freebsd-nq/sys/geom/geom_aes.c
Poul-Henning Kamp 3924ad705e Time has run from the "run GEOM in userland" harness, and the new regression
test is built to test GEOM as running in the kernel.

This commit is basically "unifdef -D_KERNEL" to remove the mainly #include
related code to support the userland-harness.
2003-04-13 09:02:06 +00:00

383 lines
9.8 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2002 Poul-Henning Kamp
* Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Poul-Henning Kamp
* and NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
* under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
* DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*
* This method provides AES encryption with a compiled in key (default
* all zeroes).
*
* XXX: This could probably save a lot of code by pretending to be a slicer.
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/bio.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/libkern.h>
#include <sys/endian.h>
#include <sys/md5.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <geom/geom.h>
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael.h>
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael.h>
#define AES_CLASS_NAME "AES"
#define MASTER_KEY_LENGTH (1024/8)
static const u_char *aes_magic = "<<FreeBSD-GEOM-AES>>";
static const u_char *aes_magic_random = "<<FreeBSD-GEOM-AES-RANDOM>>";
static const u_char *aes_magic_test = "<<FreeBSD-GEOM-AES-TEST>>";
struct g_aes_softc {
enum {
KEY_ZERO,
KEY_RANDOM,
KEY_TEST
} keying;
u_int sectorsize;
off_t mediasize;
cipherInstance ci;
u_char master_key[MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
};
/*
* Generate a sectorkey from the masterkey and the offset position.
*
* For KEY_ZERO we just return a key of all zeros.
*
* We feed the sector byte offset, 16 bytes of the master-key and
* the sector byte offset once more to MD5.
* The sector byte offset is converted to little-endian format first
* to support multi-architecture operation.
* We use 16 bytes from the master-key starting at the logical sector
* number modulus he length of the master-key. If need be we wrap
* around to the start of the master-key.
*/
static void
g_aes_makekey(struct g_aes_softc *sc, off_t off, keyInstance *ki, int dir)
{
MD5_CTX cx;
u_int64_t u64;
u_int u, u1;
u_char *p, buf[16];
if (sc->keying == KEY_ZERO) {
rijndael_makeKey(ki, dir, 128, sc->master_key);
return;
}
MD5Init(&cx);
u64 = htole64(off);
MD5Update(&cx, (u_char *)&u64, sizeof(u64));
u = off / sc->sectorsize;
u %= sizeof sc->master_key;
p = sc->master_key + u;
if (u + 16 <= sizeof(sc->master_key)) {
MD5Update(&cx, p, 16);
} else {
u1 = sizeof sc->master_key - u;
MD5Update(&cx, p, u1);
MD5Update(&cx, sc->master_key, 16 - u1);
u1 = 0; /* destroy evidence */
}
u = 0; /* destroy evidence */
MD5Update(&cx, (u_char *)&u64, sizeof(u64));
u64 = 0; /* destroy evidence */
MD5Final(buf, &cx);
bzero(&cx, sizeof cx); /* destroy evidence */
rijndael_makeKey(ki, dir, 128, buf);
bzero(buf, sizeof buf); /* destroy evidence */
}
static void
g_aes_read_done(struct bio *bp)
{
struct g_geom *gp;
struct g_aes_softc *sc;
u_char *p, *b, *e, *sb;
keyInstance dkey;
off_t o;
gp = bp->bio_from->geom;
sc = gp->softc;
sb = g_malloc(sc->sectorsize, M_WAITOK);
b = bp->bio_data;
e = bp->bio_data;
e += bp->bio_length;
o = bp->bio_offset - sc->sectorsize;
for (p = b; p < e; p += sc->sectorsize) {
g_aes_makekey(sc, o, &dkey, DIR_DECRYPT);
rijndael_blockDecrypt(&sc->ci, &dkey, p, sc->sectorsize * 8, sb);
bcopy(sb, p, sc->sectorsize);
o += sc->sectorsize;
}
bzero(&dkey, sizeof dkey); /* destroy evidence */
bzero(sb, sc->sectorsize); /* destroy evidence */
g_free(sb);
g_std_done(bp);
}
static void
g_aes_write_done(struct bio *bp)
{
struct g_aes_softc *sc;
struct g_geom *gp;
gp = bp->bio_to->geom;
sc = gp->softc;
bzero(bp->bio_data, bp->bio_length); /* destroy evidence */
g_free(bp->bio_data);
g_std_done(bp);
}
static void
g_aes_start(struct bio *bp)
{
struct g_geom *gp;
struct g_consumer *cp;
struct g_aes_softc *sc;
struct bio *bp2;
u_char *p1, *p2, *b, *e;
keyInstance ekey;
off_t o;
gp = bp->bio_to->geom;
cp = LIST_FIRST(&gp->consumer);
sc = gp->softc;
switch (bp->bio_cmd) {
case BIO_READ:
bp2 = g_clone_bio(bp);
if (bp2 == NULL) {
