freebsd-nq/usr.sbin/rpc.yppasswdd/yppasswdd_server.c
Warner Losh 02da3f2280 yppasswdd assumed that a struct x_master_passwd is type punable to a
struct passwd.  This is not the case when sizeof(unsigned long) !=
sizeof(time_t).  Write a dinky function to do the assignment instead
of relying on the punning.  This does slow things down a little (1
extra function call, 11 pointer or int assignments), but is much safer
and machines have been fast enough since the mid 1990s that nobody
will notice the difference.

time_t is a 64-bits int on arm and mips.  Before this change, arm was
silently broken.  I guess there aren't that many ARM machines running
master YP domain servers. :)

The client side doesn't assume this type punning, so it doesn't need
to be fixed.
2009-02-18 22:27:46 +00:00

919 lines
23 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 1995, 1996
* Bill Paul <wpaul@ctr.columbia.edu>. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by Bill Paul.
* 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Bill Paul AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Bill Paul OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <db.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <libgen.h>
#include <libutil.h>
#include <rpc/rpc.h>
#include <rpcsvc/yp.h>
struct dom_binding;
#include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
#include "yppasswdd_extern.h"
#include "yppasswd.h"
#include "yppasswd_private.h"
#include "ypxfr_extern.h"
#include "yp_extern.h"
static struct passwd yp_password;
static void
xlate_passwd(struct x_master_passwd *xpwd, struct passwd *pwd)
{
pwd->pw_name = xpwd->pw_name;
pwd->pw_passwd = xpwd->pw_passwd;
pwd->pw_uid = xpwd->pw_uid;
pwd->pw_gid = xpwd->pw_gid;
pwd->pw_change = xpwd->pw_change;
pwd->pw_class = xpwd->pw_class;
pwd->pw_gecos = xpwd->pw_gecos;
pwd->pw_dir = xpwd->pw_dir;
pwd->pw_shell = xpwd->pw_shell;
pwd->pw_expire = xpwd->pw_expire;
pwd->pw_fields = xpwd->pw_fields;
}
static void
copy_yp_pass(char *p, int x, int m)
{
char *t, *s = p;
static char *buf;
yp_password.pw_fields = 0;
buf = realloc(buf, m + 10);
bzero(buf, m + 10);
/* Turn all colons into NULLs */
while (strchr(s, ':')) {
s = (strchr(s, ':') + 1);
*(s - 1)= '\0';
}
t = buf;
#define EXPAND(e) e = t; while ((*t++ = *p++));
EXPAND(yp_password.pw_name);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_NAME;
EXPAND(yp_password.pw_passwd);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_PASSWD;
yp_password.pw_uid = atoi(p);
p += (strlen(p) + 1);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_UID;
yp_password.pw_gid = atoi(p);
p += (strlen(p) + 1);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_GID;
if (x) {
EXPAND(yp_password.pw_class);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_CLASS;
yp_password.pw_change = atol(p);
p += (strlen(p) + 1);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_CHANGE;
yp_password.pw_expire = atol(p);
p += (strlen(p) + 1);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_EXPIRE;
}
EXPAND(yp_password.pw_gecos);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_GECOS;
EXPAND(yp_password.pw_dir);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_DIR;
EXPAND(yp_password.pw_shell);
yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_SHELL;
return;
}
static int
validchars(char *arg)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < strlen(arg); i++) {
if (iscntrl(arg[i])) {
yp_error("string contains a control character");
return(1);
}
if (arg[i] == ':') {
yp_error("string contains a colon");
return(1);
}
/* Be evil: truncate strings with \n in them silently. */
if (arg[i] == '\n') {
arg[i] = '\0';
return(0);
}
}
return(0);
}
static int
validate_master(struct passwd *opw __unused, struct x_master_passwd *npw)
{
if (npw->pw_name[0] == '+' || npw->pw_name[0] == '-') {
yp_error("client tried to modify an NIS entry");
return(1);
}
if (validchars(npw->pw_shell)) {
yp_error("specified shell contains invalid characters");
return(1);
}
if (validchars(npw->pw_gecos)) {
yp_error("specified gecos field contains invalid characters");
return(1);
}
if (validchars(npw->pw_passwd)) {
yp_error("specified password contains invalid characters");
return(1);
}
return(0);
}
static int
validate(struct passwd *opw, struct x_passwd *npw)
{
if (npw->pw_name[0] == '+' || npw->pw_name[0] == '-') {
yp_error("client tried to modify an NIS entry");
return(1);
}
if ((uid_t)npw->pw_uid != opw->pw_uid) {
yp_error("UID mismatch: client says user %s has UID %d",
npw->pw_name, npw->pw_uid);
yp_error("database says user %s has UID %d", opw->pw_name,
opw->pw_uid);
return(1);
}
if ((gid_t)npw->pw_gid != opw->pw_gid) {
yp_error("GID mismatch: client says user %s has GID %d",
npw->pw_name, npw->pw_gid);
yp_error("database says user %s has GID %d", opw->pw_name,
opw->pw_gid);
return(1);
}
/*
* Don't allow the user to shoot himself in the foot,
* even on purpose.
