There is no functional change for the existing Fortuna random(4) implementation, which remains the default in GENERIC. In the FenestrasX model, when the root CSPRNG is reseeded from pools due to an (infrequent) timer, child CSPRNGs can cheaply detect this condition and reseed. To do so, they just need to track an additional 64-bit value in the associated state, and compare it against the root seed version (generation) on random reads. This revision integrates arc4random(9) into that model without substantially changing the design or implementation of arc4random(9). The motivation is that arc4random(9) is immediately reseeded when the backing random(4) implementation has additional entropy. This is arguably most important during boot, when fenestrasX is reseeding at 1, 3, 9, 27, etc., second intervals. Today, arc4random(9) has a hardcoded 300 second reseed window. Without this mechanism, if arc4random(9) gets weak entropy during initial seed (and arc4random(9) is used early in boot, so this is quite possible), it may continue to emit poorly seeded output for 5 minutes. The FenestrasX push-reseed scheme corrects consumers, like arc4random(9), as soon as possible. Reviewed by: markm Approved by: csprng (markm) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22838
617 lines
18 KiB
C
617 lines
18 KiB
C
/*-
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2019 Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org>
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/domainset.h>
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#include <sys/fail.h>
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#include <sys/limits.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/queue.h>
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#include <sys/random.h>
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#include <sys/sdt.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/taskqueue.h>
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#include <machine/atomic.h>
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#include <machine/smp.h>
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#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
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#include <dev/random/random_harvestq.h>
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#include <dev/random/fenestrasX/fx_brng.h>
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#include <dev/random/fenestrasX/fx_hash.h>
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#include <dev/random/fenestrasX/fx_pool.h>
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#include <dev/random/fenestrasX/fx_priv.h>
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#include <dev/random/fenestrasX/fx_pub.h>
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/*
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* Timer-based reseed interval growth factor and limit in seconds. (§ 3.2)
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*/
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#define FXENT_RESSED_INTVL_GFACT 3
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#define FXENT_RESEED_INTVL_MAX 3600
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/*
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* Pool reseed schedule. Initially, only pool 0 is active. Until the timer
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* interval reaches INTVL_MAX, only pool 0 is used.
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*
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* After reaching INTVL_MAX, pool k is either activated (if inactive) or used
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* (if active) every 3^k timer reseeds. (§ 3.3)
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*
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* (Entropy harvesting only round robins across active pools.)
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*/
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#define FXENT_RESEED_BASE 3
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/*
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* Number of bytes from high quality sources to allocate to pool 0 before
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* normal round-robin allocation after each timer reseed. (§ 3.4)
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*/
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#define FXENT_HI_SRC_POOL0_BYTES 32
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/*
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* § 3.1
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*
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* Low sources provide unconditioned entropy, such as mouse movements; high
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* sources are assumed to provide high-quality random bytes. Pull sources are
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* those which can be polled, i.e., anything randomdev calls a "random_source."
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*
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* In the whitepaper, low sources are pull. For us, at least in the existing
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* design, low-quality sources push into some global ring buffer and then get
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* forwarded into the RNG by a thread that continually polls. Presumably their
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* design batches low entopy signals in some way (SHA512?) and only requests
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* them dynamically on reseed. I'm not sure what the benefit is vs feeding
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* into the pools directly.
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*/
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enum fxrng_ent_access_cls {
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FXRNG_PUSH,
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FXRNG_PULL,
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};
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enum fxrng_ent_source_cls {
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FXRNG_HI,
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FXRNG_LO,
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FXRNG_GARBAGE,
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};
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struct fxrng_ent_cls {
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enum fxrng_ent_access_cls entc_axx_cls;
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enum fxrng_ent_source_cls entc_src_cls;
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};
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static const struct fxrng_ent_cls fxrng_hi_pull = {
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.entc_axx_cls = FXRNG_PULL,
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.entc_src_cls = FXRNG_HI,
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};
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static const struct fxrng_ent_cls fxrng_hi_push = {
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.entc_axx_cls = FXRNG_PUSH,
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.entc_src_cls = FXRNG_HI,
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};
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static const struct fxrng_ent_cls fxrng_lo_push = {
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.entc_axx_cls = FXRNG_PUSH,
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.entc_src_cls = FXRNG_LO,
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};
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static const struct fxrng_ent_cls fxrng_garbage = {
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.entc_axx_cls = FXRNG_PUSH,
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.entc_src_cls = FXRNG_GARBAGE,
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};
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/*
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* This table is a mapping of randomdev's current source abstractions to the
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* designations above; at some point, if the design seems reasonable, it would
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* make more sense to pull this up into the abstraction layer instead.
