freebsd-nq/sys/net80211/ieee80211_crypto.c
Adrian Chadd 781487cfc6 [net80211] turn the default TX key configuration (for WEP) into a vap callback.
The ath10k firmware supports hardware WEP offload, and in native wifi mode
(or 802.3 ethernet mode, for that matter) the WEP key isn't actually included
in the TX payload from net80211.  Instead, a separate firmware command is issued
that sets the default TX key to be the specified key.

However, net80211 doesn't at all inform the driver layer that this is
occuring - it just "expects" to be inserting WEP header information
when doing WEP TX, even with hardware encryption.

So, to better support the newer world order, turn the default TX key assignment
into a VAP method that can be overridden by the driver and ensure its wrapped
in a crypto begin/end set.  That way it should be correctly atomic from the
point of view of keychanges (as long as the driver does the right thing.)

It'd be nice if we passed through to the key_set call a flag that says
"also make this the default key" - that's captured here by calling the
deftxkey method after the key_set method.  Maybe I can do that later.

Note: this is a net80211 ABI change, and will require a kernel+modules
recompile.  Happy Holidays, etc.

Tested:

* ath10k driver port
* rtwn_usb, WEP station
2016-12-27 06:10:28 +00:00

805 lines
22 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2001 Atsushi Onoe
* Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Sam Leffler, Errno Consulting
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
/*
* IEEE 802.11 generic crypto support.
*/
#include "opt_wlan.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/if_media.h>
#include <net/ethernet.h> /* XXX ETHER_HDR_LEN */
#include <net80211/ieee80211_var.h>
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_80211_CRYPTO, "80211crypto", "802.11 crypto state");
static int _ieee80211_crypto_delkey(struct ieee80211vap *,
struct ieee80211_key *);
/*
* Table of registered cipher modules.
*/
static const struct ieee80211_cipher *ciphers[IEEE80211_CIPHER_MAX];
/*
* Default "null" key management routines.
*/
static int
null_key_alloc(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct ieee80211_key *k,
ieee80211_keyix *keyix, ieee80211_keyix *rxkeyix)
{
if (!(&vap->iv_nw_keys[0] <= k &&
k < &vap->iv_nw_keys[IEEE80211_WEP_NKID])) {
/*
* Not in the global key table, the driver should handle this
* by allocating a slot in the h/w key table/cache. In
* lieu of that return key slot 0 for any unicast key
* request. We disallow the request if this is a group key.
* This default policy does the right thing for legacy hardware
* with a 4 key table. It also handles devices that pass
* packets through untouched when marked with the WEP bit
* and key index 0.
*/
if (k->wk_flags & IEEE80211_KEY_GROUP)
return 0;
*keyix = 0; /* NB: use key index 0 for ucast key */
} else {
*keyix = ieee80211_crypto_get_key_wepidx(vap, k);
}
*rxkeyix = IEEE80211_KEYIX_NONE; /* XXX maybe *keyix? */
return 1;
}
static int
null_key_delete(struct ieee80211vap *vap, const struct ieee80211_key *k)
{
return 1;
}
static int
null_key_set(struct ieee80211vap *vap, const struct ieee80211_key *k)
{
return 1;
}
static void null_key_update(struct ieee80211vap *vap) {}
/*
* Write-arounds for common operations.
*/
static __inline void
cipher_detach(struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
key->wk_cipher->ic_detach(key);
}
static __inline void *
cipher_attach(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
return key->wk_cipher->ic_attach(vap, key);
}
/*
* Wrappers for driver key management methods.
*/
static __inline int
dev_key_alloc(struct ieee80211vap *vap,
struct ieee80211_key *key,
ieee80211_keyix *keyix, ieee80211_keyix *rxkeyix)
{
return vap->iv_key_alloc(vap, key, keyix, rxkeyix);
}
static __inline int
dev_key_delete(struct ieee80211vap *vap,
const struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
return vap->iv_key_delete(vap, key);
}
static __inline int
dev_key_set(struct ieee80211vap *vap, const struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
return vap->iv_key_set(vap, key);
}
/*
* Setup crypto support for a device/shared instance.
