-dir, so the link should get replaced.
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*/
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/* Create a regular file and a symlink to it */
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assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "non_dir");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
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archive_write_disk_set_options(a, 0);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* Create symlink to the file. */
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir5");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFLNK | 0777);
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archive_entry_set_symlink(ae, "non_dir");
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archive_write_disk_set_options(a, 0);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* Extract a dir whose name matches the symlink. */
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assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
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archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "link_to_dir5");
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archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFDIR | 0777);
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assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
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/* Verify link was followed. */
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assertEqualInt(0, lstat("link_to_dir5", &st));
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assert(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode));
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#if ARCHIVE_VERSION_NUMBER < 2000000
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archive_write_finish(a);
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#else
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assert(0 == archive_write_finish(a));
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#endif
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/* Test the entries on disk. */
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assert(0 == lstat("dir", &st));
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failure("dir: st.st_mode=%o", st.st_mode);
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assert((st.st_mode & 0777) == 0755);
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assert(0 == lstat("link_to_dir", &st));
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failure("link_to_dir: st.st_mode=%o", st.st_mode);
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assert(S_ISLNK(st.st_mode));
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#if HAVE_LCHMOD
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/* Systems that lack lchmod() can't set symlink perms, so skip this. */
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failure("link_to_dir: st.st_mode=%o", st.st_mode);
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assert((st.st_mode & 07777) == 0755);
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#endif
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assert(0 == lstat("dir/filea", &st));
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failure("dir/filea: st.st_mode=%o", st.st_mode);
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assert((st.st_mode & 07777) == 0755);
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failure("dir/fileb: This file should not have been created");
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assert(0 != lstat("dir/fileb", &st));
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assert(0 == lstat("link_to_dir2", &st));
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failure("link_to_dir2 should have been re-created as a true dir");
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assert(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode));
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failure("link_to_dir2: Implicit dir creation should obey umask, but st.st_mode=%o", st.st_mode);
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assert((st.st_mode & 0777) == 0755);
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assert(0 == lstat("link_to_dir2/filec", &st));
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assert(S_ISREG(st.st_mode));
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failure("link_to_dir2/filec: st.st_mode=%o", st.st_mode);
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assert((st.st_mode & 07777) == 0755);
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#endif
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}
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