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*/
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static const struct fxrng_ent_char {
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const struct fxrng_ent_cls *entc_cls;
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} fxrng_ent_char[ENTROPYSOURCE] = {
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[RANDOM_CACHED] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_ATTACH] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_KEYBOARD] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_MOUSE] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_NET_TUN] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_NET_ETHER] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_NET_NG] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_INTERRUPT] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_SWI] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_FS_ATIME] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_UMA] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_lo_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_OCTEON] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_push, /* Could be made pull. */
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_SAFE] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_GLXSB] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_HIFN] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_RDRAND] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_pull,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_NEHEMIAH] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_pull,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_RNDTEST] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_garbage,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_VIRTIO] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_pull,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_BROADCOM] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_CCP] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_pull,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_DARN] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_pull,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_TPM] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_push,
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},
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[RANDOM_PURE_VMGENID] = {
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.entc_cls = &fxrng_hi_push,
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},
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};
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/* Useful for single-bit-per-source state. */
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BITSET_DEFINE(fxrng_bits, ENTROPYSOURCE);
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/* XXX Borrowed from not-yet-committed D22702. */
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#ifndef BIT_TEST_SET_ATOMIC_ACQ
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#define BIT_TEST_SET_ATOMIC_ACQ(_s, n, p) \
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(atomic_testandset_acq_long( \
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&(p)->__bits[__bitset_word((_s), (n))], (n)) != 0)
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#endif
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#define FXENT_TEST_SET_ATOMIC_ACQ(n, p) \
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BIT_TEST_SET_ATOMIC_ACQ(ENTROPYSOURCE, n, p)
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/* For special behavior on first-time entropy sources. (§ 3.1) */
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static struct fxrng_bits __read_mostly fxrng_seen;
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/* For special behavior for high-entropy sources after a reseed. (§ 3.4) */
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_Static_assert(FXENT_HI_SRC_POOL0_BYTES <= UINT8_MAX, "");
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static uint8_t __read_mostly fxrng_reseed_seen[ENTROPYSOURCE];
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/* Entropy pools. Lock order is ENT -> RNG(root) -> RNG(leaf). */
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static struct mtx fxent_pool_lk;
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MTX_SYSINIT(fx_pool, &fxent_pool_lk, "fx entropy pool lock", MTX_DEF);
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#define FXENT_LOCK() mtx_lock(&fxent_pool_lk)
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#define FXENT_UNLOCK() mtx_unlock(&fxent_pool_lk)
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#define FXENT_ASSERT(rng) mtx_assert(&fxent_pool_lk, MA_OWNED)
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#define FXENT_ASSERT_NOT(rng) mtx_assert(&fxent_pool_lk, MA_NOTOWNED)
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static struct fxrng_hash fxent_pool[FXRNG_NPOOLS];
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static unsigned __read_mostly fxent_nactpools = 1;
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static struct timeout_task fxent_reseed_timer;
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static int __read_mostly fxent_timer_ready;
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/*
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* Track number of bytes of entropy harvested from high-quality sources prior
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* to initial keying. The idea is to collect more jitter entropy when fewer
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* high-quality bytes were available and less if we had other good sources. We
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* want to provide always-on availability but don't necessarily have *any*
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* great sources on some platforms.
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*
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* Like fxrng_ent_char: at some point, if the design seems reasonable, it would
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* make more sense to pull this up into the abstraction layer instead.
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*
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* Jitter entropy is unimplemented for now.
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*/
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static unsigned long fxrng_preseed_ent;
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void
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fxrng_pools_init(void)
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{
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < nitems(fxent_pool); i++)
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fxrng_hash_init(&fxent_pool[i]);
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}
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static inline bool
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fxrng_hi_source(enum random_entropy_source src)
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{
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return (fxrng_ent_char[src].entc_cls->entc_src_cls == FXRNG_HI);
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}
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/*
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* A racy check that this high-entropy source's event should contribute to
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* pool0 on the basis of per-source byte count. The check is racy for two
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* reasons:
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* - Performance: The vast majority of the time, we've already taken 32 bytes
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* from any present high quality source and the racy check lets us avoid
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* dirtying the cache for the global array.
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* - Correctness: It's fine that the check is racy. The failure modes are:
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* • False positive: We will detect when we take the lock.