*/
if (!ok_shell(npw->pw_shell)) {
yp_error("%s is not a valid shell", npw->pw_shell);
return(1);
}
if (validchars(npw->pw_shell)) {
yp_error("specified shell contains invalid characters");
return(1);
}
if (validchars(npw->pw_gecos)) {
yp_error("specified gecos field contains invalid characters");
return(1);
}
if (validchars(npw->pw_passwd)) {
yp_error("specified password contains invalid characters");
return(1);
}
return(0);
}
/*
* Kludge alert:
* In order to have one rpc.yppasswdd support multiple domains,
* we have to cheat: we search each directory under /var/yp
* and try to match the user in each master.passwd.byname
* map that we find. If the user matches (username, uid and gid
* all agree), then we use that domain. If we match the user in
* more than one database, we must abort.
*/
static char *
find_domain(struct x_passwd *pw)
{
struct stat statbuf;
struct dirent *dirp;
DIR *dird;
char yp_mapdir[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
static char domain[YPMAXDOMAIN];
char *tmp = NULL;
DBT key, data;
int hit = 0;
yp_error("performing multidomain lookup");
if ((dird = opendir(yp_dir)) == NULL) {
yp_error("opendir(%s) failed: %s", yp_dir, strerror(errno));
return(NULL);
}
while ((dirp = readdir(dird)) != NULL) {
snprintf(yp_mapdir, sizeof yp_mapdir, "%s/%s",
yp_dir, dirp->d_name);
if (stat(yp_mapdir, &statbuf) < 0) {
yp_error("stat(%s) failed: %s", yp_mapdir,
strerror(errno));
closedir(dird);
return(NULL);
}
if (S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
tmp = (char *)dirp->d_name;
key.data = pw->pw_name;
key.size = strlen(pw->pw_name);
if (yp_get_record(tmp,"master.passwd.byname",
&key, &data, 0) != YP_TRUE) {
continue;
}
*((char *)data.data + data.size) = '\0';
copy_yp_pass(data.data, 1, data.size);
if (yp_password.pw_uid == (uid_t)pw->pw_uid &&
yp_password.pw_gid == (gid_t)pw->pw_gid) {
hit++;
snprintf(domain, YPMAXDOMAIN, "%s", tmp);
}
}
}
closedir(dird);
if (hit > 1) {
yp_error("found same user in two different domains");
return(NULL);
} else
return((char *)&domain);
}
static const char *maps[] = {
"master.passwd.byname",
"master.passwd.byuid",
"passwd.byname",
"passwd.byuid"
};
static const char *formats[] = {
"%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%ld:%ld:%s:%s:%s",
"%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%ld:%ld:%s:%s:%s",
"%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s",
"%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s"
};
static int
update_inplace(struct passwd *pw, char *domain)
{
DB *dbp = NULL;
DBT key = { NULL, 0 };
DBT data = { NULL, 0 };
char pwbuf[YPMAXRECORD];
char keybuf[20];
int i;
char *ptr = NULL;
static char yp_last[] = "YP_LAST_MODIFIED";
char yplastbuf[YPMAXRECORD];
snprintf(yplastbuf, sizeof yplastbuf, "%llu",
(unsigned long long)time(NULL));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
if (i % 2) {
snprintf(keybuf, sizeof keybuf,
"%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
key.data = &keybuf;
key.size = strlen(keybuf);
} else {
key.data = pw->pw_name;
key.size = strlen(pw->pw_name);
}
/*
* XXX The passwd.byname and passwd.byuid maps come in
* two flavors: secure and insecure. The secure version
* has a '*' in the password field whereas the insecure one
* has a real crypted password. The maps will be insecure
* if they were built with 'unsecure = TRUE' enabled in
* /var/yp/Makefile, but we'd have no way of knowing if
* this has been done unless we were to try parsing the
* Makefile, which is a disgusting thought. Instead, we
* read the records from the maps, skip to the first ':'
* in them, and then look at the character immediately
* following it. If it's an '*' then the map is 'secure'
* and we must not insert a real password into the pw_passwd
* field. If it's not an '*', then we put the real crypted
* password in.