*/
void
ieee80211_crypto_attach(struct ieee80211com *ic)
{
/* NB: we assume everything is pre-zero'd */
ciphers[IEEE80211_CIPHER_NONE] = &ieee80211_cipher_none;
}
/*
* Teardown crypto support.
*/
void
ieee80211_crypto_detach(struct ieee80211com *ic)
{
}
/*
* Setup crypto support for a vap.
*/
void
ieee80211_crypto_vattach(struct ieee80211vap *vap)
{
int i;
/* NB: we assume everything is pre-zero'd */
vap->iv_max_keyix = IEEE80211_WEP_NKID;
vap->iv_def_txkey = IEEE80211_KEYIX_NONE;
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_WEP_NKID; i++)
ieee80211_crypto_resetkey(vap, &vap->iv_nw_keys[i],
IEEE80211_KEYIX_NONE);
/*
* Initialize the driver key support routines to noop entries.
* This is useful especially for the cipher test modules.
*/
vap->iv_key_alloc = null_key_alloc;
vap->iv_key_set = null_key_set;
vap->iv_key_delete = null_key_delete;
vap->iv_key_update_begin = null_key_update;
vap->iv_key_update_end = null_key_update;
}
/*
* Teardown crypto support for a vap.
*/
void
ieee80211_crypto_vdetach(struct ieee80211vap *vap)
{
ieee80211_crypto_delglobalkeys(vap);
}
/*
* Register a crypto cipher module.
*/
void
ieee80211_crypto_register(const struct ieee80211_cipher *cip)
{
if (cip->ic_cipher >= IEEE80211_CIPHER_MAX) {
printf("%s: cipher %s has an invalid cipher index %u\n",
__func__, cip->ic_name, cip->ic_cipher);
return;
}
if (ciphers[cip->ic_cipher] != NULL && ciphers[cip->ic_cipher] != cip) {
printf("%s: cipher %s registered with a different template\n",
__func__, cip->ic_name);
return;
}
ciphers[cip->ic_cipher] = cip;
}
/*
* Unregister a crypto cipher module.
*/
void
ieee80211_crypto_unregister(const struct ieee80211_cipher *cip)
{
if (cip->ic_cipher >= IEEE80211_CIPHER_MAX) {
printf("%s: cipher %s has an invalid cipher index %u\n",
__func__, cip->ic_name, cip->ic_cipher);
return;
}
if (ciphers[cip->ic_cipher] != NULL && ciphers[cip->ic_cipher] != cip) {
printf("%s: cipher %s registered with a different template\n",
__func__, cip->ic_name);
return;
}
/* NB: don't complain about not being registered */
/* XXX disallow if references */
ciphers[cip->ic_cipher] = NULL;
}
int
ieee80211_crypto_available(u_int cipher)
{
return cipher < IEEE80211_CIPHER_MAX && ciphers[cipher] != NULL;
}
/* XXX well-known names! */
static const char *cipher_modnames[IEEE80211_CIPHER_MAX] = {
[IEEE80211_CIPHER_WEP] = "wlan_wep",
[IEEE80211_CIPHER_TKIP] = "wlan_tkip",
[IEEE80211_CIPHER_AES_OCB] = "wlan_aes_ocb",
[IEEE80211_CIPHER_AES_CCM] = "wlan_ccmp",
[IEEE80211_CIPHER_TKIPMIC] = "#4", /* NB: reserved */
[IEEE80211_CIPHER_CKIP] = "wlan_ckip",
[IEEE80211_CIPHER_NONE] = "wlan_none",
};
/* NB: there must be no overlap between user-supplied and device-owned flags */
CTASSERT((IEEE80211_KEY_COMMON & IEEE80211_KEY_DEVICE) == 0);
/*
* Establish a relationship between the specified key and cipher
* and, if necessary, allocate a hardware index from the driver.
* Note that when a fixed key index is required it must be specified.
*
* This must be the first call applied to a key; all the other key
* routines assume wk_cipher is setup.