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* • False negative: We still collect the entropy; it just won't be
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* preferentially placed in pool0 in this case.
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*/
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static inline bool
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fxrng_hi_pool0_eligible_racy(enum random_entropy_source src)
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{
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return (atomic_load_acq_8(&fxrng_reseed_seen[src]) <
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FXENT_HI_SRC_POOL0_BYTES);
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}
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/*
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* Top level entropy processing API from randomdev.
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*
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* Invoked by the core randomdev subsystem both for preload entropy, "push"
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* sources (like interrupts, keyboard, etc) and pull sources (RDRAND, etc).
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*/
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void
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fxrng_event_processor(struct harvest_event *event)
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{
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enum random_entropy_source src;
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unsigned pool;
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bool first_time, first_32;
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src = event->he_source;
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ASSERT_DEBUG(event->he_size <= sizeof(event->he_entropy),
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"%s: he_size: %u > sizeof(he_entropy): %zu", __func__,
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(unsigned)event->he_size, sizeof(event->he_entropy));
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/*
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* Zero bytes of source entropy doesn't count as observing this source
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* for the first time. We still harvest the counter entropy.
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*/
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first_time = event->he_size > 0 &&
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!FXENT_TEST_SET_ATOMIC_ACQ(src, &fxrng_seen);
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if (__predict_false(first_time)) {
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/*
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* "The first time [any source] provides entropy, it is used to
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* directly reseed the root PRNG. The entropy pools are
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* bypassed." (§ 3.1)
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*
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* Unlike Windows, we cannot rely on loader(8) seed material
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* being present, so we perform initial keying in the kernel.
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* We use brng_generation 0 to represent an unkeyed state.
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*
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* Prior to initial keying, it doesn't make sense to try to mix
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* the entropy directly with the root PRNG state, as the root
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* PRNG is unkeyed. Instead, we collect pre-keying dynamic
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* entropy in pool0 and do not bump the root PRNG seed version
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* or set its key. Initial keying will incorporate pool0 and
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* bump the brng_generation (seed version).
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*
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* After initial keying, we do directly mix in first-time
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* entropy sources. We use the root BRNG to generate 32 bytes
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* and use fxrng_hash to mix it with the new entropy source and
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* re-key with the first 256 bits of hash output.
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*/
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FXENT_LOCK();
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FXRNG_BRNG_LOCK(&fxrng_root);
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if (__predict_true(fxrng_root.brng_generation > 0)) {
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/* Bypass the pools: */
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FXENT_UNLOCK();
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fxrng_brng_src_reseed(event);
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FXRNG_BRNG_ASSERT_NOT(&fxrng_root);
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Keying the root PRNG requires both FXENT_LOCK and the PRNG's
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* lock, so we only need to hold on to the pool lock to prevent
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* initial keying without this entropy.
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*/
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FXRNG_BRNG_UNLOCK(&fxrng_root);
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/* Root PRNG hasn't been keyed yet, just accumulate event. */
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fxrng_hash_update(&fxent_pool[0], &event->he_somecounter,
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sizeof(event->he_somecounter));
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fxrng_hash_update(&fxent_pool[0], event->he_entropy,
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event->he_size);
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if (fxrng_hi_source(src)) {
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/* Prevent overflow. */
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if (fxrng_preseed_ent <= ULONG_MAX - event->he_size)
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fxrng_preseed_ent += event->he_size;
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}
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FXENT_UNLOCK();
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return;
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}
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/* !first_time */
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/*
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* "The first 32 bytes produced by a high entropy source after a reseed
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* from the pools is always put in pool 0." (§ 3.4)
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*
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* The first-32-byte tracking data in fxrng_reseed_seen is reset in
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* fxent_timer_reseed_npools() below.
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*/
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first_32 = event->he_size > 0 &&
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fxrng_hi_source(src) &&
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atomic_load_acq_int(&fxent_nactpools) > 1 &&
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fxrng_hi_pool0_eligible_racy(src);
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if (__predict_false(first_32)) {
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unsigned rem, seen;
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FXENT_LOCK();
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seen = fxrng_reseed_seen[src];
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if (seen == FXENT_HI_SRC_POOL0_BYTES)
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goto round_robin;
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rem = FXENT_HI_SRC_POOL0_BYTES - seen;
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rem = MIN(rem, event->he_size);
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fxrng_reseed_seen[src] = seen + rem;
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/*
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* We put 'rem' bytes in pool0, and any remaining bytes are
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* round-robin'd across other pools.
