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freebsd-nq/sys/netkey/keysock.c
Robert Watson a34b704666 Merge next step in socket buffer locking: 
- sowakeup() now asserts the socket buffer lock on entry.  Move
  the call to KNOTE higher in sowakeup() so that it is made with
  the socket buffer lock held for consistency with other calls.
  Release the socket buffer lock prior to calling into pgsigio(),
  so_upcall(), or aio_swake().  Locking for this event management
  will need revisiting in the future, but this model avoids lock
  order reversals when upcalls into other subsystems result in
  socket/socket buffer operations.  Assert that the socket buffer
  lock is not held at the end of the function.

- Wrapper macros for sowakeup(), sorwakeup() and sowwakeup(), now
  have _locked versions which assert the socket buffer lock on
  entry.  If a wakeup is required by sb_notify(), invoke
  sowakeup(); otherwise, unconditionally release the socket buffer
  lock.  This results in the socket buffer lock being released
  whether a wakeup is required or not.

- Break out socantsendmore() into socantsendmore_locked() that
  asserts the socket buffer lock.  socantsendmore()
  unconditionally locks the socket buffer before calling
  socantsendmore_locked().  Note that both functions return with
  the socket buffer unlocked as socantsendmore_locked() calls
  sowwakeup_locked() which has the same properties.  Assert that
  the socket buffer is unlocked on return.

- Break out socantrcvmore() into socantrcvmore_locked() that
  asserts the socket buffer lock.  socantrcvmore() unconditionally
  locks the socket buffer before calling socantrcvmore_locked().
  Note that both functions return with the socket buffer unlocked
  as socantrcvmore_locked() calls sorwakeup_locked() which has
  similar properties.  Assert that the socket buffer is unlocked
  on return.

- Break out sbrelease() into a sbrelease_locked() that asserts the
  socket buffer lock.  sbrelease() unconditionally locks the
  socket buffer before calling sbrelease_locked().
  sbrelease_locked() now invokes sbflush_locked() instead of
  sbflush().

- Assert the socket buffer lock in socket buffer sanity check
  functions sblastrecordchk(), sblastmbufchk().

- Assert the socket buffer lock in SBLINKRECORD().

- Break out various sbappend() functions into sbappend_locked()
  (and variations on that name) that assert the socket buffer
  lock.  The !_locked() variations unconditionally lock the socket
  buffer before calling their _locked counterparts.  Internally,
  make sure to call _locked() support routines, etc, if already
  holding the socket buffer lock.

- Break out sbinsertoob() into sbinsertoob_locked() that asserts
  the socket buffer lock.  sbinsertoob() unconditionally locks the
  socket buffer before calling sbinsertoob_locked().

- Break out sbflush() into sbflush_locked() that asserts the
  socket buffer lock.  sbflush() unconditionally locks the socket
  buffer before calling sbflush_locked().  Update panic strings
  for new function names.

- Break out sbdrop() into sbdrop_locked() that asserts the socket
  buffer lock.  sbdrop() unconditionally locks the socket buffer
  before calling sbdrop_locked().

- Break out sbdroprecord() into sbdroprecord_locked() that asserts
  the socket buffer lock.  sbdroprecord() unconditionally locks
  the socket buffer before calling sbdroprecord_locked().

- sofree() now calls socantsendmore_locked() and re-acquires the
  socket buffer lock on return.  It also now calls
  sbrelease_locked().

- sorflush() now calls socantrcvmore_locked() and re-acquires the
  socket buffer lock on return.  Clean up/mess up other behavior
  in sorflush() relating to the temporary stack copy of the socket
  buffer used with dom_dispose by more properly initializing the
  temporary copy, and selectively bzeroing/copying more carefully
  to prevent WITNESS from getting confused by improperly
  initialized mutexes.  Annotate why that's necessary, or at
  least, needed.

- soisconnected() now calls sbdrop_locked() before unlocking the
  socket buffer to avoid locking overhead.

