c034143269
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
424 lines
11 KiB
C
424 lines
11 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/module.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/libkern.h>
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#include <sys/endian.h>
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#include <sys/pcpu.h>
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#if defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
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#include <machine/cpufunc.h>
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#include <machine/cputypes.h>
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#include <machine/md_var.h>
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#include <machine/specialreg.h>
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#endif
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#include <machine/pcb.h>
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#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
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#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
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#include <crypto/via/padlock.h>
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/*
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* Implementation notes.
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*
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* Some VIA CPUs provides SHA1 and SHA256 acceleration.
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* We implement all HMAC algorithms provided by crypto(9) framework, but we do
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* the crypto work in software unless this is HMAC/SHA1 or HMAC/SHA256 and
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* our CPU can accelerate it.
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*
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* Additional CPU instructions, which preform SHA1 and SHA256 are one-shot
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* functions - we have only one chance to give the data, CPU itself will add
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* the padding and calculate hash automatically.
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* This means, it is not possible to implement common init(), update(), final()
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* methods.
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* The way I've choosen is to keep adding data to the buffer on update()
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* (reallocating the buffer if necessary) and call XSHA{1,256} instruction on
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* final().
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*/
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struct padlock_sha_ctx {
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uint8_t *psc_buf;
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int psc_offset;
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int psc_size;
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};
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CTASSERT(sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx) <= sizeof(union authctx));
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static void padlock_sha_init(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx);
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static int padlock_sha_update(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *buf,
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uint16_t bufsize);
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static void padlock_sha1_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx);
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static void padlock_sha256_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx);
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static struct auth_hash padlock_hmac_sha1 = {
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.type = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC,
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.name = "HMAC-SHA1",
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.keysize = SHA1_BLOCK_LEN,
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.hashsize = SHA1_HASH_LEN,
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.ctxsize = sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx),
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.blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_LEN,
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.Init = (void (*)(void *))padlock_sha_init,
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.Update = (int (*)(void *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t))padlock_sha_update,
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.Final = (void (*)(uint8_t *, void *))padlock_sha1_final,
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};
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static struct auth_hash padlock_hmac_sha256 = {
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.type = CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC,
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.name = "HMAC-SHA2-256",
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.keysize = SHA2_256_BLOCK_LEN,
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.hashsize = SHA2_256_HASH_LEN,
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.ctxsize = sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx),
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.blocksize = SHA2_256_BLOCK_LEN,
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.Init = (void (*)(void *))padlock_sha_init,
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.Update = (int (*)(void *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t))padlock_sha_update,
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.Final = (void (*)(uint8_t *, void *))padlock_sha256_final,
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};
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MALLOC_DECLARE(M_PADLOCK);
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static __inline void
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padlock_output_block(uint32_t *src, uint32_t *dst, size_t count)
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{
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while (count-- > 0)
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*dst++ = bswap32(*src++);
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}
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static void
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padlock_do_sha1(const u_char *in, u_char *out, int count)
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{
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u_char buf[128+16]; /* PadLock needs at least 128 bytes buffer. */
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u_char *result = PADLOCK_ALIGN(buf);
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((uint32_t *)result)[0] = 0x67452301;
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((uint32_t *)result)[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
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((uint32_t *)result)[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
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((uint32_t *)result)[3] = 0x10325476;
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((uint32_t *)result)[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
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#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM
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__asm __volatile(
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".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xa6, 0xc8" /* rep xsha1 */
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: "+S"(in), "+D"(result)
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: "c"(count), "a"(0)
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);
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#endif
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padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out,
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SHA1_HASH_LEN / sizeof(uint32_t));
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}
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static void
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padlock_do_sha256(const char *in, char *out, int count)
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{
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char buf[128+16]; /* PadLock needs at least 128 bytes buffer. */
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char *result = PADLOCK_ALIGN(buf);
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((uint32_t *)result)[0] = 0x6A09E667;
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((uint32_t *)result)[1] = 0xBB67AE85;
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((uint32_t *)result)[2] = 0x3C6EF372;
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((uint32_t *)result)[3] = 0xA54FF53A;
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((uint32_t *)result)[4] = 0x510E527F;
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((uint32_t *)result)[5] = 0x9B05688C;
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((uint32_t *)result)[6] = 0x1F83D9AB;
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((uint32_t *)result)[7] = 0x5BE0CD19;
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#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM
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__asm __volatile(
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".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xa6, 0xd0" /* rep xsha256 */
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: "+S"(in), "+D"(result)
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: "c"(count), "a"(0)
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);
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#endif
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padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out,
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SHA2_256_HASH_LEN / sizeof(uint32_t));
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}
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static void
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padlock_sha_init(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx)
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{
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ctx->psc_buf = NULL;
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ctx->psc_offset = 0;
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ctx->psc_size = 0;
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}
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static int
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padlock_sha_update(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *buf, uint16_t bufsize)
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{
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if (ctx->psc_size - ctx->psc_offset < bufsize) {
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ctx->psc_size = MAX(ctx->psc_size * 2, ctx->psc_size + bufsize);
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ctx->psc_buf = realloc(ctx->psc_buf, ctx->psc_size, M_PADLOCK,
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M_NOWAIT);
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if(ctx->psc_buf == NULL)
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return (ENOMEM);
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}
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bcopy(buf, ctx->psc_buf + ctx->psc_offset, bufsize);
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ctx->psc_offset += bufsize;
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return (0);
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}
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static void
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padlock_sha_free(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx)
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{
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if (ctx->psc_buf != NULL) {
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//bzero(ctx->psc_buf, ctx->psc_size);
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free(ctx->psc_buf, M_PADLOCK);
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ctx->psc_buf = NULL;
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ctx->psc_offset = 0;
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ctx->psc_size = 0;
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}
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}
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static void
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padlock_sha1_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx)
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{
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padlock_do_sha1(ctx->psc_buf, hash, ctx->psc_offset);
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padlock_sha_free(ctx);
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}
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static void
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padlock_sha256_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx)
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{
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padlock_do_sha256(ctx->psc_buf, hash, ctx->psc_offset);
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padlock_sha_free(ctx);
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}
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static void
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padlock_copy_ctx(struct auth_hash *axf, void *sctx, void *dctx)
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{
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if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0 &&
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(axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC ||
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axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC)) {
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struct padlock_sha_ctx *spctx = sctx, *dpctx = dctx;
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dpctx->psc_offset = spctx->psc_offset;
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dpctx->psc_size = spctx->psc_size;
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dpctx->psc_buf = malloc(dpctx->psc_size, M_PADLOCK, M_WAITOK);
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bcopy(spctx->psc_buf, dpctx->psc_buf, dpctx->psc_size);
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} else {
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bcopy(sctx, dctx, axf->ctxsize);
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}
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}
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static void
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padlock_free_ctx(struct auth_hash *axf, void *ctx)
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{
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if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0 &&
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(axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC ||
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axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC)) {
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padlock_sha_free(ctx);
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}
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}
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static void
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padlock_hash_key_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, const uint8_t *key,
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int klen)
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{
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struct auth_hash *axf;
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axf = ses->ses_axf;
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/*
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* Try to free contexts before using them, because
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* padlock_hash_key_setup() can be called twice - once from
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* padlock_newsession() and again from padlock_process().