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*/
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fxrng_hash_update(&fxent_pool[0],
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((uint8_t *)event->he_entropy) + event->he_size - rem,
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rem);
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if (rem == event->he_size) {
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fxrng_hash_update(&fxent_pool[0], &event->he_somecounter,
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sizeof(event->he_somecounter));
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FXENT_UNLOCK();
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return;
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}
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/*
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* If fewer bytes were needed than this even provied, We only
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* take the last rem bytes of the entropy buffer and leave the
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* timecounter to be round-robin'd with the remaining entropy.
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*/
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event->he_size -= rem;
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goto round_robin;
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}
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/* !first_32 */
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FXENT_LOCK();
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round_robin:
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FXENT_ASSERT();
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pool = event->he_destination % fxent_nactpools;
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fxrng_hash_update(&fxent_pool[pool], event->he_entropy,
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event->he_size);
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fxrng_hash_update(&fxent_pool[pool], &event->he_somecounter,
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sizeof(event->he_somecounter));
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if (__predict_false(fxrng_hi_source(src) &&
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atomic_load_acq_64(&fxrng_root_generation) == 0)) {
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/* Prevent overflow. */
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if (fxrng_preseed_ent <= ULONG_MAX - event->he_size)
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fxrng_preseed_ent += event->he_size;
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}
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FXENT_UNLOCK();
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}
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/*
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* Top level "seeded" API/signal from randomdev.
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*
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* This is our warning that a request is coming: we need to be seeded. In
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* fenestrasX, a request for random bytes _never_ fails. "We (ed: ditto) have
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* observed that there are many callers that never check for the error code,
|
|
* even if they are generating cryptographic key material." (§ 1.6)
|
|
*
|
|
* If we returned 'false', both read_random(9) and chacha20_randomstir()
|
|
* (arc4random(9)) will blindly charge on with something almost certainly worse
|
|
* than what we've got, or are able to get quickly enough.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool
|
|
fxrng_alg_seeded(void)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t hash[FXRNG_HASH_SZ];
|
|
sbintime_t sbt;
|
|
|
|
/* The vast majority of the time, we expect to already be seeded. */
|
|
if (__predict_true(atomic_load_acq_64(&fxrng_root_generation) != 0))
|
|
return (true);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Take the lock and recheck; only one thread needs to do the initial
|
|
* seeding work.
|
|
*/
|
|
FXENT_LOCK();
|
|
if (atomic_load_acq_64(&fxrng_root_generation) != 0) {
|
|
FXENT_UNLOCK();
|
|
return (true);
|
|
}
|
|
/* XXX Any one-off initial seeding goes here. */
|
|
|
|
fxrng_hash_finish(&fxent_pool[0], hash, sizeof(hash));
|
|
fxrng_hash_init(&fxent_pool[0]);
|
|
|
|
fxrng_brng_reseed(hash, sizeof(hash));
|
|
FXENT_UNLOCK();
|
|
|
|
randomdev_unblock();
|
|
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This may be called too early for taskqueue_thread to be initialized.
|
|
* fxent_pool_timer_init will detect if we've already unblocked and
|
|
* queue the first timer reseed at that point.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (atomic_load_acq_int(&fxent_timer_ready) != 0) {
|
|
sbt = SBT_1S;
|
|
taskqueue_enqueue_timeout_sbt(taskqueue_thread,
|
|
&fxent_reseed_timer, -sbt, (sbt / 3), C_PREL(2));
|
|
}
|
|
return (true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Timer-based reseeds and pool expansion.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
fxent_timer_reseed_npools(unsigned n)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* 64 * 8 => moderately large 512 bytes. Could be static, as we are
|
|
* only used in a static context. On the other hand, this is in
|
|
* threadqueue TASK context and we're likely nearly at top of stack
|
|
* already.