g_io_deliver(bp, ENOMEM);
return;
}
bp2->bio_done = g_aes_read_done;
bp2->bio_offset += sc->sectorsize;
g_io_request(bp2, cp);
break;
case BIO_WRITE:
bp2 = g_clone_bio(bp);
if (bp2 == NULL) {
g_io_deliver(bp, ENOMEM);
return;
}
bp2->bio_done = g_aes_write_done;
bp2->bio_offset += sc->sectorsize;
bp2->bio_data = g_malloc(bp->bio_length, M_WAITOK);
b = bp->bio_data;
e = bp->bio_data;
e += bp->bio_length;
p2 = bp2->bio_data;
o = bp->bio_offset;
for (p1 = b; p1 < e; p1 += sc->sectorsize) {
g_aes_makekey(sc, o, &ekey, DIR_ENCRYPT);
rijndael_blockEncrypt(&sc->ci, &ekey,
p1, sc->sectorsize * 8, p2);
p2 += sc->sectorsize;
o += sc->sectorsize;
}
bzero(&ekey, sizeof ekey); /* destroy evidence */
g_io_request(bp2, cp);
break;
case BIO_GETATTR:
bp2 = g_clone_bio(bp);
if (bp2 == NULL) {
g_io_deliver(bp, ENOMEM);
return;
}
bp2->bio_done = g_std_done;
bp2->bio_offset += sc->sectorsize;
g_io_request(bp2, cp);
break;
default:
g_io_deliver(bp, EOPNOTSUPP);
return;
}
return;
}
static void
g_aes_orphan(struct g_consumer *cp)
{
struct g_geom *gp;
struct g_provider *pp;
struct g_aes_softc *sc;
int error;
g_trace(G_T_TOPOLOGY, "g_aes_orphan(%p/%s)", cp, cp->provider->name);
g_topology_assert();
KASSERT(cp->provider->error != 0,
("g_aes_orphan with error == 0"));
gp = cp->geom;
sc = gp->softc;
gp->flags |= G_GEOM_WITHER;
error = cp->provider->error;
LIST_FOREACH(pp, &gp->provider, provider)
g_orphan_provider(pp, error);
bzero(sc, sizeof(struct g_aes_softc)); /* destroy evidence */
return;
}
static int
g_aes_access(struct g_provider *pp, int dr, int dw, int de)
{
struct g_geom *gp;
struct g_consumer *cp;
gp = pp->geom;
cp = LIST_FIRST(&gp->consumer);
/* On first open, grab an extra "exclusive" bit */
if (cp->acr == 0 && cp->acw == 0 && cp->ace == 0)
de++;
/* ... and let go of it on last close */
if ((cp->acr + dr) == 0 && (cp->acw + dw) == 0 && (cp->ace + de) == 1)
de--;
return (g_access_rel(cp, dr, dw, de));
}
static struct g_geom *
g_aes_taste(struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *pp, int flags __unused)
{
struct g_geom *gp;
struct g_consumer *cp;
struct g_aes_softc *sc;
int error;
u_int sectorsize;
off_t mediasize;
u_char *buf;
g_trace(G_T_TOPOLOGY, "aes_taste(%s,%s)", mp->name, pp->name);
g_topology_assert();
gp = g_new_geomf(mp, "%s.aes", pp->name);
gp->start = g_aes_start;
gp->orphan = g_aes_orphan;
gp->spoiled = g_std_spoiled;
cp = g_new_consumer(gp);
g_attach(cp, pp);
error = g_access_rel(cp, 1, 0, 0);
if (error) {
g_detach(cp);
g_destroy_consumer(cp);
g_destroy_geom(gp);
return (NULL);
}
buf = NULL;
g_topology_unlock();
while (1) {
if (gp->rank != 2)
break;
sectorsize = cp->provider->sectorsize;
mediasize = cp->provider->mediasize;
buf = g_read_data(cp, 0, sectorsize, &error);
if (buf == NULL || error != 0) {
break;
}
sc = g_malloc(sizeof(struct g_aes_softc), M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
if (!memcmp(buf, aes_magic, strlen(aes_magic))) {
sc->keying = KEY_ZERO;
} else if (!memcmp(buf, aes_magic_random,
strlen(aes_magic_random))) {
sc->keying = KEY_RANDOM;
} else if (!memcmp(buf, aes_magic_test,
strlen(aes_magic_test))) {
sc->keying = KEY_TEST;
} else {
g_free(sc);
break;
}
gp->softc = sc;
gp->access = g_aes_access;
sc->sectorsize = sectorsize;
sc->mediasize = mediasize - sectorsize;
rijndael_cipherInit(&sc->ci, MODE_CBC, NULL);
if (sc->keying == KEY_TEST) {
int i;
u_char *p;
p = sc->master_key;
for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof sc->master_key; i ++)
*p++ = i;
}
if (sc->keying == KEY_RANDOM) {
int i;
u_int32_t u;
u_char *p;
p = sc->master_key;
for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof sc->master_key; i += sizeof u) {
u = arc4random();
*p++ = u;
*p++ = u >> 8;
*p++ = u >> 16;
*p++ = u >> 24;
}
}
g_topology_lock();
pp = g_new_providerf(gp, gp->name);
pp->mediasize = mediasize - sectorsize;
pp->sectorsize = sectorsize;
g_error_provider(pp, 0);
g_topology_unlock();
break;
}
g_topology_lock();
if (buf)
g_free(buf);
g_access_rel(cp, -1, 0, 0);
if (gp->softc != NULL)
return (gp);
g_detach(cp);
g_destroy_consumer(cp);
g_destroy_geom(gp);
return (NULL);
}
static struct g_class g_aes_class = {
.name = AES_CLASS_NAME,
.taste = g_aes_taste,
G_CLASS_INITIALIZER
};
DECLARE_GEOM_CLASS(g_aes_class, g_aes);