*/
if (yp_get_record(domain,maps[i],&key,&data,1) != YP_TRUE) {
yp_error("couldn't read %s/%s: %s", domain,
maps[i], strerror(errno));
return(1);
}
if ((ptr = strchr(data.data, ':')) == NULL) {
yp_error("no colon in passwd record?!");
return(1);
}
/*
* XXX Supposing we have more than one user with the same
* UID? (Or more than one user with the same name?) We could
* end up modifying the wrong record if were not careful.
*/
if (i % 2) {
if (strncmp(data.data, pw->pw_name,
strlen(pw->pw_name))) {
yp_error("warning: found entry for UID %d \
in map %s@%s with wrong name (%.*s)", pw->pw_uid, maps[i], domain,
(int)(ptr - (char *)data.data),
(char *)data.data);
yp_error("there may be more than one user \
with the same UID - continuing");
continue;
}
} else {
/*
* We're really being ultra-paranoid here.
* This is generally a 'can't happen' condition.
*/
snprintf(pwbuf, sizeof pwbuf, ":%d:%d:", pw->pw_uid,
pw->pw_gid);
if (!strstr(data.data, pwbuf)) {
yp_error("warning: found entry for user %s \
in map %s@%s with wrong UID", pw->pw_name, maps[i], domain);
yp_error("there may be more than one user \
with the same name - continuing");
continue;
}
}
if (i < 2) {
snprintf(pwbuf, sizeof pwbuf, formats[i],
pw->pw_name, pw->pw_passwd, pw->pw_uid,
pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_class, pw->pw_change,
pw->pw_expire, pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir,
pw->pw_shell);
} else {
snprintf(pwbuf, sizeof pwbuf, formats[i],
pw->pw_name, *(ptr+1) == '*' ? "*" : pw->pw_passwd,
pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir,
pw->pw_shell);
}
#define FLAGS O_RDWR|O_CREAT
if ((dbp = yp_open_db_rw(domain, maps[i], FLAGS)) == NULL) {
yp_error("couldn't open %s/%s r/w: %s",domain,
maps[i],strerror(errno));
return(1);
}
data.data = pwbuf;
data.size = strlen(pwbuf);
if (yp_put_record(dbp, &key, &data, 1) != YP_TRUE) {
yp_error("failed to update record in %s/%s", domain,
maps[i]);
(void)(dbp->close)(dbp);
return(1);
}
key.data = yp_last;
key.size = strlen(yp_last);
data.data = (char *)&yplastbuf;
data.size = strlen(yplastbuf);
if (yp_put_record(dbp, &key, &data, 1) != YP_TRUE) {
yp_error("failed to update timestamp in %s/%s", domain,
maps[i]);
(void)(dbp->close)(dbp);
return(1);
}
(void)(dbp->close)(dbp);
}
return(0);
}
int *
yppasswdproc_update_1_svc(yppasswd *argp, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static int result;
struct sockaddr_in *rqhost;
DBT key, data;
int rval = 0;
int pfd, tfd;
int pid;
int passwd_changed = 0;
int shell_changed = 0;
int gecos_changed = 0;
char *oldshell = NULL;
char *oldgecos = NULL;
char *passfile_hold;
char passfile_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
char passfile_hold_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
char *domain = yppasswd_domain;
static struct sockaddr_in clntaddr;
static struct timeval t_saved, t_test;
/*
* Normal user updates always use the 'default' master.passwd file.