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*/
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padlock_free_ctx(axf, ses->ses_ictx);
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padlock_free_ctx(axf, ses->ses_octx);
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hmac_init_ipad(axf, key, klen, ses->ses_ictx);
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hmac_init_opad(axf, key, klen, ses->ses_octx);
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}
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/*
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* Compute keyed-hash authenticator.
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*/
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static int
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padlock_authcompute(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
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{
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u_char hash[HASH_MAX_LEN], hash2[HASH_MAX_LEN];
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struct auth_hash *axf;
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union authctx ctx;
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int error;
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axf = ses->ses_axf;
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padlock_copy_ctx(axf, ses->ses_ictx, &ctx);
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error = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length,
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(int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, (caddr_t)&ctx);
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if (error != 0) {
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padlock_free_ctx(axf, &ctx);
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return (error);
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}
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error = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_payload_start,
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crp->crp_payload_length,
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(int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, (caddr_t)&ctx);
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if (error != 0) {
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padlock_free_ctx(axf, &ctx);
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return (error);
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}
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axf->Final(hash, &ctx);
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padlock_copy_ctx(axf, ses->ses_octx, &ctx);
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axf->Update(&ctx, hash, axf->hashsize);
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axf->Final(hash, &ctx);
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if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
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crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, ses->ses_mlen,
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hash2);
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if (timingsafe_bcmp(hash, hash2, ses->ses_mlen) != 0)
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return (EBADMSG);
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} else
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crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, ses->ses_mlen,
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hash);
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return (0);
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}
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/* Find software structure which describes HMAC algorithm. */
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static struct auth_hash *
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padlock_hash_lookup(int alg)
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{
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struct auth_hash *axf;
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switch (alg) {
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case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
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axf = &auth_hash_null;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
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axf = &auth_hash_hmac_md5;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
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if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0)
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axf = &padlock_hmac_sha1;
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else
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axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
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axf = &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
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if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0)
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axf = &padlock_hmac_sha256;
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else
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axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
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axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
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axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
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break;
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default:
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axf = NULL;
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break;
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}
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return (axf);
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}
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bool
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padlock_hash_check(const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
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{
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return (padlock_hash_lookup(csp->csp_auth_alg) != NULL);
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}
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int
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padlock_hash_setup(struct padlock_session *ses,
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const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ses->ses_axf = padlock_hash_lookup(csp->csp_auth_alg);
|
|
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
|
|
ses->ses_mlen = ses->ses_axf->hashsize;
|
|
else
|
|
ses->ses_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate memory for HMAC inner and outer contexts. */
|
|
ses->ses_ictx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_PADLOCK,
|
|
M_ZERO | M_NOWAIT);
|
|
ses->ses_octx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_PADLOCK,
|
|
M_ZERO | M_NOWAIT);
|
|
if (ses->ses_ictx == NULL || ses->ses_octx == NULL)
|
|
return (ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
/* Setup key if given. */
|
|
if (csp->csp_auth_key != NULL) {
|
|
padlock_hash_key_setup(ses, csp->csp_auth_key,
|
|
csp->csp_auth_klen);
|
|
}
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
padlock_hash_process(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp,
|
|
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
td = curthread;
|
|
fpu_kern_enter(td, ses->ses_fpu_ctx, FPU_KERN_NORMAL | FPU_KERN_KTHR);
|
|
if (crp->crp_auth_key != NULL)
|
|
padlock_hash_key_setup(ses, crp->crp_auth_key,
|
|
csp->csp_auth_klen);
|
|
|
|
error = padlock_authcompute(ses, crp);
|
|
fpu_kern_leave(td, ses->ses_fpu_ctx);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
padlock_hash_free(struct padlock_session *ses)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ses->ses_ictx != NULL) {
|
|
padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_ictx);
|
|
bzero(ses->ses_ictx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize);
|
|
free(ses->ses_ictx, M_PADLOCK);
|
|
ses->ses_ictx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ses->ses_octx != NULL) {
|
|
padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_octx);
|
|
bzero(ses->ses_octx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize);
|
|
free(ses->ses_octx, M_PADLOCK);
|
|
ses->ses_octx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|