*
* Locking must be handled by the caller using:
* ieee80211_key_update_begin(vap);
* ieee80211_key_update_end(vap);
*/
int
ieee80211_crypto_newkey(struct ieee80211vap *vap,
int cipher, int flags, struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
struct ieee80211com *ic = vap->iv_ic;
const struct ieee80211_cipher *cip;
ieee80211_keyix keyix, rxkeyix;
void *keyctx;
int oflags;
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: cipher %u flags 0x%x keyix %u\n",
__func__, cipher, flags, key->wk_keyix);
/*
* Validate cipher and set reference to cipher routines.
*/
if (cipher >= IEEE80211_CIPHER_MAX) {
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: invalid cipher %u\n", __func__, cipher);
vap->iv_stats.is_crypto_badcipher++;
return 0;
}
cip = ciphers[cipher];
if (cip == NULL) {
/*
* Auto-load cipher module if we have a well-known name
* for it. It might be better to use string names rather
* than numbers and craft a module name based on the cipher
* name; e.g. wlan_cipher_<cipher-name>.
*/
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: unregistered cipher %u, load module %s\n",
__func__, cipher, cipher_modnames[cipher]);
ieee80211_load_module(cipher_modnames[cipher]);
/*
* If cipher module loaded it should immediately
* call ieee80211_crypto_register which will fill
* in the entry in the ciphers array.
*/
cip = ciphers[cipher];
if (cip == NULL) {
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: unable to load cipher %u, module %s\n",
__func__, cipher, cipher_modnames[cipher]);
vap->iv_stats.is_crypto_nocipher++;
return 0;
}
}
oflags = key->wk_flags;
flags &= IEEE80211_KEY_COMMON;
/* NB: preserve device attributes */
flags |= (oflags & IEEE80211_KEY_DEVICE);
/*
* If the hardware does not support the cipher then
* fallback to a host-based implementation.
*/
if ((ic->ic_cryptocaps & (1<<cipher)) == 0) {
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: no h/w support for cipher %s, falling back to s/w\n",
__func__, cip->ic_name);
flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_SWCRYPT;
}
/*
* Hardware TKIP with software MIC is an important
* combination; we handle it by flagging each key,
* the cipher modules honor it.
*/
if (cipher == IEEE80211_CIPHER_TKIP &&
(ic->ic_cryptocaps & IEEE80211_CRYPTO_TKIPMIC) == 0) {
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: no h/w support for TKIP MIC, falling back to s/w\n",
__func__);
flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_SWMIC;
}
/*
* Bind cipher to key instance. Note we do this
* after checking the device capabilities so the
* cipher module can optimize space usage based on
* whether or not it needs to do the cipher work.
*/
if (key->wk_cipher != cip || key->wk_flags != flags) {
/*
* Fillin the flags so cipher modules can see s/w
* crypto requirements and potentially allocate
* different state and/or attach different method
* pointers.
*/
key->wk_flags = flags;
keyctx = cip->ic_attach(vap, key);
if (keyctx == NULL) {
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: unable to attach cipher %s\n",
__func__, cip->ic_name);
key->wk_flags = oflags; /* restore old flags */
vap->iv_stats.is_crypto_attachfail++;
return 0;
}
cipher_detach(key);
key->wk_cipher = cip; /* XXX refcnt? */
key->wk_private = keyctx;
}
/*
* Ask the driver for a key index if we don't have one.
* Note that entries in the global key table always have
* an index; this means it's safe to call this routine
* for these entries just to setup the reference to the
* cipher template. Note also that when using software
* crypto we also call the driver to give us a key index.
*/
if ((key->wk_flags & IEEE80211_KEY_DEVKEY) == 0) {
if (!dev_key_alloc(vap, key, &keyix, &rxkeyix)) {
/*
* Unable to setup driver state.
*/
vap->iv_stats.is_crypto_keyfail++;
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: unable to setup cipher %s\n",
__func__, cip->ic_name);
return 0;
}
if (key->wk_flags != flags) {
/*
* Driver overrode flags we setup; typically because
* resources were unavailable to handle _this_ key.
* Re-attach the cipher context to allow cipher
* modules to handle differing requirements.