Some parts of this change were:

Submitted by:	sam
Sponsored by:	FreeBSD Foundation
Obtained from:	BSD/OS
2004-06-21 00:20:43 +00:00

509 lines
11 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/* $KAME: keysock.c,v 1.32 2003/08/22 05:45:08 itojun Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_ipsec.h"
/* This code has derived from sys/net/rtsock.c on FreeBSD2.2.5 */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/domain.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <net/raw_cb.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <net/pfkeyv2.h>
#include <netkey/keydb.h>
#include <netkey/key.h>
#include <netkey/keysock.h>
#include <netkey/key_debug.h>
#include <machine/stdarg.h>
struct sockaddr key_dst = { 2, PF_KEY, };
struct sockaddr key_src = { 2, PF_KEY, };
static int key_sendup0(struct rawcb *, struct mbuf *, int);
struct pfkeystat pfkeystat;
/*
* key_output()
*/
int
#if __STDC__
key_output(struct mbuf *m, ...)
#else
key_output(m, va_alist)
struct mbuf *m;
va_dcl
#endif
{
struct sadb_msg *msg;
int len, error = 0;
int s;
struct socket *so;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, m);
so = va_arg(ap, struct socket *);
va_end(ap);
if (m == 0)
panic("key_output: NULL pointer was passed.");
pfkeystat.out_total++;
pfkeystat.out_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len;
len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
if (len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
pfkeystat.out_tooshort++;
error = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
if ((m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg))) == 0) {
pfkeystat.out_nomem++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto end;
}
}
M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m);
KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP, kdebug_mbuf(m));
msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
pfkeystat.out_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++;
if (len != PFKEY_UNUNIT64(msg->sadb_msg_len)) {
pfkeystat.out_invlen++;
error = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
/*XXX giant lock*/
s = splnet();
error = key_parse(m, so);
m = NULL;
splx(s);
end:
if (m)
m_freem(m);
return error;
}
/*
* send message to the socket.
*/
static int
key_sendup0(rp, m, promisc)
struct rawcb *rp;
struct mbuf *m;
int promisc;
{
int error;
if (promisc) {
struct sadb_msg *pmsg;
M_PREPEND(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), M_DONTWAIT);
if (m && m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg))
m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
if (!m) {
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
m->m_pkthdr.len += sizeof(*pmsg);
pmsg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
bzero(pmsg, sizeof(*pmsg));
pmsg->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
pmsg->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_PROMISC;
pmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(m->m_pkthdr.len);
/* pid and seq? */
pfkeystat.in_msgtype[pmsg->sadb_msg_type]++;
}
if (!sbappendaddr(&rp->rcb_socket->so_rcv, (struct sockaddr *)&key_src,
m, NULL)) {
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
m_freem(m);
error = ENOBUFS;
} else
error = 0;
sorwakeup(rp->rcb_socket);
return error;
}
/* so can be NULL if target != KEY_SENDUP_ONE */
int
key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target)
struct socket *so;
struct mbuf *m;
int target;
{
struct mbuf *n;
struct keycb *kp;
int sendup;
struct rawcb *rp;
int error = 0;
if (m == NULL)
panic("key_sendup_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed.");
if (so == NULL && target == KEY_SENDUP_ONE)
panic("key_sendup_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed.");
pfkeystat.in_total++;
pfkeystat.in_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len;
if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
if (m == NULL) {
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
}
if (m->m_len >= sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
struct sadb_msg *msg;
msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++;
}
LIST_FOREACH(rp, &rawcb_list, list) {
if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_family != PF_KEY)
continue;
if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol &&
rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol != PF_KEY_V2) {
continue;
}
kp = (struct keycb *)rp;
/*
* If you are in promiscuous mode, and when you get broadcasted
* reply, you'll get two PF_KEY messages.
* (based on pf_key@inner.net message on 14 Oct 1998)
*/
if (((struct keycb *)rp)->kp_promisc) {
if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) != NULL) {
(void)key_sendup0(rp, n, 1);
n = NULL;
}
}
/* the exact target will be processed later */
if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
continue;
sendup = 0;
switch (target) {
case KEY_SENDUP_ONE:
/* the statement has no effect */
if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
sendup++;
break;
case KEY_SENDUP_ALL:
sendup++;
break;
case KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED:
