freebsd-nq/sys/dev/random/hash.c
Conrad Meyer 68b97d40fb random(4): Flip default Fortuna generator over to Chacha20
The implementation was landed in r344913 and has had some bake time (at
least on my personal systems).  There is some discussion of the motivation
for defaulting to this cipher as a PRF in the commit log for r344913.

As documented in that commit, administrators can retain the prior (AES-ICM)
mode of operation by setting the 'kern.random.use_chacha20_cipher' tunable
to 0 in loader.conf(5).

Approved by:	csprng(delphij, markm)
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22878
2019-12-20 21:11:00 +00:00

248 lines
7.2 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2000-2015 Mark R V Murray
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
* in this position and unchanged.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#else /* !_KERNEL */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <threads.h>
#define KASSERT(x, y) assert(x)
#define CTASSERT(x) _Static_assert(x, "CTASSERT " #x)
#endif /* _KERNEL */
#define CHACHA_EMBED
#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
#define CHACHA_NONCE0_CTR128
#include <crypto/chacha20/chacha.c>
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h>
#include <crypto/sha2/sha256.h>
#include <dev/random/hash.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
#endif
/* This code presumes that RANDOM_KEYSIZE is twice as large as RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE */
CTASSERT(RANDOM_KEYSIZE == 2*RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
/* Validate that full Chacha IV is as large as the 128-bit counter */
_Static_assert(CHACHA_STATELEN == RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE, "");
/*
* Knob to control use of Chacha20-based PRF for Fortuna keystream primitive.
*
* Benefits include somewhat faster keystream generation compared with
* unaccelerated AES-ICM; reseeding is much cheaper than computing AES key
* schedules.
*/
bool random_chachamode __read_frequently = true;
#ifdef _KERNEL
SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_random, OID_AUTO, use_chacha20_cipher, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
&random_chachamode, 0,
"If non-zero, use the ChaCha20 cipher for randomdev PRF (default). "
"If zero, use AES-ICM cipher for randomdev PRF (12.x default).");
#endif
/* Initialise the hash */
void
randomdev_hash_init(struct randomdev_hash *context)
{
SHA256_Init(&context->sha);
}
/* Iterate the hash */
void
randomdev_hash_iterate(struct randomdev_hash *context, const void *data, size_t size)
{
SHA256_Update(&context->sha, data, size);
}
/* Conclude by returning the hash in the supplied <*buf> which must be
* RANDOM_KEYSIZE bytes long.
*/
void
randomdev_hash_finish(struct randomdev_hash *context, void *buf)
{
SHA256_Final(buf, &context->sha);
}
/* Initialise the encryption routine by setting up the key schedule
* from the supplied <*data> which must be RANDOM_KEYSIZE bytes of binary
* data.
*/
void
randomdev_encrypt_init(union randomdev_key *context, const void *data)
{
if (random_chachamode) {
chacha_keysetup(&context->chacha, data, RANDOM_KEYSIZE * 8);
} else {
rijndael_cipherInit(&context->cipher, MODE_ECB, NULL);
rijndael_makeKey(&context->key, DIR_ENCRYPT, RANDOM_KEYSIZE*8, data);
}
}
/*
* Create a psuedorandom output stream of 'bytecount' bytes using a CTR-mode
* cipher or similar. The 128-bit counter is supplied in the in-out parmeter
* 'ctr.' The output stream goes to 'd_out.'
*
* If AES is used, 'bytecount' is guaranteed to be a multiple of
* RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE.
*/
void
randomdev_keystream(union randomdev_key *context, uint128_t *ctr,
void *d_out, size_t bytecount)
{
size_t i, blockcount, read_chunk;
if (random_chachamode) {
uint128_t lectr;
/*
* Chacha always encodes and increments the counter little
* endian. So on BE machines, we must provide a swapped
* counter to chacha, and swap the output too.
*/
le128enc(&lectr, *ctr);
chacha_ivsetup(&context->chacha, NULL, (const void *)&lectr);
while (bytecount > 0) {
/*
* We are limited by the chacha_encrypt_bytes API to
* u32 bytes per chunk.
*/
read_chunk = MIN(bytecount,
rounddown((size_t)UINT32_MAX, CHACHA_BLOCKLEN));
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&context->chacha, NULL, d_out,
read_chunk);
d_out = (char *)d_out + read_chunk;
bytecount -= read_chunk;
}
/*
* Decode Chacha-updated LE counter to native endian and store
* it back in the caller's in-out parameter.
*/
chacha_ctrsave(&context->chacha, (void *)&lectr);
*ctr = le128dec(&lectr);
explicit_bzero(&lectr, sizeof(lectr));
} else {
KASSERT(bytecount % RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE == 0,
("%s: AES mode invalid bytecount, not a multiple of native "
"block size", __func__));
blockcount = bytecount / RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE;
for (i = 0; i < blockcount; i++) {
/*-
* FS&K - r = r|E(K,C)
* - C = C + 1
*/
rijndael_blockEncrypt(&context->cipher, &context->key,
(void *)ctr, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE * 8, d_out);
d_out = (char *)d_out + RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE;
uint128_increment(ctr);
}
}
}
/*
* Fetch a pointer to the relevant key material and its size.
*
* This API is expected to only be used only for reseeding, where the
* endianness does not matter; the goal is to simply incorporate the key
* material into the hash iterator that will produce key'.
*
* Do not expect the buffer pointed to by this API to match the exact
* endianness, etc, as the key material that was supplied to
* randomdev_encrypt_init().
*/
void
randomdev_getkey(union randomdev_key *context, const void **keyp, size_t *szp)
{
if (!random_chachamode) {
*keyp = &context->key.keyMaterial;
*szp = context->key.keyLen / 8;
return;
}
/* Chacha20 mode */
*keyp = (const void *)&context->chacha.input[4];
/* Sanity check keysize */
if (context->chacha.input[0] == U8TO32_LITTLE(sigma) &&
context->chacha.input[1] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&sigma[4]) &&
context->chacha.input[2] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&sigma[8]) &&
context->chacha.input[3] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&sigma[12])) {
*szp = 32;
return;
}
#if 0
/*
* Included for the sake of completeness; as-implemented, Fortuna
* doesn't need or use 128-bit Chacha20.
*/
if (context->chacha->input[0] == U8TO32_LITTLE(tau) &&
context->chacha->input[1] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&tau[4]) &&
context->chacha->input[2] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&tau[8]) &&
context->chacha->input[3] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&tau[12])) {
*szp = 16;
return;
}
#endif
#ifdef _KERNEL
panic("%s: Invalid chacha20 keysize: %16D\n", __func__,
(void *)context->chacha.input, " ");
#else
raise(SIGKILL);
#endif
}