*/
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: driver override for cipher %s, flags "
"0x%x -> 0x%x\n", __func__, cip->ic_name,
oflags, key->wk_flags);
keyctx = cip->ic_attach(vap, key);
if (keyctx == NULL) {
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: unable to attach cipher %s with "
"flags 0x%x\n", __func__, cip->ic_name,
key->wk_flags);
key->wk_flags = oflags; /* restore old flags */
vap->iv_stats.is_crypto_attachfail++;
return 0;
}
cipher_detach(key);
key->wk_cipher = cip; /* XXX refcnt? */
key->wk_private = keyctx;
}
key->wk_keyix = keyix;
key->wk_rxkeyix = rxkeyix;
key->wk_flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_DEVKEY;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Remove the key (no locking, for internal use).
*/
static int
_ieee80211_crypto_delkey(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
KASSERT(key->wk_cipher != NULL, ("No cipher!"));
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: %s keyix %u flags 0x%x rsc %ju tsc %ju len %u\n",
__func__, key->wk_cipher->ic_name,
key->wk_keyix, key->wk_flags,
key->wk_keyrsc[IEEE80211_NONQOS_TID], key->wk_keytsc,
key->wk_keylen);
if (key->wk_flags & IEEE80211_KEY_DEVKEY) {
/*
* Remove hardware entry.
*/
/* XXX key cache */
if (!dev_key_delete(vap, key)) {
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: driver did not delete key index %u\n",
__func__, key->wk_keyix);
vap->iv_stats.is_crypto_delkey++;
/* XXX recovery? */
}
}
cipher_detach(key);
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
ieee80211_crypto_resetkey(vap, key, IEEE80211_KEYIX_NONE);
return 1;
}
/*
* Remove the specified key.
*/
int
ieee80211_crypto_delkey(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
int status;
ieee80211_key_update_begin(vap);
status = _ieee80211_crypto_delkey(vap, key);
ieee80211_key_update_end(vap);
return status;
}
/*
* Clear the global key table.
*/
void
ieee80211_crypto_delglobalkeys(struct ieee80211vap *vap)
{
int i;
ieee80211_key_update_begin(vap);
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_WEP_NKID; i++)
(void) _ieee80211_crypto_delkey(vap, &vap->iv_nw_keys[i]);
ieee80211_key_update_end(vap);
}
/*
* Set the contents of the specified key.
*
* Locking must be handled by the caller using:
* ieee80211_key_update_begin(vap);
* ieee80211_key_update_end(vap);
*/
int
ieee80211_crypto_setkey(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
const struct ieee80211_cipher *cip = key->wk_cipher;
KASSERT(cip != NULL, ("No cipher!"));
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: %s keyix %u flags 0x%x mac %s rsc %ju tsc %ju len %u\n",
__func__, cip->ic_name, key->wk_keyix,
key->wk_flags, ether_sprintf(key->wk_macaddr),
key->wk_keyrsc[IEEE80211_NONQOS_TID], key->wk_keytsc,
key->wk_keylen);
if ((key->wk_flags & IEEE80211_KEY_DEVKEY) == 0) {
/* XXX nothing allocated, should not happen */
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: no device key setup done; should not happen!\n",
__func__);
vap->iv_stats.is_crypto_setkey_nokey++;
return 0;
}
/*
* Give cipher a chance to validate key contents.
* XXX should happen before modifying state.
*/
if (!cip->ic_setkey(key)) {
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
"%s: cipher %s rejected key index %u len %u flags 0x%x\n",
__func__, cip->ic_name, key->wk_keyix,
key->wk_keylen, key->wk_flags);
vap->iv_stats.is_crypto_setkey_cipher++;
return 0;
}
return dev_key_set(vap, key);
}
/*
* Return index if the key is a WEP key (0..3); -1 otherwise.
*
* This is different to "get_keyid" which defaults to returning
* 0 for unicast keys; it assumes that it won't be used for WEP.
*/
int
ieee80211_crypto_get_key_wepidx(const struct ieee80211vap *vap,
const struct ieee80211_key *k)
{
if (k >= &vap->iv_nw_keys[0] &&
k < &vap->iv_nw_keys[IEEE80211_WEP_NKID])
return (k - vap->iv_nw_keys);
return (-1);
}
/*
* Note: only supports a single unicast key (0).