*/
passfile = passfile_default;
result = 1;
rqhost = svc_getcaller(rqstp->rq_xprt);
gettimeofday(&t_test, NULL);
if (!bcmp(rqhost, &clntaddr, sizeof *rqhost) &&
t_test.tv_sec > t_saved.tv_sec &&
t_test.tv_sec - t_saved.tv_sec < 300) {
bzero(&clntaddr, sizeof clntaddr);
bzero(&t_saved, sizeof t_saved);
return(NULL);
}
bcopy(rqhost, &clntaddr, sizeof clntaddr);
gettimeofday(&t_saved, NULL);
if (yp_access(resvport ? "master.passwd.byname" : NULL, rqstp)) {
yp_error("rejected update request from unauthorized host");
svcerr_auth(rqstp->rq_xprt, AUTH_BADCRED);
return(&result);
}
/*
* Step one: find the user. (It's kinda pointless to
* proceed if the user doesn't exist.) We look for the
* user in the master.passwd.byname database, _NOT_ by
* using getpwent() and friends! We can't use getpwent()
* since the NIS master server is not guaranteed to be
* configured as an NIS client.
*/
if (multidomain) {
if ((domain = find_domain(&argp->newpw)) == NULL) {
yp_error("multidomain lookup failed - aborting update");
return(&result);
} else
yp_error("updating user %s in domain %s",
argp->newpw.pw_name, domain);
}
key.data = argp->newpw.pw_name;
key.size = strlen(argp->newpw.pw_name);
if ((rval = yp_get_record(domain,"master.passwd.byname",
&key, &data, 0)) != YP_TRUE) {
if (rval == YP_NOKEY) {
yp_error("user %s not found in passwd database",
argp->newpw.pw_name);
} else {
yp_error("database access error: %s",
yperr_string(rval));
}
return(&result);
}
/* Nul terminate, please. */
*((char *)data.data + data.size) = '\0';
copy_yp_pass(data.data, 1, data.size);
/* Step 2: check that the supplied oldpass is valid. */
if (strcmp(crypt(argp->oldpass, yp_password.pw_passwd),
yp_password.pw_passwd)) {
yp_error("rejected change attempt -- bad password");
yp_error("client address: %s username: %s",
inet_ntoa(rqhost->sin_addr),
argp->newpw.pw_name);
return(&result);
}
/* Step 3: validate the arguments passed to us by the client. */
if (validate(&yp_password, &argp->newpw)) {
yp_error("rejecting change attempt: bad arguments");
yp_error("client address: %s username: %s",
inet_ntoa(rqhost->sin_addr),
argp->newpw.pw_name);
svcerr_decode(rqstp->rq_xprt);
return(&result);
}
/* Step 4: update the user's passwd structure. */
if (!no_chsh && strcmp(argp->newpw.pw_shell, yp_password.pw_shell)) {
oldshell = yp_password.pw_shell;
yp_password.pw_shell = argp->newpw.pw_shell;
shell_changed++;
}
if (!no_chfn && strcmp(argp->newpw.pw_gecos, yp_password.pw_gecos)) {
oldgecos = yp_password.pw_gecos;
yp_password.pw_gecos = argp->newpw.pw_gecos;
gecos_changed++;
}
if (strcmp(argp->newpw.pw_passwd, yp_password.pw_passwd)) {
yp_password.pw_passwd = argp->newpw.pw_passwd;
yp_password.pw_change = 0;
passwd_changed++;
}
/*
* If the caller specified a domain other than our 'default'
* domain, change the path to master.passwd accordingly.