if (kp->kp_registered)
sendup++;
break;
}
pfkeystat.in_msgtarget[target]++;
if (!sendup)
continue;
if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) == NULL) {
m_freem(m);
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
/*
* ignore error even if queue is full. PF_KEY does not
* guarantee the delivery of the message.
* this is important when target == KEY_SENDUP_ALL.
*/
key_sendup0(rp, n, 0);
n = NULL;
}
if (so) {
error = key_sendup0(sotorawcb(so), m, 0);
m = NULL;
} else {
error = 0;
m_freem(m);
}
return error;
}
/*
* key_abort()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_abort()
*/
static int
key_abort(struct socket *so)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_abort(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_attach()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_attach()
*/
static int
key_attach(struct socket *so, int proto, struct thread *td)
{
struct keycb *kp;
int s, error;
if (sotorawcb(so) != 0)
return EISCONN; /* XXX panic? */
kp = (struct keycb *)malloc(sizeof *kp, M_PCB, M_WAITOK); /* XXX */
if (kp == 0)
return ENOBUFS;
bzero(kp, sizeof *kp);
/*
* The splnet() is necessary to block protocols from sending
* error notifications (like RTM_REDIRECT or RTM_LOSING) while
* this PCB is extant but incompletely initialized.
* Probably we should try to do more of this work beforehand and
* eliminate the spl.
*/
s = splnet();
so->so_pcb = (caddr_t)kp;
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_attach(so, proto, td);
kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
if (error) {
free(kp, M_PCB);
so->so_pcb = (caddr_t) 0;
splx(s);
return error;
}
kp->kp_promisc = kp->kp_registered = 0;
if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
key_cb.key_count++;
key_cb.any_count++;
kp->kp_raw.rcb_laddr = &key_src;
kp->kp_raw.rcb_faddr = &key_dst;
soisconnected(so);
so->so_options |= SO_USELOOPBACK;
splx(s);
return 0;
}
/*
* key_bind()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_bind()
*/
static int
key_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_bind(so, nam, td); /* xxx just EINVAL */
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_connect()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_connect()
*/
static int
key_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_connect(so, nam, td); /* XXX just EINVAL */
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_detach()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_detach()
*/
static int
key_detach(struct socket *so)
{
struct keycb *kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
int s, error;
s = splnet();
if (kp != 0) {
if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol
== PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
key_cb.key_count--;
key_cb.any_count--;
key_freereg(so);
}
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_detach(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_disconnect()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:key_disconnect()
*/
static int
key_disconnect(struct socket *so)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_disconnect(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_peeraddr()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_peeraddr()
*/
static int
key_peeraddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_peeraddr(so, nam);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_send()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_send()
*/
static int
key_send(struct socket *so, int flags, struct mbuf *m, struct sockaddr *nam,
struct mbuf *control, struct thread *td)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_send(so, flags, m, nam, control, td);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_shutdown()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_shutdown()
*/
static int
key_shutdown(struct socket *so)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_shutdown(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_sockaddr()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_sockaddr()
*/
static int
key_sockaddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_sockaddr(so, nam);
splx(s);
return error;
}
struct pr_usrreqs key_usrreqs = {
key_abort, pru_accept_notsupp, key_attach, key_bind,
key_connect,
pru_connect2_notsupp, pru_control_notsupp, key_detach,
key_disconnect, pru_listen_notsupp, key_peeraddr,
pru_rcvd_notsupp,
pru_rcvoob_notsupp, key_send, pru_sense_null, key_shutdown,
key_sockaddr, sosend, soreceive, sopoll,
pru_sosetlabel_null
};
/* sysctl */
SYSCTL_NODE(_net, PF_KEY, key, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Key Family");
/*
* Definitions of protocols supported in the KEY domain.
*/
extern struct domain keydomain;
struct protosw keysw[] = {
{ SOCK_RAW, &keydomain, PF_KEY_V2, PR_ATOMIC|PR_ADDR,
0, (pr_output_t *)key_output, raw_ctlinput, 0,
0,
raw_init, 0, 0, 0,
&key_usrreqs
}
};
struct domain keydomain =
{ PF_KEY, "key", key_init, 0, 0,
keysw, &keysw[sizeof(keysw)/sizeof(keysw[0])] };
DOMAIN_SET(key);
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