*/
uint8_t
ieee80211_crypto_get_keyid(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct ieee80211_key *k)
{
if (k >= &vap->iv_nw_keys[0] &&
k < &vap->iv_nw_keys[IEEE80211_WEP_NKID])
return (k - vap->iv_nw_keys);
else
return (0);
}
struct ieee80211_key *
ieee80211_crypto_get_txkey(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m)
{
struct ieee80211vap *vap = ni->ni_vap;
struct ieee80211_frame *wh;
/*
* Multicast traffic always uses the multicast key.
* Otherwise if a unicast key is set we use that and
* it is always key index 0. When no unicast key is
* set we fall back to the default transmit key.
*/
wh = mtod(m, struct ieee80211_frame *);
if (IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1) ||
IEEE80211_KEY_UNDEFINED(&ni->ni_ucastkey)) {
if (vap->iv_def_txkey == IEEE80211_KEYIX_NONE) {
IEEE80211_NOTE_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO,
wh->i_addr1,
"no default transmit key (%s) deftxkey %u",
__func__, vap->iv_def_txkey);
vap->iv_stats.is_tx_nodefkey++;
return NULL;
}
return &vap->iv_nw_keys[vap->iv_def_txkey];
}
return &ni->ni_ucastkey;
}
/*
* Add privacy headers appropriate for the specified key.
*/
struct ieee80211_key *
ieee80211_crypto_encap(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m)
{
struct ieee80211_key *k;
const struct ieee80211_cipher *cip;
if ((k = ieee80211_crypto_get_txkey(ni, m)) != NULL) {
cip = k->wk_cipher;
return (cip->ic_encap(k, m) ? k : NULL);
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Validate and strip privacy headers (and trailer) for a
* received frame that has the WEP/Privacy bit set.
*/
int
ieee80211_crypto_decap(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m, int hdrlen,
struct ieee80211_key **key)
{
#define IEEE80211_WEP_HDRLEN (IEEE80211_WEP_IVLEN + IEEE80211_WEP_KIDLEN)
#define IEEE80211_WEP_MINLEN \
(sizeof(struct ieee80211_frame) + \
IEEE80211_WEP_HDRLEN + IEEE80211_WEP_CRCLEN)
struct ieee80211vap *vap = ni->ni_vap;
struct ieee80211_key *k;
struct ieee80211_frame *wh;
const struct ieee80211_rx_stats *rxs;
const struct ieee80211_cipher *cip;
uint8_t keyid;
/*
* Check for hardware decryption and IV stripping.
* If the IV is stripped then we definitely can't find a key.
* Set the key to NULL but return true; upper layers
* will need to handle a NULL key for a successful
* decrypt.
*/
rxs = ieee80211_get_rx_params_ptr(m);
if ((rxs != NULL) && (rxs->c_pktflags & IEEE80211_RX_F_DECRYPTED)) {
if (rxs->c_pktflags & IEEE80211_RX_F_IV_STRIP) {
/*
* Hardware decrypted, IV stripped.
* We can't find a key with a stripped IV.
* Return successful.
*/
*key = NULL;
return (1);
}
}
/* NB: this minimum size data frame could be bigger */
if (m->m_pkthdr.len < IEEE80211_WEP_MINLEN) {
IEEE80211_DPRINTF(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_ANY,
"%s: WEP data frame too short, len %u\n",
__func__, m->m_pkthdr.len);
vap->iv_stats.is_rx_tooshort++; /* XXX need unique stat? */
*key = NULL;
return (0);
}
/*
* Locate the key. If unicast and there is no unicast
* key then we fall back to the key id in the header.
* This assumes unicast keys are only configured when
* the key id in the header is meaningless (typically 0).
*/
wh = mtod(m, struct ieee80211_frame *);
m_copydata(m, hdrlen + IEEE80211_WEP_IVLEN, sizeof(keyid), &keyid);
if (IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1) ||
IEEE80211_KEY_UNDEFINED(&ni->ni_ucastkey))
k = &vap->iv_nw_keys[keyid >> 6];
else
k = &ni->ni_ucastkey;
/*
* Insure crypto header is contiguous for all decap work.