*/
if (strcmp(domain, yppasswd_domain)) {
snprintf(passfile_buf, sizeof(passfile_buf),
"%s/%s/master.passwd", yp_dir, domain);
passfile = (char *)&passfile_buf;
}
/*
* Create a filename to hold the original master.passwd
* so if our call to yppwupdate fails we can roll back
*/
snprintf(passfile_hold_buf, sizeof(passfile_hold_buf),
"%s.hold", passfile);
passfile_hold = (char *)&passfile_hold_buf;
/* Step 5: make a new password file with the updated info. */
if (pw_init(dirname(passfile), passfile)) {
yp_error("pw_init() failed");
return &result;
}
if ((pfd = pw_lock()) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("pw_lock() failed");
return &result;
}
if ((tfd = pw_tmp(-1)) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("pw_tmp() failed");
return &result;
}
if (pw_copy(pfd, tfd, &yp_password, NULL) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("pw_copy() failed");
return &result;
}
if (rename(passfile, passfile_hold) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("rename of %s to %s failed", passfile,
passfile_hold);
return &result;
}
if (strcmp(passfile, _PATH_MASTERPASSWD) == 0) {
/*
* NIS server is exporting the system's master.passwd.
* Call pw_mkdb to rebuild passwd and the .db files
*/
if (pw_mkdb(yp_password.pw_name) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("pw_mkdb() failed");
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
return &result;
}
} else {
/*
* NIS server is exporting a private master.passwd.
* Rename tempfile into final location
*/
if (rename(pw_tempname(), passfile) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("rename of %s to %s failed",
pw_tempname(), passfile);
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
return &result;
}
}
pw_fini();
if (inplace) {
if ((rval = update_inplace(&yp_password, domain))) {
yp_error("inplace update failed -- rebuilding maps");
}
}
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case 0:
if (inplace && !rval) {
execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
yppasswd_domain, "pushpw", (char *)NULL);
} else {
execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
yppasswd_domain, (char *)NULL);
}
yp_error("couldn't exec map update process: %s",
strerror(errno));
unlink(passfile);
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
exit(1);
break;
case -1:
yp_error("fork() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
unlink(passfile);
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
return(&result);
break;
default:
unlink(passfile_hold);
break;
}
if (verbose) {
yp_error("update completed for user %s (uid %d) in %s:",
argp->newpw.pw_name, argp->newpw.pw_uid, passfile);
if (passwd_changed)
yp_error("password changed");
if (gecos_changed)
yp_error("gecos changed ('%s' -> '%s')",
oldgecos, argp->newpw.pw_gecos);
if (shell_changed)
yp_error("shell changed ('%s' -> '%s')",
oldshell, argp->newpw.pw_shell);
}
result = 0;
return (&result);
}
/*
* Note that this function performs a little less sanity checking
* than the last one. Since only the superuser is allowed to use it,
* it is assumed that the caller knows what he's doing.
*/
int *
yppasswdproc_update_master_1_svc(master_yppasswd *argp,
struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static int result;
int pfd, tfd;
int pid;
uid_t uid;
int rval = 0;
DBT key, data;
char *passfile_hold;
char passfile_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
char passfile_hold_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
struct sockaddr_in *rqhost;
SVCXPRT *transp;
struct passwd newpasswd;
result = 1;
transp = rqstp->rq_xprt;
/*
* NO AF_INET CONNETCIONS ALLOWED!
*/
rqhost = svc_getcaller(transp);
if (rqhost->sin_family != AF_UNIX) {
yp_error("Alert! %s/%d attempted to use superuser-only \
procedure!\n", inet_ntoa(rqhost->sin_addr), rqhost->sin_port);
svcerr_auth(transp, AUTH_BADCRED);
return(&result);
}
if (rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor != AUTH_SYS) {
yp_error("caller didn't send proper credentials");
svcerr_auth(transp, AUTH_BADCRED);
return(&result);
}
if (__rpc_get_local_uid(transp, &uid) < 0) {
yp_error("caller didn't send proper credentials");
svcerr_auth(transp, AUTH_BADCRED);
return(&result);
}
if (uid) {
yp_error("caller euid is %d, expecting 0 -- rejecting request",
uid);
svcerr_auth(rqstp->rq_xprt, AUTH_BADCRED);
return(&result);
}
passfile = passfile_default;
key.data = argp->newpw.pw_name;
key.size = strlen(argp->newpw.pw_name);
/*
* The superuser may add entries to the passwd maps if
* rpc.yppasswdd is started with the -a flag. Paranoia
* prevents me from allowing additions by default.