|
|
*/
|
|
uint8_t hash[FXRNG_HASH_SZ * FXRNG_NPOOLS];
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_DEBUG(n > 0 && n <= FXRNG_NPOOLS, "n:%u", n);
|
|
|
|
FXENT_ASSERT();
|
|
/*
|
|
* Collect entropy from pools 0..n-1 by concatenating the output hashes
|
|
* and then feeding them into fxrng_brng_reseed, which will hash the
|
|
* aggregate together with the current root PRNG keystate to produce a
|
|
* new key. It will also bump the global generation counter
|
|
* appropriately.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
|
fxrng_hash_finish(&fxent_pool[i], hash + i * FXRNG_HASH_SZ,
|
|
FXRNG_HASH_SZ);
|
|
fxrng_hash_init(&fxent_pool[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fxrng_brng_reseed(hash, n * FXRNG_HASH_SZ);
|
|
explicit_bzero(hash, n * FXRNG_HASH_SZ);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* "The first 32 bytes produced by a high entropy source after a reseed
|
|
* from the pools is always put in pool 0." (§ 3.4)
|
|
*
|
|
* So here we reset the tracking (somewhat naively given the majority
|
|
* of sources on most machines are not what we consider "high", but at
|
|
* 32 bytes it's smaller than a cache line), so the next 32 bytes are
|
|
* prioritized into pool0.
|
|
*
|
|
* See corresponding use of fxrng_reseed_seen in fxrng_event_processor.
|
|
*/
|
|
memset(fxrng_reseed_seen, 0, sizeof(fxrng_reseed_seen));
|
|
FXENT_ASSERT();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
fxent_timer_reseed(void *ctx __unused, int pending __unused)
|
|
{
|
|
static unsigned reseed_intvl_sec = 1;
|
|
/* Only reseeds after FXENT_RESEED_INTVL_MAX is achieved. */
|
|
static uint64_t reseed_number = 1;
|
|
|
|
unsigned next_ival, i, k;
|
|
sbintime_t sbt;
|
|
|
|
if (reseed_intvl_sec < FXENT_RESEED_INTVL_MAX) {
|
|
next_ival = FXENT_RESSED_INTVL_GFACT * reseed_intvl_sec;
|
|
if (next_ival > FXENT_RESEED_INTVL_MAX)
|
|
next_ival = FXENT_RESEED_INTVL_MAX;
|
|
FXENT_LOCK();
|
|
fxent_timer_reseed_npools(1);
|
|
FXENT_UNLOCK();
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The creation of entropy pools beyond 0 is enabled when the
|
|
* reseed interval hits the maximum. (§ 3.3)
|
|
*/
|
|
next_ival = reseed_intvl_sec;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pool 0 is used every reseed; pool 1..0 every 3rd reseed; and in
|
|
* general, pool n..0 every 3^n reseeds.
|
|
*/
|
|
k = reseed_number;
|
|
reseed_number++;
|
|
|
|
/* Count how many pools, from [0, i), to use for reseed. */
|
|
for (i = 1; i < MIN(fxent_nactpools + 1, FXRNG_NPOOLS); i++) {
|
|
if ((k % FXENT_RESEED_BASE) != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
k /= FXENT_RESEED_BASE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we haven't activated pool i yet, activate it and only
|
|
* reseed from [0, i-1). (§ 3.3)
|
|
*/
|
|
FXENT_LOCK();
|
|
if (i == fxent_nactpools + 1) {
|
|
fxent_timer_reseed_npools(fxent_nactpools);
|
|
fxent_nactpools++;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Just reseed from [0, i). */
|
|
fxent_timer_reseed_npools(i);
|
|
}
|
|
FXENT_UNLOCK();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Schedule the next reseed. */
|
|
sbt = next_ival * SBT_1S;
|
|
taskqueue_enqueue_timeout_sbt(taskqueue_thread, &fxent_reseed_timer,
|
|
-sbt, (sbt / 3), C_PREL(2));
|
|
|
|
reseed_intvl_sec = next_ival;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
fxent_pool_timer_init(void *dummy __unused)
|
|
{
|
|
sbintime_t sbt;
|
|
|
|
TIMEOUT_TASK_INIT(taskqueue_thread, &fxent_reseed_timer, 0,
|
|
fxent_timer_reseed, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_load_acq_64(&fxrng_root_generation) != 0) {
|
|
sbt = SBT_1S;
|
|
taskqueue_enqueue_timeout_sbt(taskqueue_thread,
|
|
&fxent_reseed_timer, -sbt, (sbt / 3), C_PREL(2));
|
|
}
|
|
atomic_store_rel_int(&fxent_timer_ready, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
/* After taskqueue_thread is initialized in SI_SUB_TASKQ:SI_ORDER_SECOND. */
|
|
SYSINIT(fxent_pool_timer_init, SI_SUB_TASKQ, SI_ORDER_ANY,
|
|
fxent_pool_timer_init, NULL);
|