*/
cip = k->wk_cipher;
if (m->m_len < hdrlen + cip->ic_header &&
(m = m_pullup(m, hdrlen + cip->ic_header)) == NULL) {
IEEE80211_NOTE_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_CRYPTO, wh->i_addr2,
"unable to pullup %s header", cip->ic_name);
vap->iv_stats.is_rx_wepfail++; /* XXX */
*key = NULL;
return (0);
}
/*
* Attempt decryption.
*
* If we fail then don't return the key - return NULL
* and an error.
*/
if (cip->ic_decap(k, m, hdrlen)) {
/* success */
*key = k;
return (1);
}
/* Failure */
*key = NULL;
return (0);
#undef IEEE80211_WEP_MINLEN
#undef IEEE80211_WEP_HDRLEN
}
/*
* Check and remove any MIC.
*/
int
ieee80211_crypto_demic(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct ieee80211_key *k,
struct mbuf *m, int force)
{
const struct ieee80211_cipher *cip;
const struct ieee80211_rx_stats *rxs;
struct ieee80211_frame *wh;
rxs = ieee80211_get_rx_params_ptr(m);
wh = mtod(m, struct ieee80211_frame *);
/*
* Handle demic / mic errors from hardware-decrypted offload devices.
*/
if ((rxs != NULL) && (rxs->c_pktflags & IEEE80211_RX_F_DECRYPTED)) {
if (rxs->c_pktflags & IEEE80211_RX_F_FAIL_MIC) {
/*
* Hardware has said MIC failed. We don't care about
* whether it was stripped or not.
*
* Eventually - teach the demic methods in crypto
* modules to handle a NULL key and not to dereference
* it.
*/
ieee80211_notify_michael_failure(vap, wh, -1);
return (0);
}
if (rxs->c_pktflags & IEEE80211_RX_F_MMIC_STRIP) {
/*
* Hardware has decrypted and not indicated a
* MIC failure and has stripped the MIC.
* We may not have a key, so for now just
* return OK.
*/
return (1);
}
}
/*
* If we don't have a key at this point then we don't
* have to demic anything.
*/
if (k == NULL)
return (1);
cip = k->wk_cipher;
return (cip->ic_miclen > 0 ? cip->ic_demic(k, m, force) : 1);
}
static void
load_ucastkey(void *arg, struct ieee80211_node *ni)
{
struct ieee80211vap *vap = ni->ni_vap;
struct ieee80211_key *k;
if (vap->iv_state != IEEE80211_S_RUN)
return;
k = &ni->ni_ucastkey;
if (k->wk_flags & IEEE80211_KEY_DEVKEY)
dev_key_set(vap, k);
}
/*
* Re-load all keys known to the 802.11 layer that may
* have hardware state backing them. This is used by
* drivers on resume to push keys down into the device.
*/
void
ieee80211_crypto_reload_keys(struct ieee80211com *ic)
{
struct ieee80211vap *vap;
int i;
/*
* Keys in the global key table of each vap.
*/
/* NB: used only during resume so don't lock for now */
TAILQ_FOREACH(vap, &ic->ic_vaps, iv_next) {
if (vap->iv_state != IEEE80211_S_RUN)
continue;
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_WEP_NKID; i++) {
const struct ieee80211_key *k = &vap->iv_nw_keys[i];
if (k->wk_flags & IEEE80211_KEY_DEVKEY)
dev_key_set(vap, k);
}
}
/*
* Unicast keys.
*/
ieee80211_iterate_nodes(&ic->ic_sta, load_ucastkey, NULL);
}
/*
* Set the default key index for WEP, or KEYIX_NONE for no default TX key.
*
* This should be done as part of a key update block (iv_key_update_begin /
* iv_key_update_end.)
*/
void
ieee80211_crypto_set_deftxkey(struct ieee80211vap *vap, ieee80211_keyix kid)
{
/* XXX TODO: assert we're in a key update block */
vap->iv_update_deftxkey(vap, kid);
}