*/
if ((rval = yp_get_record(argp->domain, "master.passwd.byname",
&key, &data, 0)) != YP_TRUE) {
if (rval == YP_NOKEY) {
yp_error("user %s not found in passwd database",
argp->newpw.pw_name);
if (allow_additions)
yp_error("notice: adding user %s to \
master.passwd database for domain %s", argp->newpw.pw_name, argp->domain);
else
yp_error("restart rpc.yppasswdd with the -a flag to \
allow additions to be made to the password database");
} else {
yp_error("database access error: %s",
yperr_string(rval));
}
if (!allow_additions)
return(&result);
} else {
/* Nul terminate, please. */
*((char *)data.data + data.size) = '\0';
copy_yp_pass(data.data, 1, data.size);
}
/*
* Perform a small bit of sanity checking.
*/
if (validate_master(rval == YP_TRUE ? &yp_password:NULL,&argp->newpw)){
yp_error("rejecting update attempt for %s: bad arguments",
argp->newpw.pw_name);
return(&result);
}
/*
* If the caller specified a domain other than our 'default'
* domain, change the path to master.passwd accordingly.
*/
if (strcmp(argp->domain, yppasswd_domain)) {
snprintf(passfile_buf, sizeof(passfile_buf),
"%s/%s/master.passwd", yp_dir, argp->domain);
passfile = (char *)&passfile_buf;
}
/*
* Create a filename to hold the original master.passwd
* so if our call to yppwupdate fails we can roll back
*/
snprintf(passfile_hold_buf, sizeof(passfile_hold_buf),
"%s.hold", passfile);
passfile_hold = (char *)&passfile_hold_buf;
if (pw_init(dirname(passfile), passfile)) {
yp_error("pw_init() failed");
return &result;
}
if ((pfd = pw_lock()) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("pw_lock() failed");
return &result;
}
if ((tfd = pw_tmp(-1)) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("pw_tmp() failed");
return &result;
}
xlate_passwd(&argp->newpw, &newpasswd);
if (pw_copy(pfd, tfd, &newpasswd, NULL) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("pw_copy() failed");
return &result;
}
if (rename(passfile, passfile_hold) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("rename of %s to %s failed", passfile,
passfile_hold);
return &result;
}
if (strcmp(passfile, _PATH_MASTERPASSWD) == 0) {
/*
* NIS server is exporting the system's master.passwd.
* Call pw_mkdb to rebuild passwd and the .db files
*/
if (pw_mkdb(argp->newpw.pw_name) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("pw_mkdb() failed");
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
return &result;
}
} else {
/*
* NIS server is exporting a private master.passwd.
* Rename tempfile into final location
*/
if (rename(pw_tempname(), passfile) == -1) {
pw_fini();
yp_error("rename of %s to %s failed",
pw_tempname(), passfile);
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
return &result;
}
}
pw_fini();
if (inplace) {
xlate_passwd(&argp->newpw, &newpasswd);
if ((rval = update_inplace(&newpasswd, argp->domain))) {
yp_error("inplace update failed -- rebuilding maps");
}
}
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case 0:
if (inplace && !rval) {
execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
argp->domain, "pushpw", (char *)NULL);
} else {
execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
argp->domain, (char *)NULL);
}
yp_error("couldn't exec map update process: %s",
strerror(errno));
unlink(passfile);
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
exit(1);
break;
case -1:
yp_error("fork() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
unlink(passfile);
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
return(&result);
break;
default:
unlink(passfile_hold);
break;
}
yp_error("performed update of user %s (uid %d) domain %s",
argp->newpw.pw_name,
argp->newpw.pw_uid,
argp->domain);
result = 0;
return(&result);
}